"And you created a second France…"
Marshal Kulik, 1941
… If the composition of German forces is well known, the numbers and armament of Soviet forces are pieced together fragment by fragment and often remain approximate estimates. There are both subjective reasons (the Soviet political leadership's desire to conceal the truth about the war) and objective reasons for this: Soviet troops were caught in the deployment phase, continued arriving at the front, and the later they entered combat, the closer they were to full establishment strength. The manpower and armament of many formations that entered battle on 22 June and afterwards remain unknown to this day.
The forces on the Soviet side should also include NKVD troops and other militarized organizations, which actively participated in combat operations.
Furthermore, comparing the strength of Army Group Centre with Soviet Western Front forces is entirely insufficient to understand the events. Firstly, in any war, not only the composition and armament of forces matter, but also their distribution along the front and in depth. To win, one must be stronger "here and now," not just in general. German forces were fully mobilized and ready for the offensive, while Soviet troops were caught by surprise.
Secondly, the boundary lines between German Army Groups North and Centre and between Soviet Northwestern and Western Military Districts did not coincide. One of the main German strike groupings in the Western direction (3rd Panzer Group supported by 8th Air Corps) initially participated in defeating the left wing of the Northwestern Front. The Northwestern Front faced not just one panzer group (4th Panzer Group under Hoepner) but two (including Hermann Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group with two motorized and two army corps - a total of four panzer, three motorized, and four infantry divisions).
* * *
"At the border" |
"50-100 km away" |
"3d Echelon" |
TOTAL |
|
Rifle Div |
56, 27, 85, 2, 8, 13, |
17, 37, 50, 24, 155, |
64, 100, 108, 161 |
24 |
Tank Div |
29, 33 (11 MC), |
4, 7 (6 MC) |
27, 36 (17 MC), |
12 |
MotDiv | 208 | 29, 204, 205, 209 | 210 | 6 |
CavDiv | 6 | 36 |
| 2 |
TOTAL |
12 rd, 6 td, 1 md, 1 cd |
8 rd, 2 td, 4 md, 1 cd |
4 rd, 4 td, 1 md |
44 |
In addition to the above-mentioned forces, the 22nd Army was being transferred to the WSMD, to the Polotsk and Nevel area (formed from troops of the Ural Military District; by the start of the war, three rifle divisions had arrived: the 98th, 112th, and 186th). To the Gomel area, the 63rd Rifle Corps of the 21st Army was being transferred (formed from the Volga Military District troops, concentrating near Chernigov and Gomel; several rifle divisions arrived at their concentration areas shortly before the war).
Less well known is the transfer in May 1941 of three additional rifle divisions to WSMD: the 224th and 231st from the Moscow Military District and the 201st from the Siberian Military District. These divisions were used to form three anti-tank artillery brigades and two airborne brigades (the 7th and 8th) of the 4th Airborne Corps. Although creating fully combat-ready units from recently formed rifle divisions in such a short time was unrealistic, their presence in the WSMD (Western Front) cannot be completely ignored.
The war caught the Red Army on the move. Preparations for war were clearly underway. Army General K. N. Galitsky (in 1941 a Major General, commander of the 24th Rifle Division) wrote in his memoirs:
"…On June 12 I was summoned to the district HQ. In the waiting room, I saw Major General V. B. Borisov, commander of the 21st Rifle Corps, and Major General V. P. Evdokimov, commander of the 50th Rifle Division, leaving the commander's office. Their faces were concerned. There was no time to talk - I was immediately called in.
In the office were Army General D. G. Pavlov and District Chief of Staff Major General V. E. Klimovskikh.
After greeting me, Pavlov said:
'From June 13-14, month-long training assemblies will begin to retrain infantrymen as specialists of other branches. Call up Red Army reservists and junior commanders. Train them as mortar men, machine gunners, artillerymen, and tank crews to quickly master the new automatic weapons, 82-mm mortars, new artillery, and anti-tank weapons you have received…'
Pavlov continued:
'In the second half of June there will probably be large-scale exercises of the district troops, during which the 24th Rifle Division will be moved by trucks of two motor transport brigades to the Grodno area. You must begin preparations: train personnel to load and unload equipment, and teach commanders to control their units on the march with flags and radios. Select two or three routes and reconnoiter them with your unit commanders.'
He showed me the main route on the map: Molodechno-Vishnev-Lida-Skidel-Grodno.
'Keep in mind,' he added, 'that according to the exercise plan, in the 20s of June, the 50th Rifle Division will move into the Vileyka-Smorgon-Krevo area. Transfer your barracks to them and prepare camp sites in the forests there. All their supplies will come from your depots. Coordinate details with the district Chief of Staff. And finally:
'There will be no written orders from me. Do everything according to my personal instructions. Report them to Army Commander Kuznetsov. Clarify unclear issues with the district Chief of Staff…'" (K. N. Galitsky, Years of Severe Trials. 1941-44. Moscow: Nauka, 1973)
The level of secrecy is also evident in the Western Front war diary:
"Troops were moving to the border according to General Staff directives. No written orders were given to corps or divisions. Division commanders received oral instructions from District Chief of Staff Major General Klimovskikh. Personnel were told they were going to large exercises. Troops took all training equipment (instruments, targets, etc.)… "
Marshal G. K. Zhukov, recalling the defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol, wrote about secrecy there:
"To prevent the enemy from learning about the offensive, the operation plan was developed personally by the group commander, Military Council member, political department head, Chief of Staff, and operations chief. Branch commanders and the logistics chief worked only on specific tasks approved by the commander. Only one typist was allowed to type the plan and orders.
"As D-Day approached, different categories of commanders were briefed step by step, starting four days before, down to 24 hours before the operation. Soldiers and sergeants received their combat missions three hours before the attack…"
In 1941, the master of camouflage Zhukov was Chief of the RKKA General Staff. Since the war began clearly not as the Soviet leadership had planned, only fragmentary data remains to assess these preparations.
…On 18 June 1941, Military Councils of border districts were ordered to establish front HQs and deploy them to main field command posts by 22-23 June. The Western Front FCP was at Obuz-Lesna, 25 km southwest of Baranovichi (by the war's start, it included Deputy Front Commander Lt. Gen. V. N. Kurdyumov, Operations Chief Maj. Gen. I. I. Semenov, and Signals Chief Maj. Gen. A. T. Grigoriev).
The 10th Army's 1st Rifle Corps HQ moved to its field CP at Wizna (06:00, 21 June); the 5th Corps HQ moved from Bielsk to Zambrow (both towns on the western USSR border).
The Bialystok salient, where Soviet troops were positioned, had the shape of a bottle with its neck facing east, relying on the single Bialystok-Slonim road. Moreover, all formation headquarters of the 10th Army were located west of Bialystok by the start of the war:
• 1st Rifle Corps - Wizna
• 5th Rifle Corps - Zambrow
• 6th Mechanized Corps - Bialystok
• 13th Mechanized Corps - Bielsk
• 6th Cavalry Corps - Lomza.
A telling detail: artillery regiments of divisions and corps were withdrawn for training to field camps, so many divisions met 22 June without their artillery. For example, the 152nd Corps Artillery Regiment (4th Rifle Corps) was ordered overnight to Sopotskin on the border. On the morning of 22 June, its command platoons were fighting with infantry, while batteries deployed only 7-8 km from the border posts. In late May, the 444th Corps Artillery Regiment (4th Rifle Corps), equipped with 152-mm guns towed by Stalinets-65 tractors, was sent to Sopotskin but entered the war without shells or personal weapons.
At the Chervony Bor corps artillery range (southeast of Lomza), 10th Army Artillery Chief Maj. Gen. M. M. Barsukov gathered three RHK artillery regiments (124th, 375th howitzer, 311th gun), four corps regiments (130th, 262nd of 1st Corps; 156th heavy and 315th of 5th Corps), both artillery regiments of 86th Division (248th light, 383rd howitzer), 117th howitzer regiment of 8th Division, and 7th howitzer regiment of 7th Tank Division.
