The beginning of August 1941 was marked by a renewed intensification of German operations on the Eastern Front. However, this time Army Group Centre did not direct its main efforts towards Moscow, but shifted the axis of its offensive southward. The plan was to first conduct a limited operation near Roslavl, then near Rogachev, followed by the defeat of Soviet forces near Gomel, and finally to deploy the 2nd Army against the Korosten grouping - the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front.
The German command intended to use its mobile forces (2nd Panzer Group) to encircle the Soviet Southwestern Front east of the Dnieper in coordination with the 1st Panzer Group of Army Group South.
This shift in the direction of the German offensive was yet another unpleasant surprise for the Soviet High Command.
On the southern flank of the Western Direction, Soviet forces were consolidated into the CENTRAL FRONT under Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov.
Former Chief of Operations of the 13th Army HQ, S. P. Ivanov (later Army General), cited in his memoirs an excerpt from the Central Front directive signed by I. V. Stalin and G. K. Zhukov:
"…It is extremely necessary for the Central Front to act as actively as possible, in order to tie down as many enemy forces as possible…"
At the end of July, Central Front forces indeed acted actively, diverting significant German forces from the Moscow axis. However, as noted in the Front's operations summary for the morning of 1 August:
"As a result of unsuccessful fighting on the east bank of the Sozh River east and northeast of Krichev and offensive fighting between Krichev and Propoisk, the Front's forces are now engaged in defensive battles."
By early August, the Central Front consisted of three armies: the 13th, 21st, and 3rd.
The 13th Army, having suffered defeat near Mogilev, held a broad sector along the Sozh River from Propoisk to (exclusive) Mstislavl. On 28 July, its newly appointed commander, Major General K. D. Golubev, attempted to reorganize command and control of his forces.
As he wrote to F. I. Kuznetsov on 31 July, who did not support his idea, the proposed changes were:
"1. Eliminate the countless detachments and sub-detachments bearing the numbers of various divisions, which when plotted on maps misled Front HQ and Stavka.
2. Consolidate all troops into two corps, each with two divisions.
The 45th Rifle Corps under Magon would include the 148th Rifle Division and a composite division formed from the 4th Airborne Corps, which in reality amounted to only two regiments. I believed that calling things by their true names meant understanding them correctly. Additionally, I was attempting to form an army reserve from rear units, using the 6th Rifle Division HQ.
I issued orders accordingly, but now everything must change again. The 4th Airborne Corps is to be restored (5,512 rifles, 8 guns, 12 heavy and 66 light machine guns). If you deem it necessary to revert, I will comply, but this will leave Magon with only the 148th Rifle Division, assembled from detachments of the 6th, 148th, 160th, and 132nd Divisions, totaling 4,900 rifles…
3. You daily reproach me for poor command and lack of situational awareness. It is not for me to judge; as my superior, you evaluate me. But I feel obliged to state that I believe I know the dispositions of my forces and the enemy before them. When I am unclear, I report honestly and ask permission to clarify before giving a definitive report. Our information comes not from random sources but from liaison officers, subordinate commanders and HQs, and aviation.
Please note that the Army Military Council is working under extremely difficult conditions: we have not a single meter of wire, very few aircraft, and a 105 km front held by a thin 'cardboard' line with an average density of 40 rifles, 1.3 guns, and 2.1 machine guns per km.
We receive no reinforcements or equipment, and logistics are disorganized. Under these harsh conditions, we try to resolve everything ourselves with our own means, and we can and must do much, but some things are simply beyond our capacity.
For example, I am firmly convinced that the enemy facing Magon is much stronger than the Front HQ believes - I estimate two infantry divisions up to a full corps. It is wrong to think that Magon's 10,000-strong corps can easily defeat them.
…I now fear that the enemy, using its superiority, will break through the weak front of the 148th Division to strike the flank and rear of Kachalov, from whom we are separated by 35 km. Under these conditions, we are forming a reserve division, but even if we succeed, it will be mere infantry without heavy weapons. We urgently need machine guns, artillery (requests submitted).
We desperately need a fresh rifle division and at least a tank battalion…"
The structure of the 13th Army in late July - early August 1941 is important for understanding force distribution before the new German offensive.
On the Roslavl axis, the 148th Rifle Division held the line. Its 507th Rifle Regiment, by 10 July, had reached the Dnieper south of Mogilev but was encircled with the 61st Rifle Corps and destroyed by mid-July. The 496th Rifle Regiment fought at the Bykhov bridgehead and was also encircled (by 25 July, 400 men had escaped). By early August, both regiments were reconstituted; artillery status is unknown. The division was reinforced with the 649th Corps Artillery Regiment, and also included two battalions of the 712th Rifle Regiment (132nd Division) with 25 guns.
The 160th Rifle Division, arriving piecemeal, had fought at Bykhov and Chausy. By 25 July, 1,500 men had escaped encirclement south of the Sozh, integrated into the 137th Rifle Division. In the 45th Corps, detachments of the 636th Rifle Regiment (up to battalion strength, with 14 guns) and the reconstituting 443rd Rifle Regiment fought. On 26 July, the division's strength was 1,200 men, HQ at Khotovizh.
As part of Golubev's reorganization, 160th Division detachments were subordinated to the 148th Division, becoming its 654th Rifle Regiment.
