Overall, the defeat of Soviet troops in the 1941 border battle broadly repeated the defeat of the Allied army during the French campaign of 1940. At the spearhead of its main offensive, the Wehrmacht created overwhelming superiority. Infantry units of the 4th and 9th Armies encircled the Soviet Western Front strike grouping east of Bialystok. The second ring of encirclement was formed by panzer groups - the Wehrmacht's "trademark."
On 3 July, German Chief of General Staff Colonel General F. Halder wrote:
"Overall, it can already be said that the task of destroying the main forces of the Russian ground army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper has been accomplished. I consider the statement by a captured corps commander correct: east of the Western Dvina and Dnieper we will encounter only scattered groups, which, given their numbers, will not seriously hinder the advance of German forces.
Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia has been won in 14 days. Of course, it is not over yet. The vast territory and stubborn resistance of the enemy, using all available means, will tie down our forces for many weeks to come.
…Once we cross the Western Dvina and Dnieper, the issue will no longer be the destruction of enemy armed forces, but depriving them of industrial regions and preventing them, using their enormous industrial power and inexhaustible manpower, from creating new armed forces.
As soon as the war in the East moves from the phase of destroying enemy armed forces to the phase of economic suppression, the next tasks in the war against England will come to the fore…"
On 4 July, Hitler stated:
"I always try to put myself in the enemy's place. In practice, he has already lost this war. It is good that we simultaneously destroyed the Russian tank and air forces at the very start. The Russians will never be able to restore them…"
(V. V. Golitsyn, Dossier Barbarossa. Moscow: Reitar, 2011, p.49, citing RGVA, f.1280, op.2, d.26, l.42)
However, unlike in France, where the second part of the 1940 campaign quickly turned into "mopping up operations," the Germans encountered an unpleasant surprise: at the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper, they were met by the Second Strategic Echelon forces.
The second surprise concerned political stability. In France, demoralization of the High Command and paralysis of military will prevented recovery and regaining initiative during the Wehrmacht's regrouping (even though eliminating the enemy encircled near Dunkirk took longer than German command planned). The rapid military defeat of the Allied Franco-Anglo-Dutch-Belgian army led to political instability, collapse of the Cabinet, replacement of the Commander-in-Chief, and the rise of capitulation sentiment. New Prime Minister Marshal P?tain expressed the will of the French people, who did not want a war of annihilation. The idea of continued resistance faded away.
In the war with the USSR, Hitler also bet on the collapse of the Soviet political system. He had plenty of reasons to think so. The number of "traitors" during the Great Patriotic War exceeded all imaginable limits. Yet the System endured, though at times it stood at the brink of collapse. At the war's outset, Stalin was clearly confused.
Writer Konstantin Simonov recalled conversations with Marshal I. S. Konev:
"Konev said that by the start of the war, he believed in Stalin absolutely, loved him, was under his spell. His first doubts and disappointments about Stalin arose during the war. These feelings erupted twice. First, in the opening days and weeks of the war, when he felt that something was wrong, when he sensed the loss of that decisive will from above, the familiar force that came from Stalin. Yes, at that time he felt Stalin was bewildered.
The second time was at the start of the Battle of Moscow, when despite the obvious situation and the Front's appeals, Stalin refused to authorize a timely withdrawal to the Mozhaisk line. Later, as the German offensive developed and the situation became nearly catastrophic, Stalin again became confused.
At that moment, he called the Western Front almost hysterically, speaking of himself in the third person: 'Comrade Stalin is not a traitor, Comrade Stalin is not a turncoat, Comrade Stalin is an honest man, his only mistake is that he trusted the cavalrymen too much, Comrade Stalin will do everything in his power to rectify the situation.'
That was when Konev sensed Stalin's utter confusion, the absence of his usual willpower.
Later, when Molotov arrived with a commission - a man extremely unintelligent, and those who pity him simply do not know him - it was under Molotov's participation that they tried to place all blame on the military, declaring them responsible for the disaster.
That was when Konev felt Stalin was not the infinitely strong figure he had imagined. The image remained, but behind it stood a man bewildered and deeply at fault."
At that time, there were reports that the Soviet leadership sought peace with Germany at the cost of ceding the Baltics, Moldova, Western Belarus, and Western Ukraine.
Historian D. Volkogonov cited this episode as unconfirmed but possible, quoting Marshal K. S. Moskalenko's speech on 2 July 1957:
"While investigating Beria's case with Prosecutor General Rudenko, we established that Beria testified… that back in 1941 Stalin, Beria, and Molotov discussed capitulating to fascist Germany, offering Hitler the Soviet Baltics, Moldova, and parts of other republics. They tried to contact Hitler through the Bulgarian ambassador… This testimony was recently confirmed by that ambassador…"
Volkogonov added that in private conversation, Moskalenko confirmed this and shared further details.