A contrasting example: future Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, then commander of the 18th Infantry Division (1939), later Army Group South Chief of Staff, recalled that two weeks before the invasion of Poland he knew nothing of the planned aggression. While everyone was aware of tensions, Army Group South commander Rundstedt received his order and clarity on the "Polish question" only on 24 August 1939: attack on 26 August at 04:30 (later postponed to 1 September).
All participants in summer 1941 events in Belarus recalled sensing the inevitability of war with Germany. The entire border atmosphere was tense with storm. Yet from high command came reassurances: "All is well," "Ignore it," "Germany is honoring the pact."
One might argue that the USSR was merely deploying forces like any other state preparing for war (defensive or offensive) - as Poland did in 1939, or Finland the same year, when it mobilized its covering forces in peacetime and met the Soviet invasion with honor.
But a closer look reveals an entirely different picture.
One way or another, the Red Army was preparing for a very different war from the one that actually came…
The battles with the encircled forces of the Soviet Western Front ended. In the Bialystok-Minsk battle, the following were destroyed:
3rd Army - 4th Rifle Corps: 27th and 56th Rifle Divisions. Corps commander Major General E. A. Egorov was captured (released after the war, arrested, and executed in 1950 for "loss of command control, failure to resist the enemy, and pro-fascist agitation among prisoners of war"); 27th Division commander Major General A. M. Stepanov was killed while breaking out; 56th Division commander Major General S. P. Sakhnov escaped encirclement.
85th Rifle Division: Commander Major General A. V. Bondovsky was severely wounded and evacuated; remnants were led out by deputy commander Colonel K. F. Skorobogatkin.
11th Mechanized Corps: 29th and 33rd Tank Divisions, 204th Motorized Division. Deputy Corps Commander Major General P. G. Makarov and Corps Artillery Chief Major General N. M. Starostin were captured and died in POW camps (Makarov in late 1943 from illness and starvation, Starostin executed in November 1941 for "pro-Soviet agitation"); Corps Chief of Staff Colonel S. A. Mukhin went missing; 29th Division commander Colonel N. P. Studnev was killed during retreat. Corps commander Major General D. K. Mostovenko, 33rd Division commander Colonel M. F. Panov, and 204th Division commander Colonel A. M. Pirov escaped encirclement.
3rd Army Chief of Staff Major General A. K. Kondratyev was wounded and evacuated; Army Commander Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov escaped encirclement with HQ elements north of Rogachev on 28 July.
10th Army lost all its units. Its HQ, withdrawn from Bialystok salient, was destroyed attempting to cross the Minsk-Baranovichi highway. An advance detachment with Marshal G. I. Kulik, Army Chief of Staff Major General P. I. Lyapin, and 1st Rifle Corps Commander Major General F. D. Rubtsov broke east; the rest of HQ was scattered or destroyed. Army Commander Major General K. D. Golubev and Artillery Chief Major General M. M. Barsukov later escaped; Armor Chief Colonel G. I. Antonov was captured (joined Vlasov, avoided repatriation post-war, died in Munich 1963).
1st Rifle Corps: 2nd and 8th Rifle Divisions. Corps Commander Major General Rubtsov escaped; 8th Division commander Colonel N. I. Fomin went missing; Colonel K. P. Dyukov, acting commander of 2nd Division, led ~200 men out.
5th Rifle Corps: 13th and 86th Rifle Divisions. Corps Commander Major General A. V. Garnov went missing (D. Egorov states he emerged but shot himself after speaking with L. Z. Mekhlis at Western Front HQ); 13th Division commander Major General A. Z. Naumov was captured (freed by US forces, handed to USSR, executed 1950 for "voluntary surrender and collaboration"); 86th Division commander Colonel M. A. Zashibalov was severely wounded and evacuated, deputy commander Colonel A. G. Molev was captured. Deputy Corps Commander Major General F. I. Budanov and Corps Artillery Chief Major General G. P. Kozlov went missing.
113th Rifle Division: Commander Major General Kh. N. Alaverdov was severely wounded on 22 June, captured on 1 July, and died in captivity in 1942.
6th Mechanized Corps: 4th and 7th Tank Divisions, 29th Motorized Division. Corps Commander Major General M. G. Khatskilevich and Corps Artillery Chief Major General A. S. Mitrofanov were killed during retreat; Corps Chief of Staff Colonel E. S. Koval went missing (also missing were Commissar S. A. Eitingon, Intelligence Chief Major Ya. E. Beilis, Deputy Commander Colonel D. G. Kononovich). 4th Tank Division commander Major General A. G. Potaturchev and 29th Motorized Division commander Major General I. P. Bikzhanov were captured (Potaturchev released post-war, died 1947 in NKVD prison; Bikzhanov returned to service after NKVD vetting); 7th Tank Division commander Major General S. V. Borzilov escaped encirclement.
13th Mechanized Corps: 25th and 31st Tank Divisions, 208th Motorized Division. Corps Commander Major General P. N. Akhlyustin was killed escaping encirclement; Deputy Commander Major General V. I. Ivanov and 25th Division commander Colonel N. M. Nikiforov went missing (Ivanov reportedly killed by German saboteurs in RKKA uniform). 208th Division commander Colonel V. I. Nichiporovich formed a partisan detachment; 31st Division commander Colonel A. S. Kalikhovich was wounded but escaped.
6th Cavalry Corps: 6th and 36th Cavalry Divisions. Corps Commander Major General I. S. Nikitin and 36th Division commander Major General E. S. Zybyn were captured (Nikitin died in captivity 1942, Zybyn released by US in 1945, handed to USSR, executed 1946 for "loss of control and anti-Soviet agitation in captivity"). 6th Division commander Major General M. P. Konstantinov was wounded on 29 June at Ros River, sheltered by peasants, then joined partisans. Corps Chief of Staff Colonel I. E. Pankov was killed 6 July during retreat.
From 4th Army, the 49th Rifle Division was completely destroyed; Commander Colonel K. F. Vasilyev was captured near Baranovichi (escaped, later imprisoned and died 1944 in soviet concentration camp).
All units in Brest Fortress (most of 6th and 42nd Rifle Divisions, 33rd Engineer Regiment) were destroyed. Composite units of 28th Rifle Corps defended the Western Front's southern flank.
Remnants of 14th Mechanized Corps were withdrawn for reformation (General Staff report to A. M. Vasilevsky, 30 June: 467 officers, 1500 enlisted, 150 T-26 tank crews). Its two tank divisions (22nd, 30th) were disbanded 19 September 1941, as was 205th Motorized Division (commander Colonel F. F. Kudyurov escaped).
Remnants of 121st, 143rd, and 155th Rifle Divisions escaped encirclement.
13th Army's 21st Rifle Corps was destroyed: 37th, 17th, and 24th Rifle Divisions. Corps Commander Major General V. B. Borisov was killed; HQ escaped under Chief of Staff Major General D. E. Zakutny, later used in 21st Army. Division commanders Major Generals T. K. Batsanov (24th) and K. N. Galitsky (17th), and 37th Division commander Colonel A. E. Chekharin escaped with remnants.
Remnants of 44th Rifle Corps (64th and 108th Divisions) escaped without their commanders; Corps HQ remained outside encirclement. 64th Division commander Colonel S. I. Iovlev and 108th Division commander Major General A. I. Mavrichev escaped only on 26 September near Bely. Meanwhile, both divisions were reformed in the Western Front; 108th was commanded from 13 July by General Major N. I. Orlov, and 64th from 24 July by Colonel A. S. Gryaznov.
8th AT Artillery Brigade lost all equipment and was disbanded 1 July; commander Colonel I. S. Strelbitsky escaped.
