Uladzimir Martau
BELARUSSIAN CHRONICLES,
the year 1941

Chapter VII.
The Battle of Lida, 25-28.06.1941

"In those undistinguished battles…"
A. T. Tvardovsky

An Optional Preface (2025)

Mark Solonin rightly devoted an entire episode of his new YouTube project "The Second Front" to the battles at Lida. We have until now underestimated this episode of the first days of the Great Patriotic War in vain. And I, in my book "Belarusian Chronicles. 1941", described those battles "by rote", superficially, without great immersion in the events. And it is not that there was little data - there is not much more now. But now, having an understanding of the overall picture, we have come to understand better those fragments that were available to us, but which we did not know how to read. That happens.

The book of my late comrade Dmitry Egorov "The Defeat of the Western Front" already contained much information on this subject. But I did not understand. And the author also did not understand much, he simply collected "for the future".

Now it is possible to rethink those events in the triangle Vilnius - Molodechno - Lida and to understand their logic. At our disposal are:

• the research of Dmitry Egorov with a large number of memoirs tied to military units, dates and settlements;

• documents of Soviet units and reports of Soviet commanders that shed a little light on those events;

• the combat journals (hereinafter CJ) of the German 3rd Tank Group and the 57th Motorized Corps, presented in 2012 by Mark Solonin on his website (I quote these documents while preserving the peculiarities of their translation, even if they sometimes grate on my ear).

And so, having studied those events anew, I cannot agree with Mark Solonin's harsh conclusions regarding the 17th and 37th Rifle Divisions. And the example of the 24th Rifle Division may speak not of what M. Solonin had in mind. Although, in my opinion, K. N. Galitsky in 1941 is above all praise, at the level of K. K. Rokossovsky.

The difference between the actions of the 17th RD and the 37th RD, on the one hand, and the 24th RD, on the other, can be explained by the fact that two divisions (the 17th and 37th RD) moved out from their places of permanent deployment in peacetime ("for exercises"), without mobilized rear services, part of them was transferred by rail in peacetime order (ammunition in the last car, the headquarters separate from the communications battalion), part of the 37th RD (the 247th RR and the 170th LAR) found itself on June 22 at the Benyakone station cut off from the rest of the forces, on June 24 came under the blow of the German 12th TD and retreated in disorder beyond the Zhizhma River. By this time the corps headquarters had only just arrived in the area of Ivye…

And the 24th RD was at full readiness, mobilized, had made a three-day march from the area of Molodechno, Volozhin, had managed to take up positions and later even received as reinforcement a tank battalion with KVs and T-34s.

And that means that something important from those events may have eluded Mark Solonin.

Let us try to look a little more closely at what, how and why it happened.

On the Eve of the Main Battles in the Area of Lida

1. The Wehrmacht. 3rd Tank Group. 57th Motorized Corps

On June 22, 1941, Germany treacherously attacked the peaceful USSR. The German 3rd Tank Group of Colonel General H. Hoth (the 39th and 57th Motorized, the 5th and 6th Army Corps) as part of Army Group "Center" was advancing in Lithuania, in the zone of the Soviet Northwestern Front. The German mobile formations broke far ahead of the infantry divisions and on the very first day reached the Neman: the 39th Motorized Corps - at Alytus, with the further aim of advancing toward Vilnius, the 57th Motorized Corps seized the crossing at Merkine*.

Table 7-1.
Formations of the German 3rd Tank Group on June 22, 1941.

Table 7-2.
Tank Park of the Divisions of the 3rd Tank Group on June 22, 1941.

* 11 Pz.I tankettes and 2 Pz.II light tanks were in service not with the tank regiment, but with the division's sapper battalion.
** Command tanks, armed only with machine guns, with a dummy gun.

At the tip of the offensive of the German 57th Motorized Corps operated the 12th Tank Division and half of the 18th Motorized Division (in the first days of the war the 18th Motorized Division operated as two almost autonomous halves). In the CJ of the 57th Motorized Corps it was said: "At about 17:00 <June 22> the forward units of the 18th MD, led by the division commander, captured the bridge at Merkine. The bridge is not damaged. Thanks to the rapid advance it was possible to get it intact, which is of the utmost importance. The destruction of the bridge by the enemy could have delayed the advance by an average of two days and allowed the enemy to recover from the surprise, to bring up new forces to the Neman and to fortify there. A forceful seizure of the bridge would have cost much blood and effort.

At 17:00 the commander of the 18th MD orally gave the following order: "The division has created a bridgehead at Merkine and secured the road to Alytus. Then the division occupied the bridge at Perloja <halfway from Merkine to Varena (Orany)> and created a bridgehead there to secure the crossing of the 12th TD over the Neman and the regrouping for the further offensive on June 23 on the eastern bank of the Neman. To accomplish this task the division must clear the road for the 12th TD. The chief of staff of the 504th Sapper Regiment received an order to conduct reconnaissance to Orany".

20:00

Merkine is firmly in German hands. From 20:00 the corps command post is in the forest southwest of Merkine. In the evening of June 22 the corps is with its forward units (12th TD) on the eastern bank of the Neman 25 km east of Merkine. Delays in the advance can be quickly eliminated".

Entries in the CJ of the 57th Motorized Corps for June 23:

"06:00

The offensive to the east in accordance with Order No. 1 of the corps is proceeding according to plan. Half of the 18th MD is included in the second echelon of the advancing units of the 12th TD. In front of the 12th TD the weak resistance of the enemy is quickly broken.

15:30

The 22nd Motorcycle Battalion <of the 12th Tank Division> has lain down northwest of Voronovo under strong enemy fire and is conducting a heavy battle. It seems that the enemy is using forces that were deployed along the big roads from Vilnius to Lida.

22:30

By this time the 12th TD, as a result of numerous engagements, has occupied a small territory and is again conducting battle with a strong enemy northwest of Voronovo. This is the reason for the congestion on the roads intended for tanks during the forward movement.

…The most advanced units of the 12th TD are at Novosady <northwest of Radun>, and to the west in front of them is the enemy with forces up to one infantry regiment".

In the morning of June 24 the 12th Tank Division received an order to advance and occupy the area to the south of Oshmyany, the 19th Tank Division - to come out to the area northwest of Eisiskes, while its reinforced motorized infantry regiment was to replace half of the 18th Motorized Division on the line Eisiskes - Voronovo. This half of the 18th Motorized Division was planned to be used as before in the first echelon together with the 12th Tank Division. However, life made adjustments to these plans.

The German 19th Tank Division had to linger at Merkine (here at the crossing it was overtaken by the columns of vehicles of the 8th Air Corps, which became the occasion for great dissatisfaction of the commander of the 3rd Tank Group), and it crossed the Neman only in the morning of June 24. Subsequently it had to move after the 18th Motorized Division, in the second echelon of the corps, and by the evening of June 24 its forward detachment had reached only Eisiskes (north of Radun).

By this time (by noon of June 24) the 12th Tank Division with its forward detachment had reached Grauzhishki (13 km south of Oshmyany), then by order of the command sharply turned to the southeast and headed for Holshany (Oshmyany were left for the German 20th Tank Division of the neighboring 39th Motorized Corps, which soon occupied them).

In the morning of June 25 the 12th Division moved out from Holshany to Volozhin, captured the city, and by the morning of the next day occupied Rakov (in the immediate vicinity of Minsk), 135 km east of Lida. Such a pace indicates that the division was advancing in an operational void - practically without enemy opposition (in the documents there are complaints only about bad roads and damaged bridges). And in this situation the mobility characteristics of the tanks were more important than the degree of their protection, and the Czech "Skodas" Pz.38(t), which made up the bulk of the tank park of the 3rd Tank Group, were the most suitable machines.

The German 18th Motorized Division on June 24 was to cover the advance of the 12th Tank Division (and of the entire 57th Motorized Corps) from counterattacks from the south, from the side of Lida. Already in the morning of June 24 the commander of the 57th Corps reported to the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Group that the 18th Motorized Division had been attacked south of Voronovo by large enemy forces. Considering that only half of the 18th Division was here, the corps headquarters ordered the urgent pulling up to the area of the battles of the second half of the division from Merkine (this was accomplished only by June 26).

And by June 25 the forward detachment of the 161st Infantry Division of the 8th Army Corps of the 9th Army had approached the positions of the "half" of the 18th Motorized Division - the German infantry was beginning to catch up with the mobile formations that had gotten stuck at Lida.

In the history of the 161st Division the route of advance of its units after the forcing of the Neman at Druskininkai is indicated: Porechye, Novy Dvor, Zablots, Vaveryka, Myto* — all on the way to Lida.

Soon the infantry divisions of the German 5th Army Corps would come out to the area of Lida.

On the same day, June 25, the rear column of the 161st Infantry Division was attacked and encircled by some Soviet units in the area of Porechye (up to 3,000 men were encircled!) — already deep in the German rear (before the war the headquarters of the Soviet 56th Rifle Division was located in Porechye). The rear services of the 161st Division suffered "relatively heavy losses" (as indicated in the history of the division); they were unblocked only on July 2-3 by their own forces and by the forces of the approaching 102nd Infantry Division.

Meanwhile, the German 19th Tank Division received an order for June 25: to advance through Voronovo, Traby to Minsk. The movement was slowed by the night demolition of bridges northeast of Eisiskes, and the units of the 19th Tank Division moved toward Voronovo with a large detour, through Radun.

The command post of the 3rd Tank Group on June 25 relocated to Voronovo (and already on June 26, in connection with the rapid advance of the German troops to the east, it was moved further east, to Krevo); the headquarters of the 57th Motorized Corps - near Survilishki (8 km west of Traby).

SCHEME of combat operations from the Soviet edition of H. Hoth's memoirs

(on the scheme two 19th TD are erroneously indicated, the right symbol means the 12th TD).

2. The Soviet 21st Rifle Corps

Even before the start of the war the 21st Rifle Corps (the 17th, 37th and 50th Rifle Divisions, the 56th Corps Artillery Regiment; corps headquarters - Vitebsk) received an order to move out to the west. Part of the troops was sent on foot, part was planned to be transported by rail. The corps itself was subordinated to the headquarters of the 3rd Army of Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov (headquarters - Grodno).