After the fall of Minsk on 28 June 1941, Stalin reportedly fell into a state of stupor. When Politburo members arrived on 30 June with the proposal to form the State Defense Committee, Stalin seemed afraid they had come "for him," to blame him for the disaster. What followed was the "punishment of the innocent and reward of the uninvolved." That day, Western Front command and other generals were removed and later court-martialed.
Soon after, Stalin regained his composure and confidence.
On 3 July, he addressed the nation with his "soulful appeal": "Brothers and sisters…"
While the Wehrmacht's infantry units were still engaged in battles to eliminate encircled Soviet forces, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Centre, General Field Marshal F. von Bock, and his subordinate panzer generals were already eager to advance, although representatives of the High Command hesitated to launch a new offensive before completing the battles in the "pockets" west of Minsk.
Von Bock wrote in his diary:
"In the afternoon, Halder called Greifenberg. The Army High Command continues to express concern about our ability to control the eastern 'pocket'. It is even questioning whether, in this regard, it might be better to postpone the offensive of the combined panzer group.
If this happens, the Army High Command will lose the chance to capitalize on the success won at considerable cost in blood, as the Russians will gain additional time to strengthen their defensive positions on the Dnieper and along the Orsha-Vitebsk line!
In my view, we are already delaying the attack unacceptably long…"
As a result, the panzer groups of Army Group Centre received orders to advance eastward. This offensive has not received a distinct name in historiography and is often treated as an interlude between the Bialystok-Minsk and Smolensk battles.
The next day, command over the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups of Army Group Centre was assumed by the 4th Army headquarters (General Field Marshal G. von Kluge), with the 4th Army itself being designated a "panzer army."
* * * * *
The encounter with the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon came as a complete surprise to the German command. Despite this, German forces advanced eastward almost without hindrance, occupying positions for the subsequent offensive towards Moscow along the line from Vitebsk to Stary Bykhov.
The fact is that the deployment line of the High Command Reserve Group, formed on 25 June 1941, was set along the Dnieper River. And on 30 June, Stavka representatives at the Western Front, Marshals K. E. Voroshilov and B. M. Shaposhnikov, reported to Stalin:
"The situation at the front has sharply deteriorated. The enemy, outflanking both flanks of the Western Front armies with mechanized forces, has reached the area of Zaslavl-Kozekovo-Pleshchenitsy with two panzer divisions and, with its forward elements (at least a tank regiment and a motorized regiment), the Bobruisk area… In our opinion, the main defensive line can only be the Dnieper River, and even then only if fresh divisions and mechanized units are thrown to this line with utmost urgency."
Thus, the deployment line of troops arriving from the USSR's interior military districts (the Western Dvina-Dnieper line) also became the main defensive line (first defense zone: Vitebsk, Kokhanovo, and further along the Drut River). Accordingly, only delaying actions by forward detachments were conducted in the forward zone. As a result, such a convenient defensive line as the Berezina River was not used.
Yet a characteristic of the theater east of Minsk is the sparse road network among swamps and the limited number of crossings.
This explains why the combat actions of the 1st Proletarian Motor Rifle Division on the Orsha axis were relatively successful: the enemy could not bypass it widely and was forced to attack along the highway, also having to cross small rivers intersecting it.
A gap formed between the troops of the First and Second Strategic Echelons, forcing improvised groups to hold up the enemy at the Berezina line: three military schools (Lepel, Borisov, and Bobruisk); at Berezino on the Mogilev highway, the town was defended by an NKVD convoy brigade, soon replaced by paratroopers, who also lacked heavy weapons and were not equipped for defensive battles against German tanks.
All these heroic efforts of Soviet troops indicate the absence of any defense plan east of Minsk, further confirming the lack of coordination between the First and Second Strategic Echelons. Was reconnaissance of the Berezina defensive line ever conducted in preparation for war with Germany (or earlier, with Poland)? How was interaction between the First and Second Echelons prepared for defensive war? Was the Soviet military-political leadership preparing for defensive war at all?
Meanwhile, by the time of the Germans' renewed eastward advance on 1-2 July, a considerable number of Second Echelon troops had arrived.
For example, the surrender of Bobruisk on 27 June-a strategically important point-occurred with virtually no defenders, despite 21st Army concentrating just dozens of km to the east, with its units arriving even before the war.
In the Mogilev area, the first echelons of the 110th and 172nd Rifle Divisions began arriving on 26 June, and by 3 July they were fully assembled.
The 22nd Army also began arriving in Western Special Military District before the war and was almost fully assembled by 2 July (except for the 170th Division, still unloading). The army covered the junction with the Northwestern Front, with its 174th Division occupying the Polotsk Fortified district (FD) sector.
The retreat of Soviet troops eastward expanded the army's defensive zone along the Western Dvina, forcing transfer of the 186th Division from the Sebezh FD to the Ulla-Beshenkovichi area. This resulted from choosing the Dvina-Dnieper defense line. Had the left flank defense line been west of Lepel (which Germans reached only on 3 July), such expansion would not have occurred.