From Front HQ units: 17th Mechanized Corps remnants became 27th Tank Division, then on 1 August became 147th Tank Brigade. Corps Commander Major General M. P. Petrov later commanded 50th Army and was killed in October 1941 in Bryansk Front's defeat. Some Corps elements became a motorized regiment and fought in the Smolensk battle.
Commander of 36th Tank Division Colonel M. Z. Miroshnikov's fate is unknown; 209th Motorized Division commander Colonel A. I. Muravyov went missing (memoirs state he was severely wounded 25-26 June and evacuated towards Stolbtsy; no further data).
4th Air Defense Brigade and 9th Railway Brigade near Bialystok were likely destroyed.
7th Air Defense Brigade withdrew to Smolensk and participated in its defense.
17th Railway Brigade, on the Baranovichi-Minsk line, apparently avoided destruction.
Brest saw capture of Military Hospital staff and patients. Information on other Western Front units remains limited.
Regarding Marshal G. I. Kulik's escape, few details exist. He reportedly moved east through Aleksandrovka village (Uzda District) with three others (two doctors, one officer), wounded en route, stayed a week in the village, then continued east, his group growing to 200. Special search groups sought him. On 19 July, Kulik emerged in 21st Army's sector.
General Lieutenant D. M. Karbyshev left encirclement via Nizok village with an adjutant colonel. They met 10th Army HQ remnants led by General Major K. D. Golubev but chose separate routes. In early August, Karbyshev reached the Dnieper north of Mogilev but was concussed and captured on 8 August, later tortured to death in a Nazi camp.
While escaping encirclement, Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin on 2 July encountered a group of "encircled troops" led by Colonel I. S. Strelbitsky. Here, Boldin attempted to organize what he himself later called a "forest division":
"I gathered all officers and political workers. Briefly explained the situation… I devoted the entire day of 4 July to organizational matters. From those who had gathered in the forest, I formed a composite division. It consisted of five detachments, and there was even some artillery. I assigned the most experienced commanders to my staff or as detachment commanders. A prosecutor's office and tribunal were established…"
However, after multiple unsuccessful attempts to break out of encirclement as a large formation, he issued an order to continue moving eastward in small groups, and if that became impossible, to switch to partisan warfare.
Later events are contradictory and differ significantly from Boldin's own memoirs. The official version is presented in Stavka Order No. 270:
"Boldin's group," numbering 1,654 men, broke out of encirclement on 11 August 1941, east of Smolensk in the sector of the 19th Army under I. S. Konev. By that time, the group had been joined by soldiers and officers from the Smolensk "pocket" as well as by cut-off and encircled units of the Third Strategic Echelon forces that had participated in the Smolensk offensive.
Those escaping faced varied fates. Junior commander L. Z. Baklan (311th RHK Artillery Regiment) recalled:
"Retreating we avoided capture. Yet commanders who escaped captivity were court-martialed and executed. Our Chief of Staff Kashin and two young lieutenants were shot before the regiment as an example…"
ARMY COMMISSAR 1ST RANK L. Z. MEHLIS
7 July 1941
To Military Councils of 22nd, 20th, 21st, 4th, and 13th Armies:
Most characteristic death sentences for Red Army soldiers and junior commanders are allowed to be published in army/divisional newspapers. Only one per issue. Most malicious deserters and panicmongers convicted by tribunal MAY, depending on circumstances, be executed before formation. Preparations must be thorough; representatives of Political Directorate of the Red Army, Prosecutor's Office, Tribunal, and Special Department must be present. This directive is to be shared with Prosecutor, Tribunal, and 3rd Department [NKVD].
L. MEHLIS
(CAMO USSR. F. 208. Op. 2524. D. 3. L. 52)
German 9th Corps Commander General H. Geyer's campaign summary (10 July) stated:
"Our first major achievement was the Bialystok pocket; the second, the Minsk pocket.
'Pocket' is inaccurate. Unlike Poland, France, or the Balkans, these were not isolated areas where organized enemy forces fought then surrendered. Only on day one did we face cohesive armies. Surprise and our rapid tempo quickly separated and immobilized enemy units. We captured numerous orders to armies, corps, divisions - but they remained only on paper. In the first seventeen days, we encountered scattered units attempting to reconnect or fighting only upon contact, or to cover retreats…"
11 July German High Command report: Army Group Centre took 328,898 prisoners, including several senior generals, captured 3332 tanks, 1809 guns, and other equipment. (German historian V. Haupt cites 287,704 POWs, 2585 tanks, 246 aircraft, 1449 guns, based on von Bock's 8 July order.)
Official Russian data (22 June - 9 July): Western Front losses - 341,021 irrecoverable, 76,717 wounded, total 417,729 (Krievosheev et al., 1993).
As a result, 11 rifle, 9 tank, 5 motorized, and 2 cavalry divisions were disbanded. The entire 10th Army HQ and all 5 corps HQs, as well as both corps HQs of 3rd Army, were destroyed.
Captured: 1 lieutenant general, 9 major generals; killed: 9 major generals; missing: 4 major generals; 8 generals repressed (6 executed).
* * * * *
Why did the powerful Western Front cease to exist within just a few days? Why did what was an ordinary defeat in the Border Battle take on the character of a catastrophe?
Both Joseph Stalin himself and, following him, Soviet military historians (up to the 1990s) gave the following answer: a sudden attack and the numerical and technical superiority of the Wehrmacht.
However, modern researchers agree that the Western Front had sufficient forces and resources to avoid such a rout. As it has now been established, the Germans did not have technical superiority either. Soviet "hardware" was in no way inferior to the German, and in many respects even surpassed it.
The sudden blow also did not apply to all sections of the front. While the first echelons of the 4th and 3rd Armies were mostly crushed on the very first day, June 22, the strike groupings in the Bialystok salient avoided the initial devastating strike.
Yet the existing defense plans did not help to repel the German invasion. The Western Front suffered a crushing defeat and virtually ceased to exist.
Viktor Suvorov proposed another version of the catastrophe, which still stirs minds today: the defeat was caused by an offensive configuration of the troops and not merely unpreparedness for defense, but a deliberate neglect of the principles of defense. According to him, Stalin himself was preparing aggression in Europe, and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was not meant to passively stand on the border covering mobilization, but to launch hostilities before Germany attacked. He noted a paradox:
1. The air smelled of thunder, everyone was expecting war, but the German attack was a complete surprise;
2. The RKKA General Staff worked day and night in the run-up to war, yet the first hours and days revealed there were no viable defense plans, and all Soviet actions were mere improvisation.
Alexey Isaev insists that Germany "simply preempted the USSR in the deployment of its wartime army."
Ultimately, the Wehrmacht's strategic and operational-tactical superiority allowed Germany to win the French campaign without France or England preparing a "preemptive strike." In 1940, as in 1870-71, the Germans benefited from excellent General Staff work, years of officer and junior command training, combat experience gained in the early campaigns of WWII, and mastery of innovations that defined mid-20th century warfare-skillful use of tank divisions and massed aviation.
The German strike through the Baltics into the rear of Western Front troops was no less original in conception and execution than their breakthrough through the Ardennes; isolating the main Allied strike group in Belgium in 1940 was repeated almost identically at Bialystok in 1941.
Preemption in deployment resulted in the Wehrmacht seizing the strategic initiative and imposing its will on the enemy-an enormous advantage in modern war.
Wars of recent centuries were highly "technological"; as Isaev correctly notes, it is not troops per se that fight, but structures. The primary characteristic of a "structure" is informational. The meticulous elaboration of details in Plan Barbarossa (leaving aside its strategic dimension) allowed the Wehrmacht to wage war "like reading sheet music." The Germans accounted for every detail, excelling in each element: in the air, artillery duels, tank clashes, anti-tank defense, communications, pontoon bridging and river crossings, logistics, railway operations, etc.