In the "Brief Report on the Combat Operations of the 21st Corps", compiled in July 1941 by the chief of the operational department of the headquarters, Captain G. N. Regblat, it was said: "The corps commander on 18.06 with the operational group left for the city of Lida. The quartermasters from the corps units were also sent there.

The district headquarters instructed, in connection with the absence of rolling stock, to set off for the new point of deployment at the expense of one of the echelons of the 37th RD.

Thus, the corps headquarters, headed by the chief of staff of the 21st RC, Major General D. E. Zakutny, without being mobilized, according to peacetime tables, without the corps artillery regiments ¹ and the medical battalion, on June 22 at 14.00 loaded up and departed for the new point of deployment, the city of Lida.

By this time the rear services of the divisions had not yet been sent, and the remaining units of the 37th RD and the division headquarters (the 20th, 91st RR and the 245th HAR) were loaded and sent by rail to the area of Bolshie Solechniki <now - Shalchininkai>.

All units of the corps, including the corps units and the Headquarters, left guards and mobilization cells at their winter quarters. These cells in the event of mobilization were to carry it out and send people and material to the new point of deployment.

On 24.6.41 the corps headquarters reached the Bogdanovo station* and could not advance further by rail, because the Yuratishki station and the bridges had been destroyed by enemy aviation. By that time the echelons of the 37th RD were still following behind us and were forced to unload at this same station.

Thus, by the beginning of military operations the 37th RD, as well as the 17th and 50th RD, had not been fully assembled in the concentration areas. Having unloaded at 6.00 on 24.6 at the Bogdanovo station, under the influence of enemy aviation, the corps headquarters located itself in the forest 2 km northwest of Bogdanovo.

By this time the efforts of enemy aviation were directed at the railway junctions (the stations Molodechno, Yuratishki, Bogdanovo and others were bombed), at the areas of concentration of troops, at the echelons at the railway stations or in movement, at the highway roads.

The highway Lida, Yuratishki, Volozhin by this time was loaded with troops retreating from the front in an unorganized manner from Lida and Grodno. Here also was a huge accumulation of material left by the retreating units. Already here one could meet among the retreating units of various divisions soldiers and commanders of our 37th RD.

The attempt to stop the unorganized stream of fleeing people, on various types of transport, undertaken by me, by Brigade Commissar Solomin and Senior Political Instructor Polyakov (a representative of "Krasnaya Zvezda") did not yield decisive results, because enemy aviation acted in a panic-inducing way on the little stable, panic-stricken troops, who fled without any data on the situation, and all the more so on the ground enemy.

Here cowardice and self-seeking manifested themselves in full measure among a significant part of the soldiers and even commanders.

The only thing we managed to do was to temporarily delay the stream, to turn them into the nearest forests, to shelter them and thereby preserve the lives of people and material from the active bombing of the enemy…

It was necessary to take decisive measures to counter this unhindered flight from the front and thereby preserve the material and manpower. The only expedient decision could have been an organized withdrawal of our units to the line of the old state border and holding the enemy's offensive on the old pillboxes, but such a decision did not follow, because communication with the headquarters of the Army and the front was completely absent. The corps commander was at the CP 3 km northwest of Ivye, where the entire corps headquarters was summoned by messenger.

At 4.00 on 24.06.41 the corps headquarters concentrated in full strength in the forest 3 km northwest of Ivye.

On 25.6 all attempts to contact the headquarters of the 3rd Army and the front ended unsuccessfully. However, at 14.00 of the same date a Combat Order from the 13th Army was delivered to the corps headquarters by messenger…"

On June 22 at 13.55, signed by the deputy chief of staff of the Western Front, Major General I. I. Semenov, an order went out to the commander of the 21st Corps through the headquarters of the 11th Mixed Aviation Division in Lida - apparently, it was difficult to contact the headquarters, which was already on the way, in any other way - for two of its divisions (the 17th and 37th) to come out to the area of Skidel, Ostryna and prepare a defensive line on the front Merkine, Druskininkai, Ozery, Skidel, Kovshovo (on the Neman River). Like most orders of the headquarters of the Western Front in the first week of the war, this order corresponded little to the situation: the divisions of the 21st Corps, according to pre-war instructions (oral, as a rule), were in movement (making a multi-day march on foot or being transferred by rail), they had neither the time nor the opportunity to regroup to carry out a new task. Divisions, and all the more so a corps, are very massive and inert structures. The command of the Western Front, due to its inexperience in commanding such large structures as an entire front, in June 1941 constantly abused barely feasible orders.

And the Combat Order of the 13th Army, received by the 21st Corps in the afternoon of June 25, will be discussed further on.

Table 7-3.
Change in the composition of the 21st RC in pre-war plans and at the beginning of combat operations.

3. How the divisions of the 21st RC arrived in the area of combat operations. The 37th Rifle Division

The 17th and 37th Rifle Divisions, as recorded in the "Brief Report", moved out to new places of deployment according to peacetime tables, the final points of arrival: the 17th RD and the 50th RD - Lida, the 37th RD - Bolshie Solechniki (Shalchininkai). Among the settlements in which units and formations of the 21st Rifle Corps met the war (according to the memoirs of participants): the railway stations on the line Molodechno - Lida - Grodno: Bogdan (nearby - Vishnevo), Yuratishki, Gavya (nearby - Ivye), Lida, and on the other line Vilnius - Lida - Baranovichi: Benyakone, Voronovo, Bastuny.

The divisions of the 21st Corps began their redeployment to the west in a calm peacetime situation, they were going to exercises and took with them training plans, training devices and half of the combat load. And as for the units that were transferred by rail, the situation looked like this: communication between units during movement was absent, the order of transfer of combat units by rail did not take into account the sudden outbreak of war, the units that arrived at the places of unloading did not know the situation, did not know the terrain and often had no communication with higher headquarters and did not receive combat tasks. This is important to take into account when assessing subsequent events.

The 37th Rifle Division before the war was located in Lepel and Vitebsk. Even before the war it began moving out to the west: the 247th Rifle Regiment and the 170th Light Artillery Regiment from Lepel moved to the area north of Lida on foot, while two rifle regiments (the 20th and 91st) and the 245th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (HAR) from Vitebsk were to be transferred later by rail.

G. V. Revunenkov (in 1941 - colonel, chief of staff of the 37th Division, subsequently lieutenant general) recalled after the war: "On June 17, 1941, I, the commander of the 1st Rifle Corps, Major General F. D. Rubtsov, and the division commander, Colonel A. E. Chekharin, were summoned to the district headquarters. We were informed that the 37th RD was to depart for a field camp near Lida, although it was clear that the redeployment was being carried out as part of the deployment of troops on the state border. We were ordered to have with us everything for life in the camp. Two regiments set out from Lepel on march route, and the units of the Vitebsk garrison were sent by rail. The echelons were made up on the principle of convenience of transport, therefore the division headquarters followed without the communications battalion, and the ammunition was in the last echelon. We learned of the beginning of the war at 12 o'clock on June 22 at the Bogdanov station from the speech of V. M. Molotov. At that time the units of the division were still continuing their journey, there was no communication with them, neither the commander nor the headquarters knew the situation…"

Dmitry Egorov cited in his research many other memoirs: B. A. Shirokov (in 1941 - a cadet of the regimental school of the 247th Rifle Regiment of the 37th Division) wrote that on June 22 the regiment was in a forest not far from Benyakone. The commander of the tank company of the 68th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 37th Division, M. T. Ermolaev, recalled that on June 22 their echelon passed Lida, proceeded in the direction of Benyakone and began unloading in a forest area. When the unloading was nearing its end, the echelon was attacked by enemy aviation.

K. N. Osipov (in 1941 - senior political instructor, former secretary of the party bureau of the 245th HAR, in August 1941 for the exit from the encirclement as part of "Boldin's group" received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union) recalled that his regiment was moving west in four railway echelons. On June 21 the echelon with the 1st Battalion and the staff battery arrived in Lida, where it was delayed due to the occupation of the unloading place at the final station of Benyakone. He wrote: "Life in the city went on, no different from previous days. It was Saturday. In the evening the personnel of the echelon, after supper, calmly lay down to rest. Everything was ready for unloading. Everyone knew what he would do. At 4 o'clock in the morning of June 22 we were awakened by strong explosions of aerial bombs. What happened? Who is bombing and what? With such a question I ran to the station commandant of Lida. He was sitting by the telephone and was vainly trying to clarify the situation with someone. But there was no communication with other cities… By about 8 o'clock in the morning a passenger train with many damaged cars approached the station. As soon as it stopped, they began to carry out the dead and wounded. Now it was already clear that the war had begun. Only by noon the damage on the railway track from Lida to Benyakone was repaired. The echelon moved to the place of unloading. At the Benyakone station the deputy commander of the division, Regimental Commissar Pyatakov, informed us that fascist Germany had attacked the Soviet Union… We were ordered to immediately unload and concentrate 2 km from the Benyakone station in the forest, to bring everything to combat readiness… We had to urgently send a vehicle to the refueling point in the city of Lida for gasoline".

Further K. N. Osipov reports on the first engagement with the enemy (I quote from D. Egorov's book): "in the morning of June 23 a motor vehicle loaded with barrels of gasoline did after all return from Lida. The senior man told us that in Lida there was complete confusion. At the warehouses they are waiting for instructions from their superiors about the release of military property, but there are no orders. Such a multitude of vehicles had accumulated at the warehouses that the chief of the fuel and lubricants warehouse, seeing such a situation, on his own responsibility, without any requisitions, began to release gasoline. The equipment was refueled, the battalion was brought to combat readiness. Then an order came: together with the rifle regiment to begin the liquidation of an airborne landing. At 9 o'clock the column moved in the direction of Lida. In the second half of the day reconnaissance discovered enemy paratroopers, the regiment deployed in combat order. But it turned out that the landing was some "wrong" one, with tanks and armored cars (probably this was precisely the case when the forward detachment of a German tank division was taken for paratroopers - apparently a comment by D. Egorov). The howitzer batteries opened fire, but during the battle the riflemen's rather scanty supply of cartridges quickly melted away, and the delivery was not organized. The battalions withdrew to the firing positions of the battalion, forming strongpoints. The Germans three times attacked our defense under the cover of tanks, but each time they rolled back, leaving killed and wounded. Eight tanks were knocked out. When it began to get dark, a new order was received: to withdraw to Oshmyany".

