Uladzimir Martau
BELARUSIAN CHRONICLES,
the year 1941

Chapter V.
The Defeat of the Central Front

The beginning of August 1941 was marked by an intensification of the actions of the German troops on the Eastern Front. However, now the main efforts of Army Group "Center" were directed not toward the Moscow direction, but turned the axis of its offensive to the south. It was planned to conduct first a limited operation in the area of Roslavl, then in the area of Rogachev, then to defeat the Soviet troops in the area of Gomel, after which to use the 2nd Army in actions against the Korosten grouping - the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front. Its mobile troops (the 2nd Tank Group) the German command intended to use for the encirclement of the Soviet Southwestern Front east of the Dnieper in interaction with the 1st Tank Group of Army Group "South".

The change of the vector of the German offensive became yet another unpleasant surprise for the Soviet High Command.

On the southern flank of the Western Direction the Soviet troops were combined into the CENTRAL FRONT under the command of Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov.

The former chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 13th Army, S. P. Ivanov (subsequently - General of the Army), cited in his memoirs an excerpt from a directive to the Central Front signed by I. V. Stalin and G. K. Zhukov: "…It is extremely necessary for us on the Central Front to act as actively as possible, in order by active actions to tie down as many enemy forces as possible…"

The troops of the front at the end of July did indeed behave actively and drew off considerable enemy forces from the Moscow direction. However, as stated in the operational summary of the front headquarters for the morning of August 1, "As a result of unsuccessful battles on the eastern bank of the Sozh River east and northeast of Krichev and offensive battles between Krichev and Propoisk, the troops of the front are conducting defensive battles".

By the beginning of August the front already numbered three armies.

The 13th Army, which had suffered a defeat in the area of Mogilev, occupied a wide zone along the Sozh River from Propoisk to Mstislavl (exclusive). On July 28 the newly appointed commander of the army, Major General K. D. Golubev, attempted to reorganize the command of the troops entrusted to him. As he himself wrote on July 31 to F. I. Kuznetsov, who did not support this idea, the essence of the changes was as follows:

"1. To liquidate the countless number of detachments and little detachments bearing the numbers of various divisions, which, when the situation was plotted on the map, misled the front command and the Stavka.

2. To combine all the troops into two corps of two divisions each.

The 45th RC of Magon consisting of the 148th RD and a composite division, into which to combine the 4th A/B Corps, which bears the loud name of a corps and brigades, but in essence represents only two regiments. I considered that to name correctly means to understand correctly. Besides, at the expense of the rear services I am trying to form for myself an army reserve, for which I am using the Administration of the 6th RD. It was in this spirit that I gave the order, now all this has to be changed. To restore again the 4th A/B Corps (in the number of 5512 bayonets, 8 guns, 12 heavy and 66 light machine guns). Since you find it necessary to change the command - I will do it, but the only inconvenience created is that Magon will be subordinated to only one 148th RD, combined from the detachments of the 6th, 148th, 160th and 132nd RD in the number of 4900 bayonets…

3. You daily reproach me for poor command and ignorance of the situation. It is not for me, of course, to judge this, you as my superior give the assessment, but I consider it my duty to report that I consider that I know the disposition of my troops, how many and what enemy is in front of them; when something is unclear to me, I report to you frankly and ask permission in that case to report later. We obtain information not from chance people, but from our liaison delegates, from subordinate commanders and headquarters and from aviation.

Please take into account that the Military Council of the Army is working in very difficult conditions, when there is not a single meter of wire and there is a small number of aircraft, the front of 105 km represents a thin thread of a cardboard disposition, with a density of 40 bayonets, 1.3 guns and 2.1 machine guns per 1 km.

We receive no reinforcements, nor equipment, the rear and the supply are not in order.

In these difficult conditions we try to solve all these questions ourselves, with our own means, we can do much and are obliged to do much, but there are things beyond our strength.

I, for example, firmly consider that in front of Magon the enemy is considerably stronger than the front headquarters considers. I assess this as from 2 infantry divisions to a full Army Corps. To consider that Magon's 10,000-strong corps will easily defeat them is impossible.

…Now I fear another thing, that the enemy, using his superiority in forces, might break through the weak front of the 148th RD with the aim of striking the flank and rear of Kachalov, the gap with whom is 35 km. In these conditions we are forming a reserve division, if we even succeed - it will be bare infantry. Therefore machine guns, guns are urgently needed (a request was submitted).

What is needed is a fresh rifle division and at least a battalion of tanks…"

The "structure" of the 13th Army at the end of July-beginning of August 1941 is of important significance from the point of view of the distribution of forces and means on the eve of the new German offensive.

On the Roslavl direction the 148th Rifle Division occupied a zone. The division arrived at the front in parts. Thus, its 507th Rifle Regiment by July 10 had come out to the Dnieper south of Mogilev, found itself in encirclement together with the 61st Rifle Corps and was defeated by the middle of July.

The 496th Rifle Regiment of the 148th Division in the middle of July conducted a battle for the Bykhov bridgehead and also found itself in encirclement (according to the documents of the headquarters of the 13th Army, by July 25 400 men had come out from its composition).

By the beginning of August both these regiments had already been restored; regarding the artillery of the division (the light and howitzer artillery regiments) there is no information. The division was given the 649th Corps Artillery Regiment. In the composition of the 148th Division there are also mentioned 2 battalions of the 712th Rifle Regiment of the 132nd Division with 25 guns.

The 160th Rifle Division of the 13th Army also arrived at the front in parts and managed to participate in the battles for the Bykhov bridgehead and for Chausy. According to the data of the headquarters of the 13th Army, by July 25 to the southern bank of the Sozh River in the zone of the 28th Corps, 1,500 men from its composition had come out of encirclement (they remained in the composition of the 137th Rifle Division). In the composition of the 45th Corps fought the detachments of the 636th Rifle Regiment (with forces up to a battalion with 14 guns) and the hastily restored 443rd Rifle Regiment; the strength of the division in the operational summary as of July 26 is indicated as 1,200 men. The headquarters of the division was located in the area of Khotovizh.

As a result of the reorganization of the troops of the 13th Army undertaken by K. D. Golubev, the detachments of the 160th Division were subordinated to the headquarters of the 148th Division: they were designated as battalions and formed the 654th Rifle Regiment of the 148th Division.

On the right flank of the 148th Division (and of the 13th Army) operated the detachment of the 6th Rifle Division: the 84th Rifle Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 125th Rifle Regiment (also transferred to the subordination of the 148th Division).

The administration of the 6th Division was withdrawn to the army reserve for reinforcement in the area of Baleshin (south of Klimovichi).

In the area of Krichev operated the 4th Airborne Corps (two airborne brigades, formed on the eve of the war from new rifle divisions) - it is also in the documents of the headquarters of the 13th Army of the end of July-beginning of August 1941 called the "composite division", "Grishin's establishment". Apparently, soon the "arbitrariness" of K. D. Golubev was cancelled, the "composite division" returned to itself the name of the 4th Airborne Corps, its commander was appointed Colonel A. F. Kazankin, and Colonel M. D. Grishin was recalled to the disposal of the front headquarters (appointed commander of the 42nd Rifle Division).

The Soviet 13th Army had offensive tasks (in particular, the 148th Division - to advance on Molyatichi), however very soon it had to repel the enemy's offensive on Roslavl.

* * * * *

At the junction with the right flank of the 13th Army of the Central Front, the 28th Army of the Western Front under the command of Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov (the 145th and 149th Rifle, the 104th Tank Divisions) conducted combat operations.

The 28th Army acted with the 13th Army in diverging directions, as a result between the 28th and 13th Armies a gap formed, covered by weak detachments, including a rifle battalion of the 222nd Rifle Division in Shumyachi and its reconnaissance battalion in Zagustino (or Petrovichi). There was no elbow-to-elbow communication between the armies, nor was reliable communication established.

In the area of Roslavl on the basis of the administration of the 33rd Rifle Corps of the 28th Army, on July 31 the formation of the new 43rd Army under the command of Lieutenant General I. G. Zakharkin was begun (its composition was to include the 53rd, 217th and 222nd Rifle, the 105th Tank Divisions). Soon new divisions began to arrive in its composition (the 211th, 258th, 260th, 279th, 290th and 303rd Rifle), and instead of the 105th Tank Division the 109th Tank Division was transferred.

The 43rd Army became part of the new Reserve Front, formed on July 30 on the basis of the Front of Reserve Armies. The Reserve Front was headed by General of the Army G. K. Zhukov, who had been removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The 21st Army of the Central Front under the command of Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov was far more combat-capable and had three rifle and one mechanized corps. At the same time all the troops of the army (including the 25th Mechanized Corps) were already drawn into the battles.

The boundaries of the army:

- on the right - (excl.) Unecha. (excl.) Propoisk, (excl.) Mogilev;

- on the left - Gomel, (excl.) Bobruisk, (excl.) Osipovichi.

The army had its previous task: to destroy the Bobruisk-Bykhov grouping of the enemy. However the offensive planned for July 31 was cancelled, and the army went over to the defensive.

On August 1, the 3rd Army was officially included in the composition of the Central Front, its headquarters having come out of encirclement at the end of July (it had retreated from Grodno itself).

The army was subordinated the troops fighting in Polesie, in particular the 66th Rifle Corps (formerly of the 21st Army).

In a report to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on the state of the Mozyr Fortified Region it is stated that the fortified region has three machine-gun battalions (two north of the Pripyat River and one south), there are no field troops, but there is artillery: 27 76-mm guns, 4 122-mm guns and 4 152-mm guns (later 8 122-mm guns are indicated, all - from the composition of the 1st Battalion of the 447th Corps Artillery Regiment).

The composition of the Central Front as of August 1 is presented in Table 5-1. According to the brief report, as of August 1 its composition had 258,345 men, 179 tanks (15 tanks in the 13th Army, 142 tanks - in the 21st and 22 tanks - in the 3rd), 1337 guns (896 cannon and 441 howitzers) and 502 mortars.

Table 5-1.
Combat Composition of the Central Front on August 1, 1941

In italics are marked the formations and units which, due to circumstances, operated in other directions.

The Air Force of the front numbered 94 aircraft: 28 SB and 35 Su-2 bombers, fighters 1 I-16, 2 I-15, 8 MiG-3, as well as auxiliary aircraft (5 R-5, 2 SSS, 12 U-2 and 1 UT-1). A more detailed combat composition of the aviation of the Central Front is available as of August 5, see Table 5-2.

Table 5-2.
Combat Composition of the Aviation of the Central Front on August 5, 1941

The combat and numerical composition of Kachalov's Group as of July 31, 1941 is presented in Table 5-3.

Table 5-3.
Combat and Numerical Composition of Kachalov's Group on July 31, 1941

The combat composition of the Central Front does not impress. Unlike other fronts, it has practically no new formations and no reserves. In the memoirs of G. K. Zhukov an interesting episode is described that occurred at the end of July 1941.

Zhukov wrote that having discussed the situation on the Soviet-German front with the chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff V. M. Zlobin and his deputy A. M. Vasilevsky, "…we came to the conclusion that the enemy, apparently, would strive in the near future to defeat our Central Front in order to come out on the flank and rear of the Southwestern Front…" (a quotation from the first edition of "Reminiscences and Reflections" of 1969; in other editions this scene is described somewhat differently).

On July 29 the chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov asked for a meeting with Stalin for an urgent report.

"- What do you propose? - asked I. V. Stalin.

- First of all to strengthen the Central Front, transferring to it no fewer than three armies reinforced with artillery. One army at the expense of the western direction, another - at the expense of the Southwestern Front, the third - from the reserve of the Stavka. To place at the head of the front an experienced and energetic commander. Specifically I propose N. F. Vatutin…"

Further Zhukov described that in the continuation of his report he proposed to withdraw the Southwestern Front entirely beyond the Dnieper.

"- And what about Kiev? - asked I. V. Stalin.

…- Kiev will have to be abandoned…"

It was after this, according to Zhukov, that he was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and appointed commander of the troops of the Reserve Front.

On the whole the entire episode is not very plausible. Its other participants (Stalin, Mekhlis) have naturally left no memoirs about it. In the second half of the day Stalin did indeed receive in his office G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, G. I. Kulik, as well as L. Z. Mekhlis.

Probably we are dealing with a mixing in time of completely different events: the proposal on strengthening the Central Front and the proposal on withdrawing the Southwestern Front beyond the Dnieper and abandoning Kiev. In the same way earlier Zhukov wrote about the offensive on Bobruisk on July 13: "The main blow was delivered by the 63rd Rifle Corps, commanded by General L. G. Petrovsky. A few days later he died a hero's death…" (although Petrovsky perished only a month later during the defeat of the troops of the Central Front).

Moreover at the end of July 1941 there were no grounds for abandoning Kiev and withdrawing the whole Southwestern Front to the left bank of the Dnieper. The offensive of Army Group "South" on Kiev had failed. The German command drew the conclusion that Army Group "South" on its own would not be able to fulfil the task of defeating the Soviet troops in Ukraine. It was precisely to its aid that the right flank of Army Group "Center" was turning to the south.

But it is truly important that at the end of July two decisions were in principle possible: to strengthen the Moscow direction or to turn attention to the Central Front - the key to the stability of the Southwestern Front.

The choice between these decisions was not obvious. It was impossible to establish precisely which direction the German command would choose: it itself had not yet finally decided, and throughout August various events on the Soviet-German front returned the German commanders to the thought of resuming the campaign against Moscow.

The idea of strengthening the Central Front was not put into practice. Apparently, the matter concerned the transfer into its composition of the 28th Army of the Western Front, the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front (in the second echelon) and the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front. The timely transfer into the composition of the Central Front of precisely the 43rd Army with fresh two rifle (the 217th and 222nd) and one tank divisions could have changed much in those events.

However the decisions of the Soviet command were clearly lagging behind. The German command continued to hold the strategic initiative and itself chose the place and character of the forthcoming battles. Thus, the weak Central Front became easy prey for the Wehrmacht.

* * * * *

Against the Soviet troops of the Central Front operated the German 2nd Army of Colonel General M. von Weichs: the 35th, 43rd, 53rd, 12th and 13th Army Corps.

The 35th (45th and 293rd Infantry Divisions) and 43rd (134th and 260th Infantry Divisions) Army Corps advanced in Polesie. On July 31 in the diary of F. von Bock the following entry appeared: "A Russian staff plane landed behind the front line on our territory. The orders found on the courier opened our eyes to the disposition of the Russian troops who are holding the defense against us on the southern wing of the army group. It turns out that the XXXXIII Corps is opposed by only one division *. Another is several kilometers from it and is stationed on the Ptich River *. Thus the XXXXIII Corps has an excellent opportunity to defeat these two Russian divisions separately, thereby opening the way to the east for the XXXV Corps.

Weichs said that he wanted to conduct this operation simultaneously with the attack on Rogachev, so as to be able to play on the factor of surprise, but that he needed to think it all over thoroughly once more…"

The 53rd Army Corps (255th, 267th, 52nd and 167th Infantry Divisions) tied down the offensive groupings of the Soviet 21st Army in the area of Rogachev and Zhlobin.

The 12th (31st, 112th and 17th Infantry Divisions) and 13th (131st, 34th and 258th Infantry Divisions) Army Corps replaced the 24th Motorized Corps on the front from Bykhov to Krichev.

The 1st Cavalry Division from the composition of the 24th Motorized Corps was transferred to the composition of the 2nd Army.

Thus, against the main forces of the Soviet Central Front were concentrated 14 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division.

In the reserve of Army Group "Center" are listed the 162nd, 87th and 256th Infantry Divisions.

For the defeat of the Soviet grouping in the area of Roslavl and the right flank of the Soviet 13th Army the Army Group of Guderian was formed:

- the released 24th Motorized Corps (3rd and 4th Tank, 10th Motorized Divisions) became the main striking force of the Army Group;

- the 7th Army Corps, which had cleared the area of Mogilev, formed the western offensive grouping (the 7th, 23rd, 78th and the 197th Infantry Division transferred from the reserve of the OKH, which came out to the area north of Mstislavl);

- the 9th Army Corps, reinforced with motorized artillery from the composition of the 47th Motorized Corps, formed the northern offensive grouping (the 263rd, 292nd and the 137th Infantry Division released from the area of Smolensk).

A peculiarity of the Soviet-German front in this period was the absence in places of a continuous front. Only the circumstance that the main forces of the opposing sides were tied down by battles did not allow free operation with reserves.

The replacement of the 24th Motorized Corps, the release of a whole army corps from near Mogilev and of one infantry division in the area of Smolensk, as well as the transfer of yet another infantry division from the reserve of the OKH became weighty arguments of the Wehrmacht in the forthcoming battle.

* * * * *

In the negotiations with the headquarters of the 13th Army the Soviet command of the Central Front asked with concern: "What data do you have about the enemy's tank group? What is it doing? Its composition?.. Bear in mind one thing: until 29.7 we had precise data about every enemy division. These data must be renewed. Bear in mind one thing, that until 29.7 continuous battles gave us prisoners and documents, therefore no one has grounds to disbelieve these data. The appearance of each division was determined by captured soldiers and officers. With the cessation of the offensive the matter worsened. If you have found some new method of conducting reconnaissance, that is good - report it immediately, so that I can examine and use it. I demand that you organize bold reconnaissance parties along the whole front. What is indicated to you in the order, confirm by cipher or determine the enemy grouping, paying special attention to both your wings. Persistently search for the tanks…"

The accumulation of enemy troops against the right flank of the 13th Army did not go unnoticed by the command of the 45th Rifle Corps and the 13th Army. However the front commander, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, did not agree with the assessment of his subordinates about the reinforcement of the enemy on the Roslavl direction. In a note of 2.00 on July 31 Colonel L. M. Sandalov wrote to K. D. Golubev: "The commander of the troops knows the situation and ordered to inform you:

Magon is certainly exaggerating the forces.

It is certainly necessary to carry out the task with the forces that are available, and not to demand new ones, especially since our possibilities are known to you…"

A few hours later the new German offensive began.

 Chronicle of the War

August 1, 1941 (41st day of the war)

The German Offensive on Roslavl

The Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Western Direction, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, confirmed his order to the Operational Group of the 28th Army to continue the offensive on Pochinok and further on Smolensk. However on this day began the offensive of the western grouping of the Army Group of G. Guderian (the 7th Army and 24th Motorized Corps) on Roslavl.

Considering that the regrouping of the German troops in the area of Yelnya dragged on, the 9th Army Corps was able to begin the offensive a day later than the planned date.