Lepel was another strategically vital point (after Bobruisk) abandoned without a fight. Once captured, the enemy could choose attack directions freely-through Beshenkovichi to Vitebsk, to Ulla to cross the Western Dvina, or through Chashniki to Senno and Orsha. Moreover, Lepel was a major supply base now fallen to the enemy.
The 20th Army arrived with delays, especially its 69th Rifle Corps, largely due to initial deployment plans (69th Corps - Smolensk, 61st Corps - Mogilev, 20th Corps - Krichev, Chausy). This reflects issues in Second Echelon transfer planning for an expected war with Germany.
Meanwhile, the 1st Moscow Proletarian Motor Rifle Division concentrated near Orsha by 27 June but received orders to move to Borisov only three days later.
Had Berezina been chosen as the defensive line, the 1st Motor Rifle would have arrived in Borisov before the German 18th Panzer Division (30 June) and possibly before advance elements of the 7th Panzer east of Smolevichi (27 June).
Rifle divisions of 20th Army unloaded later. From 29 June, the 137th Rifle Division arrived at Orsha (division commander and signals battalion arrived on 3 July, establishing HQ communications on 4 July). From 30 June, the 53rd Rifle Division began unloading (initially unloading near Gomel from 19 June, then redirected to Orsha, leaving one rifle and one artillery regiment near Gomel). The 18th Rifle Division HQ arrived near Orsha on 3 July, with main forces already entrenched. Fully mobilized, the 73rd Rifle Division arrived east of Orsha (Gusino and Krasnoe) by 4 July (31 of 33 echelons by 18:00) and next day relieved the 137th Division. The 144th Rifle Division followed.
I lack exact arrival data for the 233rd Division, but by the Lepel counteroffensive it had taken up defensive positions. The 229th Rifle Division arrived later and by the counteroffensive had only a third concentrated.
Even with this slow concentration, 20th Army troops could have coordinated with retreating units of the 13th Army (2nd Rifle Corps' two divisions and 50th Rifle Division), shoring up defenses, restoring a continuous front, and controlling Berezina crossings. As more Soviet units arrived, defenses could be strengthened along the Berezina. Given that German armored advance detachments lacked significant striking power, the defended line could have been held, outpacing the enemy's troop concentration.
Indeed, the strike power of the Wehrmacht's advancing mobile formations towards the Berezina was modest. From 3rd Panzer Group, only 7th Panzer Division concentrated near Zembin (20th Motorized was nearby at Pleshchenitsy-Begoml; 20th Panzer was directed to Lepel via Dokshitsy).
From Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, only five divisions reached the Berezina by 1-2 July, operating separately: 18th Panzer near Borisov, 10th Panzer near Berezino, SS "Reich" Division slightly south near Brodets-Yakshitsy, 4th Panzer near Svisloch, and 3rd Panzer controlling Bobruisk, having already crossed the Berezina.
Choosing a defensive line along Polotsk FD, then the lake region of Ushachsky District, and the Berezina from west of Lepel to Bobruisk would have tied down German mobile forces and covered further Soviet troop concentration along the Dnieper line (19th Army near Vitebsk, 16th near Smolensk or Orsha, and 24th and 28th Armies near Vyazma and Roslavl or west thereof). The enemy would not have reached Dnieper attack positions by mid-July.
Even if the Berezina defense line were breached, subsequent events would have unfolded further east, with the enemy forced to act along predictable road-bound axes.
However, Stavka's 25 June decision assigned the Reserve Army Group to prepare defensive lines much further east-Sushchevo, Nevel, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Zhlobin, Gomel, Chernigov, Desna River, Dnieper River to Kremenchug-remaining ready "upon Supreme Command order to counterattack."
As a result, the bloodied remnants of the Western Front were left unsupported. Those outside encirclements, struggling to hold the enemy, retreated eastward, continuing to lose personnel and heavy weapons.
* * * * *
One can say that the defeat in Belarus was a defeat of the RKKA General Staff. After all, the General Staff was responsible for:
• Troop deployment (when most of WSMD forces were positioned in the Bialystok salient);
• Planning the transfer of troops from the USSR's interior districts and concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon;
• Reconnaissance of defensive lines in case of war.
But above all, the defeat in Belarus was a defeat of the Soviet military-political leadership, which prepared for war but not for repelling German aggression. It was precisely this orientation that it imposed on the General Staff.
In any case, the beginning of the war forced the Soviet leadership to adopt a strategic defensive posture. However, passive waiting to predict enemy actions while ceding the initiative is hardly an effective defense strategy. A defensive strategy does not exclude active measures.
The intensification of Soviet actions is linked to the arrival of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko at the Western Front on 4 July (furthermore, from 2 July the Western Front was essentially being reformed). The most significant "thrust" of the new front was the counterattack by two mechanized corps in the Lepel direction.
However, this attempt to seize the initiative ended in failure: in the Lepel counterattack, two Soviet mechanized corps failed to achieve anything against two Wehrmacht panzer divisions.