In the memoirs of I. V. Boldin, the unusual path of Senior Political Instructor Osipov after this battle is described: he with a group of fellow soldiers withdrew to Molodechno, then came out to the Minsk fortified region and headed the garrison of one of the pillboxes, where in early July 1941 he was met by the retreating Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin (deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front and commander of the Mechanized Cavalry Group, which delivered a counterattack near Grodno in the first days of the war).

If one were to draw a detailed map of those battles, in the area of Benyakone there should have been a symbol of 1/2 of the 37th RD, because the other part of the division was only just concentrating east of Lida. It was precisely here, east of Lida, that other units of the 37th Rifle Division were unloading. R. R. Chernoshey served with the rank of lieutenant in the headquarters of the 245th HAR of the 37th Division. He recalled: "In the beginning of the second half of June 1941, all units of our division, on the basis of a received order, were urgently preparing for a new place of deployment - in the city of Lida and other districts of the Grodno region. This order began to be carried out from June 15. Within a few days already half of the strength of the division had been transported to the areas of destination, since every three hours a military echelon left the Vitebsk station.

At two o'clock in the morning of June 22 the loading of the first echelon of the 245th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, in which I had lately served, was already completed.

Exactly at three o'clock in the morning our echelon left the Vitebsk station and departed in the assigned direction.

…at about the beginning of the tenth hour of the morning the train stopped at the Vileyka station. During the stop the soldiers and commanders came out of the cars and ran toward the premises of the railway station in search of a buffet - to make purchases. But at the station there was no longer any of the service personnel, the windows and doors were open, on the floor and behind the windows all the railway documentation was scattered. It was here that we heard on the radio the news of the war.

The question arose, what to do next? But since there was no communication with the higher command, and the railway communication was damaged and did not work, the command of the regiment decided to continue the journey west in the direction of the border.

Having left Vileyka, our echelon proceeded to the Yuratishki station. In the middle of a pine forest we were fired upon from a machine gun by German aircraft, which were flying in the direction of Minsk in the number of eighteen machines. After that our train began to move at a low speed, and toward evening we arrived at the Gavya railway station. On the tracks of the station there was nothing except one locomotive, the boiler of which had been pierced by a small-caliber shell. In the premises of the station - not a single person from the railway workers. There were no inhabitants either in the houses that were on the right side of the station.

With the onset of evening we began unloading the cars right among the tracks, because the loading and unloading ramp at that time was not working. I remember well that on the right side of the station there was a large alder forest and small shrubs. Everything that had been loaded in our echelon had to be carried out on our hands, rolled out and stacked in this forest and bushes for camouflage.

On the second day of the war June 23 the commander of our regiment, Colonel Merkulov, and the chief of staff, Captain Larionov, established communication with the military units of our division, which before the war were in the city of Lida and had already taken up defense in the city, at the Gutno railway station, on the roads Lida-Ivye and Lida-Voronovo.

By decision of the command on June 24 we began to bring up on horses the 122-millimeter howitzers to the Gutno railway station. In the evening of the same day I met the commissar of the 37th Rifle Division, Pyatakov. He knew me well, for from 1938 to 1940 I served in the headquarters of the division. The commissar placed at my disposal a ZIS-5 vehicle with a driver and two soldiers and ordered me to go twice during the night to the Gavya station and bring ammunition to the area of combat operations.

It was good that before our arrival at Lida the 17th Rifle Division had unloaded at the Gavya station a considerable quantity of howitzer shells, as well as submachine gun and rifle cartridges. In our regiment there was no ammunition, but every soldier had a weapon. We were going to the new place of deployment not according to wartime tables, but according to peacetime tables…"

4. …The 17th Rifle Division

There is considerably less information about the arrival of the 17th Rifle Division at the war. G. G. Skripka* (in 1941 - major, commander of the 55th Rifle Regiment of the 17th Division) recalled that they set out on the march on June 12, with the task of concentrating at Lida on June 23. They moved on foot, with the exception of the 390th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, the 102nd Anti-Tank and the 161st Anti-Aircraft Battalions, which were to be transported from Polotsk by rail - they remained in Polotsk (in July they took part in the defense of Polotsk).

The 56th Corps Artillery Regiment of the 21st Corps also remained in the area of Polotsk - the corps was left without its corps artillery.

According to the memoirs of G. G. Skripka, the morning of June 22 found the 55th Rifle Regiment at a day halt in the area of Ivye. Here, from soldiers and commanders passing by in vehicles, they learned of the bombing of Lida. In the regiment measures were taken for camouflage from air attack, and combat security was posted. At a conference at the division headquarters (there was no communication with the corps and other higher headquarters) they discussed the question of "what to do". The chief of staff of the division, Colonel Kharitonov, proposed to open the "red packet" and act in accordance with it, but the division commander, Major General T. K. Batsanov, and his deputy for political affairs, Regimental Commissar I. S. Davydov, did not agree. It was decided to wait for orders "from above".

In the evening of June 23 the commander of the 21st Corps, V. B. Borisov, arrived in the area of Lida with the operational group of his headquarters. In execution of the last received instruction of the front command, he gave the order for the 17th Division to advance in the direction of Radun (northwest of Lida)… The political instructor of the regimental school of the 55th RR, A. Ya. Rogatin, recalled that at the station stood echelons with KV-2 and T-34 tanks intended for the 11th Mechanized Corps. All the tanks were refueled, but there were no crews. The division commander, Major General T. K. Batsanov, ordered to find among the soldiers and junior command staff those who could take on the role of driver-mechanics, but only a few former tractor drivers were found. The tanks were lowered from the platforms, driven away to the places chosen by the command and buried in the ground, turning them into immobile firing points; due to inept handling several machines were overturned. At the same time, wrote D. Egorov in his research, as can be seen from the published German photographs, many tanks remained at the station, including on the platforms.

G. G. Skripka continued: "On the night of June 24, having left the temporary camp in the forest near Ivye, the 55th Rifle Regiment by a forced march by morning came out to the western outskirts of Lida, and then turned to the northwest. To the right along the Lida-Radun highway two other rifle regiments of the division were to advance. When the regiment approached the Ditva River* we received from the reconnaissance sent forward a report that Radun was already occupied by enemy motorized infantry and tanks. I decided to advance to the commanding height near the village of Dubintsy about 10 km south of Radun and take up defense on it. The regiment reached the heights at about 12 o'clock. The battalions immediately began to dig in: the 1st and 3rd on the first line of defense, and the 2nd battalion on the second. Soon an enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared in the sky. Having made two circles over the height, it flew away. Thus our defense was discovered by the enemy. Then his response actions followed. At about 14 o'clock the observer from the trigonometric tower standing on the height reported that along the road from Radun a column of vehicles with motorized infantry was moving. At 1.5-2 km the enemy dismounted and, deploying into company columns, moved toward the height. Having approached a distance of 1 km, the columns scattered into chains. No less than a battalion was advancing. I ordered not to open fire without my signal of 3 red rockets. From a distance of 300 m the attackers opened fire from submachine guns. Enemy artillery also began to hit the height. Having let them come to about 200 m, I gave the signal to open fire. The enemy attack immediately bogged down. Suffering heavy losses, the attacking chains rolled back. The battle temporarily died down. Even the artillery shelling of our side ceased. An hour later another column of vehicles with motorized infantry approached from the side of Radun. Artillery and mortar fire on our defense resumed. A new attack was being prepared. With the aim of delivering a counterattack from the flank we sent two rifle companies of the 2nd battalion around the advancing enemy through the forest adjoining the height from the west. They were led by the chief of staff of the regiment, Captain Startsev A.A. The second enemy attack was also repelled by the fire of small arms, mortars and regimental artillery. No means of reinforcement had been attached to the regiment, therefore they managed only with their own forces <let me remind you: the howitzer artillery regiment, the anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery battalions of the division remained in Polotsk>². The turning point was the sudden counterattack of the rifle companies that had gone around the right flank of the advancing enemy. The Hitlerites were again forced to withdraw. The attempt of about 10 medium tanks to go around the defense of the regiment from the right flank was also unsuccessful. Our anti-tank guns knocked out four of them, the rest turned back. We held the line of defense, having destroyed in the course of the battle, which continued until the onset of darkness, several hundred fascists. Our losses were small. In the evening of June 24 an order came from the division commander to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Ditva River. Leaving a rifle company on the height as a rear march outpost, the regiment withdrew at night to a new line. The outpost was to join the regiment in the morning. However, at dawn from the side of the height a rumble of a strong battle became audible. In addition, the regiment was ordered, without lingering on the line of the Ditva, to withdraw to Lida. As a result the outpost did not return to the regiment. Its fate is unknown…"

It is difficult to say how far G. G. Skripka's memoirs about that particular battle correspond to reality (especially as regards the hundreds of enemies killed). What is important are the names of the settlements (Dubintsy 10 km south of Radun), the numbering of the units (the 55th RR of the 17th RD) and the dates (June 24).

Clarification. It is also important to look at the geographical map of the area, to assess the swampy floodplain of the Dzitva, to see that Dubintsy, if you are not advancing on Radun but defending against the enemy from the side of Radun, are in a trap of swampy little rivers, from which, in case of the approach of the enemy, one must urgently get out to the eastern bank of the Dzitva, closer to Lida.

Map of Eastern Poland, 1933

In the second half of the same day, June 24, as appears from the documents of the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps, the units of the 37th Rifle Division, which occupied positions to the right of the 17th Division, in the area of Voronovo, were attacked by "an airborne group of the enemy with tanks", as a result of which the 247th Rifle Regiment with the 170th Artillery Regiment, "poorly controlled, did not offer due resistance to the enemy and retreated in disorder beyond the Zhizhma River, where they went over to the defensive".

According to German documents, on June 24 north of Voronovo (which may correspond to the area of Benyakone) units of the 57th Motorized Corps captured an echelon with military property and uniforms, the corps also reported the capture as trophies of 60 field artillery guns.

60 guns for half of the 37th Division - this is a very great deal, this is practically all the regimental artillery of the 247th Rifle Regiment and the divisional artillery of the 170th Artillery Regiment.