On the very first day the German 3rd Tank Division of Lieutenant General W. Model, having overcome weak resistance, reached the western bank of the Oster River in the area south of Khoronevo, capturing the bridges undestroyed. By the end of the day in the Soviet reports the head of the enemy's motorized mechanized column is indicated at Shumovka on the Warsaw highway south of Shumyachi, and the attack by Soviet aviation on the advancing enemy in the area of Zvenchatka, Shumovka is also described.

The German 4th Tank Division on the eve had been replaced in the area of Krichev by the 258th Infantry Division and had been regrouped to the northern flank of the 24th Motorized Corps. At the end of July its 35th Tank Regiment had in service more than 90 tanks: 34 Pz.-II, 6 Pz.-III with a 37-mm gun and 36 with a 50-mm gun, 11 Pz.-IV and 11 command vehicles. The division bypassed the positions of the Soviet 13th Army, coming out on the flank and rear of the Soviet 28th Army and, as stated in the history of the division, in the first two days advanced 70 km, capturing 400 prisoners, 35 guns, 7 tanks and 58 other transport vehicles.

The German 7th Army Corps in the composition of 4 infantry divisions went over to the offensive from the line Krichev (excl.), Khislavichi.

The 23rd Infantry Division operating in the center of the corps attacked from the area of Mstislavl in the direction of Roslavl. As G. Guderian wrote in his memoirs, while visiting the troops, "I came under the bombing of our own aircraft, which dropped bombs on the subunits of the 23rd Infantry Division and caused them great damage. The first bomb fell 50 m in front of my vehicle. These regrettable cases occurred despite the fact that our troops had the necessary identification marks and the routes of movement were indicated in the orders… In the rest the advance of the units of the 23rd Infantry Division did not encounter serious resistance"".

The Soviet 148th Rifle Division of the 45th Rifle Corps, which had 5,000 men of personnel on a front of up to 25 km (and which was not preparing for defense, but was carrying out offensive tasks) was literally swept away by the German offensive. The communication of the headquarters of the 13th Army with the 45th Corps and the 148th Division was disrupted. The commander of the 148th Rifle Division, Colonel F. M. CherOkhmanov, was wounded, the commissar of the division, Regimental Commissar M. L. Odishariya, was taken prisoner. The remnants of the division numbering up to 500 men headed by the chief of staff of the division came out by August 5 to the area of Ershichi south of Roslavl.

The detachment of the 6th Rifle Division operating on the northern flank also found itself in encirclement (the remnants of the detachment broke out of the encirclement on the night of August 4).

The 6th Rifle Division (in the composition of a regiment and a half), previously withdrawn to the reserve of the 13th Army in the area of Baleshin, was moved out to the southern bank of the Oster River; it occupied the line Penkovka, Khotovizh, Khodun, height 156.9 and soon was subordinated to the headquarters of the 4th Airborne Corps.

There is information that on this day the commander of the 6th Division, Colonel M. A. Popsuy-Shapko, perished*. The division was taken over by the deputy commander of the 6th Division, Colonel F. A. Ostashenko.

Units of the 160th Rifle Division were retreating to the southern bank of the Sozhenka River into the zone of the 4th Airborne Corps. The 566th Light Artillery Regiment (with three 122-mm guns remaining in service) was given to the 7th Airborne Brigade, the 633rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment (it had two 122-mm guns) - to the 8th Brigade.

The administration of the 160th Division, which had come out of encirclement, was soon (August 4) withdrawn to the area of Gomel to the front reserve for re-formation.

The 4th Airborne Corps (two brigades) continued to hold a sector on the eastern bank of the Sozh River opposite Krichev, intercepting the Warsaw highway and the Krichev-Roslavl railway, and repelled an enemy attack on Mikheevichi. This sector received the name "Krichev bridgehead" in the documents of the headquarters.

The headquarters of the 13th Army immediately lost control of its troops in the zone of the German breakthrough; moreover, it did not even have the possibility to inform the 28th Army (in whose zone Roslavl was located) about the breakthrough of the tanks.

The 13th Army also had no reserves on the Roslavl direction. However in the area southwest of Roslavl two cavalry divisions from the composition of the group of the Inspector General of Cavalry of the Red Army, Colonel General O. I. Gorodovikov (the 21st Mountain Cavalry and the 52nd Cavalry) were concentrating. They were planned to be sent on a deep raid through the rear of the enemy operating against the Operational Group of Kachalov, and then also through the rear of the enemy's Yelnya grouping. But soon they had to enter battle with the enemy under completely different conditions.

Both these cavalry divisions, as well as the 222nd Rifle Division defending in the area of Roslavl, were on paper subordinated to the 28th Army, however soon all three divisions were transferred to the composition of the 13th Army.

The 52nd Cavalry Division (which was on the march in the direction of Miloslavichi) received the task to come out to the area of Shumovka, Dubovitsa. Osva and, having separated the infantry from the tanks, to destroy it. After that it was to advance on Studenets and, having entered into communication with the 148th Rifle Division, to restore a continuous front. However on this day the army headquarters was unable to establish communication with the 52nd Cavalry Division.

The 21st Cavalry Division was still receiving orders directly from Colonel General O. I. Gorodovikov; time was also needed to establish communication with it and to redirect the division.

Based on the results of the battles the commander of the 13th Army, Major General K. D. Golubev, in a combat report to Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov drew the conclusion:

"The enemy has brought up fresh forces, having, apparently, the tasks of holding Krichev, by a blow in the direction of Studenets, Snigirevka, to come out on the rear of Kachalov's group and to disrupt its offensive. I request:

1. By front aviation to influence the enemy in the direction north of Krichev.

2. To transfer to my disposal the 137th RD.

3. To reinforce the 13th Army with at least one tank battalion and two or three anti-tank battalions.

4. It is necessary urgently to close the gap between the right wing of our army and Kachalov's group. I have no reserves at my disposal.

5. In the area of Novozybkov there is the 121st RD. I request that it also be subordinated to me".

In the negotiations of K. D. Golubev with F. I. Kuznetsov at midnight on August 1 some questions were clarified:

"- …According to my calculations, the 137th RD can be transferred in 25 and 28 hours to the area of Klimovichi.

- That is incorrect. First, it will come on foot earlier in 25 hours. Second, order it to set out immediately in battalion groups and transfer it by combined march. Third, right now organize a night attack on the enemy's mechanized groups.

- Did I understand you correctly that the Administration of Popov <of the 28th Rifle Corps - VM> and everything that is east of Krichev remains at my disposal?

- Incorrect. Popov and everything that was on his front passes to your neighbor <the 21st Army>. The front east of Krichev is yours. You are also given the 137th RD, which by motor transport concentrate at Klimovichi and smash with everything that you gather. And you can gather much. Has the 1000 men of armed replacements arrived to you?

- These replacements today by the morning were poured into the 6th Division. The 137th RD was almost without artillery, will it be reinforced with it?

- At the expense of what can it be reinforced? What naive questions! Artillery cannot be given instantaneously, even if it existed. It has the necessary artillery. More initiative is required, more energy is required and the manifestation of firmness and courage by all chiefs, by all fighters. One must prove by the destruction of the enemy one's devotion to the Motherland.

- Can we take the 3rd Regiment of the 137th RD from Popov?

- Since it is in battle, it cannot be taken. You have enough forces: the 6th, 137th RD, the 52nd CD, the 222nd RD and besides more than 50 AA guns in Roslavl. And plus all the aviation. Calculate how many forces that is! And the enemy, apparently, here has a battered tank division, which must be demoralized and destroyed.

- So the 222nd RD is subordinated to me?

- Yes. Unite the actions of all the troops from Krichev to Roslavl, in order to destroy the enemy group for me. That is all".

In Polesie

The 232nd Rifle Division in the composition of 4 rifle regiments (the 793rd, 764th, 797th and 487th *) with the support of the 18th Tank Regiment went over to the offensive and approached Parichi itself; the battles were already going on the line Gretsky, Chervyakovo, Knyshevichi, the forest south of Protasy. But by the end of the day one rifle regiment was thrown back from Chervyakovo to Peschanaya Rudnya.

The main forces of Kurmyshev's detachment gathered in the area of Ozemlya and conducted a battle for the Ratmirovichi station. By enemy aviation on this day the armored train No. 52 was put out of action.

The 75th Rifle Division (to which were subordinated the 18th Border Detachment and the 20th Motorcycle Regiment) also went over to the offensive and came out to the line Korzhovka, mark 134, half a kilometer east of Novoselki.

Von Bock wrote on this day:

"I called Weichs again and inquired whether it was not time to begin the advance of the XXXXIII Corps. His arguments "against" did not impress me. I might perhaps succeed in releasing a tank formation to develop the attack on the eastern bank of the Dnieper by August 9. Weichs, however, holds the opinion that we should use to our advantage the favorable situation and attack at once with all forces, without waiting for the approach of the tank men…"

August 2

The German Offensive on Roslavl

The operation of the German Army Group of Guderian in the area of Roslavl continued. From the western direction the 7th Army and 24th Motorized Corps continued their advance.

From the north the German 9th Army Corps began the offensive: the 263rd Infantry Division advanced west of the Smolensk-Roslavl highway, the 292nd Division felt out a breach in the Soviet defense between Belik and Shmakovo (southeast of Pochinok) and delivered a blow in the interfluve of the Oster and Desna Rivers. The 137th Infantry Division advanced to the south and secured the left (eastern) flank of the corps.

According to the testimony of G. Guderian, "During August 2 the 9th Corps did not achieve any significant successes…" But on the whole the situation in the area of Roslavl developed favorably for the enemy. Von Bock wrote in his diary: "The attack on Roslavl continues to develop successfully. In this direction the enemy has few troops <emphasized by me - VM>, and our losses are not great. It is a pity that we are now also at the limit of our possibilities, and we can no longer delay the withdrawal of the tank groups for rest and re-formation".

At this time the Operational Group of the 28th Army headed by Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov (headquarters - Stodolishche) continued to carry out the order to come out on the rear of the enemy's Yelnya grouping. However it had already become clear that the enemy had begun a breakthrough on the front of the Operational Group. The military commissar of the 104th Tank Division, A. S. Davidenko, recalled: "On the morning of August 2 reconnaissance reported that the enemy was bypassing our division on the right and on the left. Holding back on our sector the 292nd Infantry Division of the enemy, we from the CP of the division saw how the fascists crushed the combat orders of our neighbors on the right and the unending river of forces of the German 137th Infantry Division rushed to the south, cutting off our strike group from the disposition of our main forces. I and the division commander V. G. BURKOV twice tried to contact the headquarters of the 28th Army by cipher messages, but there were no results. Therefore we took the decision to withdraw, and at noon on August 2 the units of the 104th Division withdrew under the pressure of superior enemy forces, having entered into a tense battle with tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy in the area of Borisovka…" (material of the staff member of the Roslavl Museum Tatyana Sidorova, site www.roslavl.ru)

The Soviet 222nd Rifle Division (commander - Colonel F. A. Bobrov), reinforced with two battalions of anti-tank artillery, was ordered to hold the defense line in the area of Roslavl. It was subordinated to the headquarters of the 13th Army, however this decision (as well as the earlier subordination to the headquarters of the 28th Army) remained on paper: it was not possible to establish communication with the 222nd Division.

At about 13.00 the 222nd Division began a disorderly withdrawal into Roslavl, while losing communication with its 774th Rifle Regiment.

13th Army

The 4th Airborne Corps with the 6th Rifle Division continued to hold the "Krichev bridgehead", holding back the enemy's attacks.

Units of the German 7th Infantry Division crossed at Zimonino to the southern bank of the Oster River and occupied Pervomayskoye and Ganovka; its forward detachment penetrated to Kashin and Poloshkovo.

Moreover the enemy attacked and dispersed two battalions of the 6th Rifle Division, occupying Khotovizh.

Meanwhile Major General K. D. Golubev was making desperate attempts to restore the control of his units and formations.

According to the information of the army headquarters, the remnants of the 148th Rifle Division were gathering in the area of Khoronevo north of Dubovitsa (K. D. Golubev reported to F. I. Kuznetsov that "the main forces are defeated and dispersed by the enemy's tank units" ); one battalion of the 649th Corps Artillery Regiment was retreating and was stopped at Dubovitsa, the second was attacked at Osetishche, communication with it was lost.

The 52nd Cavalry Division, according to the information of the army headquarters, by the evening of August 1 had reached a position south of the Warsaw highway: the 105th Cavalry Regiment - Osva, the 81st Cavalry Regiment - Bednota, the 117th Cavalry Regiment with the division administration - Kovalevka. K. D. Golubev reported that the division had entered battle for Dubovitsa; communication with the division was maintained by the commander of the 45th Rifle Corps, Division Commander E. Ya. Magon. However in reality the cavalry division could not break through so far (to the area of Dubovitsa north of the highway); on the following day it entered battle in the area of Novaya Dubovichka on the highway.

The chief of staff of the 13th Army, Brigade Commander A. V. Petrushevsky, was sent to the 21st Mountain Cavalry Division to organize a counterattack. Having unloaded at the Kommunary station (north of Kostyukovichi), the division was directed to the disposal of Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov, however the route of movement was intercepted by the enemy: on the eve German forward detachments had already penetrated into the area of Miloslavichi, Titovka (on the communications of the 13th Army).

With two cavalry regiments (the 67th and 17th) with the support of artillery the 21st Cavalry Division attacked Ponyatovka, Nizhneye Glushkovo and Zimnica south of the Warsaw highway, and the commander of the 67th Cavalry Regiment, Major A. I. Maksimov, perished.

The commander of the 13th Army, K. D. Golubev, "in the heat of the moment" complained to the front commander F. I. Kuznetsov: "The 21st CD, better equipped with equipment <than the 52nd Cavalry Division> and twice as large in number, fought badly and at the first shots from Ponyatovka rushed back in disorder and concentrated in the area of Krasnopolye".

The third cavalry regiment (the 112th) with an armored battalion moved by another route and entered battle north of the highway separated from the main forces of the division. The regiment with the armored battalion after the battles in the area of Krivoles, Pustosel found itself in encirclement, from which it broke out only in the morning of August 4 to the area of Ershichi 35 km south of Roslavl, while the rearguard of the regiment managed to break through to the area of Khotimsk.

The 13th Army continued to pull up reserves to the place of the enemy's breakthrough. The 137th Rifle Division continued to concentrate in the area of Klimovichi (with three regiments without one battalion left in the zone of the 28th Corps).

Into the composition of the army was transferred the restored 121st Rifle Division (of two-regiment composition, disposition - Novozybkov); according to the instruction of the front commander, on August 2 it was to receive 3,000 rifles, "the necessary number of machine guns (if they arrive to us)" <a phrase from the negotiations> and a battalion of the 455th Corps Artillery Regiment (12 guns of 107-mm caliber). As the third rifle regiment of the 121st Division was subordinated the 459th Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Division, which was being brought up to strength in Unecha (it was also to receive 1,000 rifles and other property).

21st Army

On this day the 28th Rifle Corps together with the zone along the southern bank of the Sozh River from Propoisk (excl.) to Krichev (excl.) was transferred to the composition of the 21st Army. The commander of the corps, Major General V. S. Popov, left a report on the state of the troops entrusted to him:

-- with the departure of the 137th Rifle Division, on a front of 60 km there remained only one 55th Rifle Division (3180 rifles, 57 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns);

-- the separate reconnaissance battalion of the 55th Division (the 79th), which was defending the line Osinki, Borisovichi, by the order of the commander of the 13th Army was thrown into the offensive on Krichev, suffered losses, of it there remained 30 men, this sector is open;

-- the 12th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion was removed from its positions by the order of the commander of the 13th Army and sent to the army headquarters;

-- the means of communication of the corps were taken away by the headquarters of the 21st Army;

-- one battalion of the 137th Rifle Division, which was defending on the front pos. Novaya Zhizn, Khristoforovka, pos. Chernets, because of the absence of reserves cannot be removed from the front.

The commander of the 21st Army, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, immediately submitted a report to the front commander, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov: "From the reports of the corps commander of the 28th, General Popov, it is evident that you have subordinated to the Military Council of the 21st Army not the 28th Corps, but only the administration of the corps, from which the means of communication have been taken away. I earnestly request you to look into this and at least to some degree to restore the combat capability of the transferred 28th RC.

In the future I very much request you as the Front Commander not to subordinate to me administrations alone and not to permit others to dispose of the formations or units subordinated to me by other Army Commanders and persons from the Front Headquarters apart from the Military Council of the 21st Army…"

Meanwhile the Soviet command did not abandon its offensive plans: on the left flank of the 21st Army (at the junction with the 3rd Army) a detachment of Major General V. I. Neretin was formed (one rifle battalion of the 132nd Rifle Division and a cavalry regiment) with subordination directly to the front headquarters. It came out to the line Streshin, Shikhovo, Kalinovka in readiness to act in a western and north-western direction. Reconnaissance to Mormol and Shatilki.

The headquarters of the detachment from 13.00 on August 1 - Streshin.

In Polesie

The Soviet 232nd Rifle Division resumed the offensive in the area of Parichi, but ran into a counter-offensive of the enemy and instead of advancing forward was forced to repel it.

Kurmyshev's detachment was pressed by the enemy from Ozemlya to the south.

The 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions were thrown back by the enemy to the south and concentrated in the area of Slavkovichi (the 47th CD), Bobrovichi (the 43rd CD) on the western bank of the Ptich River.

And only the offensive of the 75th Rifle Division yielded certain results. Von Bock wrote in his diary:

"A difficult situation has developed in the 293rd Infantry Division, stationed at the very tip of the southern wing of the 2nd Army. It took a solid blow on the nose near Ptich. However, this was to be expected, since I, unfortunately, did not succeed in preventing this setback by the timely advance of the XXXXIII Corps. I called the headquarters of the 2nd Army and said that I would personally give the order for the beginning of the attack if the army command did not do so. To this I was told that the attack was planned for August 4…"

August 3

The German Offensive on Roslavl

Units of the 9th Army Corps of the northern German offensive grouping broke through to the Roslavl-Smolensk highway and soon joined up with the forward detachment of the 4th Tank Division, completing the encirclement of the Operational Group of the 28th Army.

G. Guderian described the completion of the encirclement of the Soviet 28th Army as follows: "…I decided to spend the day of August 3 again in this <9th> corps, in order to develop the further offensive and to ensure complete success. First I set out for the command post of the 292nd Infantry Division in Kovali, and from there to the 507th Infantry Regiment. On the way I met the corps commander, with whom I discussed in detail the course of the combat operations. Having arrived at the 507th Infantry Regiment, I went forward together with the lead company, eliminating unnecessary halts. Three kilometers from the big Moscow highway tanks were spotted through binoculars, located northeast of Roslavl. We immediately halted the movement. I ordered the self-propelled gun that was moving together with the lead subunit of infantry to give the tanks the conditional signal "I am here" and received a return signal, meaning that these were our tanks. This was a subunit of the 35th Tank Regiment of my 4th Tank Division!