On the right flank of the 148th Division (and 13th Army) operated a detachment from the 6th Rifle Division: 84th Rifle Regiment and 3rd Battalion of the 125th Rifle Regiment (both reassigned to the 148th Division). The 6th Division HQ was moved to army reserve near Baleshin (south of Klimovichi) for refitting.
Near Krichev operated the 4th Airborne Corps (two airborne brigades formed from new rifle divisions prewar), referred to in 13th Army documents as a "composite division" or "Grishin's command." Soon Golubev's reorganization was reversed, the corps regained its designation, Colonel A. F. Kazankin was appointed commander, and Colonel M. D. Grishin was reassigned (later appointed commander of the 42nd Rifle Division).
The 13th Army had offensive orders (e.g., the 148th Division was to attack Molyatichi), but soon faced a German offensive towards Roslavl.
On the boundary with the 13th Army, the 28th Army of the Western Front under Lt. Gen. V. Ya. Kachalov (145th and 149th Rifle, 104th Tank Divisions) was engaged. Operating on diverging axes, a gap developed between the armies, covered only by weak detachments (e.g., a rifle battalion of the 222nd Rifle Division at Shumyachi, its recon battalion at Zagustino/Petrovichi). There was no lateral connection or reliable communication.
Near Roslavl, on 31 July, the HQ of the 33rd Rifle Corps (28th Army) began forming the new 43rd Army under Lt. Gen. I. G. Zakharkin (planned to include the 53rd, 217th, 222nd Rifle and 105th Tank Divisions). Soon it received additional divisions (211th, 258th, 260th, 279th, 290th, 303rd Rifle), and the 109th Tank Division replaced the 105th.
The 43rd Army became part of the new Reserve Front, formed on 30 July from the Front of Reserve Armies under Army General G. K. Zhukov, recently dismissed as Chief of the General Staff.
The 21st Army of the Central Front under Lt. Gen. M. G. Efremov was more combat-ready, with three rifle and one mechanized corps. However, all units (including the 25th Mechanized Corps) were already engaged.
Army boundaries:
• Right: (excl.) Unecha, (excl.) Propoisk, (excl.) Mogilev
• Left: Gomel, (excl.) Bobruisk, (excl.) Osipovichi
Its mission remained to destroy the Bobruisk-Bykhov enemy grouping, but the offensive scheduled for 31 July was cancelled, and the army switched to defensive operations.
On 1 August, the 3rd Army officially joined the Central Front, its HQ having escaped encirclement in late July (retreating from Grodno). Its forces included units fighting in Polesye, notably the 66th Rifle Corps (formerly of the 21st Army).
Summary as of 1 August: Personnel: 258,345, Tanks: 179 (13th Army - 15, 21st - 142, 3rd - 22), Guns: 1,337 (896 field guns, 441 howitzers), Mortars: 502
The Front Air Force had 94 aircraft: Bombers: 28 SB, 35 Su-2, Fighters: 1 I-16, 2 I-15, 8 MiG-3, Auxiliary: 20 aircraft.
* * *
The Central Front's Order of Battle Was Unimpressive. Unlike other fronts, it had virtually no new formations and no reserves. In G. K. Zhukov's memoirs, an interesting episode from late July 1941 is described.
Zhukov wrote that after discussing the situation on the Soviet-German front with Chief of the General Staff Operations Directorate V. M. Zlobin and his deputy A. M. Vasilevsky:
"…We came to the conclusion that the enemy would likely seek in the near future to defeat our Central Front to outflank and strike the rear of the Southwestern Front…"
(quotation from the first edition of "Reminiscences and Reflections," 1969; later editions describe this scene somewhat differently).
On 29 July, Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov requested an urgent meeting with Stalin.
"What do you propose?" asked I. V. Stalin.
"First of all, reinforce the Central Front by transferring at least three armies strengthened with artillery. One army from the Western Direction, another from the Southwestern Front, and a third from Stavka reserve. Place an experienced and energetic commander in charge. Specifically, I propose N. F. Vatutin…"
Zhukov then described how, continuing his report, he proposed withdrawing the entire Southwestern Front beyond the Dnieper.
"What about Kiev?" asked Stalin.
"…We will have to abandon Kiev…"
According to Zhukov, it was after this that he was removed from his post as Chief of the General Staff and appointed commander of the Reserve Front.
Overall, the entire episode seems somewhat implausible. Other participants (Stalin, Mekhlis) naturally left no memoirs of it. In the afternoon, Stalin indeed met with Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Shaposhnikov, Kulik, and Mekhlis.
It is likely that Zhukov conflated temporally separate events: his proposals to reinforce the Central Front and his proposal to withdraw the Southwestern Front behind the Dnieper and abandon Kiev. Similarly, earlier Zhukov wrote about the Bobruisk offensive of 13 July:
"The main blow was delivered by the 63rd Rifle Corps under General L. G. Petrovsky. A few days later he died a hero's death…"
(though Petrovsky actually died a month later during the Central Front's defeat).
Moreover, in late July 1941, there were no grounds for abandoning Kiev or withdrawing the entire Southwestern Front to the left bank of the Dnieper. The Army Group South offensive against Kiev had failed. The German command concluded that Army Group South alone could not defeat Soviet forces in Ukraine. This was precisely why Army Group Centre's right flank was pivoted southward to assist.