5. Tanks on Railway Platforms in Lida

A modern researcher (https://iam-krasnoyarsk.livejournal.com) conducted a whole investigation into the fate of the echelon with KV-2 tanks intended for the 29th Tank Division of the 11th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Army and which only got as far as Lida: on June 17 an echelon with 20 KV-2 tanks set out from Leningrad to Grodno; by the end of June the 29th Tank Division was to receive another echelon with 11 KV-2 tanks (that is, in total it would have been 31 tanks - a battalion of heavy KV-2 tanks in the 29th Tank Division), but this did not happen.

The railway station Lida, at which stood the train with KV-2 tanks, was jammed with the echelons of the 21st Rifle Corps. It is not surprising that German aviation subjected the station to a massive bombardment. About the further movements of this echelon is known from a telegram to the Main Automobile and Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GABTU KA) from the chief of the automobile and armored directorate of the ZapOVO, Colonel Ivanin, as of 12.50 on June 23, 1941: "...20 KV tanks intended for Grodno arrived in Lida. At 5.00 on June 23 sent to Baranovichi at the disposal of Major General Petrov, unit 9406 <17th Mechanized Corps>".

Apparently, the echelon did not get to Baranovichi to the 17th Mechanized Corps of General Petrov (damage to the track?), the modern researcher writes that it was returned back to Lida, and then sent to the east, in the direction of Molodechno. On the stretch between the stations Lida and Yuratishki it was overtaken by enemy bombers, as a result of the raid one platform with a KV-2 tank placed on it was destroyed, and the echelon itself was torn into two parts. One part went further east, but only got as far as the Bogdanovo or Yuratishki station (we will still see these tanks in battle), and the other part of the echelon was returned to the Lida station, where the tanks were unloaded by units of the 17th Rifle Division (as a participant in those events told us, and at least one KV-2 tank was overturned).

6. The Atmosphere

It must be taken into account that the Red Army was moving west for a completely different, victorious war, and met a counter-flow of fleeing demoralized troops. This morally broke many.

Who fled? Why did they flee?

It is obvious that for the units of the Red Army that were located in the Baltic, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine in June 1941, this was foreign territory, to which it had brought nothing good. However much one may speak of the "liberation campaign", the Red Army brought to Western Belarus all the "delights" of the Stalinist regime: repressions, the power of party officials ("outsiders") and the power of the NKVD ("punishers"). After the sudden attack of Germany, the Soviet authorities immediately took to flight, and other Soviet employees followed them. And after them fled the army, including the commanders. What victorious war?

Not yet seeing the ground enemy, the troops newly arriving in the area of the battles were already breathing in the atmosphere of defeat: in the air reigned German aviation, to which there was almost no opposition; rumors of the all-powerful and ubiquitous airborne landings of the enemy still more undermined the belief that the Red Army was "invincible and legendary". Many wanted to be on the side of the victors. And on the side of the losers?..

There is a known report of the commander of the 229th Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, Captain Sumarov, who described the situation in Lida after the air raid of June 23, 1941: "After the bombing of the city all the administration: such as the City Soviet, the RK (district committee) and the City Committee of the VKP(b), the directors of enterprises, the militia and the NKVD threw down their posts and fled. The city was left without any administration, and also the districts. Hostile elements began to drag away the military warehouses left by military units without any guard, and also the population is dragging away everything from various supply bases. The prison was emptied. The political prisoners were also released…"

And also in the Red Army there was a large number of reservists from the western regions of Belarus - they had no basis whatsoever to fight for Soviet power, they did not consider it their own. Their mass desertion is another important subject of the summer of 1941.

And this spontaneous unorganized stream of those fleeing to the east, not only civilians, "civilians", but also soldiers and commanders, demoralized the newly arriving troops, carried them along with them. Thus arose the phenomenon which in the summer of 1941 received the name DRAP.

7. The 209th Motorized Division in Ivye

Before the war, in Ivye (40 km northeast of Lida) was located the headquarters of the 209th Motorized Division of the 17th Mechanized Corps, in the stage of formation. The division itself was formed in the spring of 1941 on the basis of the 13th Motorized Machine-Gun and Artillery Brigade (the heiress of the units of the Minsk Fortified Region).

As far as is known, one motorized rifle regiment of the division (the 770th) was stationed in Ivye, another motorized rifle regiment (the 754th) and the 129th Tank Regiment of the division - in the area of Lida. The artillery regiment was located in the area of Yuratishki.

Dmitry Egorov in his research discovered that the 770th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the division after the start of the war turned out to be among the defenders of the line on the Kotra River (the northern tributary of the Neman, where the remnants of the 56th Rifle Division of the 3rd Army, defeated north of Grodno, had retreated). The actions of the units of the 209th Division in the zone of precisely the 3rd Army are spoken of by the Note of Colonel A. I. Muravyov, commander of the 209th Motorized Division, written by him in the evening of June 25, 1941 shortly (a few hours) before his death (this document was published in 2012 by Mark Solonin):

"To the Commander of the Troops of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army Comrade Pavlov

I report:

1. All control on the part of the commander of the 3rd Army <Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov> has been lost. Hundreds of commanders apply to me daily, searching for the headquarters of the 3rd Army, among them on 25.6.41 the chief of staff of the Air Force of the 3rd Army and the chief of the 3rd Department <military counter-intelligence> applied.

2. Almost exactly the same situation in the 4th Rifle Corps.

3. On the front Radun, Volkovysk the enemy does not show particular activity, and the question is exclusively one of the loss of control.

A mass of command staff and rank-and-file is fleeing, and not one of them has seen a live German, but exclusively: "the German is bombing, he does not let us live". In fact, the losses from the actions of aviation on ground troops in real military operations are extremely insignificant.

As an example, the 209th MD during 22-25.6.41 is systematically subjected to air raids and has during these days 7 killed and 12 wounded.

During these days I detained up to 3,000 armed, healthy fleeing people exclusively from aviation, and not from ground troops.

4. On the front Lida, Slonim during 22-25.6 besides the actions of aviation [of the enemy] I have established nothing more.

I request:

To create blocking detachments, sending responsible commanders of the front to certain sectors, and now all this uncontrollable mass sows panic about non-existent uprisings in the small towns, paratroopers and airborne landings, which extremely harmfully affects the arriving new units, [on] the population. These rumors, absolutely improbable, go deep into the limits of the Soviet Union. It is extremely difficult for the field troops to engage in the work of returning to the front those fleeing without any reason for it.

Commander of the 209th Motorized Division, Colonel Muravyov.

25.6.41, 22.30" (TsAMO, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 90, ll. 8-11)

About the further fate of the division the information is extremely scanty. On the night of June 25 to 26 the 209th Motorized Division, by order of the commander of the 17th Mechanized Corps, began its withdrawal through Novogrudok to the area of Mir (40 km west of Stolbtsy halfway along the Baranovichi-Minsk road), somewhere here Colonel A. I. Muravyov was seriously wounded in the stomach and evacuated to Stolbtsy, of his further fate nothing is known (listed as missing); the division was taken over by his deputy, Colonel I. T. Chalenko. Soon the division came under the blow of units of the German 47th Motorized Corps, advancing on Minsk from Baranovichi, was defeated, and its remnants Colonel I. T. Chalenko brought out of the encirclement together with the group of the commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov.

Thus, the units of the Soviet 209th Motorized Division, apparently, did not participate in the battles at Lida.

8. The 24th Rifle Division, on the Eve of the War

The 24th Rifle Division constituted the second echelon of the 3rd Army and before the start of the war was stationed in the area of Molodechno, Volozhin, Krasnoye. The division commander K. N. Galitsky is the only one who left full-fledged memoirs about those events, albeit of the Soviet persuasion - he recalled that his division (as well as many others, according to him) was transferred to wartime tables in April. He wrote about the last 10 days before the war (I already cited this quote in my 1st chapter): "…On June 12 I was summoned to the district headquarters. In the reception room I met the commander of the 21st Rifle Corps, Major General V. B. Borisov, and the commander of the 50th Rifle Division, Major General V. P. Evdokimov, coming out of the office of the commander <of the ZapOVO, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov>. Their faces were preoccupied. But we did not manage to talk - I was immediately invited to the commander. In his office was also the chief of staff of the district, Major General V. E. Klimovskikh.

Having greeted me, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov said:

- From June 13-14 it is necessary to conduct month-long training camps for the retraining of infantrymen as specialists of other branches of the armed forces. Call up from the reserve Red Army soldiers and junior commanders for the camps. Train them according to the programs of specialists - mortar men, machine gunners, artillerymen and tank men, so that they may more quickly master the new automatic small arms, 82-mm mortars, new artillery and anti-tank weapons received by you.

We have already received this equipment and begun to master it. Besides the weapons indicated by the commander, the reconnaissance battalion of the division received ten T-26 tanks and the same number of armored cars…

- In the second half of June, - continued General D. G. Pavlov, - large exercises of the district troops will apparently take place, during which the 24th Rifle Division will be transferred by motor vehicles of two automobile brigades³ to the area of Grodno. Now it is necessary to begin preparing for the exercise: to train the personnel in loading onto motor vehicles and unloading the material part, and to teach the commanders to control their subunits on the march with flags and by radio. You need to map out two or three routes of movement and reconnoiter them with the unit commanders.

Going up to the map, the commander showed me the main route of movement - Molodechno-Vishnevo-Lida-Skidel-Grodno.

- Bear in mind, - he said further, - according to the plan of the exercise, in the 20s of June the 50th Rifle Division will come out to the area of Vileyka, Smorgon, Krevo. Hand over to it your military camps and prepare places for camps in the forests of this area. All the supply of the units of this division will be carried out from your warehouses. Work out the details of the disposition of General Evdokimov's units with the chief of staff of the district…

...On June 16-17, we with the regimental commanders and the officers of the headquarters conducted a reconnaissance of the routes of the forthcoming exercise in the direction of Lida - Grodno. The units of the division continued their intense combat training in the summer camps".

As regards the preparation of his division immediately before the war, K. N. Galitsky recalled: "…on one of the last days of May 1941, right at the end of the division exercises… the chief of artillery of the division, Colonel V. V. Dobronravov, reported to me that according to the plan of combat training of the district, after the exercise it was necessary to send both of our artillery regiments and the anti-aircraft battalion to the camps and artillery firing at the district range, which was located 120 km from Molodechno.