I immediately got into my vehicle and set out for my tank men. The remnants of the Russian troops threw down their weapons and retreated, while along the beams and planks of the blown-up bridge over the Ostrik River the soldiers of the 2nd Company of the 35th Tank Regiment climbed in order to greet me. This was the very company which quite recently had been commanded by my eldest son. The soldiers loved him very much and transferred their love and trust to me. Ober-Lieutenant Krause, who now commanded this company, reported the situation to me, and I wished the company further successes.

Thus, the ring of encirclement around the Russian troops in the area of Roslavl was closed. In the encirclement remained three or four Russian divisions. The task now was to compel the encircled Russians to surrender. When half an hour later General Geyer appeared, I told him that the highway to Moscow must be held at all costs. The 292nd Infantry Division was given the task - to close the ring of encirclement with its front to the west, and the 137th Infantry Division - with its front to the east, along the Desna River".

Meanwhile the German 23rd Infantry Division at about 10.30 occupied Roslavl.

G. Guderian later reported: "The offensive on Roslavl proceeded exceptionally well. The infantry simply marches. At the last moment the enemy offered resistance, but it yielded nothing".

In the memoirs of the commander of the German 9th Army Corps, General H. Geyer, a different picture is described: stubborn battles with the Soviet troops, in which several times the matter came to a crisis. The key point for which fierce battles flared up was Ermolino. On the German side here at first fought the 509th Infantry Regiment of the 292nd Division.

According to the memoirs of G. Guderian, by the end of the day the formations of his Army Group had come out:

- the 7th Infantry Division and the 3rd Tank Division - to the area west of Klimovichi,

- the 78th Infantry Division - Ponyatovka south of the Krichev-Roslavl highway,

- the 23rd Infantry Division - Roslavl,

- the 197th Infantry Division and the 5th Machine-Gun Battalion - north of Roslavl,

- the 10th Motorized Division - Khislavichi,

- the 263rd Infantry Division - south of Prudki,

- the 292nd Infantry Division - Kazaki on the Warsaw highway east of Roslavl (in the combat journal of the 292nd Division it is stated that Kazaki was taken only on August 6 - the village was defended by units of the Soviet 222nd Rifle Division),

- the 137th Infantry Division - the eastern bank of the Desna River.

The commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov, who found himself in a difficult situation, in the evening of August 3 gave the order to come out of the encirclement on Roslavl through Lysovka and Starinka.

The Soviet Stavka of the High Command ordered on the night of August 4 to resubordinate Kachalov's Group (the 145th and 149th Rifle, the 104th Tank Divisions with the means of reinforcement, as well as the 222nd Rifle Division with the approaching units of the 109th Tank Division) from the Western to the composition of the Reserve Front.

The cavalry divisions of the group of O. I. Gorodovikov (the 21st and 52nd) were now officially transferred to the composition of the Central Front.

13th Army

In the area of the "Krichev bridgehead" the units of the 4th Airborne Corps managed to defeat the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion of the 62nd Infantry Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division, capturing trophies. An attack on the headquarters of the 8th Airborne Brigade was also repelled.

However on the whole the enemy was increasing the pressure on the Soviet troops. The front of the 6th Rifle Division moved back to the south (the line Sredny, Krym, Barsuki); it continued to control the Warsaw highway only with its left flank.

Meanwhile the command of the Central Front at 19.30 issued a partial combat order for a counterattack and the destruction of the enemy that had broken through to Roslavl.

The 13th Army was ordered, while tying down the enemy in the area of Roslavl with the forces of the 222nd Rifle Division with two armored trains and holding the "Krichev bridgehead" with the forces of the 4th Airborne Corps (two brigades, the 6th Rifle Division), with its main forces to attack the rear of the enemy that had broken through from the west and southwest:

- the 52nd Cavalry Division - from the forests north of Shumyachi;

- the 137th and 121st Rifle Divisions, the 21st Cavalry Division - from the area of Miloslavichi, Vasilevka, Gulki.

At the same time it was planned that from the north a blow against the enemy was to be delivered by the Operational Group of the 28th Army.

This order to a great extent passed off wishful thinking as reality. There was no communication and, accordingly, no coordination with the 28th Army, and the cavalry divisions of the Reserve of the High Command had already entered battle.

The 21st Mountain Cavalry Division after the battle in the area of Ponyatovka by the end of the day withdrew to the area of Krasnopolye; its 112th Cavalry Regiment with the armored battalion operated in encirclement north of the highway ("in the forests north of Shumyachi"), communication with it was absent.

The 52nd Cavalry Division after the battle in the area of Novaya Dubovichka (battles for Verkhneye Glushkovo and Bychki are also described) was forced to withdraw to the area of Fedorovka, Pozhyr.

And most importantly: the rapid and persistent actions of the enemy did not give time to properly concentrate the troops and coordinate their actions.

However the command of the Central Front continued to underestimate the forces and the decisive character of the enemy's offensive. In the negotiations of the front commander, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, with the chief of staff of the 13th, Brigade Commander A. V. Petrushevsky, it was said:

"- I request permission to report also the outcome of the battle of the 52nd CD yesterday. By the end of the day this division began to advance successfully, was subjected to a strong flank attack by tanks and motorcyclists with motorized infantry and withdrew to the area of Pozhyr, where it is putting itself in order. That is all from me.

- Comrade Petrushevsky, you are a military man and therefore you know that the enemy, in order to have strong fire on the front Roslavl, Dedin, must deploy several divisions, which he does not have. And the fact that the 52nd CD was subjected to fire, and moreover even strong fire, shows one thing: poor reconnaissance, poor use of the means of fire, weak initiative and low combat staunchness. Impress this firmly on the commanders. One must understand one thing, that the enemy could not immediately develop the blow, which means that something hinders him. What can hinder him? First, a large number of our troops. Second, the enemy is thoroughly battered by our aviation, from the blows of which he has suffered losses. I do not see the enemy's decisive actions, apart from the first steps against the 148th RD, which ran away without anyone commanding it. That is what I see…"

In the zone of the 21st Army

Active combat operations were conducted only at the junction with the 3rd Army (the 66th Corps).

The 110th Rifle Regiment (after the death of K. A. Reimer on July 22 the regiment was taken over by Major M. V. Taynov) advanced to the west, without encountering resistance of the enemy, and came out to the line Krasnaya Gorka, Pervomaysk, Yasnaya Polyana, Chernyaki.

The detachment of V. I. Neretin, without encountering resistance of the enemy, came out: the cavalry regiment - to the area Lyady, Zabrodye, height 139; the rifle battalion occupied Oblitsy. The detachment had an order to go over to the offensive in the direction of Korotkovichi.

In Polesie

Kurmyshev's detachment after the battle in the area of Ratmirovichi bent its right flank at Shkava.

The 43rd Cavalry Division crossed to the eastern bank of the Ptich River at Porechye and was transferred to the subordination of the 3rd Army of the Central Front. Soon the 47th Cavalry Division also crossed to the eastern bank of the Ptich River at Rozhanov, Zatishe and was also included in the composition of the 3rd Army.

Meanwhile the 20th Motorcycle Regiment, subordinated to the 75th Rifle Division, crossed the Pripyat River and occupied Petrikov.

August 4

The German Offensive on Roslavl

In the battles in the area of Ermolino north of Roslavl, where the encircled Soviet troops tried to break out of the encirclement, all the units of the 292nd Infantry Division were drawn in. At the village of Starinka the commander of the Soviet 28th Army, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov, perished.

The commander of the German 9th Army Corps, H. Geyer, recalled: "At the place I was able to see with my own eyes how fierce the battles at Ermolino were on August 4 and on the night of August 5. Here there remained many burned and abandoned tanks. In one of them we found a killed Russian commander…"

The military commissar of the 104th Tank Division, A. S. Davidenko, left memoirs about the breakthrough from encirclement in the area of Starinka: "Late at night on August 3 the headquarters of the 104th Tank Division moved to the area of Stodolishche, which was overcrowded with subunits of the 145th and 149th Rifle Divisions. Therefore Colonel V. G. BURKOV ordered his tank units to advance further, to take up a position in a forest massif and to ensure thorough camouflage from ground and air enemy. The 104th Motorized Rifle Regiment at that time by the order of the commander operated in other sectors of the encircled grouping.

Early in the morning of August 4 the division commander V. G. BURKOV received an order from the commander of the group V. Ya. Kachalov about coming out of the encirclement. The division was entrusted with ensuring the withdrawal from the encirclement of the headquarters of the 28th Army and the direction of movement to Lysovka and Starinka was indicated. By Colonel V. G. BURKOV the combat formation of the units of the division was determined, while in the vanguard the 207th Tank Regiment (commander Agafonov) was to act.

Units of the 104th Tank Division moved in the indicated direction, but soon encountered strong resistance of large enemy forces, which by that time had already occupied the village of Starinka. On the large field west of Starinka a fierce battle developed, which lasted until late evening. Our tank men and the Hitlerites several times went over to the attack, but these attacks brought success to neither one nor the other side. From our side only tanks without infantry participated in the battle, and therefore we did not succeed in breaking through in an easterly direction. The tanks maneuvered on the open field, but the strong artillery and mortar fire of the fascists did not give the 207th Tank Regiment the possibility to advance forward. On the edge of the forest, directly in the combat orders of the units, the observation post was located, where Colonel V. G. BURKOV and I were. Not far from us were located the commander, the commissar and the chief of staff of the 207th Regiment.

In the middle of the day the commander of the group, General Kachalov, came to the command post of the 104th Division on a T-34 tank. Having heard the report of the division commander V. G. BURKOV, he gave concrete instructions on how to act further. The tank of the commander moved in the direction of the forest, beyond which the neighboring units of the strike group were fighting. As it is now known, soon after this General Kachalov perished tragically in battle. And our division continued the heavy battle with the fascists, striving to break out of the ring of encirclement in the area of Starinka.

...Now the mines began to burst ever closer and closer to our command post. By one of the mines the commander of the 207th Tank Regiment, Agafonov, was killed, by the next mine the commissar was killed and the chief of staff of this regiment was heavily wounded.

Soon an enemy mine exploded a few steps from the group of commanders who together with Colonel Burkov were directing the battle. Vasily Gerasimovich was heavily wounded by the fragments of this mine in both shoulders and lost consciousness. After the bandaging done by the doctors, Vasily Gerasimovich again began to direct the combat operations of the 104th Tank Division, which continued to tie down considerable forces of the enemy, which had previously been advancing in the direction of Moscow.

By the end of the day it became clear that the breakthrough of our units in the area of the village of Starinka did not succeed: the units of the group could not break the combat orders of the enemy and come out of the encirclement. Colonel Burkov passed on to me the instruction to withdraw the tanks and concentrate them at the disposal of the headquarters of the division…" (material of T. Sidorova)

The death of V. Ya. Kachalov for a long time remained a secret for the Soviet military-political leadership. The surname of the commander even got into the notorious Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941, in which it was said about the treason and surrender into captivity of the generals P. G. Ponedelin (commander of the 12th Army of the Southwestern Front), N. K. Kirillov (commander of the 13th Rifle Corps of the same 12th Army) and V. Ya. Kachalov: "The commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov, finding himself together with the headquarters of the group of troops in encirclement, displayed cowardice and surrendered into captivity to the German fascists. The headquarters of Kachalov's group came out of the encirclement, units of Kachalov's group broke out of the encirclement, while Lieutenant General Kachalov preferred to surrender into captivity, preferred to desert to the enemy".

The listed generals were contrasted with commanders who with battles passed through the rear of the enemy and not only came out of the encirclement, but also brought out personnel with them: the deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front, Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin, the member of the Military Council of the 3rd Army, Army Commissar 2nd Rank N. I. Biryukov, the brigade commissar of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Southwestern Front N. K. Popel and the commander of the 35th Tank Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps of the Southwestern Front, Colonel N. A. Novikov.

On September 29, 1941, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov was sentenced in absentia to be shot, and all measures were applied to his family as to the family of a traitor to the Motherland.

Meanwhile the commander of the 222nd Rifle Division, Colonel F. A. Bobrov, gathered his units east of Roslavl (two rifle regiments out of three) and directed them into the attack on Novaya Lipovka, however the offensive was not successful. To the area of the battles arrived the assistant of the commander of the troops of the Western Front for the Auto-Armored Directorate, Major General A. V. BORZIKOV, who reported:

"…Gathered part of the 104th <TD> I am sending to reinforce Bobrov. There is no radio. There is no group of commanders. Send a couple of reconnaissance aircraft. I am sitting blind. There is no communication with Kachalov. There is none with the 109th <TD>. I will attack. Orient me on the situation".

Soon A. V. BORZIKOV handed over the command to the commander of the 43rd Army, Lieutenant General I. G. Zakharkin, and departed for the headquarters of the Western Front.

13th Army

The formations transferred from the reserve continued their concentration: the 121st Rifle Division unloaded at the Kommunary station and followed to the area of Yakimovichi, the 137th Rifle Division concentrated in the area of Sudzily and continued its march in the direction of Miloslavichi, Tarasovichi, Putimel.

The 4th Airborne Corps with the 6th Rifle Division continued to fight for the "Krichev bridgehead". To the area of Krichev was directed the armored train No. 44 (the very one which in the first days of the war operated in the area of Lida).

The commander of the army, K. D. Golubev, planned to draw one regiment of the 137th Rifle Division into the battles in the area of Poloshkovo, however the front commander opposed the splitting of the division, which it was planned to use in the offensive on Dubovitsa.

The front commander, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, admonished Golubev before the counterattack as follows: "- I consider that the presence of the armored train, only take care of it, allows you to strengthen the position at Krichev, and having such forces, not to let a single fascist through. I demand that you personally direct the actions of each formation. To entrust in the given situation the actions of your main forces to another I do not find it possible. The enemy must be encircled. This will be the first case in the whole of this war. I am giving you many forces. These forces I have disposed. The path is determined correctly. Your business is to organize the battle, to inspire the troops. To all convey my order: not a step back. All forward. Everyone must destroy the enemy. Cowardice, panic, if individual persons display them, to cut short on the spot.

- Allow me to report that the actions of the 121st and 137th RD I have placed at the head of them the division commander Magon with the headquarters in Nedved... I consider that Magon will cope with the task.

- Throughout the entire period he has shown himself only from the bad side. Everywhere where Magon is, there is a rout. This characterizes this commander. Therefore with your assessment I do not agree. If you vouch for him, then tell Magon that in the forthcoming operation he must wash away the shame that has covered his actions. The same applies to the headquarters and to the commissar. That is all".

In the zone of the 21st Army and in Polesie

The detachment of Neretin (to which the 110th Rifle Regiment with the 36th Light Artillery Regiment operating to the right was also subordinated) had the task to come out to the line Istobki, Yashchitsy before the railway branch Zhlobin-Kalinkovichi, but was stopped on the line Paporotnaya, Oblitsy, Zabrodye.

Units of the 75th Rifle Division continued active actions: they managed to occupy Turov on the Pripyat.

German Command

On this day in Borisov, at the headquarters of Army Group "Center", the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht A. Hitler arrived for a conference with the higher military command. He made public the plans for the further conduct of the war against the USSR: special attention was paid to the capture of Leningrad and Ukraine, as well as the Crimea. The campaign against Moscow was postponed to an indefinite time.

August 5

In the Area of Roslavl

The battles of Guderian's Army Group with the encircled Soviet troops continued: units of the 292nd Infantry Division pressed the encircled Soviet troops from the north and northeast, the 23rd Infantry Division - from the southwest.

At the same time, because of the pressure of the Soviet troops, the 35th Tank Regiment of the 4th Tank Division received an order to withdraw to the rear, and the commander of the 197th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General G. Mayer-Rabingen, reported to Colonel General G. Guderian, who had returned from Borisov, that a breach had formed in the Roslavl "cauldron".

As G. Guderian recalled in his memoirs, he urgently returned the 4th Tank Division to its positions, which restored communication with the 137th Infantry Division of the 9th Army Corps. The threatened sector in the area of Roslavl was entrusted to the commander of the artillery of the 7th Army Corps, Major General R. Martinek.

13th Army

The German 7th Army Corps continued the pressure on the Soviet troops of the 13th Army, its units occupied Miloslavichi and Tarasovichi.

Meanwhile the Soviet 137th and 121st Rifle Divisions, subordinated to the headquarters of the 45th Corps, completed their concentration and went over to the offensive in the direction of Dubovitsa.

The 121st Division approached Yakimovichi.

The 137th Division with its 711th Regiment entered battle for Miloslavichi; its 624th Regiment attacked Yasnaya Polyana, but was thrown back to Neznan; the 409th Regiment attempted to capture Kiseleva Buda.

According to the report of Major General K. D. Golubev, the attached artillery approached and took up firing positions only by the evening.

The 45th Corps was reinforced with a battalion of tanks (9 serviceable vehicles). Into the disposal of the 13th Army also began to arrive the 132nd Rifle Division of Major General S. S. Biryuzov (it unloaded at the stations Klimovichi and Osmolovichi and concentrated in the area of Pavlovichi) and a regiment of the 143rd Rifle Division.

According to the operational summaries, the 52nd Cavalry Division by the order of its commander arbitrarily left the battle and headed to the area of Kletnya, while having losses of up to 50 % of personnel, up to 20 % of horse strength, all 76-mm guns were lost; by the order of the commander of the army it was returned to the battle.

On the following day K. D. Golubev reported to the front commander F. I. Kuznetsov: "I succeeded in catching the 21st and 52nd CD. The 21st CD concentrated in the area of Nikolaevka at the junction behind the 121st and 137th RD. The division commander was with me late in the evening and received the task by a night march to stretch out in the direction of Nikolaevka, Tarasovichi, Neznan, Kiseleva Buda, Stary Dedin and further to the area of Studenets. Petrovichi by the end of today. He was firmly warned about responsibility and about the necessity by the fulfilment of this task to atone for the shameful flight and arbitrary departure from the front. The 52nd CD concentrated east of Khotimsk arbitrarily, was intercepted by our delegate and, since the units of the division were to a considerable degree lost by it, from the panic report it is evident that it lost a considerable part of the artillery and machine guns. I decided to bring it out to myself in Rodnya, in the course of one or two days I will put it in order, we will punish the malicious deserters, we will gather the division and use it depending on the situation. Possibly we will also throw it in the direction of Studenets…"

The 4th Airborne Corps continued to hold the "Krichev bridgehead". As stated in the summaries, the corps was reinforced with two battalions and subunits from the composition of the 160th Rifle Division.