What is truly important, however, is that in late July there were two possible strategic decisions:
1 - Strengthen the Moscow axis, or
2 - Focus attention on the Central Front - the key to the Southwestern Front's stability.
The choice between these was not obvious. Determining exactly which direction the German command would choose was impossible: even the Germans themselves had not yet decided, and throughout August, various events on the Soviet-German front kept returning German generals to the idea of resuming the advance on Moscow.
The idea of reinforcing the Central Front was never implemented. Apparently, it involved transferring to its command:
• the 28th Army (Western Front),
• the 43rd Army (Reserve Front, second echelon), and
• the 5th Army (Southwestern Front).
Timely transfer of the 43rd Army, with its fresh 217th and 222nd Rifle Divisions and one tank division, could have significantly altered the course of events.
However, Soviet command decisions were clearly too slow. The German command retained strategic initiative, choosing the time, place, and character of upcoming battles. Thus, the weak Central Front became easy prey for the Wehrmacht.
Opposing Soviet Central Front forces was the German 2nd Army under Colonel General M. von Weichs, consisting of the 35th, 43rd, 53rd, 12th, and 13th Army Corps.
The 35th Army Corps (45th and 293rd Infantry Divisions) and 43rd Army Corps (134th and 260th Infantry Divisions) advanced in Polesye. On 31 July, Field Marshal F. von Bock recorded in his diary:
"A Russian staff aircraft landed behind our lines. Orders found on the courier revealed to us the deployment of Russian troops defending against us on the southern wing of the Army Group. It turns out that only one division (232nd) opposes the XXXXIII Corps. Another division is a few kilometers away, stationed on the Ptich River (75th Division). Thus, the XXXXIII Corps has an excellent opportunity to defeat these two Russian divisions separately, thereby opening the way east for the XXXV Corps.
Weichs said he wanted to conduct this operation simultaneously with the attack on Rogachev, to achieve surprise, but that he needed to consider it thoroughly again…"
The 53rd Army Corps (255th, 267th, 52nd, and 167th Infantry Divisions) pinned down the Soviet 21st Army's strike groupings near Rogachev and Zhlobin.
The 12th Army Corps (31st, 112th, 17th Infantry Divisions) and 13th Army Corps (131st, 34th, 258th Infantry Divisions) relieved the 24th Motorized Corps along the front from Bykhov to Krichev.
The 1st Cavalry Division, previously part of the 24th Motorized Corps, was also transferred to the 2nd Army.
Thus, 14 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division were concentrated against the main forces of the Soviet Central Front.
In the Army Group Centre reserve were the 162nd, 87th, and 256th Infantry Divisions.
To defeat Soviet forces near Roslavl and on the right flank of the 13th Army, Army Group Guderian was formed:
• The freed-up 24th Motorized Corps (3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, 10th Motorized Division) became its main strike force.
• The 7th Army Corps, having cleared Mogilev, formed the western strike grouping (7th, 23rd, 78th, and the 197th Infantry Division transferred from OKH reserve, which deployed north of Mstislavl).
• The 9th Army Corps, reinforced with motorized artillery from the 47th Motorized Corps, formed the northern strike grouping (263rd, 292nd, and the 137th Infantry Divisions, the latter freed from the Smolensk area).
A feature of the Soviet-German front during this period was the lack of a continuous frontline in places. Only the fact that the main forces of both sides were tied down in combat prevented free maneuver of reserves.
The relief of the 24th Motorized Corps, the release of an entire army corps from Mogilev, and one infantry division from the Smolensk area, plus the transfer of another infantry division from OKH reserve, were significant assets for the Wehrmacht in the upcoming battle.
The enemy troop buildup against the right flank of the 13th Army did not go unnoticed by the 45th Rifle Corps and 13th Army command. However, Front Commander Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov disagreed with his subordinates' assessment of growing enemy strength on the Roslavl axis.
In a note at 02:00 on 31 July, Colonel L. M. Sandalov wrote to K. D. Golubev:
"The Front Commander is aware of the situation and ordered the following to be conveyed to you:
Magon is clearly overestimating enemy strength.
You must fulfill your mission with the forces you have, and not request reinforcements, especially since our capabilities are known to you…"
A few hours later, on 1 August, the new German offensive began.
* * * * *
On the very first day, the German 3rd Panzer Division under Lieutenant General W. Model, after overcoming weak resistance, reached the western bank of the Oster River south of Khoronevo, capturing the bridges intact. By the end of the day, Soviet reports noted the head of an enemy motorized column near Shumovka on the Warsaw Highway south of Shumyachi, and described Soviet air attacks on advancing German forces near Zvenchatka and Shumovka.
The German 4th Panzer Division, having been relieved near Krichev by the 258th Infantry Division, was redeployed to the northern flank of the 24th Motorized Corps. It bypassed 13th Army positions, outflanking and threatening the rear of the 28th Army. As stated in the division's history, in the first two days it advanced 70 km, capturing 400 prisoners, 35 guns, 7 tanks, and 58 other vehicles.