- The time is anxious, is it worth dispersing the forces of the division? - I thought. - Besides, the crossing is tiring for the horse strength, and also part of the tractors may break down, since the engines are heavily worn.

And I decided: we will do our firing at home. I immediately contacted by telephone the chief of artillery of the district, Lieutenant General of Artillery N. A. Klich. Nikolai Aleksandrovich apparently understood my doubts. He immediately gave his consent. The division remained in one area, and this, as we shall see, helped it in the difficult conditions of the beginning of the war". *

And another quote from the memoirs of K. N. Galitsky: "When… I told the chief of staff of the division, Major Z. D. Podorvanov, about the instructions of the district commander, Zakhar Demidovich asked directly:

- Does it not seem to you, Kuzma Nikitovich, that all this forthcoming movement of troops closer to the border means the preparation of more important measures than exercises?

- Judging by the movement of the 50th Rifle Division to the area of Smorgon, Krevo, and possibly of the entire 21st Rifle Corps to the west of the city of Lida, - I answered, - a second operational echelon of the front's troops is being created on the Grodno direction. Our division, designated for transfer to the area of Grodno, obviously will have to reinforce the first operational echelon of the 3rd Army. But these are only assumptions".

9. The 24th Rifle Division, the Beginning of the War

On June 22 the 24th Rifle Division began the first-priority mobilization, and at 15.45 to Molodechno, signed by the chief of staff of the Western Front, Major General V. E. Klimovskikh, an instruction went out to the commander of the 24th Division, K. N. Galitsky: to immediately set out for the area of Lida at the disposal of the commander of the 21st Rifle Corps along the route Molodechno, Vishnevo, Ivye, Lida.

The march, begun, as K. N. Galitsky recalled, at 21.00 on June 22, was carried out by two columns: the right one (the 7th Rifle and the 160th Artillery Gun Regiment) moved along the route Vishnevo, Yuratishki, Lida, the left one (the 274th Rifle Regiment with the artillery battalion of the 246th Howitzer Artillery Regiment) - from Krasnoye to Volozhin, Ivye, Lida. The division headquarters set out first for Volozhin, then for Yuratishki. There too the chief of the rear was transferring by means of the divisional motor battalion ammunition, food for five or six days and fuel for the motor vehicles (two refuelings).

K. N. Galitsky: "By this time <June 24> our 24th Rifle Division was approaching the area of Yuratishki. The march was made during two nights <22/23 and 23/24 June>. Even at dawn on June 23 we came out into the forests west of Volozhin. Having checked the disposition of the regiments, the organization of combat security and air defense, I with the deputy for political affairs M. S. Korpak and the chief of reconnaissance, Captain P. K. Kazakevich, rode ahead, to Lida, to coordinate with the headquarters of the 11th Mixed Aviation Division the plan for covering with fighters the routes of movement and the areas of day halts of the division.

Toward us came motor vehicles full of wounded. Approaching Lida, we saw repair teams filling with earth meter-deep craters from aerial bombs on the road. In the city fires were blazing. On the streets - military patrols and sanitary teams of the local air defense. Groups of refugees, mainly women and children, with a small bundle behind their shoulders, hurriedly left the city.

We found the acting commander of the aviation division, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Gordienko, at the airfield. Here too there were no few traces of enemy bombing: the skeletons of broken and burned aircraft, deep craters on the runway. But around us work was in full swing… Now a flight of dive bombers took off. Lieutenant Colonel Gordienko gloomily explained:

- They are going to bomb the tank columns of the enemy advancing on Grodno from the north along the eastern bank of the Neman.

These words struck me. Having no communication with the army headquarters and not knowing the situation at the front, I assumed that the battles were going on somewhere on the border line. Now it became clear that the Hitlerites had broken through it and forced the Neman.

…having coordinated with Gordienko the plan of cover, we hurried back to the division to prepare the units for the move to the area of Yuratishki. Major Podorvanov met us with good news: the mobilized reservists - residents of the cities and villages of the western regions of Belarus, assigned to our division - had begun to arrive at the military camps. In an organized way, in teams and groups, they arrived during the whole day of June 23. And we were able quickly to deploy the mobilization of the second echelons of the units. At the same time transport means also arrived - horses, carts, motor vehicles. It was felt that the party regional committee was giving energetic help in carrying out the mobilization.

By the morning of June 24 the division had concentrated in the forests of the area of Yuratishki.

…from Molodechno Major Ershov telephoned me. He reported:

- The headquarters of the 13th Army has arrived here. Just now I was summoned by its commander, Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov. He informed me that our division is subordinated to him, and ordered me to convey that he is calling you to Molodechno.

How could I leave the units in such a difficult situation? After all, the division might enter battle at any moment. Having consulted with the deputy for political affairs and the chief of staff, I decided to send to the headquarters of the 13th Army my deputy, Colonel I. A. Bisyarin. Along the way I instructed him to resolve the questions of organizing the delivery of ammunition and other types of supply of the division. Bidding farewell to I. A. Bisyarin, we had no doubt that he would quickly return. But the situation turned out to be even more difficult than I had assumed. Having set out in the morning of June 24, Ilya Alekseevich Bisyarin almost immediately found himself in encirclement, from which he came out with a small group of Red Army soldiers only on August 13".

Soon K. N. Galitsky received information from his reconnaissance about the breakthrough of the Germans to Oshmyany.

On this same day K. N. Galitsky established communication with the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps. He recalled: "It turned out that the corps headquarters had only arrived this morning by rail at the Bogdanovo station. There it immediately came under bombing. Now all its efforts were directed at establishing communication.

Having reported on the state of our division, I also mentioned the summons I had received to the commander of the 13th Army.

- I have no communication with him, as with the front command, so far, - answered General Borisov. - But I know that the 13th Army is to deploy to the right of the 3rd, in order to close the breach that has formed between it and the 11th Army of the Northwestern Front.

At once he brought us up to date on the events. It turned out that the data obtained by our reconnaissance, although incompletely, on the whole correctly reflected the situation at the front. General Borisov's communication confirmed that the enemy had broken through at the junction of the Northwestern and Western Fronts. But at the same time we now learned that the tank formations of the enemy had gone around not only the right flank of the 3rd Army, but also the left flank of the 10th Army defending to the south. Thus, the situation was even more dangerous than it had seemed to us. General Borisov also told about the forces that participated in the counterattack in the area of Grodno, and about the tasks assigned to them by the front…

Then the corps commander led me to the map spread out on the table.

- The task of your division, - he said, - is the following: tomorrow, June 25, to advance to the line of the rivers Kleva, Gavya. You see, this is 15-18 km north of Yuratishki. There, on the sector Traby - Subbotniki* (16-18 km), you are to organize the defense".

10. Where is the 50th RD?

The 50th Rifle Division, originally intended for the 21st Rifle Corps, like the 209th Motorized Division, remained outside the battles in the area of Lida and had a completely different fate - "fortunate" for the number of the division, but not for its commander and not for its soldiers (the division commander, Major General V. P. Evdokimov, apparently went mad and disappeared without trace in July 1941); I have information in my book about the combat path of this division, of which by the end of July 1941 indeed "only a number" remained.

And in June 1941, even before the start of the war, the 50th Rifle Division began moving from Polotsk to the area of Molodechno (to the camps of the 24th Division, which in turn was to depart to the west according to the plan), and by the morning of July 25 its headquarters was located 10 km north of Vileyka. It was unable to advance further: in its path was the "panzerstrasse" of the German 3rd Tank Group, from Molodechno to Volozhin (36 km) - the forward units of the 3rd Tank Group after the occupation of Vilnius turned toward Minsk.

The details of those battles are unknown; it is known only that the German 20th Tank Division on June 24 occupied Oshmyany and moved toward Molodechno, and the 7th Tank Division on June 24 occupied Smorgon, and on June 25 Vileyka (in 1941 - a regional center; it was precisely about the help from the Vileyka regional committee that K. N. Galitsky wrote in his memoirs).

On June 24 the commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 24th Division, Major I. T. Shchuka, in a message to his headquarters mentioned the 50th Division: "I am conducting battle with the forward tank units of the enemy west of Oshmyany. Prisoners of the 12th Tank Division of the 57th Tank Corps have been captured. In the area of Oshmyany is the reconnaissance of the 50th Rifle Division. The units of this division after a night march this morning concentrated in the forest in the area of Kurenets (10 km north of Vileyka)".

Dmitry Egorov reports that on June 26 units of the 50th Division (the 49th Rifle Regiment, the 6th Reconnaissance Battalion with the fire support of the 202nd Light Artillery Regiment and a battalion of the howitzer artillery regiment) attacked and even occupied the northern part of Molodechno.

However, in the situation of chaos on the Western Front the division lost communication with the command and found itself in a situation of information vacuum.

An interesting document: the note of the chief of the department of political propaganda of the 50th Rifle Division, Regimental Commissar Sumar, to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)B, member of the Military Council of the front and head of the UPP of the front of June 27 ("a cry from the soul"):

«Please explain what is going on? Where are our troops? Where is the local authority of the territory of Western Belarus?

We have been travelling through Western Belarus and so far have found nowhere either troops or local authorities. Everyone is fleeing to the east without any grounds.

Our division is fully combat-capable, is conducting battle with the Germans, but:

a) no one sets a combat task for us, the headquarters of the army and corps are nowhere to be found;

b) shells, cartridges, fuel and food are running out. We can provide ourselves with food by requisition, but we must obtain ammunition somewhere, otherwise we are helpless.

I earnestly request: tell us what to do next, we want and can fight the Germans».

Of the further it is known that the Soviet 50th Division soon had to retreat to the east through Pleshchenitsy (north of Minsk), Zembin (north of Borisov), Senno to Vitebsk to Velizh, and further, to the Dnieper crossings east of Smolensk (this is already when the Smolensk Battle was in full swing), and only here in the end of July 1941 did it manage to link up with the main forces.

Thus the fate of the 50th Rifle Division turned out to be different from the fate of many other divisions of the Western Front.