Meanwhile, discussing Western Front headquarters actions during the first week of the war is hardly meaningful: there reigned informational chaos, with no reliable data on enemy actions or the condition and combat readiness of own troops.
The severest consequence was the disruption of communications between the front HQ and formations and units. The front, as a systemic whole, disintegrated long before its forces were physically crushed. Orders were often issued to formations already incapable of combat, while combat-capable units were sent to secondary sectors. Operational-tactical reconnaissance, especially aerial, was absent; panic and rumor further disorganized command and intensified chaos. - Almost everything happened as it had in France in 1940.
Yet one cannot dismiss the facts of the USSR's unpreparedness for defensive war, noted by almost all memoirists who were not privy to top state secrets in 1941. They lamented:
- the lack of mines and barriers (and "defensive armaments" in general, especially armor-piercing shells, without which Soviet forces could hardly expect success against German tanks); - the disassembly of the fortified line along the old Soviet-Polish border; - the preservation of bridges over the Bug River after the 1939 border demarcation with Germany; - the configuration of Soviet forces, enabling the Germans to strike directly into the rear of the powerful 3rd and 10th Armies-from the Suwalki salient towards Lunna and Mosty, and from the south towards Bielsk and Volkovysk.
With remarkable naivety, former Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov recalled:
"On the eve of the war, the 10th Army and several other units of the Western District were deployed in the Bialystok salient, which jutted out towards the enemy. The 10th Army occupied the most disadvantageous position. Such an operational configuration of its troops created a threat of deep envelopment and encirclement from Grodno and Brest by flanking attacks. Meanwhile, the deployment of front forces on the Grodno-Suwalki and Brest axes was insufficiently deep and powerful to prevent breakthroughs and the envelopment of the Bialystok grouping.
This erroneous troop deployment, made in 1940, was not corrected right up to the outbreak of war…"
1. Obus-Lesna – Field Headquarters of the Western Front.
2. Defense of the Brest Fortress (June 22–30 1941).
After the war with Finland exposed numerous deficiencies in the RKKA, and with Marshal S. K. Timoshenko's appointment as People's Commissar of Defense in 1940, troops began to be trained "only in what is needed in war." Yet the Red Army was not taught to defend. The clearest testimony comes from L. M. Sandalov:
"In March-April 1941, the 4th Army staff participated in an operational map game in Minsk. A front-level offensive operation from Western Belarus towards Bialystok and Warsaw was studied.
At the end of May, an army field trip concluded with a map game. An offensive operation from the Pruzhany, Antopol, Bereza-Kartuska area towards Brest and Biala Podlaska was played out, with the 28th Rifle Corps advancing in coordination with the Pinsk Naval Flotilla.
Finally, on the eve of war, June 21, 1941, the army HQ concluded a two-stage command-staff exercise of the 28th Rifle Corps on "An offensive by a rifle corps overcoming a river obstacle." For the last week of June, the district HQ prepared another game with the 4th Army HQ-again on an offensive operation…"
Sandalov further reflected:
"Conducted activities, especially the formation of mechanized corps and artillery regiments of Reserve of High Command (RHC), were subordinated solely to the interests of offensive, without considering that they might also have to defend. Field and anti-tank artillery and tanks had a negligible number of armor-piercing shells, while infantry units had no anti-tank or anti-personnel mines or obstacles."
Worse still, the Red Army was not only untrained in defense-it had no intention to defend! (That is, this "deliberate neglect of defense" extended beyond tactical issues). Above all, this is evidenced by the abnormally high troop density in the Brest Fortress-precisely where Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group struck. How could anyone insist on concentrating two rifle divisions in the fortress and another tank division within direct enemy reach unless they knew (believed) that no attack was imminent?
A new thesis is now advanced to explain Western Special Military District (WSMD) troop deployment by the availability of barracks infrastructure. Indeed, Western Belarus, only annexed to the USSR in September 1939, did not fully suit a western-facing defensive front. The RKKA had to use barracks left by the Polish army.
But why should "barracks infrastructure" play a decisive role (not just an important one, but decisive)? Especially in summer, when troops could be deployed wherever needed?
Nothing prevented the deployment of RHK anti-tank artillery brigades, for example, near Baranovichi (rather than Ruzhanystok near Dombrova) - right by a major artillery range and on the possible German axis towards Minsk.
Why not move artillery to summer camps near Baranovichi, rather than Ruzhanystok and Chervony Bor? Why station the only combat-ready 6th Mechanized Corps with its thousand tanks in the Bialystok salient, when the direct road to Moscow lay through Brest?
Furthermore, the "barracks" argument must fit within the broader system of Soviet war preparations-something it does not.
L. M. Sandalov also recalled:
"The district considered the possibility of a German breakthrough through the shallow defensive lines of the covering armies along unfinished fortified regions with low troop density. The district covering plan envisaged that if major German motorized forces broke through the army defenses, they would be destroyed by district-level anti-tank artillery brigades and mechanized corps. However, on the Baranovichi axis there were no district-level anti-tank brigades. Therefore, the district HQ ordered the 4th Army that, in case of a breakthrough, the 47th Rifle Corps would be moved to delay the enemy along Pruzhany-Gorodets, while the 14th Mechanized Corps would concentrate in the anti-tank area Kamieniec-Shcherchevo-Dzyadovka and strike the enemy flank and rear generally towards Zhabinka…
The flaw in this decision was that the mechanized corps, being part of the covering forces and with no other second-echelon troops, would inevitably be drawn into battle before it could concentrate in the anti-tank area. Its divisions and units would have to be withdrawn from combat, which, given the corps' state and capabilities, was nearly impossible. Moreover, the designated "anti-tank area" was far from the main operational routes, and no one was assigned to establish an "intercepting position" there.
…Another major flaw of the district and army covering plans was the absence of any provision for creating rear front and army defensive lines."
Meanwhile, the Bialystok salient could not be defended "just like that," perimeter-style (just as Poland in 1939). Knowing now the events of summer 1941, one can say that the salient should have been defended from Vilnius and the Slonim-Baranovichi area. But no specific defense of either Vilnius or Slonim-Baranovichi was planned. No staff games were held to rehearse repelling German aggression on the Western Front (or other fronts).
Indeed, on the Western Front there was no deep reflection on defense against enemy attack. Thus the question of what the Soviet General Staff, which, according to Zhukov, "worked sleepless nights" throughout the pre-war period, was actually doing hangs in the air.
Isaev writes that an offensive doctrine was characteristic of all armies of the 1930s-40s. But the main peculiarity of the RKKA was that it did not even consider the possibility of a defensive war during the period under review.
After the December 1940 Moscow conference of senior commanders, two operational-strategic war games were conducted, now known as "rehearsals for disaster." In both, the "Eastern" side's actions were only discussed from the moment after repelling aggression and going on the counteroffensive.
"Their main flaw was that the initial operations of the war were completely excluded, despite the games stipulating that the 'Westerners' attacked first. In the first game, the 'Westerners' invaded on July 15, reaching Osovets-Skidel-Lida-Kaunas-Siauliai (70-120 km east of the border) by July 23-25, but by August 1 they were thrown back to the border. From there, further 'Eastern' offensive operations to encircle and destroy the 'Westerners' in East Prussia were rehearsed.
In the second game, after invading to a depth of 50-70 km, the 'Westerners' were driven back 90-180 km west of the border. How the 'Easterners' managed not only to repel them to the border but even carry the war into their territory was left unexamined. Thus, neither at the conference nor in the games was there any attempt to analyze the situation that could arise in the initial operations if Germany attacked. Therefore, assertions that these games practiced 'issues related to troop actions in the initial period of war' are groundless-these issues were not even listed among their learning objectives…" (P. N. Bobylev, Military History Journal, No. 7-8, 1993).