The German 7th Army Corps, comprising four infantry divisions, attacked from the Krichev (excl.) - Khislavichiline. Its central formation, the 23rd Infantry Division, advanced from Mstislavl towards Roslavl. As Guderian wrote in his memoirs:
"While visiting the troops, I came under bomb attack from our own aircraft, which dropped bombs on units of the 23rd Infantry Division, causing heavy casualties. The first bomb fell 50 meters in front of my car. Such unfortunate incidents occurred despite our forces having proper identification and march routes being clearly designated in orders… Otherwise, the advance of the 23rd Infantry Division encountered no serious resistance."
The Soviet 148th Rifle Division of the 45th Rifle Corps, with 5,000 men holding a 25 km front (and tasked with offensive, not defensive operations), was literally swept away by the German offensive. Communication between the 13th Army HQ and both the 45th Corps and the 148th Division was severed. Division commander Colonel F. M. Cherokmanov was wounded, while Commissar M. L. Odisharia was captured. About 500 survivors, led by the division's Chief of Staff, reached Yershichi south of Roslavl by 5 August.
The 6th Rifle Division detachment on the northern flank was also encircled (its remnants broke out on the night of 4 August).
There is information that Colonel M. A. Popsuy-Shapko, division commander, was killed that day (According to the "Memorial" database of the Russian Ministry of Defense, he is listed as missing in action; however, the same source states that, "according to Directorate I, he was executed, but there is no official record").
The 13th Army HQ immediately lost control of its troops in the breakthrough sector and could not even inform the 28th Army, within whose sector Roslavl lay, about the tank breakthrough.
The 13th Army had no reserves on the Roslavl axis. However, two cavalry divisions of General-Colonel O. I. Gorodovikov's Cavalry Inspectorate Group (21st Mountain Cavalry and 52nd Cavalry Divisions) were concentrating southwest of Roslavl. They were intended for a deep raid into the enemy rear opposing Kachalov's Operational Group, and later into the rear of the German Yelnya grouping. But soon they had to engage under entirely different conditions.
Still, the Central Front command continued to underestimate enemy strength and intentions. In a 3 August conversation between Front Commander Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov and 13th Army Chief of Staff Combrig A. V. Petrushevsky:
"- Permission to report yesterday's outcome of 52nd Cavalry Division's battle. By day's end, it began advancing successfully but came under heavy flank attack by tanks, motorcyclists, and motorized infantry, forcing it back to the Pozhyr area, where it is regrouping. That is all.
- Comrade Petrushevsky, you are a military man and thus know that for the enemy to deliver strong fire on the Roslavl-Dedino front, he would need to deploy several divisions, which he does not have. The fact that 52nd Cavalry Division came under such heavy fire indicates poor reconnaissance, poor use of firepower, weak initiative, and low combat resilience. Instill this firmly in your commanders. Understand that the enemy has not yet developed a major offensive - something is hindering him. What could that be? First, our large troop presence. Second, the enemy has been badly mauled by our aviation. I see no decisive enemy action, except for initial moves against the 148th Rifle Division, which, being leaderless, disintegrated. That is what I see…"
On 3 August, units of the 9th Army Corps, the northern strike group of Army Group Guderian, broke through to the Roslavl-Smolensk highway and soon linked up with the 4th Panzer Division's spearhead (western strike group), completing the encirclement of the 28th Army's Operational Group.
By 6 August, fighting with the encircled Soviet forces near Roslavl ended. The German command summarized the battle:
"Soviet formations encircled near Roslavl, 100 km southeast of Smolensk, have been destroyed. 38,000 prisoners, 250 tanks, 359 guns, and other weapons were captured…"
28th Army commander Lt. Gen. V. Ya. Kachalov and Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. P. G. Egorov were killed. Army Chief of Artillery Maj. Gen. V. E. Taranovich led some survivors out of encirclement.
149th Rifle Division commander Maj. Gen. F. D. Zakharov escaped on 28 August; the division was reconstituted and fought with the 43rd Army (Reserve Front).
The 145th Rifle Division was virtually destroyed and disbanded. Its former commander Maj. Gen. A. A. Volkhyn escaped [Kachalov had criticized him on 31 July, requesting his removal and trial; Colonel K. Ya. Baulin took command the same day. Volkhyn was officially dismissed on 28 August 1941, reassigned to the Stalingrad Military District, commanded the 16th Reserve Rifle Brigade, later led the 147th Rifle Division at Stalingrad, was court-martialed and sentenced to death (commuted to 10 years labor camp), returned to the army in Dec 1942, and promoted to Major General in Jan 1944], while Baulin was captured.
On 7 August, Central Front commander Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov was recalled to Moscow and soon sent to Crimea. Command passed to Lt. Gen. M. G. Efremov; Maj. Gen. V. N. Gordov became acting 21st Army commander.
Meanwhile, on 5 August, the 45th Rifle Corps under Comdiv E. Ya. Magon (121st and 137th Rifle Divisions, later joined by the 132nd Rifle Division and 21st Cavalry Division) launched a flank counterattack towards Dubovitsa, aiming to reach the Krichev-Roslavl highway.
The 13th Army was reinforced with the 50th Tank Division (81 tanks as of 10 August) with the 25th Mechanized Corps HQ.
On 6 August, after regrouping, the 4th Airborne Corps also counterattacked near the Krichev bridgehead, while 6th Rifle Division units captured Ganovka.
By 7 August, Magon's 45th Rifle Corps (promoted to Major General that day) advanced and secured the Krichev-Roslavl highway east of Khotovizh.