11. Soviet Anti-Tank Brigades (ATABs)

And what about the 8th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, which was stationed in Lida? For some reason it turned out not to be where the main events took place. Probably there is a reason why all three AT artillery brigades turned out to be in the area of the Suwalki salient - it is hidden in the pre-war plans of the General Staff of the Red Army. The reconnaissance of the Western Front quite accurately identified the configuration of the Wehrmacht units in the Suwalki salient (at least, this is how it was later recalled). But the Wehrmacht delivered the main blow from Suwalki not in the direction of Grodno, Lida and further to Minsk, but much further north. That is, such were the plans of the command of the Red Army, this is how it took into account the actions of the probable enemy, that all three of these brigades - and these are enormous resources, each with two artillery regiments and one anti-aircraft artillery battalion! - played no role in the battles, nothing is known about their actions, and hundreds of guns were in fact not used.

The German "panzerstrasse" Vilnius-Oshmyany-Smorgon-Molodechno-Radoshkovichi (for the 39th Motorized Corps) and Voronovo-Holshany-Volozhin-Rakov (for the 57th Motorized Corps) led three tank divisions (the 12th, 20th and 7th) straight to Minsk. - This was far from Lida (the place of deployment of the 8th ATAB of front subordination), and all the more so from Ruzhanystok (where before the war the 6th ATAB of the 10th Army and the 7th ATAB of the 3rd Army were concentrating).

And why these ATABs did not receive an order to redeploy - this is the theme of the loss of control and the disruption of communications on the Western Front. And it is not solved by the number of radios in a formation or in general at the disposal of the front.

12. The Soviet 13th Army

As a result of the ill-fated Directive No. 3, on June 23 the headquarters of the Western Front issued an order to the 3rd and 10th Armies and to the deputy front commander I. V. Boldin (published in the SBD - "Collection of Combat Documents" without date and time and without the signatures of the front commander and the member of the Military Council):

"From the morning of June 24 you are to:

1. With the strike group consisting of the 6th and 11th Mechanized Corps, the 36th Cavalry Division under the command of Comrade Boldin, continue the decisive offensive in the general direction of Grodno, take possession of this city and continue the offensive along both banks of the Neman River toward Druskininkai and Merkine. The final goal of the day - to occupy the small town of Merkine. Bear in mind the securing of the operation along the western bank of the Neman River from the side of the Augustow forests and from the side of Suwalki.

2. To the commander of the troops of the 3rd Army, Comrade Kuznetsov, with the 85th and 56th Rifle Divisions to attack in the general direction of Grodno and fortify to the north of this city. With the 27th Rifle Division to advance to the front Labno, Lipsk, Dombrova, where to fortify, entering into communication with the 2nd Rifle Division in the area of Osowiec.

3. The 21st Rifle Corps, securing itself from the side of Vilnius on the front Oshmyany, the Benyakone station with the 24th and 37th Rifle Divisions, with the 17th Rifle Division to advance in the general direction of Radun, Varena (Orany). The securing from the west of the area of Lida is assigned to the 8th Anti-Tank Brigade…"

Meanwhile, on June 23 at about 18.00 the headquarters of the Soviet 13th Army arrived in Molodechno. According to pre-war plans it was assigned a completely different sector (on the southern face of the Belostok salient, the headquarters Bel'sk or Novogrudok); now the troops that were to cover the junction of the Western and Northwestern Fronts, including the 21st Rifle Corps, were subordinated to it.

On the basis of the instructions of the front command and the available information, on June 24 the chief of staff of the 13th Army, Brigade Commander A. V. Petrushevsky, prepared Combat Order No. 01:

"1. The enemy with tank units, with the support of aviation, is pressing our units in a southeasterly direction.

2. On the left, the group of Lieutenant General Boldin is advancing in the direction of Belostok, Grodno, Merkine (Merеch).

3. The 13th Army, covering itself with part of its forces from the side of the Northwestern Front, with its main forces goes over to the defensive on the front Oshmyany, Benyakone and with its left wing advances in the general direction of Radun, Varena (Orany).

4. The 50th Rifle Division with the 84th Rifle Regiment of the NKVD troops (Molodechno), the Vilnius Infantry School and the 5th Tank Division is to cover Molodechno from the side of the Northwestern Front, going over to the defensive on the front: Danyushevo, Smorgon, Oleshchiska. To have a mobile reserve for the fight against enemy landings.

5. The 21st Rifle Corps (the 24th, 37th and 17th Rifle Divisions) is to defend with two divisions the front Oshmyany, Benyakone; the 17th Rifle Division is to advance in the direction of Radun, Orany.

6. The 8th Anti-Tank Brigade is to locate in the area of Lida, from where to secure the directions from the north and west.

7. The armored train by 5.00 on 25.6.41 is to move to the Gavya station.

8. The command post of the army headquarters from 10.00 on 25.6.41 - Bochechniki (15 km northeast of Ivye)".

The defense line Oshmyany, Benyakone, marked in this order for the 21st Corps, by June 24 no longer corresponded to the situation: the German 39th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Tank Group with two of its tank divisions (the 7th and 20th) was advancing on Minsk from the side of Vilnius through Smorgon, Oshmyany, that is, north of the line Oshmyany, Benyakone. The 24th Rifle Division, executing the previous order to come out to Lida, found itself much to the south of Oshmyany. And the 50th Rifle Division moving to its place reached only Vileyka. As a result, the above-mentioned "panzerstrasse" with a width from Smorgon (occupied by the 7th Tank Division on June 24) to Oshmyany (occupied by the 20th Tank Division on June 24) and even further south, to Holshany (through which the 12th Tank Division passed on June 24 toward Minsk) and from Molodechno to Volozhin (occupied on June 25) turned out to be free of Soviet troops.

Here the utterly mixed-up remnants of the Soviet units retreating from Lithuania, which for the most part had lost their organizational structure, were retreating to the east. The only meaningful action of theirs known to us is the attack of the detachment of the 5th Tank Division (this division was first defeated at Alytus, then thrown back from Vilnius) against the German 12th Tank Division in the area of Oshmyany on June 25 (at the same time the German division suffered, according to the memoirs of H. Hoth, significant losses), but this attack could not change the course of the combat operations. - That is, it was precisely through this "pipe" of the "panzerstrasse" north of the defensive line Oshmyany, Benyakone that the German 3rd Tank Group, almost without encountering resistance, came out to Minsk with three tank divisions (the 7th, 20th and 12th).

As a screen, the headquarters of the 13th Army could put up only the 84th Regiment of the NKVD Railway Troops. D. Egorov in his research described this episode as follows: "…on the night of June 24 the headquarters of the 9th Division <of the Rifle Division of the NKVD Troops of the USSR for the protection of railway structures and especially important industrial enterprises, commander - Colonel V. N. Istomin> together with the 84th Regiment arrived in Molodechno. At the station the Chekist-railwaymen met the heads of the power ministries of Lithuania, who had so hastily left Vilnius at the appearance of an unidentified column of armored troops near the city. Attempts to contact by telegraph with their Directorate in Moscow yielded no results, since Molodechno after repeated air raids was heavily destroyed, the wire communication had failed. Having left the 84th Regiment 15-16 km from Molodechno, V. N. Istomin set out for Minsk. On the way he met the deputy chief of the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR, Brigade Commander D. P. Onuprienko, who suggested that he return back. At the CP of the 13th Army, Onuprienko, after negotiations with the army commander, handed over to him the 84th Railway Regiment and attached the headquarters of the 9th Division. After that the division commander was permitted to set out again for Minsk. To Minsk the colonel was unable to get because of the bombing, but in Borisov the communication was working and the negotiations with Moscow took place. The chief of the Directorate, Major General Gulyev, ordered to take the regiment from the 13th Army, to put it in order and, depending on the situation, to move either back to Vilnius or to Minsk, in order to form the reserve of the commander of the 3rd Railway Division of the NKVD troops. At the front CP, where Istomin and the lieutenant colonel Gladchenko who was with him (presumably the deputy commander of the division) did manage to get, they were not received and were asked to come a bit later, when the situation eased.

At this time the 84th Regiment, according to the order for the 13th Army, was advancing to the defense line in the area of Oshmyany. As Major I. I. Piyashev <commander of the 84th Regiment> later reported to the division commander, on the approach to Molodechno they were met by the member of the Military Council of the army, Brigade Commissar P. S. Furt, who stopped them and gave another order - to put up a screen on the highway and to stop the crowds of servicemen leaving to the rear. It was already getting dark, it was not possible to hold back the pressure of the human stream. Probably among them were also German agents disguised in our uniform, for at the "needed" moment someone shouted that he saw German tanks behind, and a terrible panic began. The screen was partly swept away, partly itself succumbed to the herd instinct and fled together with everyone wherever they could…"

On this the combat operations on the Minsk direction for the 84th NKVD Regiment came to an end.

Moreover, the headquarters of the 13th Army itself found itself right on the "panzerstrasse" of the 3rd Tank Group (it never got to Bochechniki in the area of Ivye and was still located 10 km south of Molodechno) and already in the evening of June 25 came under a surprise attack by the enemy and was forced to flee, losing commanders and having lost control of its troops, with which it had only just established communication.

Thus the 21st Rifle Corps was left without communication with the higher command.

The Phase of Active Battles, June 25-28

Morning of June 25

In the operational summary No. 01 of the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps as of 09.00 in the morning of June 25 it was said that units of the 17th Rifle Division, not encountering enemy resistance, had come out to the eastern bank of the Dzitva River on the sector Solishki (25 km northwest of Lida), Belogrudtsy (10 km southwest of Lida).

The lead battalion of the 20th Rifle Regiment of the 37th Division at 5 o'clock in the morning approached Trokeli, without meeting the enemy. At the same time the 91st Rifle Regiment of the same division, preparing to go over to the offensive, in the area of Traby was itself suddenly attacked by tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy and scattered. The division headquarters of the 37th, located in Lipnishki, as described in the document, completely lost control of its units.

From these scanty data we learn that, apparently, the 91st Regiment of the 37th Division came under the blow of the 19th Tank Division, which had gone over to the offensive. As described in the CJ of the German 3rd Tank Group, "the 19th Tank Division by 14.30 reached Traby and is advancing in the direction of Vishnevo. Against the rear units of the 19th Tank Division from the area of the Bastuny station <south of Voronovo, 9 km west of Trokeli> in the afternoon a powerful attack of the enemy was carried out, which because of the confusion of the local commander substantially delayed the advance…"

Considering that in the operational summary No. 02 of the headquarters of the 21st Corps in the evening of the same day, June 25, the route of advance of the attacking detachment of the 37th Division is indicated: Doylidki (northwest of Trokeli), Zhizhma (river), the Bastuny station, Bastuny, most likely, this is precisely the 20th Rifle Regiment of the 37th Division with the support of artillery, having come out to Trokeli, attacked the rear of the German 19th Division. This blow had important consequences for the events of the next day.