* * * * *
On the eve of war, the armies of the Western Special Military District outwardly demonstrated "peacefulness": defensive works were being conducted openly along the very border in view of the potential enemy; cover divisions were in a "dismantled state": artillery was assembled separately from divisions, air defense units were on district training grounds in Krupki east of Minsk, in some places signal troops were assembled separately for training, sappers were building fortifications on the border itself, officers were on leave…
There was a "directive" from Stalin: "There will be no war." On June 14, the TASS Statement was published: "There will be no war between the USSR and Germany."
German aircraft were allowed to fly freely over the border zone, as if to confirm that the USSR was not preparing for war. Any German agents in the border area would have confirmed the same: the USSR was not preparing for war.
Again, three divisions of the 4th Army (almost half of it) were in Brest, right near the border, within enemy artillery fire range. Guard changes took place under direct enemy observation.
And at the same time, in strict secrecy, armies of the Second Strategic Echelon were being transferred from the country's interior to the western border. In the same strict secrecy, the second echelon of WSMD began to move towards the border.
Thus, the Red Army was indeed actively preparing for war, but not for defensive war!
It is telling that fuel and ammunition depots were located very close to the border: the 3rd Army lost its military depots in Grodno on the first day of battle, the 4th Army lost its depots in Kobrin and Pruzhany on the second day. Depots in Pinsk were blown up in panic. Air raids destroyed depots near Bialystok, where the main strike forces of the front were concentrated. Only after the Germans captured the large supply bases in Baranovichi and Molodechno did it become clear that fuel supplies for the Western Front were… in Maikop.
Some of the excellent Soviet artillery located on the border was destroyed in the first hours of war, playing no role in the Border Battle; another part was concentrated in the Bialystok salient and perished during the retreat, sometimes without firing a single shot.
Soviet aviation, based on airfields near the border, also quickly lost combat capability.
Thus, German tank groups, operating under "clear skies," broke deep into the rear of the Western Front, where there was no anti-tank artillery (it existed "in principle," but not where needed), no artillery at all (most of it was in the Bialystok salient), no rear army or front defensive lines, no combat-ready fortified regions…
How could there not be a rout if Soviet troops were left without artillery and aviation, without air defense, Soviet tanks and tractors without fuel and ammunition, abandoned along retreat routes?!
Moreover, two other crucial military specialities must not be forgotten: signal troops and engineers.
The already unsatisfactory state of communications in the Red Army (which Chief of WSMD Communications Major General A. T. Grigoriev reported shortly before the war to Chief of RKKA Communications Major General N. I. Gapich, and which was worsened by logistical shortcomings later recalled by wartime USSR People's Commissar of Communications I. T. Peresypkin) deteriorated further when the Western Front communications chief and its signals regiment were moved to the field command post in Obuz-Lesna on the eve of war (this topic still awaits thorough research). The field CP was not set up in time by the start of war, and soon the front communications chief and regiment returned to Minsk, but by June 26, with German tank groups breaking through to Minsk, they relocated to Mogilev, after which communications between front HQ and its forces collapsed completely.
As for the state of the engineering troops, the June 30 report of Western Front Chief of Engineers Major General P. M. Vasiliev stated:
"1. In the battles on the state border, all sapper battalions of rifle divisions, rifle corps, and RGK engineer regiments suffered heavy casualties among command, political staff, and soldiers.
2. Losses in all material supplies are large. Heavy machinery destroyed by enemy artillery and aviation on the border.
…
6. The front currently has three sapper battalions (arrived with Colonel Starinov) and two pontoon battalions.
7. Regular supply of engineering materials to troops is not conducted due to lack of transport. No mines. About 35 tons of explosives delivered.
8. Available sapper battalions are insufficient for front tasks. Request allocation of an additional five sapper battalions…"
American historian David Glantz in his book on the war's beginning cites an August 1941 report by Major General M. P. Vorobyev (who replaced Vasiliev as Western Front Chief of Engineers, later Marshal of Engineering Troops) on the destruction of the Front's engineers:
"First. From February-March 1941, all sapper battalions and engineer regiments of WSMD were engaged in special border fortification works. Year after year drawn into defensive construction away from their units, with insufficient time for combat and even political training, engineer units turned into labor teams. Sappers, separated from their formations, did not train in combat engineering support or coordination with other branches.
Second. At the start of hostilities, all engineer units were in the border strip and suffered heavy casualties among command, political staff, and soldiers. Losses in all material supplies are large. Heavy engineering equipment (road machines, compressors, etc.) partly destroyed by enemy artillery and aviation, partly abandoned. As of 24.6.41, the 23rd Engineer Regiment near Sopotskin was disorganized and scattered, the 10th Engineer Regiment's main units were drawn into fighting on the border, its HQ and special units with 1st Rifle Corps at Wizna. According to returning troops, all sapper battalions of rifle divisions and corps working on the border were drawn into battle and suffered heavy casualties, with units mixed with other branches."
To these two engineer regiments (23rd at Sopotskin and 10th at Wizna) must be added the 33rd Engineer Regiment, blockaded and destroyed in Brest Fortress. Thus, by June 22, 1941, the Front lost all three engineer regiments under its command.
A major role in the Soviet defeat was played by the tactic of continuous counterattacks chosen by Soviet military-political leadership. All Soviet counterattacks ended ingloriously. The strike forces were crushed with almost no positive results.
A. Isaev still insists on the feasibility of Soviet "flank counterattacks" against German motorized corps in the war's early days (especially citing counterattacks on the Southwestern Front).
However, the idea of counterattacks, at least on the Southwestern Front, faced serious objections from the front's Chief of Staff and Operations Chief. They cited, above all, lack of information on enemy plans and German air supremacy. But what was obvious to professional soldiers was beyond the comprehension of "commissars" of all levels (up to Stalin). Disjointed and asynchronous actions (due to disrupted communications, poor reconnaissance, broken coordination, and informational chaos) resulted in attacks delivered not with a fist but with splayed fingers. Artillery support was far from always planned, and even where it existed, there was almost no time to prepare it. Moreover, artillery suffered huge losses due to German air supremacy, while anti-air cover was grossly inadequate. Rear disorganization (again from enemy air strikes and chaos) meant that even when success was achieved, it could not be developed.
On the Western Front, the counterattack by the full-strength 6th Mechanized Corps did not hit the flank of an advancing German motorized corps but struck frontally against the 20th Army Corps. Unsurprisingly, the commander of the Soviet 7th Tank Division S. V. Borzilov lamented that his division found no worthy target near Grodno.
In this context there was, at minimum, one more cause of the Soviet defeat in 1941 and the failure of counterattacks. Recall Liddell Hart's evaluation of the Schlieffen Plan and its adaptations (whose outlines are seen in all German campaigns of the 20th century): any "natural" enemy action only brought victory closer for Germany.
In 1940 France, the French and British "naturally" rushed into Belgium, were cut off there, and crushed. In June 1941 the main strike forces of the Western Front launched a counterattack near Grodno, were cut off from their rear, and crushed.
In 1914, thanks to the changes made by Schlieffen's successors, errors of German generals, and French innovations (first use of a "motorized" army-French command moved troops to Paris by taxi), France and Britain avoided defeat. In summer 1941, the Germans gave Soviet troops no chance at all.
On June 24, German Army General Staff Chief Franz Halder wrote with surprise in his diary: Soviet operational reserves were not withdrawing but moving forward to the front! Considering that one of Barbarossa's main goals was to destroy the Red Army west of the Dvina-Dnieper line, this only helped the Germans.
The Russian army had already experienced war against a stronger, better-prepared enemy-in 1812 against Napoleon's Grand Army. There was no aviation or tanks then, but had Barclay de Tolly, and later Kutuzov, insisted on "not yielding an inch of their land," Russia would not have celebrated a great Victory; it would have lost its army somewhere near Minsk or Vitebsk. But a strategy of trading territory for time, stretching enemy communications, and avoiding direct confrontation in unfavorable conditions prevented a rout.