The armored train No. 44 was damaged (soon it again entered battle).

In Polesie

The beginning of the offensive of the German 43rd Army Corps (the 134th and 260th Infantry Divisions) against the Soviet 66th Corps in the area of Ozarichi, Shatilki.

The 232nd Rifle Division was thrown back to the line South of Molcha. Dubrova, Korma, Brodtsy, Moiseevka, mark 144.

Kurmyshev's detachment with five tanks was pressed back to Bylkov, Malyn (southwest of Ozemlya), while losing communication with the subunit that was defending Karpilovka.

Batsanov's detachment prevented the crossing of the 45th Infantry Division over the Ptich River in the area of Khoyno.

In connection with the concentration of large enemy forces the command of the Soviet 3rd Army gave the order to go over to the defensive.

Von Bock wrote in his diary: "The XXXXIII Corps finally went over to the attack on the right wing of the 2nd Army. The northern wing of the XXXV Corps, which is to advance through the marshes in the upper reaches of the Ptich, has also slowly moved forward… Behind the front line on the right wing of the 2nd Army the rear troops continue to conduct battles with the Russian cavalry corps, of which, I hope, little is left".

Indeed, already on August 3 in the operational summary of the headquarters of the Central Front it is stated: "According to the report of Batskalevich, the horse strength is overfatigued and the falling of the horse strength from overfatigue has begun…" In essence, by this time (especially taking into account the defeat of the cavalry regiments in the area southeast of Osipovichi) the "cavalry raid through the rear of the enemy" had ended. The divisions were returning to the eastern bank of the Ptich River and subsequently fought in the composition of the 3rd Army.

The 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions crossed to the eastern bank of the Ptich River on the eve. On the night of August 5 in the area of Bubnovka the remnants of the 32nd Cavalry Division (the 121st Cavalry Regiment) together with A. I. Batskalevich crossed with battle to the eastern bank of the Ptich.

From August 5 for several days in the documents of the front headquarters it was stated that no information about the 32nd Cavalry Division had been received anymore. There is information that soon Colonel A. I. Batskalevich was removed from the command of the 32nd Division (he was supposedly replaced by Colonel A. P. Moskalenko - the commander of the motorized rifle regiment of the 29th Motorized Division of the 6th Mechanized Corps who had come out of encirclement from near Belostok). However at the end of August A. I. Batskalevich again figures in the documents as the commander of the division, and in the award list for A. P. Moskalenko it is said that he replaced Batskalevich only after his wounding, while coming out of the "Kiev cauldron" in September-October 1941.

The whole cavalry group was headed by Brigade Commander A. B. Borisov; from August 10 in the summaries of the headquarters of the Central Front it is listed in the composition of the 3rd Army.

August 6

The End of the Battles near Roslavl

The Soviet troops in the area of Roslavl again attempted to break out of the encirclement. The breakthrough of the 104th Tank Division succeeded, however the second group headed by the chief of staff of the 28th Army, Major General P. G. Egorov, did not manage to come out of the encirclement. The military commissar of the 104th Tank Division, A. S. Davidenko, recalled: "Vasily Gerasimovich <Burkov> indicated the direction of movement of the column <of the 104th Tank> division and its structure. In the head part of the column was to be the headquarters of the 28th Army, and the commanders of the aviation and armored troops of the 28th Army... The presence of a large number of tanks gave the possibility, by a sudden blow against the enemy, to break the ring of encirclement. It was reported that the chief of staff of the 28th Army, General P. G. Egorov, would head another column from the units of the 145th and 149th Rifle Divisions and the attached artillery subunits, which would break through to the left…

The movement of the column took place under the cover of the trees, small open sections of the path were overcome by the vehicles one by one and at greater speed. On the way the Ostrik and Oster rivers with their swampy banks were quickly forced. The column led by Burkov early in the morning by a forest road at great speed came out to the place across the Desna River, on the move crushed the guard of the German units and crossed without losses. Further it went almost without battle to the east to its own along the Roslavl-Moscow highway and soon concentrated at the assembly point of the units of the 104th Tank Division in the area of the village of Amur.

…In the morning our column, which was going to the place of the battle where the units of the 145th and 149th Rifle Divisions under the command of General Egorov were breaking out of the encirclement. It was already quite light, and the neighboring units were subjected to fierce blows not only of the ground but also of the air enemy. The troops suffered great losses, but could not break through... By the order of the chief of staff of the army I sent into battle one company of tanks, and then had to send also the second, but it was not possible to achieve success. Therefore in the second half of the day General Egorov had to stop the battle and to direct all the remaining troops and equipment by forest roads in the opposite direction. For almost two days the Soviet units marched and did not encounter the Germans. Early in the morning of August, when it was already light, our whole long column stopped on the open road at the Desna River..." (material of T. Sidorova)

The 104th Tank Division not only itself broke out of the encirclement, but also brought out the personnel of the headquarters of the 28th Army, in all up to 13 thousand fighters and commanders. The chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder wrote in his diary: "At Roslavl the scattered units of the enemy came out of the encirclement. One should take into account the ability of the Russians to use for the movement of their troops the roads which we because of their state cannot use, as well as the ability of the Russians secretly to build crossings over the rivers…"

However the second group was practically destroyed. The German command, summing up the battle near Roslavl, reported: "The Soviet formations encircled near Roslavl 100 km southeast of Smolensk have been destroyed. 38,000 prisoners, 250 tanks, 359 guns and other weapons were captured…"

In the battle the chief of staff of the 28th Army, Major General P. G. Egorov, perished, the remnants of the Operational Group were brought out of the encirclement by the chief of artillery of the army, Major General V. E. Taranovich.

The commander of the 149th Rifle Division, Major General F. D. Zakharov, came out of the encirclement on August 28; the division was restored and fought in the composition of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front.

The 145th Rifle Division was destroyed practically completely and disbanded, its former commander, Major General A. A. Volkhin, came out of the encirclement *, but the one who replaced him, Colonel K. Ya. Baulin, was taken prisoner.

In the combat journal of the Reserve Front for August 8 it was stated that the remnants of the 145th, 149th Rifle Divisions and a regiment of the 46th Division with a total strength of up to 5,000 men had come out of the encirclement. It is noted that the headquarters of the group (with the exception of the commander and the chief of staff) came out of the encirclement completely.

13th Army

The Soviet 45th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army (the 137th and 121st Rifle Divisions) continued the offensive. The main task of the day was to come out to the Krichev-Roslavl highway.

According to the operational summaries of the Soviet headquarters, by 18.00 the Soviet troops had managed to encircle the German units in the area of Yakimovichi (the 121st Division) and Miloslavichi (the 137th Division); the 137th Division with one regiment intercepted the Warsaw highway in the area of Shesterovka, Zelenoe. The 705th Rifle Regiment of the 121st Division occupied Pozhyr.

In the summary for August 8 the losses of the 137th Division for August 4-6 are indicated: 810 men wounded, 672 - killed and missing.

The 4th Airborne Corps after regrouping also went over to a counter-offensive in the area of the "Krichev bridgehead", units of the 6th Division occupied Ganovka.

21st Army

The army was ordered to transfer to the disposal of the commander of the 13th Army, Major General K. D. Golubev, the 50th Tank Division with the administration of the 25th Mechanized Corps (from the area of Propoisk).

In its turn the detachment of Major General V. I. Neretin in the area of Streshin (at the junction with the 3rd Army) was subordinated to the 21st Army: the 110th Rifle Regiment with the 36th Light Artillery Regiment, a separate battalion (of the 132nd Division) and a cavalry regiment, the detachment of the Pinsk Military Flotilla, - in readiness for an offensive on Mormol from the morning of August 7.

In Polesie

The German 43rd Corps continued to press the units of the 66th Rifle Corps. The counterattack of the Soviet 43rd Cavalry Division was repelled by the enemy.

In the negotiations of the front headquarters with the command of the 21st Army the threat to the junction of the 21st and 3rd Armies of the Central Front and the seizure by the enemy of the crossing over the Dnieper River in the area of Rechitsa was determined. To liquidate the threat the 42nd Rifle Division was removed from the front and directed to the disposal of the commander of the 3rd Army (at the same time the order to leave the front was received by the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment, however soon, as a result of the change of the situation, it was directed to the disposal of the 13th Army).

German Command

Meanwhile the German command began preparations for the offensive on Rogachev and Zhlobin against the Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps. The commander-in-chief of the troops of Army Group "Center", Field Marshal F. von Bock, insisted that the operation be prepared with all thoroughness. "According to his report, the operation with the aim of liquidating the remnants of the enemy's troops in the area of Rogachev, planned by the command of the 2nd Army, does not promise success…" (an entry in the diary of F. Halder).

At a conference at the headquarters of the army group in Borisov (besides von Bock, there were present the chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, and the commander of the 2nd Army, Colonel General M. von Weichs) it was decided to create the main strike grouping by uniting the 12th and 13th Army Corps on the northern flank of the 2nd Army, to attach to it also a cavalry division and, possibly, a tank division (later Guderian insisted not to split the tank units: in his opinion, one tank division would not be sufficient, while to transfer the whole motorized corps to the west was equivalent to a retreat). "With the inclusion in the composition of this group of the 162nd Infantry Division * it will be ensured the necessary depth.

…For the offensive… it is necessary first of all to strengthen the right flank of our troops in the area south of Rogachev. For this the units of the 35th Corps must wait for the arrival of the troops of the 43rd Army Corps.

The preparation of the offensive can be finished in the period between 10 and 12.8."

August 7

13th Army

In the area of the "Krichev bridgehead" the 4th Airborne Corps and the 6th Rifle Division continued the offensive. The 6th Division half-encircled Khotovizh and came out to the line Khodun (excl.), Ganovka, Pervomayskoye (excl.).

The 45th Rifle Corps of E. Ya. Magon (on this day he was given the rank of major general) advanced forward and took under control the Krichev-Roslavl highway east of Khotovizh.

At 12.40 the commander of the 13th Army, Major General K. D. Golubev, gave the order:

- the 121st Rifle Division, upon the destruction of the enemy in the area of Yakimovichi, comes out to the highway in the area of Osva, Shlykovshchina with a further blow along the highway on Roslavl;

- the 137th Rifle Division after the capture of Miloslavichi, Yakimovichi forms the reserve of the army;

- the 132nd Rifle Division goes over to the offensive from the line Sklimin, Burevestnik and comes out to the highway in the area of Zvenchatka, Paporodka, Zavidovka with a further blow on Shumyachi;

- the 21st Mountain Cavalry Division forms the mobile reserve ("echelon of the development of success") and develops the offensive from the area of Ovchinnikovo 1st on Stary Dedin, Studenets.

The 137th Rifle Division continued the battles in the area of Miloslavichi, Burevestnik; with one regiment it saddled the highway in the area of Shesterovka, Zeleny.

The 21st Mountain Cavalry Division of Colonel Ya. K. Kuliev on foot from the morning became involved in battle in the area of Yasnaya Polyana, Kiseleva Buda. In the summary for the morning of August 8 battles in the area of Burevestnik, height 202.9 are described.

The 132nd Rifle Division came out to the line of the attack only by 18.00 and by the end of the day went over to the offensive in the direction of Shesterovka, Serkovka.

The activity of the Soviet troops in the area of the Warsaw highway alarmed the German command. G. Guderian, in anticipation of the offensive on Moscow, recalled: "Before going over to the offensive on Moscow or undertaking any other operation, we had to fulfil beforehand one more condition: to secure our right flank at Krichev, located as a deep ledge to the rear. The clearing of this flank from the enemy's troops was also necessary in order to ensure for the 2nd Army the offensive on Rogachev. Both the command of Army Group "Center" and the command of the tank group considered that thereby the necessity would disappear of sending tank forces into the area of operations of the 2nd Army and the great wear of the material part caused by the prolonged marches (the distance from Roslavl to Rogachev - 200 km, and there and back - 400 km).

Both headquarters considered that our main aim should be the development of the offensive on Moscow. However, despite this, from the headquarters of the army group, obviously under pressure from the OKH, there continued to come repeated demands "to transfer some tank units in the direction of Propoisk". All the misunderstandings connected with these demands were settled by the decision of General Geir <von Schweppenburg, commander of the 24th Motorized Corps>, who wished to get rid of the constant pressure on his right flank by an offensive against the enemy south of Krichev in the area of Miloslavichi. I agreed with this decision, having also received the approval of the headquarters of the army group, which renounced its demand to send tanks in the direction of Propoisk".

21st Army

In the zone of the 28th Rifle Corps the enemy forced the Sozh River and occupied a bridgehead in the area of Ustye (north of Veprin). The attempts of the Soviet troops for several days to throw the enemy back beyond the Sozh River were not crowned with success.

On the remaining sectors of the army it was calm.

In Polesie

The German 43rd Army Corps resumed the offensive in the zone of the 66th Rifle Corps. The 232nd Rifle Division abandoned Shatilki and conducted a heavy battle for Ozarichi (here too both cavalry divisions of the group of Brigade Commander A. B. Borisov fought: the 43rd and 47th).

The 75th Rifle Division received an order to withdraw to the Mozyr Fortified Region with the task of taking up a circular defense in it.

The 42nd Rifle Division transferred to the composition of the 3rd Army (two regiments * plus the 443rd Rifle Regiment of the 160th Rifle Division) was concentrating in the second echelon of the 66th Corps.

The morning offensive of the detachment of Major General V. I. Neretin of the 21st Army on Mormol was not crowned with success - here the enemy had also already concentrated considerable forces.

Soviet Command

On this day the commander of the Central Front, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, was recalled to Moscow and soon directed to the Crimea. The command of the Central Front was assumed by Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov; the acting commander of the 21st Army was appointed the chief of staff, Major General V. N. Gordov.

August 8

German Command

The chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, wrote in his diary: "Apparently, before the southern flank of the army group <"Center"> the position and grouping of the enemy's troops have changed. On large sectors of the front the enemy is clearly withdrawing from its lines. In the area south of Roslavl the troops of the 7th Army Corps, advancing after the withdrawing enemy, made a half-day march without encountering significant resistance. In the area north of Gomel the enemy continues to hold its positions; its artillery is active.

Taking into account the situation that has developed, the command of the army group intends tomorrow to go over to the offensive with the forces of the 24th Motorized Corps from the area west of Roslavl in the direction of Gomel. On August 11 the units of the 12th and 13th Army Corps will advance from the north, and the troops operating in the area west of Rogachev (the 53rd Army Corps) will begin the offensive from the northwest and will break through the enemy front at Gomel…"

In his turn, Field Marshal F. von Bock also left an entry on this subject: "The VII Corps <with its left flank> attacked in the south of Roslavl, almost without encountering resistance on the way, and during the day advanced to the south and southeast of Roslavl by 30 km. The enemy has indeed retreated here - or it simply lacks the forces to close the breach that has formed in its defense after our unexpected attack. If the attack in the south-western direction of the XXIV Tank Corps nevertheless begins in the next few days, it will be able to considerably ease the tense situation on the front.

To the tank group of Guderian orders have been sent about the attack on Krasnopolye and about the preparation of the offensive in the direction of Chechersk after the destruction of the enemy on the sector in front of the front of the 7th Division. Guderian proposes to move at once in the direction of Gomel, which is completely correct and which I would certainly approve, if the XXXXIII Corps, stationed at the very tip of the southern wing of the 2nd Army, were not lagging so far behind the center. In this connection it is not possible to use it as one of the semicircles of the pincers which are to close around Gomel. Proceeding from this, or rather for the simple reason that the XXXXIII Corps is experiencing great difficulties in forcing the Berezina, I gave the order to the 2nd Army about the formation of a separate composite battalion, which would be in a condition to reach the Dnieper on August 10. I also gave an analogous order to the XXXV Corps, although I perfectly imagine what difficulties it will have to overcome during the march under pouring rain along the half-flooded dirt roads. I understand well that all this is almost beyond the possibilities of the 2nd Army, but my duty - is to make the people move".

13th Army

In the area of the "Krichev bridgehead" the offensive of the 4th Airborne Corps continued. The 8th Brigade captured the crossing over the Oster River at Zimonino and came out to the eastern bank of the Sozh River east of Krichev.

The combat operations in the zone of the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps continued (the 137th, 132nd and 121st Rifle, the 21st Mountain Cavalry Divisions).

According to the memoirs of the commander of the 132nd Rifle Division S. S. Biryuzov, great damage to the 21st Cavalry Division was inflicted by enemy aviation: the introduction into the breakthrough of the cavalry division was not covered by means of air defense, and the modest aviation of the Central Front could not ensure reliable cover from the air for the Soviet strike grouping.

S. S. Biryuzov continued: "The enemy would not for anything reconcile himself to the fact that we had cut his communications between Krichev and Roslavl. He brought into battle his ground reserves as well.

Before us there appeared new infantry and tank units of the Germans.

The setback that befell the cavalry men confused all our plans. The regiments of the 132nd Rifle Division could no longer advance further. It was all we could do to hold on to the occupied positions. The fighters dug in, preparing for a decisive clash, and the enemy did not keep them waiting long. Already by the evening the Hitlerites struck at our flanks, trying to throw the division back beyond the highway. But all the rifle subunits and the dismounted cavalry men held firm…"

According to the Soviet summary as of 6.00 on August 9, the 45th Rifle Corps was putting itself in order after the battles of the previous days.

Meanwhile the 50th Tank Division of Colonel B. S. Bakharov with the administration of the 25th Mechanized Corps concentrated in the area of Kostyukovichi. By the morning of the following day the division came out to the area of Sudzily.

On the right flank of the 13th Army - at the junction with the Reserve Front - the direction Roslavl-Unecha remained uncovered. The enemy occupied Ershichi, having thrown back the weak screen in the form of the remnants of the 148th Rifle Division. To its aid was directed the 52nd Cavalry Division.

The Unecha combat sector created was entrusted to Colonel M. E. Kozyr. In the area of Kletnya the 78th Engineer Battalion unloaded and was transferred to the subordination of the 13th Army.

21st Army

After the departure of the 50th Tank Division with the administration of the 25th Mechanized Corps, in the area of Propoisk there remained a detachment in the composition of the 219th Motorized Rifle Division and the 12th Motorcycle Regiment under the overall command of Major General P. P. Korzun.