Also from operational summary No. 01 we learn that the zone of responsibility of the 37th Division on June 24-25 stretched from Traby to Bastuny (50 km), and the zone of the 17th Division - from Solishki to Belogrudtsy (up to the railway Lida - Mosty) on the eastern bank of the Dzitva River, also almost 50 km.

Also noteworthy is that in the morning summary of the headquarters of the 21st Corps the 24th Rifle Division is not yet mentioned. And it was precisely on this day that it entered its first battle with the enemy; the commander of the 24th Division, K. N. Galitsky, described it thus in his memoirs: "From the morning of June 25, south of the line Traby - Subbotniki, the division met the forward units of the 19th Tank Division of the enemy and in a meeting battle inflicted a defeat on them, throwing them back beyond the Kleva River. On the field of battle about three dozen German T-III tanks were left to burn out <considering that the 19th Tank Division had no Pz.III tanks, we are talking about other enemy combat vehicles>. Behind them were frozen the skeletons of more than 50 burned motor vehicles, on which enemy infantry had been moving only a few hours before. The picture was completed by dozens of wrecked enemy motorcycles scattered over the field.

The captured Hitlerites, of whom for the first battle there were quite a few - almost a hundred, - held themselves insolently and haughtily, looked sullenly. All of them were dressed in tank man's uniform - black jackets, trousers worn outside, sturdy boots, berets. On the black buttonholes gleamed metal emblems.

For interrogation we selected two officers. At first they did not want to give any information. But seeing that we had learned a good deal from their maps and documents, they decided that there was no sense in keeping silent.

- Our division, - said one of them, - crossed the Neman yesterday morning and moved in the second echelon of the 57th Tank Corps. But today, in connection with the fact that the 18th Motorized Division was delayed by battles, we were brought into the first echelon of the corps with the task of advancing as quickly as possible to Minsk through Traby, Volozhin.

- We were told, - added the second, - that there were no Russian troops ahead. - And suddenly quite unexpectedly our column was met by a deadly artillery fire. And then your attack, captivity…" ⁴

"Brandenburg" in Bogdanovo, June 25

The phenomenon of examining the events on the Western Front in June 1941 consists in the fact that many myths that were created and nurtured by Soviet propaganda and which were held in the heads of Soviet people for many decades (and in mine, of course), and now it is customary to laugh at them, may turn out to be true. In particular,

• it was precisely on the Western Front that many border fortifications were occupied by the enemy before they were occupied by Soviet troops;

• it was precisely on the Western Front that immediately behind the border outposts there were sometimes "rows of guns" which in the very first hours of the war became easy prey for the enemy. Thus it was near Grodno (both corps artillery regiments of the 4th Rifle Corps, the 152nd and 444th, and the howitzer artillery regiment of the 56th Rifle Division), thus it was in the area of Brest (the 131st Artillery Regiment of the 6th Rifle Division was located right on the bank of the Western Bug River, only a strip of water 100 m wide separated it from the enemy);

• "1000 German tanks" - almost that many were moving on Minsk;

• "there were saboteurs from the Brandenburg Regiment everywhere" - of course, not everywhere, but it was precisely in the period of interest to us in the place of interest to us that the sabotage subunits of the Brandenburg Regiment were employed.

On June 25 a platoon of German saboteurs from the Brandenburg Regiment (1 officer and 35 non-commissioned officers and soldiers) parachuted not far from the Bogdanovo station with the task of capturing and holding two bridges over the Olshanka River, over which the railway line Lida-Molodechno passed. The plan envisaged the landing of the sabotage group and the capture of the bridges before the approach of reinforcements. The saboteurs managed to approach the bridges and destroy the guard; the Soviet subunits with tanks located nearby attacked the German saboteurs, but the saboteurs managed to hold out until the approach of a motorcycle subunit, while suffering heavy losses.

In the documents of the German 3rd Tank Group on June 25 the following entry appeared: "The group of parachutists of the special-purpose regiment "Brandenburg" has been introduced into the composition of the forces of the 57th Army <Motorized> Corps for the first time. After the first success (the capture of a bridge to close the breach in the defensive line near Traby) it turned out that this subunit was still too weak to consolidate the result, and it was replaced by motorcycle riflemen. The remaining operational groups of the Brandenburg Regiment have been distributed among different divisions since the beginning of the combat operations. Their use did not justify expectations. They were not in a single case employed behind the front line [in the enemy rear] for the solution of independent combat tasks. Perhaps the reason for this lies in the subunit itself, which relies more on its weapons than on the dubious success of such combat operations [an airborne landing behind the front line]. Thus, they were more often used as especially daring forward (strike) groups and to a lesser degree did what they were created for".

Bogdanovo (a small town and a railway station) - this is not far from Vishnevo, through which the march to the east of the 24th Rifle Division passed. And most likely it was precisely the subunits of the 24th Division that participated in the battles for the bridges in the area of Bogdanov, which, apparently, they did not manage to recapture.

Evening of June 25

So, in the afternoon (at 14.00) on June 25 the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps received the order of the 13th Army (a day old), written, in turn, on the basis of Directive No. 3, sent to the troops late in the evening of June 22: to support the actions of Boldin's MCG in the offensive near Grodno. The whole history of the controllability of the troops and, accordingly, of the meaningfulness of the actions of the Soviet troops of the Western Front in the first week of the war can be illustrated precisely by this fact. Because by June 26, when the Soviet 21st Rifle Corps had finally completed its concentration in the area of Lida and was planning to go over to the offensive, the Mechanized Cavalry Group of Boldin had already ceased its unsuccessful attacks, and the front headquarters issued an order to stop the offensive and withdraw the troops from the Belostok salient (the headquarters of the 10th Army did not receive this order, but independently, having assessed the situation, at about 14.00-15.00 on June 25 gave an order to retreat from the Belostok salient, also already belated - just when at 14.00 a liaison delegate brought to the headquarters of the 21st Corps the order of the 13th Army). What could the 21st Corps support on June 26?

As G. N. Regblat wrote in his "Brief Report", "The order poorly oriented the corps in the situation, but from it it followed that the 50th RD was excluded from the composition of the corps and the 24th RD was included…

In the same order it was said that on our left operated the group of General Boldin and that the headquarters of the 13th Army was arriving by the end of the day in the forests of Bochechniki (not precisely), which is 8-10 km south of Yuratishki.

In reality, the army headquarters did not arrive in the indicated area…"

"In reality", as we know, it was precisely on this day that the headquarters of the 13th Army came under attack by subunits of the German 20th Tank Division and, instead of advancing to the west (from the small town of Gorodok* south of Molodechno to Bochechniki south of Yuratishki), the headquarters had to urgently relocate to the east, closer to Minsk.

And the former commander of the 24th Division, K. N. Galitsky, wrote: "Being summoned in the same evening <June 25> to the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps, which had moved closer to us, I reported on the battle with the enemy. It turned out that all attempts of General Borisov to contact the front headquarters had had no success, but today in the second half of the day a liaison officer arrived, delivering an order of the commander of the 13th Army, in which it was said that the 21st Rifle Corps was subordinated to him. Having informed us of this, General Borisov said that tomorrow, June 26, the corps would go over to the offensive to the north and northwest".

The position of the units of the corps for the evening of June 25 was presented in his "Brief Report" by G. N. Regblat:

"The 24th RD occupied the front along the Klyava River from Traby to the mouth of the Gavya River, covering the main direction Traby.

The 37th RD (without the 91st RR, which had scattered) occupied the front from the mouth of the Gavya River to the Bastuny station, covering the direction of Vorony <apparently, Voronovo>.

The 17th RD occupied the front of the Bastuny station, Tsibory, south of Lida <Tsibory - this means that the units of the 17th Division had withdrawn 10 km closer to Lida from the former settlement of Belogrudtsy, mentioned in the operational summary still in the morning of June 25>, with the task of developing the offensive on Lida - Radun".

Thus, after the concentration the 21st Rifle Corps had a real front, while the 24th Rifle Division occupied positions to the right of the 37th Division, at the place of "scattering" of its 91st Rifle Regiment - precisely on the path of advance to the east of the German 19th Tank Division.

It is interesting what would have changed the circumstance if the army headquarters of the 13th had subordinated the 8th ATAB to the 21st Corps? D. Egorov wrote in his research: as the commander of the 8th Brigade reported, he had enough guns, but there were no armor-piercing shells, and of shrapnel and fragmentation shells for all the crews there were only 34. By order of the army headquarters the only radio station and 87 motor vehicles, mostly ZIS-5s, which were tractors for the guns, were "appropriated".

But the headquarters of the 21st Corps did not control the 8th Artillery Brigade and did not set combat tasks. And practically nothing is known about the combat operations of the 8th ATAB in the area of Lida.

June 26

By June 26, against the three divisions of the Soviet 21st Rifle Corps operated two divisions of the 57th Motorized Corps: the 18th Motorized Division and the 19th Tank Division (the 12th Tank Division of this corps had gone far to Minsk and the next day was resubordinated to the 39th Motorized Corps).

By this time the infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht began to pull up to the area of the battles: the German 5th Army Corps (the 5th and 35th Infantry Divisions) was already coming out to the area of Varena, soon it turned further toward Lida. And from the south toward Lida advanced the 161st Infantry Division (it occupied Lida practically without a fight in the morning of June 27).