The Soviet 117th Rifle Division near Zhlobin was also defeated.
Upon closer examination, the very idea of the Lepel counterattack raises questions: was it truly conceived as a counterattack from the outset? By the time Marshal Timoshenko arrived at the Western Front (let alone when the "Lepel strike" idea emerged), the configuration of the enemy's "strike fists" was not yet clear, nor was it clear what the enemy would do or how far he would advance eastward.
A. Isaev writes: "If one attempts to formulate Timoshenko's idea in one phrase, it would be: 'A duel of mobile units in empty space between infantry corps.'"
It seems Marshal Timoshenko did not hold such an idea. More likely, at first there was no idea of a "Lepel counterattack" (which by 4 July had only just been occupied by the enemy). The issue may have been the deployment of mechanized corps (perhaps initially only the 7th) into the Lepel area-which, incidentally, was the weakest point in the old Soviet-Polish FD line (where a FD had been planned but not built), and at the same time a key point for defending the Berezina line.
Recall: previous Western Front Military Council Directive No. 14 of 1 July, signed by A. I. Eremenko, defined the need for defense precisely along the Berezina:
"The flanks of the front armies are open. The task of the armies is to prevent the enemy from reaching the Dnieper line and to hold the Berezina line (Borisov-Bobruisk-Parichi) until 7.7.41, securing themselves against tank outflanking from the north of Borisov…"
However, by 4 July, defense along the Berezina had already been breached in many places: west of Lepel, in the Borisov area and north (Zembin), as well as near Brodets, Yakshitsy, and Svisloch; earlier, Bobruisk had fallen. There were both unfortunate accidents (e.g. German capture of the bridge at Borisov, capture of the bridge at Svisloch, General-Major A. N. Ermakov's unfortunate error in failing to withdraw to the east bank in time-two RKKA cadre divisions could have resisted 46th Motorized Corps far better than NKVD convoy brigades and paratroopers) and systemic errors-abandoning Bobruisk and Lepel.
Thus, it is quite possible that there was no antagonism between Eremenko's Directive No. 14 (defense along the Berezina) and Timoshenko's Directive No. 16 (Lepel counterattack), as A. Isaev claims. In principle, both addressed the same objective: holding the Berezina line until 7 July, albeit with different forces and under different circumstances.
General-Lieutenant Eremenko had no Second Strategic Echelon troops under his command. His Western Front forces were already severely battered (except perhaps the 20th Mechanized and 4th Airborne Corps).
After forming the new Western Front, new tasks could be set. There were two options: either restore the situation or withdraw to new defensive lines. On one hand, the Dnieper defensive line was not yet prepared. On the other, the enemy had only just taken Lepel, making it seem quite possible to restore the situation there-i.e., to re-establish the Berezina defense line, offering major advantages to defenders.
An additional psychological factor was the Marshal's arrival at the front. In 1812, M. I. Kutuzov could arrive and order continued retreat. Marshal Timoshenko could not do that. He chose the most active option, and it seems this was not only his personal choice.
* * * * *
When the decision to launch the counterattack was made (on the night of 5 July), it seemed that everything favored it. It was to be delivered at the junction of two panzer groups (Hoth's 3rd and Guderian's 2nd). German panzer divisions, having already suffered losses in the first week's battles, had advanced far ahead, detached from their infantry. Even the motorized divisions lagged behind: at the height of the Lepel counterattack, the 20th Motorized Division of the 39th Motorized Corps was only just reaching Lepel (and, displaying typical overconfidence, turned toward Ulla to cross the Dvina), while the 29th Motorized Division of the 47th Motorized Corps was only just arriving at Borisov.
The forces allocated for the counterattack were also quite sufficient. Initially, the Soviet 20th Army held a significant quantitative and qualitative advantage.
The 5th Mechanized Corps attacked "from the march," but the 7th Mechanized Corps had arrived in advance and had been in the Liozno area for several days. It conducted reconnaissance and its forward detachments reached Lepel.
Under these conditions, the outcome of the clash between Soviet and German armored forces southwest of Vitebsk ("in the empty space between infantry corps") depended entirely on the command's and troops' readiness for modern maneuver warfare. The failure of the Soviet counterattack clearly showed that Soviet forces were inferior to the Germans in maneuver warfare skills.
Readiness for modern war is shaped by many factors. Organizational structure plays a major role.
It is now widely stated that the 1940-41 Soviet mechanized corps were "overloaded" with tanks (TO&E - 1031 tanks) and had insufficient motorized infantry and artillery. Yet Kleist's panzer group in the 1940 French campaign fielded as many as 1250 tanks, and it was likely this model the Soviets emulated in creating their mechanized corps. However, the Soviet leadership failed to note that a panzer group was an army-level formation, while a mechanized corps was only a division-level formation with a much more limited support structure.
Undoubtedly, the German divisional structure in summer 1941 allowed them to attack and defend effectively, often operating independently.