However, on 9 August, a new German offensive on Klimovichi began: the 24th Motorized Corps (3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, 10th Motorized Division second echelon) of Army Group Guderian, reinforced by the 7th Infantry Division, struck the 13th Army's right flank south of Miloslavichi, advancing towards Rodnya and Klimovichi.
The 45th Rifle Corps, attacking Dubovitsa and tied down by 7th Army Corps infantry, was outflanked on the right, its communications cut, and contact lost. A 50th Tank Division detachment (20 tanks, motor rifle battalion, light AT battery) was sent to assist. On 11 August, it broke through to corps HQ, but during breakout Maj. Gen. E. Ya. Magon was killed (listed as missing; buried in Klimovichi, Mogilev region).
The 132nd Rifle Division attempted breakout near Titovka (east of Klimovichi); its Chief of Staff Colonel D. V. Bychkov was captured. Commissar P. I. Lukovkin was killed in battle. Division remnants escaped only in Septemberwith commander Maj. Gen. S. S. Biryuzov (future Marshal of the USSR).
The 21st Cavalry Division was ordered to remain behind enemy lines and disrupt communications but was completely destroyed. Its commander Colonel Ya. K. Kuliyev and Special Department Chief A. S. Kibalknikov, disguised in civilian clothes, escaped two weeks later.
2nd Panzer Group commander Colonel General H. Guderian reported:
"The 24th Panzer Corps, reinforced by the 7th Infantry Division, executed a well-planned and conducted encirclement of enemy forces operating near Miloslavichi-Klimovichi from 8-13 August. As a result, four enemy rifle divisions, strong cavalry forces, and an airborne brigade were destroyed or scattered.
16,000 prisoners, 48 guns, 15 tanks, 26 AT guns, 2 AA guns, and an armored train were captured. Enemy losses were very high…"
On 12 August, the northern strike grouping of the German 2nd Army launched an offensive on the Gomel axis: 12th and 13th Army Corps (seven infantry divisions) and the 1st Cavalry Division. The main attack was delivered in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh rivers, in the sectors of the 219th Motorized Division (from Propoisk) and the 67th Rifle Corps (Bolshaya Zimnitsa, Iskan'). As a result, the 67th Rifle Corps' front was ruptured.
The Soviet command had no idea that such significant enemy forces were massing against the center of the 21st Army. Corps Commander K. N. Galitsky recalled a meeting at the 21st Army HQ:
"Neither V. N. Gordov nor we, corps commanders (myself and L. G. Petrovsky), upon arriving at Dovsk, were able to determine the enemy's strength and intentions for its decisive offensive on the Gomel axis, and we believed that counterattacks would suffice to hold our lines…"
Meanwhile, lacking fresh reserves, the Central Front command was forced to redeploy units from quiet sectors to plug German breakthroughs. In early August, the 21st Army lost:
• 42nd and 155th Rifle Divisions,
• 50th Tank Division,
• 503rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment,
• 420th Corps Artillery Regiment,
• 387th RHK Howitzer Artillery Regiment,
• 25th Mechanized Corps HQ,
• 20th Rifle Corps HQ.
As a result, by the start of the German offensive on Gomel, Soviet defenses in the interfluve were weakened: only the 219th Motorized Division (with its motorcycle regiment) and four rifle divisions of the 67th Corps with limited artillery faced the enemy.
That same day, the 43rd Army Corps of the German western strike grouping (2 infantry divisions) continued its offensive begun on 5 August in Polesye, pushing Soviet forces south of Zhlobin beyond the Dnieper, and on the Rechitsa axis reached Boroviki-Charneyka.
On 13 August, Corps Commander Maj. Gen. K. N. Galitsky was seriously wounded and evacuated. Reportedly, Combrig N. A. Gusevsky replaced him that same day.
At the same time, it was reported that Acting 21st Army Commander Maj. Gen. V. N. Gordov was also wounded near Dovsk. In a report by Colonel Angarsky, Senior Assistant Chief of Operations of Front HQ, covering 9-25 August, Gordov's injury was described:
"Army HQ lost contact with its forces at the most critical moment and exerted no influence on the battle. The Army Commander left for Dovsk with operations staff but came under artillery fire en route and, as Front HQ was told, was seriously wounded.
Later it turned out this was a fabrication by panicked staff officers. Gordov was unharmed, but Army HQ persisted in requesting permission to relocate its CP from Chechersk (which was not threatened) to Gomel…"
Colonel D. F. Tsumarev, in an oral report around 11:25 on 13 August, said:
"Just now received reports from signalmen sent to Dovsk to restore communications. They could not reach Dovsk due to heavy fighting; our units 3 km south of Dovsk are retreating south…
Please report to Sandalov and relay his decision. I believe Army HQ must prepare a new CP immediately. Rear units are pressing into HQ's current area. There is a risk we will be too late relocating CP…"
Colonel Angarsky's report continued:
"Upon learning of the withdrawal of both central corps of the 21st Army [many Front HQ documents refer to 67th and 20th Corps sectors, though 20th Corps HQ had been ordered on 11 August to transfer to Stavka's disposal], and given Army HQ confusion, Front Commander Lt. Gen. Efremov and Military Council Member Ponomarenko went with operations staff to Dovsk.