The 55th Tank Division was withdrawn to the rear.

In Polesie

According to the Soviet operational summaries, units of the 3rd Army stopped the enemy's offensive and held Selishche, Slavnya, Karpovichi, Kuridichi, Kozlovichi, Savichi.

The 42nd Rifle Division took up the defense in the area of Rechitsa in the second echelon of the 66th Corps.

The 75th Rifle Division withdrew to the Mozyr Fortified Region.

August 9

The German Offensive on Klimovichi

The new offensive of the Army Group of G. Guderian began: the 24th Motorized Corps (the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions, in the second echelon - the 10th Motorized Division), reinforced with the 7th Infantry Division, delivered a blow to the right flank of the 13th Army south of Miloslavichi in the direction of Rodnya, Klimovichi.

Von Bock wrote in his diary: "The tanks along the roads filled with liquid mud advance very slowly…"

The 45th Rifle Corps of Major General E. Ya. Magon, which was delivering a blow on Dubovitsa and was tied down by the infantry units of the 7th Army Corps, found itself enveloped on the right flank, its communications were cut, communication was disrupted.

The commander of the 132nd Rifle Division S. S. Biryuzov recalled: We finally managed to contact the headquarters of the army by radio. The commander ordered to withdraw to the east and to occupy a line remote by approximately 100-120 km from the place where we were. But when I showed this radiogram to Magon, he shook his head distrustfully:

- Your radio operators, probably, spoke with the Germans. It is unlikely that the commander of the army could have given such an order...

We tried to contact the front. Nothing came of this. The headquarters of the army also no longer answered us. Communication with it was restored only in the second half of the day, when it became obvious that the enemy had bypassed the flanks of the division and was trying to take us in pincers from two sides. I was again ordered to begin the withdrawal, but no longer to the east, but almost to the south, to the area of Pogar, with the subsequent coming out to the line of the Desna River at Trubchevsk.

- And now, - the headquarters of the army "warned" us, - we are again closing communication and will open it only tomorrow...

What this meant, we understood: the army CP would be moving to another area…"

August 10

13th Army

The German 24th Motorized Corps continued the offensive. By the end of the day the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions had advanced southwest of Miloslavichi to the line Rodnya, Osmolovichi, Klimovichi. The 10th Motorized Division moving in the second echelon reached Miloslavichi.

The position of the formations of Guderian's Army Group is described by him as follows:

— the 7th Infantry Division - in the area south of Khotovizh;

— the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions conducted the offensive southwest of Miloslavichi;

— the 10th Motorized Division reached Miloslavichi;

— the 78th Infantry Division - in Sloboda (south of Yakimovichi), its forward detachment - in Bukhano (more likely, Bokhany west of Khotimsk);

— the 197th Infantry Division - in Ostrovaya, its forward detachment - in Aleshnya;

— the 29th Motorized Division - in Roslavl; the 23rd Infantry Division - at rest north of Roslavl;

— the 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions - on the line of the Desna River.

F. Halder wrote in his diary that on the sector between Roslavl and Bryansk there were only weak enemy forces; German reconnaissance had penetrated far to the south.

The main forces of the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps (the 121st, 137th and 132nd Rifle Divisions, the 21st Mountain Cavalry Division) found themselves in encirclement in the forests in the area of Shesterovka, Kiseleva Buda, Neznan. Communication with the command of the 45th Corps was interrupted. Up to two battalions of the 137th Division with subunits of the 121st and 132nd Divisions withdrew to the line Rodnya, Leonpolye.

Because of the threat of envelopment, the 4th Airborne Corps with the 6th Rifle Division was forced to withdraw to the line Osmolovichi, Lobzha, which meant the abandonment of the "Krichev bridgehead".

The headquarters of the 13th Army began its movement from the area of Rodnya to the area of Kostyukovichi.

In the area of Kostyukovichi by 1.30 on August 11 the 155th Rifle Division with artillery, transferred from the composition of the 21st Army, was concentrating (the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment and the 387th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command were transferred to the composition of the 13th Army). It received the task to attack together with the 50th Tank Division on the flank and rear of the enemy that had broken through from Osmolovichi.

The combat composition of the 13th Army as of August 10 is presented in Table 5-4.

Table 5-4. Combat Composition of the 13th Army on August 10, 1941  *

21st Army

The German 43rd Army Corps attacked the Soviet troops in the direction of Streshin. Major General V. I. Neretin asked permission to withdraw, but the front commander, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, demanded that the defense be held.

The detachment of Neretin was reinforced with the 437th Rifle Regiment from the composition of the 154th Rifle Division of the 63rd Corps.

August 11

13th Army

Units of the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps continued to fight in encirclement. To the aid of E. Ya. Magon was directed a detachment of the 50th Tank Division (20 tanks, a battalion of motorized infantry, a light anti-tank battery). It broke through to the CP of the corps, but while coming out of the encirclement Major General E. Ya. Magon perished (in the documents of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR he was listed as missing; buried in the settlement of Klimovichi, Mogilev Oblast).

In the Soviet summary it is stated that the tank group of Zakharov after a successful battle in the area of Galichi brings out of the encirclement the 771st Rifle Regiment of the 137th Rifle Division. In the operational summary of the army headquarters of the 13th for August 14 it is stated that in the area of Galichi the 41st Motorized Infantry Regiment of the 10th Motorized Division was defeated, its headquarters was destroyed and a German colonel was bayoneted.

The Soviet 132nd Rifle Division was breaking out of the encirclement in the area of Titovka (east of Klimovichi), while the chief of staff of the division, Colonel D. V. Bychkov, was taken prisoner. In the course of the battles the commissar of the division, Regimental Commissar P. I. Lukovkin, perished. The remnants of the 132nd Rifle Division came out of the encirclement only in September together with the commander, Major General S. S. Biryuzov (the future Marshal of the Soviet Union).

The 21st Cavalry Division was ordered not to come out of the encirclement and to act on the enemy's communications; as a result the division was completely defeated. Its commander, Colonel Ya. K. Kuliev, and the chief of the Special Department, A. S. Kibalnikov, having changed into civilian clothes, came out of the encirclement two weeks later.

The administration of the 45th Corps was retreating to the line Mglin, Surazh along the Iput River (the corps was taken over by Colonel M. V. Ivashechkin; headquarters - Tserkovishche).

In the disposal of the 13th Army of those listed in Table 5-4 there remained: the hastily restored 148th Rifle Division (2 rifle companies with 2 122-mm guns), reinforced with two armored trains, concentrated in Belynkovichi (south of Kostyukovichi); to it were subordinated the reserve regiment in Surazh and the 383rd Regiment of the 121st Rifle Division in Nivnoye.

The 52nd Cavalry Division with a composite detachment of the 148th Division and a detachment of the 50th Tank Division ("group of Zakharov") soon entered battle south of Ershichi (in the area of Razrytoe, Petrovka, Malaya Yazovka, Dubrovka).

Khotimsk was defended by the 112th Cavalry Regiment with an armored battalion from the composition of the 21st Cavalry Division.

North of Kostyukovichi the 25th Mechanized Corps defended (the 50th Tank Division and the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment; it also took over a regiment of the 137th Division) and the 155th Rifle Division with the 387th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command.

On the left flank of the 13th Army the 4th Airborne Corps with the 6th Rifle Division withdrew far to the south to the line Krasovichi, Derazhnya, Kliny, Kholmy, Veprin, while losing communication with two battalions of the 8th Brigade. Units of the 7th Airborne Brigade were combined into two battalions. The remnants of the 6th Division were gathering in the area of Shishkovka.

In the zone of the 21st Army

The German 2nd Army was finishing the last preparations for the offensive on the Gomel direction.

F. Halder wrote in his diary: "General of Artillery Brand reports on the preparation of the artillery for the offensive on the southern flank of Army Group "Center" (Rogachev). The 13th Army Corps will advance in interaction with the corps artillery. The command of the 12th Army Corps attaches special importance to the destruction of the enemy's command posts. The system of artillery observation posts has fully justified itself. Great importance is attached to the use of captive observation balloons.

The enemy is trying to hinder the work of our artillery reconnaissance. Against sound-measuring reconnaissance the enemy uses the principle of the closing up of the batteries and firing in a fan. To complicate the actions of our light-measuring reconnaissance the enemy conducts salvo fire from many guns located at a great distance from each other (600 m).

The Russian artillery possesses great mobility thanks to the use of tractors. A very good Russian map of the scale 1:50000 has been found, which can be successfully used for conducting fire".

Meanwhile the German 43rd Army Corps threw back the detachment of V. I. Neretin beyond the Dnieper River and occupied Streshin and Zaton.

On the following day the detachment of Neretin was disbanded, the 110th Rifle Regiment was transferred to the subordination of the 63rd Rifle Corps, the cavalry regiment was transferred to the 3rd Army.

August 12

The German Offensive on Gomel

On the Gomel direction the northern strike grouping of the German 2nd Army began the offensive: the 12th and 13th Army Corps (7 infantry divisions) and the 1st Cavalry Division. The main blow was delivered in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh in the zone of the 219th Motorized Division (from the side of Propoisk) and in the zone of the 67th Rifle Corps (Bolshaya Zimnica, Iskan). As a result of the German offensive the front of the 67th Rifle Corps was torn apart.

The Soviet command had no idea about the concentration against the center of the 21st Army of such considerable forces. The commander of the 67th Rifle Corps, K. N. Galitsky, recalled about a conference at the CP of the 21st Army: "neither V. N. Gordov nor we with L. G. Petrovsky, as corps commanders, having arrived in Dovsk, unfortunately, were able to determine the forces and intentions of the enemy, who had begun a decisive offensive on the Gomel direction, and counted on holding the occupied line by counterattacks…"

On the other hand, not having fresh reserves, the command of the Soviet Central Front was forced to regroup the troops and to transfer formations and units from the quiet sectors to the places of the German breakthroughs. Thus, in the first ten days of August from the 21st Army were taken the 42nd and 155th Rifle Divisions, the 50th Tank Division, the 503rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment and the 387th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command, as well as the administrations of the 25th Mechanized Corps and the 20th Rifle Corps. As a result by the beginning of the German offensive on Gomel on the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh the Soviet defense turned out to be weakened: the enemy was opposed by the 219th Motorized Division with a motorcycle regiment and 4 rifle divisions of the 67th Rifle Corps with a limited amount of artillery.

The combat composition of the Soviet 21st Army by the beginning of the German offensive on August 12 is presented in Table 5-5.

Table 5-5.
Combat Composition of the 21st Army on August 12, 1941

The Soviet command took the decision to counterattack the enemy with the forces of the 219th Motorized Division and the 67th Rifle Corps in the general direction of Rekta. The corps was reinforced with the 167th Rifle Division of Major General V. S. Rakovsky, which was being transferred to the area of Dovsk by motor transport. The counterattack was planned for the morning of August 13.

Meanwhile the German 43rd Army Corps of the western offensive grouping (2 infantry divisions) continued the offensive, threw back the Soviet troops south of Zhlobin beyond the Dnieper River, and on the Rechitsa direction came out to the line Boroviki, Charneyka.

The enemy's attack on Rogachev in the zone of the Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps was repelled.

Field Marshal von Bock wrote in his diary: "The attack of the 2nd Army, which began on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, is developing well. The XXXXIII Corps, which is going on the right wing, will most likely not be able to attack across the Dnieper before the day after tomorrow. It is a pity that the tanks cannot be used on the left wing for an attack to the west of the Sozh River. Weichs understands that the main efforts must be concentrated on the right wing.

The enemy encircled in the area of the XXIV Tank Corps and the 7th Division <the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps is meant - VM> is still holding on. In this connection the possibility of the offensive of the XXIV Corps on Gomel appears ever more ephemeral, especially if one takes into account that the 4th Tank Division encountered strong opposition in the area of Kostyukovichi, and also was subjected to attacks of the enemy on its eastern flank…"

August 13

The German Offensive on Gomel

The Soviet counterattack in the direction of Rekta, planned for the morning of this day, remained for the most part on paper, at least in regard to the 219th Motorized Division and the 67th Rifle Corps.

The morning report of the chief of the operational department of the chief of staff of the 21st Army, Colonel D. F. Tsumarev, to the chief of staff of the Central Front, Colonel L. M. Sandalov, gives some idea of the events that took place:

"First. The position on the front of the 28th RC is almost without changes…

Second. The 219th Motorized Rifle Division holds Gaishin, Nikolsky, Krasny, Khlebno. At 08.15 the enemy with forces up to two battalions of infantry with the support of tanks (according to the report of Korzun, tanks up to a regiment) went over to the offensive from the area of Nikolsky, Koselsk, Prudok on Khlebno. At present a battle is going on. Aviation was sent there to destroy the tanks and infantry.

The 117th RD during the night withdrew to the line height 170.3, south. 2 km of Korma to Obricht (with two regiments). One regiment is unknown where it is located, it is being searched for *. From the morning of 06.00 the division went over to the offensive in the direction of Novoselki, Mal. Barsuki. At present it is conducting a battle for Novoselki. In the area of Novoselki up to a battalion of infantry with 3-4 tanks. Moreover the 117th RD during the night was being gathered along the whole road from Korma to Chechersk. Its artillery regiment, the rear services blocked the whole road. And it was necessary for everyone from the chief of staff to the member of the military council to gather and put in order the units. Moreover before the front of the division the situation by the end of yesterday was better than that of the others, but the division commander, the chief of staff and the chief of artillery lost all direction of the units of the division. At present exactly at 08.00 from the area of my CP I sent the battalion of the 707th Artillery Regiment, as well as the chief of staff of the division and the chief of artillery, who absolutely did not know where their division was, where the units were and what they were doing. At present the division is being put in order.

I missed the 187th RD. It went over to the offensive from the line Rudnya, Voshanka, Privolye in the general direction of Nov. Bych, Rekta. There are as yet no results of the battle. The rear services of the division and the 419th Artillery Regiment I also detained today in the area of Chechersk and at 08.00 sent them to the area of Litvinovichi at the disposal of the division commander. Moreover this regiment, instead of fulfilling the order of the division commander and concentrating by the end of the day in the area of Litvinovichi, headed by the commander and the commissar of the regiment, was detained by the chief of the political department of the army in the area of Chechersk and presented to me in the Army HQ, from where at 07.00 I sent them to the front.

The 151st RD from the morning continues to conduct a battle on the line Nov. Zhuravichi, Guta. Before the front of the division up to a regiment of infantry. The enemy directs special effort from Zhuravichi along the highway to Dovsk and from Khatovnya to Kanava.

Third. The 102nd RD as before holds the occupied line.

Fourth. The 167th RD, the 696th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, four tanks, two armored cars, concentrated in the area of Dovsk, under the personal direction of Gordov are advancing in the north-eastern direction, saddling the highway Dovsk, Propoisk, with the task of encircling and defeating the enemy in the area of Nov. Bych, Rekta, Bolotnoye, Berezovka…"

Thus, only the hastily transferred to the zone of the 67th Corps Soviet 167th Division went over to active actions. By this time the 117th and 187th Rifle Divisions under the pressure of the enemy had already withdrawn to the south and southeast. This allowed the German troops to attack the 167th Division on the flank; the division suffered losses and was thrown back to its starting positions.

As a result the initiative remained with the enemy. Developing the offensive along the Mogilev highway, by 11.00 the German units occupied Dovsk. The 219th, 117th and 187th Divisions were pressed back to the Sozh River, the German strike wedge advanced to Bogdanovichi.

On this day the commander of the 67th Rifle Corps, Major General K. N. Galitsky, was seriously wounded (twice in the leg) and evacuated. There is information that on this same day he was replaced by Brigade Commander N. A. Gusevsky. Still on August 12 he was appointed commander of the Unecha-Pochep combat sector, however, apparently, he remained at the disposal of the commander of the 21st Army; there is a record of the report of Lieutenant Colonel Tokarev (chief of staff of the 67th RC) to Colonel L. M. Sandalov that on 13.08 "Brigade Commander Gusevsky arrived at the place and began work".

Simultaneously a report came that the acting commander of the 21st Army, Major General V. N. Gordov, was also wounded in the area of Dovsk. In the report of the senior assistant of the chief of the operational department of the front headquarters, Colonel Angarsky, on the actions of the armies of the Central Front from August 9 to 25 the report of the wounding of Gordov is presented as follows:

"The headquarters of the army at the most critical moment lost communication with the troops and in essence had no influence at all on the course of the battle. The army commander with a group of operational workers set out in the direction of DOVSK, but on the way came under artillery fire and, as was reported from the army headquarters to the front, turned out to be seriously wounded. As it later turned out, all this turned out to be a complete fantasy of the confused workers of the headquarters of the 21st A. The army commander was unharmed, but the army headquarters insistently sought permission to transfer the CP from the area of CHECHERSK (which no one was yet threatening) to GOMEL…"

In the question of the transfer of the CP of the army from the area of Chechersk the report of Colonel Angarsky does not give a complete picture. Colonel D. F. Tsumarev in a regular oral report to the front headquarters at about 11.25 said:

"This very minute I received reports from the signalmen sent to Dovsk to restore communication that they could not reach Dovsk because of the fact that there is a strong battle going on there and our units 3 km south of Dovsk are conducting a battle, retreating in a southerly direction…

I request that you report to Sandalov and transmit to me his answer of decision. I consider that the Army HQ must prepare a new CP. I request instructions on this account, because the rear services of the units are beginning to press on the area of the Army HQ. There is a threat that we may be late with the deployment of the new CP…"

Further Colonel Angarsky continued in his report:

"Having received data on the withdrawal of two central corps of the 21st A <in many documents of the front headquarters the defense zones of the 67th and 20th Rifle Corps were mentioned, although on August 11 the administration of the 20th Corps received an order to depart to the disposal of the Stavka - VM> and taking into account the confusion of the army headquarters, the commander of the front, Lieutenant General Comrade EFREMOV, and the member of the Military Council PONOMARENKO set out with a group of operational workers to the area of Dovsk. Simultaneously in the name of Tsumarev (chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 21st A) the following instruction was transmitted:

1. I categorically forbid the withdrawal and any talk about withdrawal by anyone.

2. To enter immediately into the command of the army to the corps commander of the 63rd, Lieutenant General PETROVSKY.

3. To enter into the command of the 63rd RC to the commander by appointment of PETROVSKY.

4. About the commander admitted to the command of the 63rd RC immediately report to the Military Council of the front.

5. The task of the 21st A is to encircle the enemy that has broken through, to press him to the Sozh River and destroy him.

6. The Army HQ in such a situation must strive to be closer to the troops, to organize the battle and direct it, and by no means to flee from the troops in a serious situation.