However, in the Lepel counterattack specifically, the "overloading" factor was unlikely decisive. In reality, the tank "overload" was more than halved since both the 5th and 7th Corps lacked their full tank complement. Both corps lacked their motorized divisions, but unlike under Grodno, their tank divisions retained and used their own motor rifle regiments.
The 20th Army was reinforced with artillery, including anti-air. Air support was planned: as of 8 July, the front had 389 aircraft.
Additionally, rifle divisions were present in the offensive zone. In case of success, they were expected to commit detachments with artillery to consolidate gains.
In reality, organizational flaws were not the key issue. More fundamental reasons for the failure at Lepel-and Soviet tank counterattacks in 1941 in general-lay in command and control. S. P. Ivanov wrote in his memoirs:
"Coordination was extremely poor. The 20th Army HQ was practically excluded from corps command. Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin told me it was expected General D. G. Pavlov would coordinate tank actions. Timoshenko appointed him his deputy for armored forces. But Stalin ordered otherwise, and Pavlov fell into Beria's hands…"
At no point during the counterattack was there coordination between the mechanized corps. Even tank divisions within the 7th Corps acted separately. The "armored fist" turned into a blow with splayed fingers-while the 7th Corps struck against entrenched German panzer divisions in defense.
Technical planning was inadequate, including logistics. The 5th Corps' rear was left on trains or in Ukraine.
Major General A. V. Borzikov, assistant to Western Front's armored commander, reported to RKKA Main Agency of Automobiles and Tanks chief:
"The corps (5th and 7th) fight well, but HQs are unresponsive and clumsy. Too many vehicles are lost for trivial faults. Neither divisions, corps, army, nor front can organize repair or evacuation. No spares, no rubber, poor supplies. Corps lack aviation, making them blind, often striking empty space with no intercorps communications. Losses in 5th and 7th are heavy. 5th is near Orsha, 7th near Vitebsk southwest, both now to operate with infantry. Enemy uses incendiary spray… tanks burn. Worst losses from aviation. 50% equipment lost, most tanks need repairs."
The 5th Mechanized Corps (Maj. Gen. I. P. Alekseenko, a professional tanker) achieved some results. The 7th Corps completely failed. It lacked coordination with the 153rd Rifle Division, in whose zone it attacked. After the 14th Tank Division encountered enemy anti-tank defenses at the Chernogostnitsa River, instead of maneuvering or increasing artillery support, Corps Commander Maj. Gen. V. I. Vinogradov ordered repeated frontal attacks. On 6 July, 20th Army commander Lt. Gen. P. A. Kurochkin reported to Marshal Timoshenko:
"The corps' failure was due to command's inability to organize combat, lack of coordination between artillery and tanks, poor HQ work, inadequate air support, allowing enemy aviation to bomb units with impunity…"
Kurochkin's 7 July night order to continue the offensive included use of 69th Corps artillery, but no time was allotted for its preparation. V. Suvorov noted in The Last Republic that Soviet artillery's ineffectiveness stemmed from the complete absence of maps for indirect fire. The Reserve Front War Diary confirms:
"No maps. 20th Army HQ has only a few sets. 69th Corps and 73rd Division arrived with none. Partially supplied from Reserve Army Group HQ."
The 14th Tank Division's battle on 7 July was a slaughter: attacking unsuppressed anti-tank defenses, it lost over half its tanks, demoralizing its personnel. On 8 July, the division spent the day regrouping. Isaev rightly notes that had Vinogradov changed its objective and attack direction on 7 July, it could have supported the 18th Division at Senno, preserving a unified tank front.
Vinogradov likely failed to realize the 14th Division faced an entire German panzer division, not a weak forward detachment, leading him to order suicidal attacks.
In the end, it was precisely through the sector of the failed 7th Corps that a German strike from Senno hit the 5th Corps' rear-a textbook maneuver.
In any battle, success is not just about planning; it is about tempo-who can build up forces fastest where needed. Soviet command showed no coordination between corps or even divisions within the 7th Corps, let alone with other 20th Army units. As a result, neither the 18th Tank Division's actions at Senno nor the 5th Corps' breakthrough toward Lepel were supported. Rifle units remained immobile; tank divisions operated without reinforcements even in breakthrough sectors; belated orders for infantry support arrived too late (e.g. the 153rd Division received its order after the counterattack was halted).
On the German side, the junction of two panzer groups did not become a weak point. The 17th Panzer Division was committed there (to outflank the 1st Motor Rifle Division near Kokhanovo), soon joined by the 12th Panzer Division, settling the matter decisively.
Even successful actions by the 5th Corps or holding Senno on 8 July would not have solved the key problem-restoring the Berezina defense line. Without capturing Lepel, Soviet forces could not threaten German crossings of the Dvina along the 22nd Army's extended flank, deciding the Vitebsk battle's outcome.