At the same time, to Tsumarev (21st Army Ops Chief) was sent this order:
1. Categorically forbid withdrawal or talk of withdrawal.
2. Lt. Gen. Petrovsky (63rd Corps) to take command of the army immediately.
3. Command of 63rd Corps to pass to Petrovsky's designated deputy.
4. Report name of acting 63rd Corps commander to Front Military Council immediately.
5. 21st Army's task: encircle, pin, and destroy the enemy that has broken through, forcing him against the Sozh River.
6. Army HQ must remain close to troops, organize and lead battle, and by no means flee in a crisis.
7. Repeat: withdrawal is forbidden, even to consider. Restore the situation step by step, strengthen each position; if you cannot advance, crawl forward. But this is not an enemy we crawl against - we must advance and attack.
8. Report execution.
Acting Front Commander Efremov, Military Council Member Gaponovich, 13.8.41, 11:50."
For unclear reasons, Efremov's order to appoint Petrovsky as 21st Army Commander remained unimplemented. Other "decisive" paper measures also failed.
On 14 August, by 08:00, the German 1st Cavalry Division captured Chechersk. The 21st Army HQ, located nearby, was struck, command and control collapsed. HQ received relocation orders only in the evening, escaped with losses, and moved to Vetka.
Without contact with HQ, and aware of the catastrophe unfolding on its right flank, the 63rd Rifle Corps under Lt. Gen. L. G. Petrovsky abandoned Rogachev and Zhlobin by day's end, withdrawing east of the Dnieper to Stolpnya, Gorodets, Chernaya Virnya, Zhlobin.
Colonel Angarsky's report stated:
"On 15 August, 21st Army's situation not only failed to improve, it worsened, requiring the most decisive actions by Army Command in planning withdrawal…"
F. Halder wrote in his diary:
"The offensive near Rogachev is developing very successfully. Soon the northern (12th, 13th Corps) and western (43rd Corps) strike groups may link up north of Gomel. We can expect many prisoners and booty. 24th Motorized Corps units are advancing very slowly, but fortunately they are not needed for the final assault on Gomel…"
By 17 August, battles near Zhlobin ended. East of Zhlobin, five rifle divisions of the 21st Army were destroyed:
• 61st, 154th (63rd Corps),
• 102nd, 151st, 167th (67th Corps).
A September 19 "inventory" saw the 61st, 151st, and 102nd Divisions disbanded; the 167th was disbanded in December, but effectively lost in mid-August.
61st Division Commander Maj. Gen. N. A. Prishchepa was mortally wounded, dying 18 August. 102nd Division Commander Colonel S. S. Chernyugov escaped; Chief of Staff Combrig I. G. Bessonov was captured (collaborated in captivity, executed 1950).
63rd Corps HQ was destroyed. In a rearguard fight at Skepnya (20 km east of Zhlobin), Corps Commander Lt. Gen. L. G. Petrovsky and Chief of Artillery Maj. Gen. A. F. Kazakov were killed.
Chief of Staff Colonel A. L. Feigin was captured 18 August (died shortly after liberation 18 May 1945).
On 19 August, German forces captured Gomel. Alarmed by the situation on the Central Front and the threat to the Southwestern Front, on 20 August, Stavka member Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov (then Reserve Front Commander) reported to I. V. Stalin:
"The enemy, seeing our major forces massed on the road to Moscow, with Central Front and Velikiye Luki groups on his flanks, has temporarily abandoned his Moscow attack, gone on active defense against Western and Reserve Fronts, and thrown all his mobile and panzer forces against Central, Southwestern, and Southern Fronts.
Possible enemy plan: defeat Central Front, reach Chernigov, Konotop, Priluki, strike Southwestern Front armies from the rear, then renew the main offensive on Moscow via Bryansk forests and against Donbass.
I believe the enemy knows our defense system, operational-strategic dispositions, and capabilities well…
To counter this and prevent Central Front's destruction and an enemy breakthrough into Southwestern Front's rear, I submit the urgent need to concentrate a strong grouping near Glukhov, Chernigov, Konotop.
Screening forces must immediately deploy along the Desna River…"
That day, Stavka replied:
"We agree with your assessment of probable German movement towards Chernigov, Konotop, Priluki. Such an advance would outflank our Kiev group from east of the Dnieper and encircle 3rd and 21st Armies…
To prevent this, the Bryansk Front has been formed under Eremenko. Other measures are underway. We hope to halt the German advance. Stalin, Shaposhnikov."
That day, Stavka authorized withdrawal of Central Front's left wing (3rd Army) and Southwestern Front's right wing (5th Army and 27th Corps) east of the Dnieper.
On 21 August, Hitler issued Directive:
"… 2. The exceptionally favorable operational situation created by our reaching the Gomel-Pochep line must be immediately exploited by Army Groups South and Centre in converging attacks.
The aim is not merely to push the Soviet 5th Army beyond the Dnieper by a local offensive of the 6th Army, but to completely destroy enemy forces before they can retreat to the Desna-Konotop-Sula line.
This will enable Army Group South to advance east of the middle Dnieper and, with its left flank linked to central forces, continue the offensive towards Rostov and Kharkov…"
Combat operations on the Central Front represented a classic defeat in detail - a series of successive Wehrmacht operations in each of which the enemy created overwhelming superiority over Soviet forces.