7. I repeat - I forbid even thinking about withdrawal. I demand the restoration of the situation and step by step, strengthening the terrain occupied by the troops, if it is even impossible to go, then to crawl forward. But before us there is not such an enemy that one should crawl, but one must go and attack.

8. Report the execution.

Acting Front Commander EFREMOV Member of the Military Council of the Front Gaponovich

13.8.1941 11.50".

The decision of Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov to enter into the command of the 21st Army by Lieutenant General L. G. Petrovsky for not very clear reasons remained on paper. Other "decisive" paper measures of the Soviet command also did not help.

By the end of the day the German forward detachments occupied Merkulovichi on the Dovsk-Gomel highway and moved on Chechersk.

The left-flank divisions of the 67th Corps (the 151st, 102nd and the new 167th) by the end of the day were consolidating on the line Lubyanka, Stary Krivsk, Aleksandrovka, Sverzhen; the headquarters of the corps was located in a grove west of Novy Krivsk.

The enemy also suffered losses: in the battle at the village of Zvonets north of Dovsk the commander of the German 31st Infantry Division, Major General K. Kalmykoff, perished (posthumously recommended for the rank of lieutenant general).

Meanwhile the German 43rd Army Corps forced the Dnieper River in the area of Streshin. Units of the 63rd and 67th Rifle Corps found themselves in semi-encirclement in the triangle Zhlobin, Rogachev, Stary Krivsk.

13th Army

The German 24th Motorized Corps resumed the attacks from the area of Voloskovnya on Kostyukovichi, Klintsy. By 14.00 the defense of the detachment of the 137th Rifle Division was broken through, the German troops continued the offensive on Kostyukovichi.

In the summary of the army headquarters of the 13th these events are described as follows: "The 137th RD (500 men) by the evening of 13.8.41 conducted an unequal battle with two motorized regiments of the enemy, supported by tanks, began to withdraw in a southerly direction. By 20.00 on 13.8.41 the tanks of the enemy broke through the front of the 786th RR <of the 155th RD> at Prusino and rushed on Kostyukovichi. After the passage of the tanks the infantry closed up, cutting off the enemy's infantry from the tanks that had broken through. The enemy's tanks were driven out of Kostyukovichi by the approaching detachment of Bakharev <commander of the 50th Tank Division> and a battalion of communists. Only in the morning of 14.8.41 the enemy again managed to capture Kostyukovichi. Of the 137th RD there remained only 250 men, who withdrew to Belynkovichi…"

As a result of the evening battle the headquarters of the 25th Mechanized Corps was cut off. It came out of the encirclement at night and concentrated in the forest south of Krasnitsa, and on August 15 received an order to depart to Bryansk.

The commander of the 2nd Tank Group, Colonel General G. Guderian, wrote in the daily report of his tank group: "The 24th Tank Corps, reinforced with the 7th Infantry Division, conducted a well-planned and executed encirclement of the enemy operating in the area of Miloslavichi-Klimovichi in the period from August 8 to 13. As a result 4 enemy infantry <divisions>, strong cavalry and an airborne brigade were destroyed and dispersed.

There were captured 16,000 prisoners, 48 guns, 15 tanks, 26 anti-tank guns, 2 anti-aircraft guns and an armored train. The losses of the enemy were very high…"

August 14

MAP OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
POSITION OF THE TROOPS OF THE CENTRAL FRONT ON 14.VIII.1941.

Enlarge the map in a separate window (9.7 MB)

The German Offensive on Gomel

Units of the German 1st Cavalry Division by 8.00 took Chechersk. The headquarters of the 21st Army located near Chechersk came under attack, the command of the troops was finally disrupted. The headquarters received an order to relocate only in the evening, with losses broke out of the encirclement and moved to a new CP in the area of Vetka.

The chief of staff of the Central Front, Colonel L. M. Sandalov, reported to the Stavka: "from 22.00 on 14.08.1941 to 01.00 on 15.08.1941 the Commander of the troops of the front personally, Lieutenant General Efremov, with a large group of staff workers ascertained the situation at the front and established personal communication with the commanders of units and formations, since the headquarters of the 21st Army and the headquarters of the 67th RC lost the command of the troops and let the command slip…"

Those units and formations of the 67th Rifle Corps which were pressed back to the Sozh River were subordinated to the headquarters of the 28th Rifle Corps (in its composition there turned out in the end the 55th, 219th, 187th and 117th Divisions).

The remaining divisions of the 67th Corps (the 102nd, 151st and 167th Rifle Divisions) were rolling back to the south, apparently deprived of all command.

By the end of the day the German troops came out to the line Dudichi, Koshelevo 30-35 km from Gomel.

In the negotiations of the headquarters of the Central Front and the headquarters of the 21st Army (Colonel L. M. Sandalov - Colonel D. F. Tsumarev) strong concern of the Soviet command for the Gomel direction was noted:

"Comrade TSUMAREV, why has the direction on GOMEL remained completely uncovered, while all your units have gone beyond the Sozh River?! What measures are you taking?!

- I answer. Beyond the Sozh River the 187th, 219th and 117th RD went because the enemy threw them back to the Sozh River. All the attempts of 13.08.41 to withdraw the units of the 187th, 117th RD were not successful. The units, having suffered great losses…

- Stop! Who is now covering the GOMEL direction, and what measures are you taking for this?! Because this question is a very important one asked by the boss from the Stavka. Obviously, who will be responsible for this? What measures are you taking in order to quickly throw the troops onto the defense of GOMEL?! That is all.

- I answer. We do not have a single fighter whom…

- You have for this five divisions which are doing nothing at all! And you speak about individual fighters! Bear in mind that the question acquires colossal importance, since the main point which must be defended by you - GOMEL, and you have uncovered it, abandoned it. Is the member of the Military Council there? And why has GORDOV left for PETROVSKY?.."

East of Zhlobin

Not having communication with the army headquarters and knowing about the growing catastrophe on its right flank, the Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps of Lieutenant General L. G. Petrovsky by the end of the day abandoned Rogachev and Zhlobin and began the withdrawal to the eastern bank of the Dnieper River; units of the corps were retreating to the line Stolpnya, Gorodets, Chernaya Virnya, Zhlobin.

At the same time the formal permission for the withdrawal of the corps L. G. Petrovsky received only in the evening:

"Combat Instruction

1. The withdrawal is permitted by Comrade SHAPOSHNIKOV, if you really consider the situation threatening. The area occupied by you is very important, and its loss is extremely undesirable.

2. Assess more seriously the position of your corps and, possibly, you will be able to hold the sector occupied by your corps.

3. I grant you the right to decide the question of the withdrawal, you can see the situation better.

4. Transmit your decision immediately.

5. If the decision is taken by you on the withdrawal, immediately report to the Military Council of the Front and the Army by radio and other means of communication.

6. On the withdrawal I set you the task: having broken away from the enemy, secretly deliver a blow to the enemy on the rear in the general direction through GORODETS-STRESHIN. To join your flanks to the left of the 21st Army and with the left to the right flank of the 3rd Army.

Signed: EFREMOV, PONOMARENKO, GAPONOVICH

14.8.1941 19.45"

In the already mentioned report of Colonel Angarsky it was said on this account: "…the decision on the withdrawal of the 63rd RC was taken by the Military Council of the front somewhat late, since already from the morning of 14.8 the units of the corps, conducting heavy battles with superior enemy forces, began independently to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Dnieper River.

This withdrawal was not planned by anyone and therefore proceeded in a rather unorganized form. The deep envelopment of the right flank of the corps and the threat of a breakthrough of the communications led to the loss of the command of the troops on the part of the corps commander; the 61st RD gradually began to roll back to the south and southeast.

Thus, the blow in the direction of GORODETS, STRESHIN could not take place because of the spontaneity of the withdrawal of the troops and the loss of command".

Besides the catastrophe on the right flank, the threat over the 63rd Corps also loomed from the left flank: the German 43rd Army Corps advancing here occupied Skepnya.

13th Army

The German 24th Motorized Corps completed the battles in the area of Krichev, Klimovichi and occupied Kostyukovichi. Further the German mobile troops continued the offensive in a southerly direction on Klintsy, Unecha and Starodub.

On the left (eastern) flank of the 24th Motorized Corps advanced the 47th Motorized Corps (the 17th and 18th Tank, the 29th Motorized Divisions).

Formation of the Bryansk Front

As a result of the offensive of the Army Group of Guderian a multi-kilometer breach formed in the defense of the Soviet troops. After the defeat of the group of V. Ya. Kachalov this breach (on the right flank of the 13th Army) was to be covered by the 2nd Rifle Corps of Major General A. N. Ermakov. In the order of A. N. Ermakov of August 9 there are listed the 258th, 260th and 290th Rifle Divisions, two anti-tank artillery regiments, the troops of the Bryansk garrison and corps units (the 5th Separate Sapper Battalion, the 10th Separate Communications Battalion).

As a result of the further German advance to the south the breach in the area of Bryansk only increased.

To cover the Bryansk direction at the junction of the Reserve and Central Fronts the new BRYANSK FRONT was created (for the formation of the headquarters were directed the remnants of the administration of the 20th Rifle Corps and the administration of the 25th Mechanized Corps).

The commander of the front was appointed Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko (former deputy commander of the Western Front, entered into command on August 16), the chief of staff of the front became Major General G. F. Zakharov (former chief of staff of the 22nd Army), the commander of the artillery of the front - Major General M. P. Dmitriev, the commander of the Air Force of the front - Major General F. N. Polynin (former commander of the 13th Aviation Division).

Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky described in his memoirs the meeting of A. I. Eremenko with Stalin and the members of the State Defense Committee (GKO) in the Kremlin: "I. V. Stalin briefly but clearly outlined on the whole the situation that had developed on the Soviet-German front, dwelling with special attention on the Western and Southwestern directions. He also briefly shared his opinion on the assessment of the enemy and on what could be expected from him in the near future. He noted that most probably the enemy would in the future also direct his main efforts toward the capture of Moscow, delivering the main blows with large tank groupings on the flanks, from the north - through Kalinin and from the south - through Bryansk, Orel. For this purpose the fascists on the Bryansk direction as the main strike grouping are keeping the 2nd Tank Group of Guderian. This direction for us is at present the most dangerous also because it is covered by the Central Front, stretched over a large sector and weak in its composition.

Stalin also said that although the possibility of using Guderian's group for a flank blow against the right-flank troops of the Southwestern Front is unlikely, one must nevertheless fear this. Proceeding from all this, the main and obligatory task of the troops of the Bryansk Front consists in not only reliably covering the Bryansk direction, but at all costs in time to defeat the main forces of Guderian…

Having heard Stalin, the newly appointed commander of the Bryansk Front very confidently declared that "in the next few days, certainly", he would defeat Guderian. This firmness impressed the Supreme Commander.

- That is the man we need in these complex conditions, - he threw after Eremenko, who was leaving his office…"

Initially the Bryansk Front included two armies.

The new 50th Army (commander - former commander of the 17th Mechanized Corps of the Western Front, Major General M. P. Petrov; the headquarters was created on the basis of the administration of the 2nd Rifle Corps) in the composition of 8 new rifle divisions and the 55th Cavalry Division covered the breach between the 13th Army and the Reserve Front (the 43rd Army) on the Bryansk direction.

The 13th Army (commander - Major General K. D. Golubev; headquarters - Unecha) nominally had in its composition the 137th, 121st, 132nd, 143rd, 148th, 6th, 155th Rifle Divisions, 2 cavalry divisions (the 21st and 52nd) and the 50th Tank Division, as well as the 4th Airborne Corps. The army was retreating to the south and southeast under the pressure of the Army Group of Guderian.

In the reserve of the front were listed 3 rifle divisions and 1 cavalry (the 4th, re-formed from the remnants of the 210th Motorized Division that had come out of encirclement in the area of Mogilev).

In the CENTRAL FRONT there remained two armies:

The 3rd Army as before defended in the area of Mozyr, Kalinkovichi.

The 21st Army defended on the Gomel direction. Its 63rd Rifle Corps and part of the 67th Corps (in all 5 rifle divisions: the 61st, 154th, 102nd, 151st and 167th) operated in semi-encirclement in the area east of Zhlobin.

August 15

East of Zhlobin

In the report of Colonel Angarsky on the combat operations of the armies of the Central Front it was said: 15.8 the position of the troops of the 21st A not only did not improve, but on the contrary, worsened still more, and demanded the most decisive measures on the part of the army command in regard to the command and planning of the withdrawal…".

F. Halder wrote in his diary: "The offensive in the area of Rogachev is developing very successfully. Apparently, soon somewhere north of Gomel a junction of the advancing groups is to be expected - the northern (the 12th and 13th Army Corps) and the western (the 43rd Army Corps). One can also count on the capture of a large number of prisoners and trophies. Parts of the 24th Motorized Corps are advancing very slowly. Fortunately, these troops are not needed for the final offensive on Gomel…"

The German 43rd Army Corps occupied Buda-Koshelevo on the railway Gomel-Zhlobin. The 63rd Rifle Corps and part of the 67th Corps found themselves already in complete encirclement.

To their aid the Soviet 232nd Rifle Division (of the 3rd Army) attacked the enemy that had broken through in the direction of Verkhnyaya Olba, Gubichi (all - south of Streshin); in the operational summary of the headquarters of the artillery of the front it is stated that on the eastern bank of the Dnieper 8 battalions of the division were already operating.

Here too fought the 110th Rifle Regiment with the 36th Artillery Regiment, which was reinforced with a battalion and an artillery battalion from the composition of the 160th Rifle Division (a march battalion that had arrived from Kirovabad, under the command of Captain Tediashvili). The detachment was subordinated to Major General I. M. Skugarev. Battles in the area of Nikolaev, Skepnya are described.

On the Gomel Direction

The German troops continued the offensive on Gomel. By the end of the day the enemy occupied Pykhan, Osobin, Lapichi 15-20 km north and northwest of Gomel.

To the commander of the 67th Corps, Brigade Commander N. A. Gusevsky, were subordinated all the troops on the Gomel direction: front subunits (a sapper company, a motor company, an anti-tank battery), the reconnaissance battalions of the 151st and 167th Rifle Divisions, the 560th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, as well as the 435th Corps Artillery Regiment, the sapper battalion and the communications battalion of the 67th Corps. The group of Gusevsky defended on the line Kalinovka, Semenovka, Staraya Belitsa.

Under the threat of encirclement units of the Soviet 28th Rifle Corps withdrew to the south and abandoned Krasnopolye.

The commander of the 117th Rifle Division, Colonel M. F. Starostin, was recalled to the disposal of the headquarters of the 21st Army and appointed chief of staff of the 67th Rifle Corps. The acting commander of the 117th became Lieutenant Colonel N. S. Danilov.

The headquarters of the Central Front moved its CP to a forest 5 km west of Pesochnaya Buda south of Gomel.

In the evening F. Halder added: "The combat operations north of Gomel are developing favorably. Two large groupings of the enemy are encircled. Thousands of prisoners are expected. On the southern flank of the front of the army group three divisions are preparing an offensive on Mozyr…" (already on the following day there appeared an entry about two infantry divisions for the capture of Mozyr: the 45th and 293rd; in Halder the 290th is erroneously indicated).

August 16

In the zone of the 13th Army

The German 24th Motorized Corps broke through the defense of the Soviet 13th Army, occupied Mglin and continued the offensive to the south on Unecha.

In the area of Vetka

The Soviet 55th Tank Division (without tanks) repelled an attempt of the enemy to force the Sozh River in the area of Vetka.

The 219th Motorized Division received an order to go out to the army reserve and also concentrate in the area of Vetka.

Besides, into the area of Khalkh (west of Vetka) was thrown a detachment of the headquarters of the 21st Army (600 men with an artillery battery) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Shimansky.

On the Gomel Direction

The advance of the German troops on the Gomel direction continued. As stated in the report of Colonel Angarsky, "All the attempts of the army command to conduct separate counterattacks on the wedged-in units of the enemy yielded no results… The blocking detachments, as well as the operational workers of the front headquarters, during the whole day were occupied with putting in order the disordered units of the corps, directing them back to the front…

Many Red Army men and command staff from the 67th RC turned out to be beyond the Sozh River in the area of Nova-Belitsa and the forests to the south…"

On August 18 the chief of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Central Front, Senior Major of State Security P. G. Begma, reported to the Military Council of the front:

"The command of the 21st Army has lost the command of the troops, as a result the number of servicemen retreating in disorder from the line of defense without an order has increased, a difficult situation has been created on this sector of the front.

On August 16-17 by all the operational staff of the front the detention of those retreating along the roads was organized.

According to incomplete data, detained and returned to the front:

Armed servicemen about 1000 men.

Unarmed over 400 men.

Howitzers of various types 7.

Anti-tank guns 3.

Mortars 2.

Shells over 1000.

Mines of various types about 200.

Machine guns 10.

and other weapons.

Of the number of those detained 6 persons were arrested. It has been established that the rear institutions, such as veterinary hospitals, medical posts, are armed with weapons to a greater degree than the units at the front…"

East of Zhlobin

In the area east of Zhlobin the 63rd Rifle Corps fought in encirclement; Lieutenant General L. G. Petrovsky took the decision on a breakthrough from the encirclement in the direction of Skepnya, Gubichi to join up with the 3rd Army.

About the actions of the three rifle divisions of the 67th Corps there is no information. In the operational summary of the headquarters of the Central Front it is stated that there was also no information about the location of the headquarters of the 67th Corps.

August 17

In the zone of the 13th Army

The offensive of the right flank of the German 24th Motorized Corps (the 4th Tank Division) as a result of the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops was slowed down, however the 3rd Tank Division and the 10th Motorized Division following it successfully advanced to the south and occupied Unecha - a road junction of Gomel-Bryansk.

In the area of Vetka

The German 1st Cavalry Division forced the Sozh River in the area of Vetka, where hot battles flared up. According to the Soviet operational summaries, Vetka several times passed from hand to hand.

The detachment of the headquarters of the 21st Army under the command of Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Shimansky on the night of August 17 captured Radugi north of the crossing over the Sozh River in the area of Khalkh, however then was thrown back to its starting positions.