In 1941, the "natural" (reflexive, unthinking) reaction of the USSR's military-political leadership (Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov) to the German invasion only played into the aggressor's hands. The Western Front's troops were defeated and destroyed as an organized force in less than two weeks.
* * * * *
The first days of the war also revealed the Wehrmacht's superior operational-tactical preparation. Having gained extensive combat experience in the Polish and French campaigns, the Germans avoided direct frontal engagements, especially tank-versus-tank duels. Their infiltration tactics along routes of least resistance allowed them to bypass prepared defensive lines. Overall, they acted with great clarity based on the situation: attacking when needed, defending when required. In direct clashes, German losses were comparable to the enemy's (for example, in the tank battle in Belgium on 13 May 1940 between the French 3rd Mechanized Division and Hoth's Panzer Corps, the French lost 105 tanks, the Germans 164). Thus, whereas Soviet tankers in 1941 stubbornly sought tank duels (misled by confidence in their equipment and experience against weaker opponents), the Germans had no qualms about avoiding such encounters.
It is noteworthy that German military leadership did not assign primary importance to capturing large settlements. The 7th Panzer Division, having first broken through the Minsk Fortified Region, bypassed Minsk from the north towards Smolevichi to cut off the 13th Army's retreat. Likewise, the 18th Panzer Division of the 47th Motorized Corps bypassed Minsk from the south. Thus, Minsk "fell into German hands like a ripe apple" (A. Isaev cites the 3rd Panzer Group's war diary entry for 25 June: "The capture of Minsk is not the most important task; more important is securing the areas on both sides of the city, especially the highway and railway to the east…").
Combat experience revealed that mastery of defensive tactics perfectly complemented an aggressive strategy. Many memoirs describe battles for small towns where Soviet troops in defense were often easily dislodged, only for arriving reserves to face fierce resistance from entrenched German infantry. "The Germans managed to entrench themselves…" was a common refrain in recollections.
One must also note the excellent coordination between German ground forces and their attack aviation.
What is the point here?
Stalin achieved "outstanding" success in subduing the army. After the purges of the 1930s, he could be sure any order would be followed exactly. The main problem of 1941 was that the "genius of all times and peoples" could be wrong in his plans and assumptions.
In many spheres Stalin relied on young ambitious leaders. In the army in 1941, this approach failed. During the prewar purges, many "inconvenient" division and corps commanders, army and district commanders were repressed for various reasons. In 1941, former regimental and brigade commanders promoted to army and front commands could not cope. In someone's memoirs, it is described how difficult front command was even later for I. D. Chernyakhovsky.
Or this fact: Stalin repeatedly removed and reinstated I. S. Konev from front command. He trusted Konev, but the responsibility of commanding a front was extremely difficult even for this future Marshal.
In 1941, Stalin's military proteges could offer nothing against the German generals. Like any profession, military command requires not only willpower and knowledge but also extensive practical experience. D. G. Pavlov (aged 44 in 1941) had commanded a tank brigade in Spain, then became Head of RKKA Armored Forces and in 1940 was appointed Commander of the Western Special Military District.
M. P. Kirponos (aged 49) from 1934 to 1939 headed an infantry school, then commanded a division in the Finnish war, after which, skipping several ranks, was made Commander of the Leningrad Military District (MD), and in early 1941 of the Kiev MD. Their high ranks at the start of war should not deceive; these were advances they and their troops ultimately paid for.
Future Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky (in 1941, Major General, commander of the 9th Mech Corps) recalled his first impressions of Southwestern Front commander Kirponos:
"…I reported to Colonel General M. P. Kirponos in the morning. I was struck by his obvious confusion. Sensing my surprise, he tried to appear calm but failed. My brief report on the 5th Army and Corps situation he listened to distractedly, often interrupting to rush to the window exclaiming: 'What is the air defense doing?.. Planes are flying unchallenged… Outrageous!' He immediately ordered increased air defense activity and summoned its commander. Yes, it was confusion, because in that situation, in my view, a front commander had more important concerns than air defense.
He did try to address major issues, giving repeated phone orders to HQ to command decisive counterattacks. But it all sounded hesitant, fussy, ungrounded. Ordering one or two divisions into attack, he did not ask whether they were capable of counterattacking nor explained their specific objectives. It seemed he either did not know the situation or did not want to.
At that moment I concluded that these vast, complex responsibilities were beyond him, and woe to the troops under his command. With such thoughts I left South Western Front (SWF) HQ for Moscow. I learned the Western Front was also in dire straits, Germans nearing Smolensk. Knowing its commander, General Pavlov, from the 1930s when he commanded a regiment in my division, I concluded he was no better than Kirponos, perhaps worse.
On the road I pondered how we had suffered such a heavy defeat in the war's initial period.
Certainly, one could assume the enemy, preempting us in massing forces at the border, would push back our covering troops to some extent. But somewhere in depth, per General Staff calculations, our main forces should have deployed in time, met the enemy organized, and counterattacked. Why had this not happened?..
I had often read fierce post-October criticism of the Russian general staff as incompetent, talentless, tyrannical, etc. But studying WWI's outset and the Russian General Staff's plans, I found the opposite.
That plan accounted for all real factors affecting readiness, concentration, and deployment timing. It assessed Russia's and Germany's comparative mobilization speeds, determining deployment lines and their distance from the border. Covering troops' composition was based on this. Then, deployment lines were near frontier fortresses-a plan I understood.
But what plan did our General Staff (GS) prepare for 1941? Did one even exist?..
I longed to know where deployment lines were planned. Previously, they coincided with the Fortified district (FD) line set back from the old border-a realistic approach. Could that line still serve in 1941? Yes, since our new neighbor was fascist Germany, fully mobilized and already waging aggressive war.
New weapons and systems dictated a new warfare character-increased mobility and maneuver on theater scale.
Without mobilizing, we should have preserved and strengthened, not dismantled, our old FDs. Building new FDs visibly on the border was misguided. Besides violating regulations, by spring 1941 it was clear we could not complete them. It was GS's duty to prove this to the government.
I recalled June 1941 district field trips and conversations with officers who assessed the situation soberly. We agreed Germany, having freed its hands in the West, was ready to attack the USSR. Did central and district military leaders really not sense this? Suppose the GS had no realistic initial war plan-how then explain the criminal negligence of border district commands? My observations in Kiev's Special MD, confirmed in the war's first days, showed local command had done nothing within its powers to prepare to meet the enemy.
I had spent my entire Red Army service in border districts: the Far East, Transbaikalia, Belorussian MD, Leningrad's MD. This let me deeply study their tasks and constant high combat readiness obligations, including rapid activation. Peacetime troop deployment was thus determined, and threatening periods saw preplanned movements. All this was drilled in district war games with top commanders, and similarly with corps and division commanders. Such preparation occurred-except in KSMD. Thus its troops were completely unprepared on day one. Their border deployment did not match threat realities. Many formations lacked full ammunition sets; artillery was at ranges near the border and left there.
What happened on 22 June was foreseen in no plans; thus, troops were literally taken by surprise. Loss of district HQ communications worsened the crisis.
Events would have been different if district command had acted decisively within its authority, taking initiative and responsibility as dictated by the situation. But this was not done. All waited for orders from above.
I saw this even in the operational package I opened on day one. Its contents assumed a fully formed Mech Corps with all required combat capabilities. Yet as it was only in early formation, GS and district command should have assigned it an appropriate wartime role. The same applied to the 19th and 22nd Mech Corps-only the 4th and 8th were ready for battle, having started formation earlier and possessing T-34s and KVs.
Preserving these corps could have played a decisive role in later counterattacks with armies arriving from the interior. Instead, lacking tanks, they were poor infantry formations without proper infantry weapons. Tasks assigned to them were based on their formal designation, not their actual capabilities.