First, the Wehrmacht conducted its operation near Roslavl, where the German western strike group (2 panzer, 1 motorized, and 4 infantry divisions) faced only a single Soviet unit - the 148th Rifle Division, practically without reinforcement assets and tasked with offensive rather than defensive missions.
It is unsurprising that Army Group Commander Colonel General H. Guderian recalled, "The infantry simply marched forward," and the main German losses were caused by their own aviation!
After capturing Roslavl, the enemy simply crushed Soviet units hurriedly redeployed to the breakthrough sector. The Soviet command managed to significantly reinforce the 13th Army, adding:
• 2 cavalry divisions,
• 4 reconstituted rifle divisions (137th, 121st, 132nd, 155th),
• 50th Tank Division,
• heavy artillery.
However, all these new formations had to enter battle directly from march, with no time to form counterattack groupings, conduct reconnaissance, or coordinate with neighbors or between combat arms.
As a result, they could only contain the enemy but could not reverse the situation.
Next, the enemy struck in the Dnieper-Sozh interfluve, precisely where Soviet command had been stripping units away, seeing it as a quiet sector. Again, against Soviet divisions deprived of attached reinforcement assets, the Germans created numerical superiority. The 12 August offensive by 7 German infantry and 1 cavalry division split the 67th Rifle Corps front in two (the corps HQ had just taken over the sector from the 20th Rifle Corps, reassigned to Stavka reserve, and likely had no time to establish reliable communications with its new divisions).
The enemy's ability to target headquarters immediately disrupted command and control, which was never restored before Gomel fell.
It is noteworthy that the Soviet Central Front operated "with a single composition": all plans to reinforce it remained on paper. There were no reserves to counter German breakthroughs or plug gaps (the decision to withdraw the 167th Rifle Division from the 63rd Corps as reserve on a "quiet sector" was clearly too late). Critically, there was no mobile reserve, the only means that might have improved the situation.
Fresh units from Stavka reserve (266th and 277th Rifle Divisions) arrived at the front only at the "mopping up" stage, when the fate of Gomel and the entire Front was essentially sealed.
The Central Front clearly became a "pariah" in Soviet High Command planning. It lacked proper commanders - most were only acting: Acting Front Commander M. G. Efremov, Acting Chief of Staff L. M. Sandalov, Acting 21st Army Commander V. N. Gordov…
Only on the eve of the Front's disbandment was Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov appointed Chief of Staff - but he was not a staff officer, but a NKVD general.
S. P. Ivanov wrote in his memoirs:
"Central Front Chief of Staff, former 4th Army Chief of Staff Colonel L. M. Sandalov, visited our 13th Army CP. Sandaov praised our HQ's organization and rhythm, receiving data from Operations that were for him genuine revelations. He liked our communications hub and security. I remember he said:
'Well, you truly have order here. In 4th Army HQ, having lost most of its radios and vehicles during retreat, we had nothing like this.'
By the way, this disarray in HQ, which had struggled to command 4th Army formations, had a negative effect on the entire combat performance of the new Front, especially its coordination with neighbors…
Retrospectively assessing the operational situation, one concludes that the creation of the Central Front did not fulfill the hopes placed upon it, and it is no coincidence it existed for only a single month.
Lacking a fully functional HQ and, most importantly, weakly manned with troops, it found itself in precisely the sector where the decisive events of late summer - early autumn 1941 unfolded [emphasis added - Author]…"
The breakthrough towards Gomel from the north and the advance of the German 43rd Army Corps from Streshin led to the encirclement and destruction of the 63rd Rifle Corps and parts of the 67th Corps. As before, Soviet command delayed issuing retreat orders. This untimely withdrawal only worsened the situation.
The defeat near Zhlobin resulted in the loss of several divisions, large quantities of artillery, and promising commanders. The German command, summarizing the battles near Rogachev, Zhlobin, and Gomel, reported capturing 78,000 Soviet soldiers and officers, 144 tanks, and approximately 700 guns.
A gap was torn in the Central Front's defenses, drastically worsening the situation of the left-flank 3rd Army near Mozyr and Kalinkovichi. Gomel fell, undermining the entire front's stability.
Combined with the fact that the newly created Bryansk Front was only beginning to take command of the withdrawing 13th Army, and was simultaneously tasked with covering the Moscow axis, these developments promised immeasurable disasters for Soviet forces in Ukraine.
* * * * *
Having assessed the situation, the Soviet Supreme High Command concluded that it was necessary to unify the efforts of troops fighting the German 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group, to disband the Central Front and transfer its forces to the Bryansk Front, placing responsibility for eliminating the dangerous enemy grouping on Lt. Gen. A. I. Eremenko.
A. M. Vasilevsky included excerpts from Stalin's conversation with Eremenko in his memoirs:
Stalin:
"I have several questions for you. 1. Should we disband the Central Front, merge the 3rd Army with the 21st, and place the combined army under your command?.. …3. We can send you, tomorrow or the next day at the latest, two tank brigades with some KV tanks and 2-3 tank battalions; do you need them badly? 4. If you promise to smash that scoundrel Guderian, we can send a few more air regiments and some Katyusha batteries. Your answer?"