On the Gomel Direction

The battles on the near approaches to Gomel began. The chief of the Gomel combat sector was appointed Major General P. P. Korzun. In the report of Colonel Angarsky it was said:

"The position on the Gomel sector of the front somewhat stabilized. Thanks to the reinforcements advanced from the city, the offensive of the enemy was temporarily held back…"

From the operational summary of the headquarters of the Central Front: "The scattered units of the 67th RC are being put in order, merged with the detachment of Manevich <1200 fighters, 4 guns> and Voinov <the 696th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, a battalion of infantry, 8 tanks> and are deploying on the line Pokolyubichi, Lopatino, Krasnoye, Uritskoye…"

The commanders of the 67th Rifle Corps managed to find the 626th Rifle Regiment of the 151st Division under the command of Major Mkartychyan (200 men; at the expense of the rear services of the 102nd and 151st Divisions the strength of the regiment was brought up to 634 men); it was directed to the area of Staraya Belitsa, Teleshi, Randovka.

The command of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that the headquarters of the 67th Corps did not arrive in the area of the battles near Gomel, the means of command of Brigade Commander N. A. Gusevsky and in the fighting separate detachments were absent (besides the above listed, the detachments of Ivanov*, Smolkin, Lieutenant Colonel Walter are also described).

The communication of the headquarters of the Central Front and the 21st Army was also disrupted.

The End of the Battles near Zhlobin

East of Zhlobin five rifle divisions of the 21st Army were defeated: the 61st and 154th from the composition of the 63rd Rifle Corps and the 102nd, 151st and 167th - from the composition of the 67th Corps.

During the "inventory" of the divisions on September 19, 1941 the 61st, 151st and 102nd Rifle Divisions were disbanded; the 167th Rifle Division was disbanded only in December 1941, however from the combat composition of the Red Army it dropped out precisely in the middle of August 1941.

The commander of the 61st Rifle Division, Major General N. A. Prishchepa, was mortally wounded in battle and died on August 18.

The commander of the 102nd Division, Colonel S. S. Chernyugov, came out of the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 102nd Rifle Division, Brigade Commander I. G. Bessonov, was taken prisoner (in captivity he collaborated with the enemy, shot in 1950).

To what extent Major General V. I. Neretin commanded the 151st Rifle Division in these last battles, it is difficult to say (a few days before this he had directed the actions of a separate detachment in the area of Streshin). And already on August 20 V. I. Neretin headed the arriving 266th Rifle Division.

The commander of the 626th Rifle Regiment of the 151st Division, Colonel N. I. Alekseev, is listed as missing (there is information that he perished still on July 28 during the enemy's attack on the headquarters of the regiment at the village of Zhuravichi).

Besides, the 110th Rifle Regiment, which fought in the area of Streshin, was defeated. According to the memoirs of G. D. Plaskov, only a handful of fighters together with Major M. V. Taynov broke out of the encirclement.

The administration of the 63rd Rifle Corps turned out to be defeated. In the rearguard battle at Skepnya (20 km east of Zhlobin) the commander of the corps, Lieutenant General L. G. Petrovsky, and the chief of artillery of the corps, Major General A. F. Kazakov, perished.

The chief of staff of the 63rd Rifle Corps, Colonel A. L. Feigin, on August 18 was taken prisoner (he died soon after his liberation from captivity on May 18, 1945).

The chief of the engineer service of the 63rd Corps, Colonel B. N. Belostotsky, and the chief of the reconnaissance department of the corps headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Bolotov, went missing.

The main forces of the 154th Rifle Division headed by Major General S. Ya. Fokanov broke out of the encirclement, while they defeated in the area of Gubichi the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion of the 445th Infantry Regiment of the German 134th Infantry Division. Already on August 19 the Soviet command reported the coming out of the encirclement of two regiments. Soon the 154th Rifle Division was listed in the composition of the Soviet 3rd Army.

In the award list for the chief of staff of the 154th Division, Colonel M. K. Agevnin (awarding of the Order of the "Red Banner" on July 21, 1942) it was said: "During the breakthrough from the enemy encirclement near the city of Zhlobin he brought out a thousand fighters, commanders and political workers, and on the way under his direction two headquarters of fascist divisions were defeated, documents with maps were captured, which were handed over to the headquarters of the 3rd Army, only heavy guns alone 12 were destroyed and 45 motor vehicles were burned…"

The commander of the 473rd Rifle Regiment of the 154th Division, Colonel A. M. Borodin, was taken prisoner (he perished in captivity in 1944).

In the battle at the village of Skepnya on August 17 the Hero of the Soviet Union Captain F. A. Batalov perished - the commander of a battalion of the 437th Rifle Regiment of the 154th Division (in the OBD "Memorial" he is listed as missing).

In the memoirs of A. I. Eremenko there are cited the memoirs of S. Ya. Fokanov (subsequently - lieutenant general) from a personal archive: "On August 16, 1941, Lieutenant General L. G. Petrovsky arrived to me, at the command post of the division, in the area of the Khalkh station, southeast of the city of Zhlobin, where he set tasks for me and the commander of the 61st Rifle Division * to go over to a breakthrough of the enemy encirclement. The time of the breakthrough was set for 3.00 in the morning of August 17. By the decision of Lieutenant General Petrovsky, the headquarters of the corps and he himself were to go over to the breakthrough with the 61st Division.

According to his order the 154th Division, subsequently the 47th Guards, began the breakthrough exactly at 3.00 on August 17. At this time the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel A. L. Feigin, arrived to me and transmitted the order of Petrovsky to appear before him.

Having left at my place in reserve the communications battalion, the sapper battalion, the battery of the anti-tank battalion, I went to look for Petrovsky. When I found him, he informed me that the exit of the 61st Division was ensured, and he would now be with my division. By this time the main units of the 154th Division, having broken the ring of encirclement, had advanced about six kilometers. Ensuring their exit from the rear with the subunits remaining in the reserve, we went with Leonid Grigoryevich from the Khalkh station to the village of Rudnya-Baranovka. At this time the ring of encirclement again closed, and we had to break through it once more.

Having broken through the first line of defense at the village of Skepnya, which is 20 km southeast of the city of Zhlobin, we ran into the second line of defense of the Hitlerites. Here in the battle the adjutant of the corps commander was killed, and Petrovsky himself was wounded in the arm.

Having set me the task of attacking the village of Skepnya, Petrovsky with his reserve went north of the village of Skepnya, in order to ensure the flank of the attackers. This was our last conversation with him.

After the breakthrough of the second line of defense of the enemy, about two hours later, I met the chief of artillery of the 63rd Corps, Major General of Artillery A. F. Kazakov, wounded in the stomach, 2 km northeast of the village of Skepnya. I asked him where General Petrovsky and his headquarters were. He answered that Petrovsky and his chief of staff, Colonel Feigin, had been killed not far from him in the bushes by an enemy ambush, part of which was dressed in Red Army uniform, and part in women's dress.

I took measures to search for Petrovsky and his chief of staff and sent out two reconnaissance groups in the direction indicated by Major General Kazakov. Both groups returned with the same data, confirming the report of Major General Kazakov about the enemy ambush, but they did not find the corpses.

Major General Kazakov was placed on a cart and followed with me. However soon by a direct hit of a mine the cart was destroyed, and General Kazakov was killed. We buried him right there. As it later turned out, the local inhabitants buried L. G. Petrovsky one kilometer south of the village of Rudenka. After the liberation of this area on July 13, 1944, in the presence of his relatives his remains were transferred and buried with military honors in the village of Staraya Rudnya of the Zhlobin district of Mogilev Oblast".

* * *

Already after the defeat of the Soviet grouping east of Zhlobin the Soviet command continued to give impossible orders (apparently, to the commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov):

"August 18. 15.30.

1. Immediately organize a blow against the enemy, and together with PETROVSKY complete the rout. Liquidate no fewer than two enemy divisions. Gather for the blow the maximum of forces, including the armored trains.

2. Set out sooner.

3. About the decision, the number of forces sent, the direction of the blow and the time report immediately by cipher. EFREMOV".

Even in the morning of August 20 in the negotiations of the headquarters of the Central Front and the chief of staff of the 3rd Army, Major General A. S. Zhidov, it was said: "There is still no communication with Petrovsky and about him, apart from what was yesterday, nothing is known. His establishment is in an exceptionally sick state. He was given the task - to occupy the line Borkhov, Borshchevka <east of Rechitsa - VM>. He did not fulfil it, he took cover in Kopny <?>. At present he has been promised to be shot and ordered to fulfil the task. There is very little hope".

August 18

In the zone of the 13th Army

The offensive of the German 2nd Tank Group of Colonel General G. Guderian to the south continued: the 24th Motorized Corps took Starodub, as a ledge behind it in the direction of Pochep moved the 47th Motorized Corps.

In the area of Vetka

The German 1st Cavalry Division forced the Sozh River in the area of Vetka and moved on Dobrush, bypassing Gomel from the east. By 14.00 it occupied Maryino on the eastern bank of the Sozh River.

The actions of the commander of the 219th Motorized Rifle Division, Major General P. P. Korzun, in the area of Maryino caused the dissatisfaction of the front commander, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, who gave the order: "for the non-fulfilment by you on 18.08.1941 of the order of the Military Council of the front immediately hand over the command of the division to Major General Skugarev and yourself arrive at the front headquarters".

As follows from the negotiations of Major General V. N. Gordov with his subordinates, "The incident with Vetka produced a very unpleasant impression on the Military Council, and also in the Stavka…"

The acting commander of the 21st Army, Major General V. N. Gordov, on August 20 interceded for Korzun: "…Personally Comrade Korzun behaved exceptionally bravely. Being wounded in the morning, he remained in the ranks and directed the battle until darkness. With the onset of darkness he was wounded a second time and is now evacuated. The one appointed in his place, Lunev <Colonel Ivan Fedorovich Lunev - deputy division commander for the combatant part> received a heavy concussion. To the establishment of Korzun was appointed Konovalov <Colonel Fedor Ivanovich Konovalov - chief of staff>".

Into the area of Gomel arrived the first echelons of fresh reserves - units of the 266th Rifle Division. They were immediately used in battle in the area of Maryino.

The Defense of Gomel

The German 17th and 131st Infantry Divisions conducted battles on the approaches to Gomel; battles for Pokolyubichi, Prudok, Lopatino, Kostyukovka are described. The Military Council of the Soviet Central Front in the evening took the decision: "To hold Gomel at all costs" , but this was already no more than a good wish.

In the report of Colonel Angarsky it was said: "The front commander, who found himself without any reserves, tried to cover the Gomel direction with separate small detachments, formed for the most part from the fleeing Red Army men of the 67th RC.

This measure turned out to be of little reality, the detachments formed in haste without artillery and mortars could not hold back the offensive of the enemy.

The transfer of the 219th Motorized Rifle Division to the area of Kostyukovka <north of Gomel and west of Vetka - VM> also did not take place, because in the process of carrying out this transfer it was decided (18.8) to deliver with the units of the 219th Motorized Rifle Division a blow against the enemy that had broken through into the area of Maryino. Not having fulfilled this task, the 219th Motorized Rifle Division by the morning of 19.8 withdrew to the area of Dobrush.

In this period the commander of the 21st A lost the command of the troops and did not have a clear plan of action. The separate instructions given by the headquarters of the army for the most part did not correspond to the situation and as a result the troops acted independently.

The headquarters of the front exercised the command of the army by means of short instructions arising from the necessity urgently to react in connection with the changes that had taken place on one or another sector of the front.

A firm plan set out in a directive or order with the indication of concrete tasks for the troops was not worked out by the headquarters of the front…"

In Polesie

The offensive of the German 35th Corps in the area of Mozyr began. To the two German infantry divisions (the 293rd and 45th) was opposed the Soviet 3rd Army (see Table 5-6).

In the German operational summaries it is noted that on the first day the advance of the German troops was insignificant. The commander of the Soviet 3rd Army, Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, at about 16.30 reported to the front headquarters:

"From me from the Berezina to Ozarichi on the whole front at Zhmachenko, Borisov and Batsanov a hot battle is going on. If the matter is tolerable at Zhmachenko, where they managed to batter the 135th Regiment of the enemy <of the 45th Infantry Division>, then at Borisov and Batsanov the matter is not good. Borisov has given up Karpovichi, and Batsanov is withdrawing from Ozarichi. The only armored train has been ordered to live long, put out of action by aviation. The attempts of the enemy to force the crossing at Gorval have so far been repelled…"

V. I. Kuznetsov reported on the morning of the following day that he had removed from the command of the commander of the 43rd Cavalry Division, Brigade Commander I. K. Kuzmin, and sent him to the front headquarters to be brought before a military tribunal.

Table 5-6. Combat Composition of the 3rd Army on August 18, 1941

August 19

In the zone of the 13th Army

The German 2nd Tank Group of G. Guderian ran into stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops in the area of Pochep. The Soviet 45th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, which again found itself in encirclement as a result of the advance of the German 24th Motorized Corps, began a breakthrough in the area between Mglin and Unecha.

In the area of Dobrush

The battles on the eastern bank of the Sozh River continued.

According to the data of the Soviet operational summaries, units of the German 1st Cavalry Division broke into Dobrush, but were driven out of there by the Soviet troops under the command of Major General P. P. Korzun, while Korzun himself was wounded.

In the area of the battles was also the acting commander of the 21st Army, Major General V. N. Gordov.

In the negotiations of the headquarters of the Central Front and the headquarters of the 21st Army dissatisfaction was expressed with the increased attention of Major General V. N. Gordov to the area of Dobrush: "Efremov considers that Gordov should personally visit Gomel and acquaint himself with the situation on the spot. It is necessary to take measures so that the whole city is transferred to a defensive state, and to fight for every street and house. Special attention must be paid to covering the bridges. Having used the stone buildings on the outskirts and further, having skillfully placed the means of fire, the street battle can be conducted long and successfully, if only everything is organized. Barricades must be widely used. That is all".

The Defense of Gomel

In the report of Colonel Angarsky it was said: "The enemy on this day attacked Gomel simultaneously with three divisions. From the front Vetka, Khalkh, Konturovka the 17th ID advanced; from the side of Semenovka the 131st ID operated and from Uritskoye on Milcha the 267th ID delivered a blow. Despite the great superiority of forces, the enemy advanced with extreme caution. Our units withdrew only under the influence of artillery and mortar fire…

Thus with methodical consistency the Germans during August 19 occupied all the settlements located to the north and northwest of Gomel…"

Besides, at about 14.00 the enemy succeeded in forcing the Sozh River south of Gomel - in the area of Novaya Belitsa.

At about 17.00 the German troops entered Gomel from the side of Uritskoye, Milcha. As Angarsky writes, "with the onset of darkness the enemy opened artillery fire on the city, while his infantry was still 2-3 km from the forward line of our troops…"

Justifying the abandonment of Gomel, Colonel Angarsky wrote: "In view of the fact that our units were greatly mixed up in the darkness and fearing the threat of the enemy's coming out to the crossings, it was decided at night to abandon the city of Gomel, which was carried out by the order of the Military Council of the front.

At midnight the evacuation of the city was finished, after which the sappers under the direction of Major General Baranov <N. P. Baranov - chief of the department of engineer troops of the 21st Army> blew up the bridges over the Sozh River…"

In the negotiations of the headquarters of the Central Front and the headquarters of the 21st Army (Brigade Commander V. S. Golushkevich - Colonel D. F. Tsumarev) at 22.20 it was said:

"First. In connection with the situation that has developed, Gusevsky is permitted to leave the point occupied by him. The bridges have already been blown up, there remains one pontoon bridge opposite the park of Paskevich.

Second. It is necessary to conduct the withdrawal as organized as possible under the cover of darkness. Gusevsky has been informed of the permission. The darkness must allow all this to be done.

Third. At the same time it is immediately necessary to organize the defense of our bank of the river so that the enemy should in no case be able to cross over to our side. It is necessary to think everything over thoroughly and to gather the corresponding forces and create a grouping. The enemy's crossings succeed because the troops are stretched along the river in a cordon and do not have sufficient strike groupings…"

Into the area of Gomel (at the Zyabrovka station) fresh formations transferred by the Stavka to the composition of the Central Front continued to arrive:

— the 266th Rifle Division (commander - Colonel I. D. Dryakhov; soon subordinated to the headquarters of the 67th Corps and immediately changed commander: already from August 20 the division was commanded by Major General V. I. Neretin) - by 20.00 6 echelons had arrived;

— the 277th Rifle Division (Brigade Commander M. A. Romanov) - 1 echelon had arrived.

However they clearly arrived too late for the defense of Gomel and the prevention of the defeat of the Central Front.

In Polesie

In the area of Mozyr the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops continued.

The commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, reported to the chief of staff of the Central Front, Colonel L. M. Sandalov: "The situation is becoming complicated. Batsanov has been broken through. Borisov too. The enemy has taken possession of the area of Kuridichi and 3-4 km east of Kozlovichi. One of the daughters of Borisov <cavalry division> does not exist. The same with one of the children <regiments> of Batsanov. I request authorization to remove from the area of Rechitsa Levashov <the 214th Airborne Brigade> and at night give it to Rubtsov <commander of the 66th Rifle Corps>, in order to stop the advance of the enemy…"

Soviet Command

Alarmed by the situation on the Central Front and the looming threat over the Southwestern Front, the member of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov (who at that moment held the position of commander of the troops of the Reserve Front) sent a report to I. V. Stalin:

"The enemy, having become convinced of the concentration of large forces of our troops on the path to Moscow, having on his flanks the Central Front and the Velikiye Luki grouping of our troops, has temporarily renounced the blow on Moscow and, having gone over to the active defense against the Western and Reserve Fronts, has thrown all his strike mobile and tank units against the Central, Southwestern and Southern Fronts. The possible intention of the enemy: to defeat the Central Front and, having come out into the area of Chernigov, Konotop, Priluki, by a blow from the rear to defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front. After that the main blow on Moscow bypassing the Bryansk forests and a blow on the Donbass. I consider that the enemy knows very well the whole system of our defense, the whole operational-strategic grouping of our forces and knows our nearest possibilities… For counteracting the enemy and preventing the defeat of the Central Front and the coming out of the enemy on the rear of the Southwestern Front I consider it my duty to report my considerations on the necessity as soon as possible to gather a strong grouping in the area of Glukhov, Chernigov, Konotop. The covering echelon of the concentration immediately throw out to the Desna River…"

On the same day Zhukov received the answer: "Your considerations about the probable advance of the Germans in the direction of Chernigov, Konotop, Priluki we consider correct. The advance of the Germans… will mean the bypass of our Kiev group from the eastern bank of the Dnieper and the encirclement of our 3rd and 21st Armies… In anticipation of such an undesirable casus and for its prevention the Bryansk Front has been created headed by Eremenko. Other measures are also being taken, of which we will report separately. We hope to cut short the advance of the Germans. Stalin. Shaposhnikov".