What were those who drafted such directives thinking, placing them under lock and key? Their orders were clearly unrealistic, yet they issued them, aiming, I am sure, to justify themselves later by saying orders for "decisive action" had been given. They cared not that these orders sent Mech Corps to slaughter. Excellent tank crews died in hopeless infantry roles.
Even when the main German attack axes and forces were obvious, district command still could not take responsibility for decisive measures to save the situation by withdrawing forces to the old UR line.
If GS failed to do so, the district command, being on site, was obliged to act.
Instead, it blindly carried out outdated directives from GS and Stavka, nervously and irresponsibly throwing unprepared units piecemeal against the enemy's main thrusts-knowing such "bandages" could not stop him given the time, situation, and their capabilities. Such efforts might have worked deeper in the rear with assembled forces, which the district possessed, but these were fed in piecemeal and destroyed.
I have mentioned Kirponos' orders in my presence at SWF HQ - throwing in divisions one or two at a time against massed enemy forces. What could this lead to but piecemeal destruction of our forces, aiding only the enemy?
Recalling everything I saw, felt, and learned in those early weeks, I could not fathom what was happening.
Elementary tactical and operational rules dictate that having lost a battle, forces must strive to disengage part of their strength to avoid total destruction, then with fresh units from the rear organize defense and strike back."
The questions posed by Rokossovsky remain unanswered to this day.
Where were the deployment lines for the main Soviet forces at war's outset? Where should border divisions have retreated, where should WSMD's second echelon have supported them, and where should forces from the interior have concentrated?
This could not be the line of new FDs, built on the very border. Slogans like "not an inch of our land…" are not serious military arguments. They are slogans, and Stalin least of all believed his own slogans.
The decision to dismantle old FDs dates to November 1939. According to Sandalov, GS Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov favored WSMD HQ's option to build FDs 25-50 km from the border, but construction on the border itself was chosen. In summer 1941, neither Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kirponos, nor Pavlov were in top power, so the source lies higher.
FDs were so close to the border that on 22 June, German forces sometimes occupied them before Soviet troops.
Western Belarus' rail network was not ready for rapid mass troop transfers to the new border.
Nor could the old FD line serve, as it no longer existed by June 1941. Thus, orders for troops to regroup behind it could not be fulfilled.
Yet the reason for dismantling the old Soviet-Polish FD system remains unexplained. In combat readiness, manned by field troops and supported by artillery, it could have stopped the enemy before Minsk. Motorized corps, especially their spearheads, lacked the power to overcome such positions alone.
Preserving the FDs could have provided the Western Front forces with a fallback line to halt the enemy and withdraw eastward. Belarus' terrain prevented German tank groups from closing a ring west of Minsk through Naliboki forest (von Bock even wanted their junction east of Minsk near the Berezina). 4th and 9th German armies only linked through Naliboki on July 1.
With the dismantling of FDs, Soviet defense planning became unclear.
In reality, the deployment line for forces arriving from the interior became the Western Dvina-Dnieper line.
This left First Strategic Echelon divisions one-on-one with superior enemy forces. How can one speak of "preemption in deployment" as the cause of the Western Front's defeat in June 1941, if the Second Strategic Echelon arriving from the interior had no mission to support covering forces, acted "on its own" when war began, and thus had no relation to the Border Battle (i.e., national defense)?
First and Second Strategic Echelons in effect did not coordinate. The enemy smashed them piecemeal. An ordinary defeat of the Western Front troops in the Border Battle thus became a rout with far-reaching consequences.
* * * * *
From his vast experience and perspective as a Marshal, K. K. Rokossovsky never learned where the troop deployment line actually lay. Long before A. Isaev advanced his thesis of "preemption in deployment," Rokossovsky reframed the issue entirely. The main question he raised, which Isaev tries to obscure, was: What was the country's defense plan in case of a sudden German attack? Not merely a border covering plan, but a true strategic defense plan.
It seems such a plan simply did not exist.
Could that be possible?
In a normal country with a normal army, such a situation is unimaginable. But pre-war USSR was neither a "normal country" nor did it have a "normal army."
This extended to the independence of generals and even the General Staff in decision-making.
M. P. Kirponos and D. G. Pavlov lacked experience and knowledge. Clearly, the new Chief of General Staff, G. K. Zhukov, lacked staff culture and experience too. But even when knowledge and experience were present, above every general stood a "commissar," lacking military expertise but wielding power and often a touchy ego. The commissar ensured political reliability and strict literal execution of every order.
The subordinate position of Soviet generals to commissars forced them to carry out any order, no matter how absurd.
Initiative was never encouraged in the Soviet army; by 1941, this was especially true. What initiative could there be if any commander could be disgraced or destroyed? Marshal G. I. Kulik, barely escaping from the Bialystok "meat grinder," was immediately denounced by the Special Department head of 10th Army, after which Major of State Security (rank equal Kombrig) A. N. Mikheev, head of the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, submitted a note to Central Committee Secretary G. M. Malenkov: "I believe Kulik must be arrested…" Hence the obedience of Soviet generals, their subservience to commissars and special departments, and their lack of desire to defend their own views.
During the Kiev Defensive Operation, SWF commander General Kirponos refused to withdraw troops and abandon Kiev-choosing instead the destruction of his front and his own death-rather than risk being accused, like D. G. Pavlov, of treason.
Yet initiative is the mother of victory by skill rather than numbers. Only commanders with initiative can react quickly to changing situations and ensure the "race of tempos" that is the essence of battle.
Returning to the war's outset and the "offensive bias" in combat training-its shortsightedness was obvious to professionals. They knew anything could happen in war. At the regimental and divisional commander level-men with combat experience in Spain, Mongolia, Finland, Western Belarus, and Western Ukraine-the slogans "always forward" and "on foreign soil with little blood" seemed foolish (or merely "slogans for the people"). Lacking "higher knowledge" of Soviet politico-military plans, division commanders could not understand the leadership's "peacefulness" and confidence that "Germany would not attack."
Only on the eve of war (June 1941) were works resumed in the Minsk Fortified Region. L. M. Sandalov recalled how shortly before the war, Army Commander 4 V. I. Chuikov (future Marshal) was removed and sent to China (thankfully, not to a camp) and replaced by A. A. Korobkov. The reason: Chuikov "did not understand circumstances" and often "asked questions" about the need for defensive readiness and the vulnerability of 4th Army, most of which was concentrated at Brest, right on the border. Indeed, its deployment was very vulnerable, as the Germans brilliantly demonstrated on June 22. The obedient Korobkov did not ask about mining bridges over the Bug, minefields, reserve defensive lines, barbed wire, etc. - yet he was held responsible for everything that happened in his army sector in June 1941!
The famous saboteur I. G. Starinov recalled visiting Western Special Military District HQ just before the war in June 1941:
"…I decided to see General Klich, district artillery commander. Maybe he could clarify things.
'Wolf!' he exclaimed, remembering my Spanish pseudonym. 'Here for exercises? Good to see you! But I'm afraid there's no time for exercises.'
He told me the Germans were continuously bringing troops to the border, moving artillery and tanks, flying reconnaissance over our territory. Many of our commanders were on leave, most vehicles and artillery tractors of artillery regiments had been taken for FD construction.
'If anything happens-guns without traction!' Klich fumed. 'Pavlov reports daily to Moscow on the seriousness, but they answer not to panic and that Stalin knows everything.'
'But aren't the German troops just resting on their eastern border?' I cautiously asked. 'TASS said so on the 14th.'
'I'm not a TASS employee-I'm a soldier!' Klich snapped. 'I keep my powder dry. Especially with these fascist bastards! Who should I believe? Hitler? You kidding, Wolf?'