Thus, the Lepel counterattack's success hinged on rapid advance and capture of Lepel by 5-6 July. Later, the underestimated German strength south of the Dvina proved sufficient not only to repel the counterattack and defeat two mechanized corps, but also to cross the Dvina and seize Vitebsk.
A breakthrough against the 7th Panzer Division at Chernogostnitsa would have flanked the 20th Panzer Division preparing to cross at Ulla. But by 7 July, 20th Motorized Division was approaching Lepel, and later the 12th Panzer Division arrived. Thus, even a breakthrough would have offered no operational freedom. The 5th Corps' forward detachment could not seize Lepel alone on 7 July.
By 8-9 July, under 39th Motorized Corps HQ were three panzer divisions (7th, 12th, 20th) and two motorized (20th, 18th). Adding the 17th Panzer of 47th Corps, German forces were more than sufficient to defeat the Soviet 20th Army.
Lacking operational reconnaissance, Soviet command knew none of this.
However, even seizing Lepel by 5-6 July would have been insufficient to stabilize the Western Front's northern flank. The essential condition was regaining the Berezina crossing at Borisov. Without it, the enemy could isolate Soviet forces at Lepel using the 47th Motorized Corps (e.g. moving the 17th Panzer north of Borisov).
Directive No. 16 tasked the 1st Motor Rifle Division with capturing Borisov crossings. But too few forces were allocated. The division failed to retake Borisov and retreated east; its sole success was delaying enemy flanking moves near Tolochin, preventing encirclement of the 5th Corps from the south.
Apparently, it proved impossible to allocate sufficient forces simultaneously to restore the Berezina line in multiple sectors. Without this, success was unrealistic.
July 1941 events showed that defense along the Berezina could only succeed if prepared in advance. Directive No. 14 of 1 July came too late. Only deploying troops from the interior directly to the Berezina could have stopped the enemy there.
The example of Polotsk is telling: a FD manned with troops and supported by artillery halted the blitzkrieg, forcing German motorized corps to await infantry reinforcements. Here, the FD line coincided with the Second Strategic Echelon's concentration line.
This is why, as early as 30 June, Marshals Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov insisted:
"… The main defense line can only be the Dnieper River, and even then only if fresh divisions and mechanized units are rushed to this line with utmost urgency…"
* * * * *
The actions of Soviet aviation in the Lepel counterattack constitute a topic of their own. The history of the Lepel counterattack once again confirmed the truth that deploying large mechanized formations without air superiority or at least reliable air cover is to doom them to destruction. For example, consider the actions of experienced German panzer divisions in Normandy in 1944 (described by K. Tippelskirch), where the Anglo-American allies enjoyed overwhelming air superiority:
"The counterattack planned for June 7, to be carried out by the combined forces of the 21st Panzer Division already in action and the arriving 12th SS Panzer Division and Training Panzer Division, broke down into a series of local counterattacks. Under normal conditions, it would have been easy to bring the 12th SS from Evreux (100 km away) and the Training Division from Chartres (200 km away) into position in time. However, only the 12th SS arrived, and upon reaching its starting area near Caen, it was subjected to heavy bombing and effectively immobilized. The Training Division, ordered on June 6 to move out immediately, was attacked by aircraft en route and delayed by destroyed roads and bridges, reaching only Falaise by night. Attempts to push forward the next day were halted by such intense air attacks that no further advance was possible that day. Thus, both divisions only managed to temporarily stop the enemy north and northwest of Caen. A new offensive was launched two days later, but again achieved only local successes due to enemy air superiority and the expanding bridgehead. Meanwhile, defending along a broad front north and southwest of Caen, the German panzer divisions repelled all British attempts to break out south and southeast. Locally this was a success, but it immobilized and exhausted the panzer divisions in defensive combat…"
Recall the prerequisites for victory over the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol in 1939: G. K. Zhukov remembered that upon arriving at the front, he "quickly realized" that a successful ground operation was impossible without air superiority. Even then it was clear that victory in the air battle must precede victory on the ground. Initial encounters between Soviet and Japanese aviators brought only disappointment. Only after Zhukov demanded the arrival of Hero of the Soviet Union pilots with Spanish combat experience did the situation change. Victory in the skies of Mongolia paved the way for ground victory. Crucially, the Japanese were deprived of aerial reconnaissance and thus operational intelligence; Zhukov's preparations remained terra incognita for them, enabling sudden deep armored strikes and total victory.
In 1941, however, all German preparations became terra incognita for the RKKA. German air reconnaissance easily uncovered Soviet troop movements-for example, near Vitebsk, where 20th Panzer Division reports state:
"Constant air reconnaissance provided information on enemy movements, confirmed by the determined resistance encountered by our advance detachment in Vitebsk…"
One of the creators of victory of Khalkhin Gol Ya. V. Smushkevich was arrested on 8 June 1941 (as an Air Force Lieutenant General) and executed in October of that year.