On this same day the Stavka of the Supreme High Command authorized the withdrawal of the left wing of the Central Front (the 3rd Army) and the right wing of the Southwestern Front (the 5th Army and the 27th Rifle Corps) beyond the Dnieper River.

August 20

The chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote: The enemy continues to offer stubborn resistance to the troops of the 35th Army Corps <in the area of Mozyr>. The same resistance the enemy offers east of Gomel and on the sector of the 12th Army Corps. On the sector of the 24th Motorized Corps the enemy is trying to break through in an easterly direction…"

By noon the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front succeeded in breaking through to the area of Shamochki. Considering the breach that had arisen between the troops of the Central and Bryansk Fronts as a result of the advance of the German 2nd Tank Group of G. Guderian, at about 22.00 the Stavka of the Supreme High Command authorized the withdrawal of the left flank of the 13th Army to the line Solovo, Borshchevo, Pogar and further along the Sudost River.

The 21st Army of the Central Front was ordered to withdraw to the front Klintsy, Gordeevka and further along the Iput, Sozh Rivers to Babovichi * .

The Soviet 3rd Army received the task of covering the area of Babovichi, Gorval, Rechitsa on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River east of Gomel. The fortifications of the Mozyr Fortified Region were ordered to be rendered useless.

In the area of Gomel

The Soviet 67th Rifle Corps fought on the line Sevryuki, Skitok on the eastern bank of the Sozh River. The arriving units of the Soviet 266th Rifle Division unsuccessfully attempted to recapture the crossing over the Sozh River at Novo-Belitsa south of Gomel.

In the operational summary of the headquarters of the artillery of the Central Front the artillery of the 67th Corps is listed, which together with the own artillery of the 266th Division (24 guns) supported the offensive:

— 435th Corps Artillery Regiment (13 guns)

— 464th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (151st RD; 8 guns)

— 353rd Artillery Regiment (151st RD; 4 guns)

— 586th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (102nd RD; 2 guns)

— 696th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (7 guns).

In the area of Dobrush

The German 1st Cavalry Division, having repelled the Soviet counterattacks, went over to the offensive from the side of Maryino on Dobrush.

The breakthrough of the enemy in the zone of the 28th Rifle Corps caused extreme dissatisfaction with the corps commander, Major General V. S. Popov, whom V. N. Gordov removed from command (the front commander M. G. Efremov confirmed this decision and "in his heart" even attempted to disband the administration of the 28th Corps itself, but this was already beyond the competence of the front).

In Polesie

In the morning negotiations of the headquarters of the Central Front and the 3rd Army the deputy chief of staff of the army, Lieutenant Colonel Posyakin, reported to Colonel I. A. Dolgov:

"The sons of Nedvigin <regiments of the 232nd RD> and part of Petrovsky <the remnants of the 63rd RC> are conducting a battle for the bridgehead of Rechitsa, the bridge over the Dnieper River is burning. <The army commander> Kuznetsov is organizing a counterattack. He will report the result additionally. On the sector Gorval, Bobrovniki and Khutor without changes. The enemy does not display particular activity. In the center on the sector of Rubtsov <the 66th RC> and <the cavalry group> Borisov the enemy displays particular activity in the direction of Kozlovichi and Domanovichi, as a result of which the sons <cavalry divisions> of Borisov, Sidelnikov <the 47th CD> and Batskalevich <interesting that as the commander of the 32nd Cavalry Division Batskalevich again figures - VM> occupy the following positions: Velikaya Polyana, Vyazovitsa, Kholodniki, Yuzhnyye.

Batsanov <the 24th RD> from the family <corps> of Rubtsov occupies Kozlovichi, Khutora and one son <regiment> Novoselki west of Bereznyaki. In the second echelon Domanovichi is occupied by Levashov <the 214th A/B Brigade> and the establishment of the former Kuzmin <the 43rd CD>. On the remaining front without changes.

Kuznetsov asked to transmit to Sandalov that the latter give instructions to establish communication, since Kuznetsov has no communication with you. I request to be informed what is happening in the area of Gomel to the northeast and southeast of it. That is all".

In the evening the chief of staff of the 3rd Army, Major General A. S. Zhidov, reported to the front headquarters about the battles in the area of Rechitsa, where the detachment of Major General S. Ya. Fokanov (the remnants of the 154th Division) and the 232nd Rifle Division of Major General S. I. Nedvigin operated.

The 42nd Rifle Division, according to this report, withdrew to the line Svyatoye, Kokuevichi.

August 21

F. Halder again wrote about the stubborn resistance to the troops of the 35th Army Corps in the area of Mozyr, as well as to the troops of the 12th Army Corps in the area of Gomel. Under the pressure of the enemy the Soviet 3rd Army abandoned Kalinkovichi.

The German 1st Cavalry Division took Dobrush.

The 2nd Tank Group of G. Guderian broke the resistance of the Soviet troops and occupied Kostobobr (the 24th Motorized Corps) and Pochep (the 47th Motorized Corps).

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht A. Hitler issued a directive: "…2. The exceptionally favorable operational situation that has developed as a result of the coming out of our troops to the line Gomel, Pochep, must be immediately used for conducting an operation by the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "South" and "Center" in converging directions. The aim of this operation must be not only the pressing of the 5th Russian Army beyond the Dnieper by a partial offensive of the 6th Army, but also the complete destruction of the enemy, before his troops can withdraw to the line Desna, Konotop, Sulla. Thereby the troops of Army Group "South" will be ensured the possibility to come out into the area east of the middle course of the Dnieper and with their left flank together with the troops operating in the center to continue the offensive in the direction of Rostov, Kharkov…".

August 22…

Units of the German 2nd Army occupied Mozyr - the last oblast center of Belarus (in 1941 Mozyr was the center of Polesie Oblast). The Soviet 3rd Army, having abandoned the city, in two night marches covered about 100 km.

August 23 the Soviet troops abandoned Rechitsa, August 25 the Soviet 66th Rifle Corps with the Mozyr Fortified Region crossed the Dnieper River over a pontoon bridge, the withdrawal of the corps was covered by the remnants of the 32nd Cavalry Division.

August 26 the enemy without a fight occupied Loev, August 28 - Bragin and Komarin.

Thus, by the end of August the battles in Belarus of the regular Soviet troops with the German troops were completed.

* * * * *

The combat operations on the Central Front represented a classic defeat in detail: a series of consecutive operations of the Wehrmacht, in each of which the enemy created an overwhelming superiority over the Soviet troops.

First the Wehrmacht conducted an operation in the area of Roslavl, where the German western offensive grouping (2 tank, 1 motorized and 4 infantry divisions) was opposed by the one and only 148th Rifle Division practically without means of reinforcement, moreover carrying out offensive tasks. It is not surprising that the commander of the German Army Group, Colonel General G. Guderian, recalled that "the infantry simply marches", and the enemy's main losses were from its own aviation!

And after the capture of Roslavl the enemy simply ground down the Soviet units and formations hastily transferred to the area of the German breakthrough. The Soviet command succeeded in substantially strengthening the 13th Army: into its composition were transferred 2 cavalry divisions, 4 restored rifle divisions (the 137th, 121st, 132nd, 155th), the 50th Tank Division, artillery of large caliber. However all these new formations had to act "on the move", there was no time either to form counterattack groupings, or to conduct reconnaissance, or to establish interaction with the neighbors and between the branches of the armed forces…

As a result they could only hold back the enemy, but not turn the situation around.

The enemy delivered its next blow in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers - precisely there where the Soviet command was withdrawing troops, as from the quietest sector. And again against the Soviet divisions, which moreover had been deprived of the previously attached means of reinforcement, the enemy created a numerical superiority. The offensive of August 12 of 7 German infantry and 1 cavalry divisions tore the front of the Soviet 67th Rifle Corps in two (moreover the headquarters of the 67th Corps had only just taken over the zone of the 20th Rifle Corps that had departed to the disposal of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and was hardly likely to have had time to establish reliable communication with its new divisions).

The ability of the enemy to strike at the headquarters immediately led to the disruption of the command of the troops, which was not restored right up to the capture of Gomel.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Central Front acted, as they say, "with one composition": all the plans for its reinforcement remained on paper. There were no reserves at all for parrying the German offensive and closing the arising breaches (the decision to withdraw the 167th Rifle Division to the reserve from the composition of the 63rd Corps on the "quiet sector" was clearly belated), and most importantly - there was no mobile reserve, which alone could somehow improve the situation.

The fresh formations from the reserve of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command (the 266th and 277th Rifle Divisions) appeared at the front already at the "eleventh hour", when the fate of Gomel and the whole front had, in essence, been decided.

The Central Front clearly turned out to be the "pariah" of the Soviet Supreme High Command. It did not even have full-fledged commanders, almost all of them "performed duties": acting front commander M. G. Efremov, acting chief of staff of the front L. M. Sandalov, acting commander of the 21st Army V. N. Gordov… Only on the eve of the disbandment of the front was its chief of staff finally appointed Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov - however not a staff officer at all, but an NKVD general.

S. P. Ivanov noted in his memoirs: "The chief of staff of the Central Front, the former chief of staff of the 4th Army, Colonel L. M. Sandalov, visited us at the CP <of the 13th Army>. Leonid Mikhailovich spoke with praise about the organization and rhythm of the work of the headquarters, received in the operational department a number of data which became a real sensation for him. He liked the communications center, the organization of the guard. I remember he said then:

- Well, you really have order here. In our 4th Army headquarters, which lost most of the radio stations and motor vehicles during the retreat, there is nothing of the kind.

By the way, this lack of organization of the headquarters, for which it was not easy even to direct the formations of the 4th Army, had by no means a favorable effect also on the whole combat activity of the troops of the new front, especially on the organization of interaction with the neighbors…

Retrospectively assessing the then operational situation, one comes to the conclusion that the creation of the Central Front could not justify the hopes that were placed on it, and it is not by chance that it existed for only one month. Not having a sufficiently efficient headquarters, and most importantly, being very weakly manned with troops, it found itself in that very zone of combat operations where the decisive events of the end of the summer - beginning of the autumn of 1941 unfolded <emphasized by me - VM>…"

The breakthrough on Gomel from the north and the advance of the German 43rd Army Corps from the side of Streshin led to the encirclement and defeat of the 63rd Rifle Corps and part of the 67th Corps. As before, the Soviet command was late with the order for the withdrawal. The untimely withdrawal of the troops only aggravated the situation.

The defeat near Zhlobin led to the loss of several divisions, a large amount of artillery, and promising commanders. The German command, summing up the battles in the area of Rogachev, Zhlobin and Gomel, reported the taking of 78,000 Soviet soldiers and officers as prisoners, the capture of 144 tanks and about 700 guns. In the defense of the Central Front a breach was made, the position of the left-flank 3rd Army in the area of Mozyr, Kalinkovichi sharply worsened, Gomel fell - the stability of the whole defense of the front was disrupted. Together with the fact that the newly created Bryansk Front was only just taking the command of the retreating 13th Army into its hands and moreover was covering the Moscow direction, all this promised the Soviet troops in Ukraine incalculable misfortunes.

* * * * *

Having discussed the situation that had developed, the Soviet Supreme High Command came to the conclusion on the necessity of uniting the efforts of the troops operating against the German 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Group, on the disbandment of the Central Front and the transfer of its troops to the Bryansk Front and the placing on Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko of the responsibility for the liquidation of the dangerous grouping of the enemy.

Excerpts from the telegraph conversation of Stalin and Eremenko were cited in his memoirs by A. M. Vasilevsky.

"Stalin:

- I have a few questions for you. 1) Should the Central Front not be disbanded, the 3rd Army united with the 21st and the united 21st Army transferred to your disposal?.. 3) We can send you in a few days, tomorrow, in the extreme case the day after tomorrow, two tank brigades with some number of KVs in them and 2-3 tank battalions; are they very necessary for you?

4) If you promise to defeat the scoundrel Guderian, then we can send a few more aviation regiments and a few RS batteries. Your answer?

Eremenko:

-…1) My opinion on the disbandment of the Central Front is as follows: in connection with the fact that I want to defeat Guderian and will certainly defeat him, the direction from the south must be firmly secured. And this means - to interact firmly with the strike group which will operate from the area of Bryansk. Therefore I request that the 21st Army, united with the 3rd, be subordinated to me… I am very grateful to you, Comrade Stalin, for the fact that you are reinforcing me with tanks and aircraft. I only request you to speed up their sending, we need them very, very much. And as regards this scoundrel Guderian, we will certainly try to defeat him, to fulfil the task set by you, that is to defeat him…"

After these negotiations, on the night of August 25, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command took the decision on the abolition from August 26 of the Central Front. The 21st and 3rd Armies were transferred to the subordination of the Bryansk Front, the former commander of the troops of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, was appointed deputy commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front.

The commander of the 21st Army was appointed Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov; Major General V. N. Gordov returned to the position of chief of staff of the army. The army was transferred the troops and the defense zone of the 3rd Army (in its subordination - the 28th, 67th and 66th Rifle Corps and the cavalry group).

The administration of the 3rd Army took over the troops at the junction of the 50th and 13th Armies (it secured the Mglin direction), it was taken over by Major General Ya. G. Kreizer.

The disbandment of the Central Front and the transfer of its armies to the Bryansk Front, as A. I. Eremenko recalled after the war, turned out to be a mistake. Before the Bryansk Front stood completely different tasks, which determined the disposition of the troops and reserves. Taking into account the looming threat over the Southwestern Front, "the Central Front should not have been abolished, but strengthened…"

That is, even after the abandonment of Gomel there was a possibility (albeit ever more ephemeral) to protect the northern flank of the Southwestern Front.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Bryansk Front did not succeed in stopping the enemy. The task set for it of delivering a flank blow against the enemy, of throwing back the 2nd Tank Group of G. Guderian in the direction of Krichev, Propoisk and by September 15 of coming out to the line Petrovichi, Klimovichi, Novozybkov, Shchors, - turned out to be beyond its strength. The breach between the 13th and 21st Armies could not be closed. The measures taken by the Soviet command turned out to be insufficient.

A. V. Vladimirsky (in 1941 - deputy chief of the operational department of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front) in his memoirs assessed the decision of the Soviet command as follows:

"In the directive of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command of August 19 the Southwestern Front was set the task - after the withdrawal of the 5th Army and the 27th Rifle Corps to firmly defend the right bank of the Dnieper on the sector (excl.) m. Loev, Perevolochnaya. At the same time it was required at all costs to hold Kiev.

Comparing the position of the troops of both sides at the junction of the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts by the time of the receipt of this directive of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, one cannot but draw attention to the fact that the withdrawal of the right wing of the Southwestern Front to the Dnieper by no means eliminated the threat of its being bypassed by the enemy from the north. By this time the important significance of the Dnieper for us had already been partially lost, in connection with the fact that the troops of Army Group "Center" as early as July had overcome this line in its upper course and had advanced east of it in the Yelnya and Roslavl directions up to 200 km and had come out to the Desna River.

Only the immediate withdrawal of the troops of the 5th Army and the 27th Rifle Corps to the Desna or even further - to the Sula River would have eliminated the threat of their envelopment from the north.

In part the commander of the Southwestern Front also initially held this point of view, which is evident from the initial directive on the withdrawal of August 19, 1941, according to which the 5th Army after the withdrawal to the Dnieper River was to turn its right flank from Navozov to Chernigov and further to extend it along the left bank of the Desna to Kladkovka. But this decision by the instruction of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front of August 20 was changed, and the 5th Army was ordered after the withdrawal to take up the defense along the left bank of the Dnieper on the front (excl.) m. Loev, Stary Glybov, not bending its right flank to the east on Chernigov, which made this flank very vulnerable from the north. Such a change of the initial decision was taken, apparently, at the insistence of the Stavka, which at this responsible moment instead of a real reinforcement of the left wing of the Central Front with tanks and aviation undertook a complex organizational restructuring which affected several fronts and armies.

It was ordered to disband the Central and to form the Bryansk Front headed by General Eremenko, to merge the 3rd Army of the former Central Front into the 21st Army and to conduct a number of other organizational measures which entailed the movement of a considerable number of leading persons of the fronts and armies at that period when it was necessary to concentrate the maximum of efforts on the organization of a blow against the enemy, who had already begun to carry out his flank maneuver dangerous for us…"

The underestimation of the importance of the Central Front became one of the main causes of the defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front in September 1941. I am compelled to repeat myself: it is impossible to win a battle lost at the level of the High Command.

The enemy did not fail to take advantage of the mistake of the Soviet High Command. He once again applied his favorite tactic of the "double pincers": the formations of the 2nd Army (the 35th, 43rd and 13th Army Corps: the 45th, 17th, 134th, 260th, 131st, 293rd and 112th Infantry plus the 1st Cavalry Division) advanced on the Chernigov direction to join up with the 6th Army of Army Group "South". On September 9 both German armies joined up in eastern Polesie. By September 13 the front of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front and the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front turned out to be finally broken, both armies went over to mobile defense.

Yielding to the enemy in the ability to conduct a maneuver war, the Soviet troops had an advantage in combat operations in Polesie (it is not for nothing that after the war the problem of the "Pripyat marshes" was raised on the shield by the German generals). After the pressing out of the Soviet troops from Polesie their further defeat became a matter of technique. Having closed their flanks, Army Groups "Center" and "South" liquidated, finally, the threat to them and released forces for further operations.

The release of the enemy's forces, as in the case of the offensive on Roslavl, promised incalculable misfortunes to the Soviet side.

The German mobile troops swung their "pincers" more widely. By September 10 the 2nd Tank Group of G. Guderian had forced the Desna and captured Romny. Thus it came out to the operational expanse and on September 15 joined up with the 1st Tank Group of Army Group "South" in the area of Lokhvitsa deep in the rear of the Soviet troops.

The Soviet Stavka of the Supreme High Command until the very last ordered the Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front to hold Kiev. The catastrophe that broke out swallowed the front. According to the official data of the Soviet General Staff, the losses of the Soviet troops amounted to more than 700 thousand men.

In the Kiev "cauldron" many defenders of Belarus also perished, including Major Generals F. D. Rubtsov, T. K. Batsanov, V. I. Neretin; Major General I. M. Skugarev was taken prisoner.

No fewer defenders of Belarus of 1941 perished in the Vyazma "cauldron" during the new German offensive on Moscow in October 1941.

* * * * *

Thus ingloriously ended the battles in Belarus.

I do not think that in my study all the factors of such a crushing defeat have been reflected.

Therefore - I am hardly likely to have exhaustively explained WHAT this was. I hope, perhaps, it has become clearer HOW this was?

Last update of this page - October 01, 2026.