Eremenko:
"…1) My opinion on disbanding the Central Front: since I intend to destroy Guderian and will destroy him, the southern direction must be firmly secured. This means close coordination with the strike group advancing from Bryansk. Therefore I request the combined 21st and 3rd Armies be subordinated to me…
I am very grateful to you, Comrade Stalin, for reinforcing me with tanks and aircraft. Please accelerate their dispatch, they are very, very much needed.
As for that scoundrel Guderian, we will definitely try to destroy him and fulfill the task you set - to defeat him…"
Following this conversation, on the night of 25 August, Stavka decided to dissolve the Central Front as of 26 August. The 21st and 3rd Armies were transferred to the Bryansk Front; former Central Front Commander Lt. Gen. M. G. Efremov was appointed Deputy Commander of the Bryansk Front.
Lt. Gen. V. I. Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the 21st Army; Maj. Gen. V. N. Gordov returned as Chief of Staff. The army received the 3rd Army's troops and sector (including the 28th, 67th, and 66th Rifle Corps and cavalry group).
The 3rd Army HQ took command on the 50th and 13th Army boundary, covering the Mglyn direction, under Maj. Gen. Ya. G. Kreizer.
Eremenko later recalled that the dissolution of the Central Front was a mistake. The Bryansk Front had entirely different tasks, determining its deployment and reserves. Given the threat looming over the Southwestern Front, "the Central Front should not have been disbanded, but strengthened…"
Even after the loss of Gomel, there remained a (increasingly ephemeral) chance to protect the Southwestern Front's northern flank.
The situation worsened because the Bryansk Front failed to stop the enemy. Its assigned task - to launch a flank attack against Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, push it back towards Krichev-Propoisk, and by 15 September reach the Petrovichi-Klimovichi-Novozybkov-Shchors line - proved beyond its capabilities.
The gap between the 13th and 21st Armies could not be closed. Soviet measures were insufficient.
A. V. Vladimirskiy (in 1941, Deputy Chief of Operations, 5th Army, Southwestern Front) evaluated Stavka's decision:
"In the Stavka directive of 19 August, the Southwestern Front was ordered, after withdrawing the 5th Army and 27th Rifle Corps, to hold the right bank of the Dnieper between Loyev and Perevolochnaya, at all costs retaining Kiev.
Comparing both sides' positions at the Bryansk-Southwestern Front junction at this time shows that withdrawing the right wing to the Dnieper did not eliminate the threat of German envelopment from the north.
The Dnieper's significance had already partly diminished, since Army Group Centre had crossed it upstream in July, advanced up to 200 km eastwards on the Yelnya and Roslavl axes, and reached the Desna River.
Only an immediate withdrawal of the 5th Army and 27th Corps to the Desna or further to the Sula could remove the northern envelopment threat.
Initially, even the Southwestern Front Commander saw this, as his 19 August directive ordered 5th Army after reaching the Dnieper to pivot its right flank from Navozy to Chernigov, extending along the left bank of the Desna to Klad'kovka.
But on 20 August, this was changed by Front HQ orders, instructing 5th Army to defend along the Dnieper from Loyev to Stary Glybov, without bending its right flank east towards Chernigov, leaving it vulnerable.
This change was probably at Stavka's insistence, which at that crucial moment, instead of reinforcing the Central Front's left with tanks and aircraft, undertook complex reorganizations affecting multiple fronts and armies.
The Central Front was disbanded, the Bryansk Front formed under Eremenko, the 3rd Army was merged into the 21st, and other organizational moves transferred numerous senior commanders - precisely when maximum effort should have focused on striking the enemy executing his dangerous flanking maneuver…"
Underestimating the Central Front's importance became a main cause of the Southwestern Front's September 1941 defeat. As stated before, a battle lost at High Command level cannot be won at divisional or regimental level.
The enemy exploited this Soviet mistake. Again employing its favored "double envelopment" tactic, 2nd Army formations (35th, 43rd, 13th Corps: 45th, 17th, 134th, 260th, 131st, 293rd, 112th Infantry Divisions + 1st Cavalry Division) advanced towards Chernigov, linking up with Army Group South's 6th Army. On 9 September, both German armies united in eastern Polesye.
By 13 September, the 5th Army (Southwestern Front) and 21st Army (Bryansk Front) lines were finally broken, both switching to mobile defense.
Though inferior in maneuver warfare, Soviet forces held an advantage fighting in Polesye (not for nothing did German generals after the war highlight the "Pripyat Marshes problem"). Once expelled from Polesye, Soviet forces were systematically destroyed.
After closing their pincers, Army Groups Centre and South eliminated the threat to themselves and freed forces for further operations. As after Roslavl, this enemy force release boded immeasurable disasters for the Soviet side.
The German mobile forces widened their envelopment. By 10 September, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group had crossed the Desna and captured Romny. By 15 September, it linked with 1st Panzer Group (Army Group South) near Lokhvitsa, deep in the Soviet rear.
Stavka ordered the Southwestern Front to hold Kiev to the last. The ensuing catastrophe engulfed the front. According to Soviet General Staff, losses exceeded 700,000 personnel.
Among those lost in the Kiev encirclement were many Belarus defenders: Maj. Gens. F. D. Rubtsov, T. K. Batsanov, V. I. Neretin killed; Maj. Gen. I. M. Skugarev captured.
Many Belarus defenders of 1941 also fell later in the Vyazma encirclement during the renewed German Moscow offensive in October 1941.
(to be continued)