The conversation ended as Klich was urgently summoned to Pavlov…"
A vast array of documents and facts has been collected demonstrating a deliberate policy of unpreparedness for war: all district HQ orders aimed at improving combat readiness were cancelled (e.g. occupying FD defensive positions, raising air defense readiness, etc.).
Viktor Suvorov, seeking to collect prewar orders by Chief of GS Zhukov on "raising RKKA readiness," cited telling examples:
"'Report to the Commissar why Kiev SMD FD units were ordered to occupy forward positions. Such action could provoke immediate armed conflict with Germany and have serious consequences. Cancel this order at once and report who gave such unauthorized instructions. Zhukov. 10.06.41.'
In May 1941, Zhukov ordered troops withdrawn from FDs. He ensured no Soviet forces were in or near FDs. On 11 June he directed all western district commanders: 'Do not occupy forward positions with field or FD units without special orders…'
Meanwhile border district commanders kept requesting permission to take up defense. Western SMD commander General Pavlov also requested this. But 'On 20 June 1941, a cipher telegram signed by GS Operations Deputy Chief Vasilevsky informed Pavlov his request was reported to the Commissar and denied, as it could provoke Germany' (Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 July 2001).
On 18 June, Baltic SMD commander ordered raised air defense readiness. Zhukov reacted: 'You issued Order No. 2 without Commissar sanction… your order causes alarm and public nervousness. Cancel immediately and explain for report to Commissar. Zhukov.'
On the night of 22 June, Zhukov… signed Directive No. 1: 'Do not yield to any provocative actions… undertake no other measures without special orders.' This prohibited executing the state border covering plan or raising the troops on alert. Only a special order from Moscow could do so-without it, any commander declaring alert risked his life.
Colonel General I. V. Boldin recounted conversations with Moscow on the morning of 22 June. Front commander Pavlov shouted: 'War! Grant permission to act! Grant permission to open artillery fire! Grant permission to shoot down German planes!'
The answer: do not yield to provocations!
This repeated a second, third, fourth time. Finally, Lieutenant General Boldin spoke with Moscow-but the answer remained: no artillery fire, no actions! Do not yield to provocations! (I. V. Boldin, Pages of Life, Moscow, 1963, pp. 84-85; Military Historical Journal, 1961, No. 4, p. 65.)
Then Pavlov committed an act of heroism. He stopped asking for permission. Taking full responsibility, he essentially declared war on Germany by his own order…"
I. V. Boldin listed facts known to Western Front HQ on 21 June 1941:
• On 20 June, six German planes violated the border at 17:41; two minutes later, another group crossed, carrying bombs, flying several km into Soviet territory.
• 3rd Army commander Kuznetsov reported German removal of barbed wire barriers near Augustow-Sejny road and engine noises in the nearby forests.
• Reconnaissance established German troop concentration along East Prussian, Mlawa, Warsaw, and Deblin axes, with most forces in a 30 km border strip. Heavy artillery and tanks were detected south of Suwalki, with many aircraft.
• Germans dug trenches along the Western Bug; 40 trains with bridging equipment and ammunition arrived at Biala Podlaska.
• "By 21 June, German forces opposite Western SMD had taken their invasion starting positions…"
Yet bound by GS and Defense Commissariat orders and terrorized by repression, Western Front leadership did nothing.
Colonel V. K. Solodovnikov, 345th Rifle Regiment commander near Augustow, recalled:
"…On the eve of war the division redeployed 239th Rifle Regiment from Grodno to Grajewo. At my request, division commander reluctantly allowed my 1st Battalion (capt. Martynov) to take up defensive positions covering Augustow from Suwalki highway; 3rd Battalion (capt. Dobshikov) deployed at Zhernovka-Sleysk left of 1st in the forward zone (pillboxes, obstacles); 2nd Battalion (capt. Krasko) remained in barracks, assigned to occupy a prepared position 5 km rearward at Belobrzechi upon alarm. The divisional and regimental artillery were 80-100 km away on training. I was assigned the division recon battalion…
At 17:00 on 21 June the army commander and member of the Military Council (three diamonds) arrived, demanding a situation report. I concluded war was inevitable-if not today, then tomorrow. They exploded, saying I had misinterpreted the situation, that Germany feared us, and we must not reveal any preparation. They forbade issuing helmets to troops, though when I said an inspection was scheduled for Sunday, they allowed it, warning the Germans must not see signs of readiness, then left. Left alone, we were amazed they refused to accept war was imminent.
At 04:00 shelling began with heavy artillery and bombing. I tried to phone the border detachment commander, but the line was cut. It was clear the enemy was attacking and a heavy fight lay ahead…"
M. I. Meltyukhov in The Initial Period of War in Military Counterintelligence Documents (2008) cites another account (Special Report of the 3rd Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense No. 36701, 5 July 1941):
"…On 21 June 3rd Army commander Kuznetsov with GS Lt. Gen. Karbyshev inspected border units. Artillery regiment deputy commander Maj. Dyurba reported massive German concentrations and lack of ammunition at fortified points. Kuznetsov replied: 'Nothing serious can happen.' He took no measures.
After invasion, Dyurba told fellow officers: 'Kuznetsov and 3rd Army command sold us out…'"
How could catastrophe not result from such "preparation for sudden attack"?
Finally, the Crimean catastrophe of May 1942. By then the army had a year of combat. Preparing an offensive with 2:1 numerical superiority over Manstein's 11th Army (plus massive Soviet tank and artillery advantage). Yet enemy action was ignored. No defense was organized. Commissar Mekhlis' whims dominated. Preemptive offensive. Defeat. Numerical and technical superiority squandered in days.
Konstantin Simonov in Lessons of History and the Writer's Duty (1965) wrote:
"I would like to cite an example of an operation where the true interests of waging war clashed vividly with false, slogan-based ideas of how war should be conducted, ideas rooted not only in military illiteracy but also in the distrust of people fostered by 1937. I am speaking of the tragic Kerch events in the winter-spring of 1942.
Seven years ago, one of our front-line veteran writers wrote to me:
"I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The cause of that shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust by army and front commanders, the tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mekhlis, a man ignorant of military affairs… He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. He moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line, etc. Three armies stood along a 16 km front, with each division occupying just 600-700 meters. Never again did I see such troop density. It all turned into a bloody mess, was driven into the sea, and perished solely because the front was commanded not by a military leader but by a madman…"
I was there myself, in the same place as the author of this letter, and although I do not share his choice of words, I fully agree with his essence.
I speak of this not to once again curse Mekhlis, who, incidentally, was a man of impeccable personal courage and did everything not out of a desire for personal glory. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and it is precisely for this reason that his actions on the Kerch Peninsula are of fundamental historical interest. He was a man who, at that period of the war, regardless of circumstances, considered anyone who preferred a strong position 100 meters from the enemy over one at 50 meters a coward; anyone who wanted to ensure basic safety for the troops a panic-monger; anyone who realistically assessed enemy strength as lacking confidence. Mekhlis, despite his personal readiness to die for the Motherland, was a distinct product of the 1937-38 atmosphere.
As for the front commander to whom Mekhlis arrived as Stavka's representative - an educated and experienced officer - he too turned out to be a product of 1937-38, but in a different sense: in his fear of assuming full responsibility, fear of opposing a reasonable military decision to Mekhlis' ignorant insistence on "everyone and everything forward," fear of risking himself by taking their dispute to Stavka.
From a historical perspective, the tragic Kerch events are significant because they embody both sides of the consequences of 1937-38: the side represented by Mekhlis, and the side represented by the then Crimean Front commander Kozlov".
Absolute control and obedience, multiplied by personal ambition, at the cost of professionalism-was no accident but deliberate policy. This policy led the army to defeat and the country to catastrophe.
Yet Franz Halder's diary note that Germany had won the war in two weeks proved mistaken. The war with the USSR was only just beginning.