An important 1941 theme was the "purge" of the Air Force (AF), without which that tragic year's events are incomprehensible. Under Stalin's axe fell AF organizers and commanders. Among those repressed in the war's first days were former AF Commander Lt. Gen. P. V. Rychagov, AF Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. P. S. Volodin, NW Front AF Commander Maj. Gen. A. P. Ionov, SW Front AF Commander Lt. Gen. E. S. Ptukhin, his Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. N. A. Laskin, Western Front AF Deputy Commander Maj. Gen. A. I. Tayursky, and others. Western Front AF Commander Maj. Gen. I. I. Kopec shot himself (likely not only due to the aviation's defeat). The lack of AF organizational capacity was a major reason for Luftwaffe air superiority. Accounts of 1941 air battles evoke the complete helplessness of Soviet aviation.
Creating elite "special mission" air regiments achieved nothing-air superiority remained with the enemy. "Bringing in Heroes of the Soviet Union" proved insufficient; organizational weakness persisted. By August 1941, these elite regiments were disbanded, surviving pilots sent to Air Force research institutes.
Meanwhile, the German command skillfully concentrated limited air assets at decisive points and times. Determining target priorities and force allocation is an organizational task-but at this moment, the Western Front AF lacked leaders of sufficient caliber. N. S. Skripko (then a colonel commanding 3rd Long Range Aviation Corps Aviation Corps, later Marshal of Aviation) recalled receiving a telegram on 30 June retargeting bombers from the right to the left flank:
"…It was clearly written in haste. The Front Air Force HQ had lost control of its units…"
This loss of control nullified the few remaining Soviet advantages. For example, the transfer of the 4th Assault Aviation Regiment with new Il-2s from Kharkov MD to Staraya Bykhov in late June 1941 was a complete surprise for the Germans. Yet the regiment operated independently, receiving only vague tasks, with no coordination with ground forces or even fighters. Thus Il-2 sorties went unescorted, suffering heavy losses.
Here another 1941 feature emerged: the war caught the RKKA mid-rearmament. Normally gradual, it had become abrupt just before the war. Troops entered combat with equipment they had not mastered. This affected aviation, armor, artillery, and signals worst.
In V. B. Yemelyanenko's documentary narrative In the Harsh Military Sky (1972), he described how on 27 June, 4th Regiment Il-2s attacked a German motorized column moving from Slutsk towards Bobruisk. Panzerwaffe units, enjoying "clear skies," advanced unafraid. It turned out Soviet pilots, transferred from older aircraft, lacked time to master their new planes and could not use their superior weaponry. Training occurred in combat, under fire, at high cost. No tactics for the new aircraft had been created or disseminated; these were developed under fire with heavy losses. Thus, deploying an entire assault regiment (over 50 heavily armed planes) against a German panzer division on the march achieved no results.
Meanwhile, German aviation effectively supported ground forces, halting Soviet tanks near Grodno and Vitebsk. Soviet aviation was incapable of such feats in 1941.
The same abrupt rearmament affected armored forces: divisions received modern T-34s and KVs, but crews were untrained. Drivers transferred straight from light T-26s and BTs (10-15 tonnes) to T-34s (~26 tonnes) and KVs (~50 tonnes) without preparation and knew nothing of their new machines. The 14th Tank Division report (Lepel offensive) states:
"In reality, 14 KVs arrived (of 20). The rest were scattered along the route with technical faults, under factory repair. Drivers were inexperienced-mostly former truck or T-26 drivers. Their first practical driving experience was marching 75 km from Smolensk unloading station to Zaolsha concentration area…"
Fighting well-designed but unmastered tanks was difficult. In the same battle at Chernogostnitsa River, 17 tanks bogged down, including 2 KVs and 7 T-34s. Experienced drivers familiar with their vehicles might have avoided this.
Repair and recovery of unmastered machines was even harder.
Thus, the tank battle near Vitebsk, like earlier battles at Grodno, clearly showed that having many excellent tanks and good tankers was insufficient to stop and defeat a skillful enemy. The air battle over the Western Front in July 1941 showed that having excellent planes and pilots also decided little. This created the Wehrmacht's operational-tactical superiority over the RKKA-through mastery of the two defining instruments of mid-20th-century warfare: armored and air formations.
This reflected the Red Army's insufficient experience with tanks and aviation and the lack of commanders able to build organizational structures suited to the superb military technology created in the USSR.
* * * * *
Based on the experience of using mobile formations, the RKKA General Staff decided on 8 July 1941 to abolish the corps echelon of armored troops and reorganize the remaining tank divisions (reducing the number of tanks per division, replacing the howitzer artillery regiment with an anti-tank artillery regiment).
On 15 July 1941, Stavka issued a directive letter on further RKKA reorganization. It emphasized the need to "gradually, without harming current operations," disband mechanized corps and shift to a tank brigade structure (single-regiment formations) as the main tactical unit of armored forces. This was not only because mechanized corps were too cumbersome in command and logistics, or "overloaded with tanks" and "underloaded with infantry or artillery," but also because the RKKA lacked (or no longer had) commanders capable of managing such complex instruments of war.
All four front-line mechanized corps commanders of the Western Front (Khatskilevich, Akhlustin, Mostovenko, Oborin), as well as armored forces general D. G. Pavlov, were lost in the first battles. We will never know their tank command talents. Khatskilevich and Akhlustin fell in combat; Mostovenko escaped encirclement; Pavlov and Oborin were "appointed" main culprits of the defeat and executed.
As for the 7th Mechanized Corps commander V. I. Vinogradov, he rose from rifle battalion commander to regiment commander, then spent seven years heading the Ryazan Infantry School. In October 1939 he commanded a rifle corps in Finland and in June 1940 was assigned the 7th Mechanized Corps. Where and when could he have gained experience commanding armored formations in battle?
After the Lepel failure, Vinogradov was reassigned to rear work but retained Stalin's trust and was promoted (general-lieutenant in May 1942, ending the war as colonel-general).
Major General I. P. Alekseenko was severely wounded near Smolensk and died on 2 August 1941.
Lt. Gen. P. A. Kurochkin later redeemed himself, commanding an army, then the Northwestern Front. He ended the war as colonel-general, later headed the General Staff Academy, and became a general of the army.
Stalin's style was to promote someone several steps upward, give him power and responsibility, and observe the result. In 1941 this led to tragedy. In June, Pavlov faltered; in July came the turn of Vinogradov-a Stalin appointee tasked beyond his experience or capability.
| Formation | Wehrmacht Commander (Birth) |
RKKA Commander (Birth) |
| Army Group | Bock (1880) | Pavlov (1897) Eremenko (1892) Timoshenko (1895) |
| Army, Panzer Group |
Kluge (1882) Strauss (1879) Weichs (1881) Hoth (1880) Guderian (1888) |
V. I. Kuznetsov (1894) Korobkov (1897) Golubev (1896) Filatov (1893) Konev (1897) Remezov (1896) Kurochkin (1900) Gerasimenko (1900) F. I. Kuznetsov (1898) Ershakov (1893) |
On both sides there were many of the same generation, but on the German side this was the generation of WWI field and staff officers, while on the Soviet side this generation was "lost". After Stalin's purges, a completely different generation held high command.
Repressed 1936-38 Soviet commanders were contemporaries of 1941's generals: I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir (b. 1896), I. F. Fedko (b. 1897), General-Colonel G. M. Shtern (b. 1900, executed 1941). M. N. Tukhachevsky and I. P. Belov were born in 1893; only Marshal A. I. Egorov (b. 1883) belonged to the older generation and ended WWI as colonel.
Thus, the elimination of Russia's German-age cohort occurred earlier, during the Revolution and Civil War.
The RKKA completely severed continuity with the Imperial Army despite many tsarist officers joining it.
Hence, 1941 Wehrmacht commanders had been WWI captains and majors, while their RKKA counterparts were at best lieutenants then.
The 1936-38 purges altered young commanders' promotion order. By 1941, K. K. Rokossovsky, who commanded a corps in 1936, was only a major general commanding a forming mechanized corps, while his former subordinates were generals of the army or district commanders (e.g. G. K. Zhukov, D. G. Pavlov).
Thus, the Soviet rearmament leap included not only equipment but also personnel. While German commanders in their mid-40s were gaining regimental command experience, their Soviet peers were already corps or army commanders-often lacking experience.
* * * * *
The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was gradually being reorganized. In addition to the decision to disband mechanized corps, the Directive Letter of 15 July 1941 indicated the need to transition to a system of small armies "of five, maximum six divisions without corps headquarters, with divisions directly subordinated to army commanders." A. M. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs:
"Stavka and the General Staff were also forced to take such a temporary measure as the abolition of the corps echelon. We resorted to this because we could not quickly replace the losses in command personnel. As a result, corps headquarters were severely understrength and unable to perform their functions effectively or command units and formations efficiently…"
The enormous loss of tanks, artillery, vehicles, and aircraft necessitated changes in force structure. According to the TO&E of 29 July 1941, rifle divisions were left with only one artillery regiment instead of two, personnel was reduced by approximately one-third, and the number of vehicles-and thus divisional mobility-was reduced by two-thirds.
Air divisions were reorganized into two-regiment structures, with aircraft numbers per regiment reduced first to 30, then to 22. Light cavalry divisions were created with a strength of up to 3,000 personnel. Instead of anti-tank artillery brigades, anti-tank artillery regiments of five, then four batteries (16 guns) were formed. Artillery regiments of Reserve of the High Command were also reorganized to reduced establishments.
On 14 July, Stavka issued an order on the preservation of weapons; on 16 July, the GKO adopted a resolution to strengthen discipline in the troops and the Politburo decided to introduce the institution of military commissars.
The country was preparing for a different war - not "on foreign soil" and not "with little bloodshed"…