About the actions of the Soviet side, Dmitry Egorov wrote in his research: "As the operator Captain Grechikhin reported on his return to the headquarters of the 13th Army, in the morning of June 26 the 21st Rifle Corps went over to the offensive with all divisions and, destroying small tank and motorized subunits of the Wehrmacht, by 13 o'clock had advanced in a northwesterly direction. The 24th Division occupied the line Traby (excl.), height mark 167.6, Mozhili <Mozhuli on the eastern bank of the Gavya River, right opposite Subbotniki>. In front of the front of the division operated units of the enemy's 19th TD and some tank regiment of his. Especially heavy battles went on in the direction of Traby, Vishnevo. In the afternoon from a captured motorcyclist it became known that the column of tanks of the German 19th Division had stopped on the march because of the absence of fuel, its delivery was expected only by evening. At 14 o'clock the artillery of the 24th RD began shelling the stopped column, a fierce battle developed on the line Traby, Subbotniki. According to an unidentified eyewitness (possibly the correspondent of "Krasnaya Zvezda", Senior Political Instructor A. Polyakov, who was in the division), the enemy suffered heavy losses in tanks. Also on the initiative of the division commander, mobile anti-tank groups were created to localize insignificant breakthroughs of the enemy's mechanized troops.

The 37th Division reached the line Govdovichi, Papashany, Daynovo, Yasvily 2nd. In front of the front of the division were small groups of enemy tanks, which were withdrawing in a northern direction.

The 17th Division came out to the line Yasvily, Sokoly, Petkovshchizna, Mnihi, Pirkuny, Evseevichi, having the 55th RR of Lieutenant Colonel <Major> G. G. Skripka in reserve…"

In the "Brief Report" of G. N. Regblat it was reported: "…The greatest concentration of enemy forces was noted on the front of the 24th RD. Here the enemy showed the greatest activity and the battles developed on the front Traby and Subbotniki. By the active actions of the 24th RD the offensive of the enemy was stopped and a great defeat was inflicted on the enemy (prisoners, trophies were captured and 127 tanks were knocked out).

The actions on the front of the 37th RD also proceeded successfully. The attacks of the enemy on the front of Vorony <Voronovo>, Gavya were repelled…

The 17th RD, having encountered stubborn resistance of the enemy, was forced to abandon offensive actions and went over to the defensive".

How the 24th Rifle Division repelled the attacks of the German 19th Tank Division, which tried to cross the Gavya River at Subbotniki and Zhemyslavl, is described in detail in the memoirs of General K. N. Galitsky. Among other things, he noted that the above-mentioned number "127 tanks" also includes tanks knocked out by the division in the battle of June 25 - the figure looks fantastic, but still, probably, many were knocked out.

In the CJ of the 57th Motorized Corps this battle is described as follows:

"7:00

The enemy delivers a counterattack against the units of the 19th TD located on the heights southwest of Survilishki. The corps headquarters, which was about to move to the corps command post in the forest north of Survilishki, is drawn into the battle that has begun. Since the enemy's attack put the corps' route of movement under threat, and the enemy managed to advance one and a half kilometers to the bridge south of Survilishki, the corps commander immediately and orally ordered the commander of the 19th TD to take and hold height 166 south of Masyuki <Matyuki>.

14:00

During the first half of the day the situation at the bridge was in part already critical, everything around the bridge and further beyond the corps command post in the forest directly north of Survilishki was under strong artillery fire. For this reason the CP was moved to the rear by about 3 km.

14:00

The attack of the 19th TD begins. The division fails to occupy the heights because of very tenacious and skillfully directed resistance. Losses in tanks are significant. Indicative of the Russians' tactics is the use of light guns on horse traction, which drive up to the forward line to conduct fire over open sights with the support of the attacking [infantry] companies. Because of this the 19th TD fails to advance to the east.

It receives repeated orders from the corps to create a defensive line west of Subbotniki-Survilishki-Traby and to prevent breakthroughs of the enemy to the north and northeast, which are undertaken repeatedly during the day, especially on the sector Survilishki-Traby. This configuration [of the front line] allows the division to repulse all attacks of the enemy".

As regards the battles in the zone of the 37th Division, R. R. Chernoshey (lieutenant of the headquarters of the 245th HAR of the 37th RD) recalled: "The order of the commissar of the division <on the use of shells from the stocks of the 17th Division, which were unloaded at the beginning of the war at the Gavya station> we carried out as it should be. The third vehicle with shells and cartridges was brought up to Gutno in the morning of June 26. And at the beginning of the twelfth hour of the same day from the side of the forest area those who occupied the defense heard a terrible rumble: in the direction of the station fourteen fascist tanks were menacingly moving.

It was here that the opportunity was given to the howitzers of our regiment to say their word. The battle did not last long, about 10-12 minutes. Seven enemy tanks stopped and began to smoke on the field, and the rest turned back and disappeared behind the corner of the forest".

Dmitry Egorov cited another fragment from the memoirs of R. R. Chernoshey (with reference to a personal archive): "The second battalion of the regiment <the 245th HAR> occupied the defense and conducted stubborn battles with the enemy along the road Lida - Dvorishche - Trokeli <east of the railway Lida - Vilnius>. There the combat operations were directed by the regimental commissar V. Zavyalov, who also died then at his combat post. In those difficult June days the commissar of the division N. Pyatakov also passed away".

In the CJ of the German 57th Motorized Corps it was said on this account:

"22:00

The 18th MD during the day on its line of defense Zhirmuny-Geranyony <this is the zone of the 37th Rifle Division> repelled numerous attacks of the enemy, holding this line until dusk".

That is, Mark Solonin is mistaken in attributing all the merits of those battles to the 24th Rifle Division alone.

In the documents of the German 57th Motorized Corps presented by M. Solonin, it was also said: "Parts of the 19th Tank Division, which were delayed by the combat operations, and they could not continue their offensive, must advance one combat group to the southeast in order to cover the breach in the front line in the area of Bogdanov until the 18th MD comes up through Vilnius to Volozhin and takes its place. Favorable was the circumstance that the 19th Tank Division held back the attacks of the enemy from the southwest at Survilishki, thus protecting the rear units of the three tank divisions advancing on Minsk. So it often happens in war that an initially unfavorable situation (the cutting off by the enemy of part of the forces of the 19th Tank Division) involuntarily favorably affected the overall situation.

The command of Army Group "Center" established by its order the boundary line between the 161st Infantry Division and the 3rd TG: the railway and all automobile crossings over the Neman River south of Lida in the zone of the 9th Army.

Unusual is the fact that along the route of our offensive there are no warehouses with military property and ammunition of the enemy <? emphasized M. Solonin>. This allows us to assume that the enemy produces the supply of fuel and food improvized, on the spot ("from the wheels"). It seems that the systematic delivery of ammunition is absent".

The last paragraph requires explanation. We know (and M. Solonin emphasizes this especially) about the enormous stocks of shells and other military property in the Western Special Military District, but these are stocks "in general", the number of armor-piercing and non-armor-piercing shells in the ZapOVO, the number of tractors and prime movers and even the number of guns - this is also "in general". But in specific units and specific places of battles it could be quite different. And the difference between the 17th and 37th RD, on the one hand, and the 24th RD, on the other - this is first of all the difference between the divisions of "peacetime" that arrived in the area of the battles and a mobilized division, this is the difference between a division (the 24th) which by two night marches moved to a new area not far from the place of its initial deployment, and divisions (the 17th and 37th RD) which partly made multi-day marches, and partly moved by rail in "peacetime" order.

G. N. Regblat in the "Brief Report" describes the combat supply of the corps as follows: "During the battles of 25-29.6 the divisions expended a significant amount of combat stocks. By the forces of the corps during the whole time of the battles it was possible, at the expense of the left undestroyed warehouses at the stations Yuratishki, Gavya and Lida, to replenish the divisions with ammunition and fuel (with the exception of armor-piercing shells and bullets, of which there were none at all). But these stocks were insignificant and could not satisfy the needs of the battles".

Lida. Armored Train No. 44. June 26

With Lida is connected the combat episode described in Soviet memoir literature from the history of armored train No. 44 (possibly this is the very armored train that was mentioned in Order No. 01 of the 13th Army): when the enemy was approaching the railway station, there still stood at it the trains with ammunition and military equipment. In the evening of June 26 an armored train with a landing force arrived in Lida and, as described, under enemy fire evacuated the railway trains in the direction of Molodechno and Baranovichi; what became further of these trains is unknown: Molodechno was already occupied by the enemy, the next day it captured Baranovichi. Nevertheless, the armored train itself managed to break through to the east. Further it fought near Stolbtsy, after which it withdrew to the east through Minsk, Osipovichi, Mogilev, Krichev, Roslavl.

And those tanks that had been unloaded in Lida from the platforms fell to the enemy.

June 27

The advance to the east of the German formations continued: the 161st Infantry Division in the morning occupied Lida (some write - with a fight, some - without a fight, but in the history of the 161st Division the support of aviation on this day is described), the 5th Army Corps (with two infantry divisions) on this day came out to the area west of Radun, and the 6th Army Corps (also with two infantry divisions) - to the area north of Orany (Varena); the Soviet 17th Rifle Division began its withdrawal from Lida to the south, in the direction of Novogrudok.

As regards the German mobile formations, in the CJ of the 3rd Tank Group it was said: "At night and early in the morning there was no communication with the corps. Telephone communication with the 57th Tank Corps has not yet been restored, with the 39th it works intermittently. Answers to radio messages require several hours.

Major of the General Staff Pollex reports that the supply base (A) at Orany <Varena> is filled. On 27.06 in the evening or in the morning of 28.06 the supply base (B) at Voronovo will also be filled. From 29.06 the supply base (C) at Molodechno is to be organized, namely on the railway Vilnius-Molodechno, which is to be examined for passability. The fact that the Russians did not thoroughly put this railway with a large number of complex engineering structures out of action is yet another proof of how chaotically their retreat is proceeding, and how ineffectively their command acts <this refers to the railway from Vilnius to Minsk in the middle of the "panzerstrasse" of the 3rd Tank Group, where there turned out to be no full-fledged formation of the Red Army>…"

In connection with the approach of the infantry divisions, the formations of the 3rd Tank Group began a regrouping on the eve of new battles: the 18th Motorized Division was ordered to be withdrawn from the battle and sent to the area of Volozhin, and taking into account the state of the roads - through Vilnius, however half of the division remained in place and was left for combat security of the zone from Zhirmuny (excluding this settlement, located between Lida and the Bastuny station, here the units of the 161st Infantry Division took up position) to Bogdanov. The 19th Tank Division remained in place. The zone from Bogdanov to Rakov (in essence the northern face of the new Minsk "cauldron") was to be occupied by the 14th Motorized Division (at that time - in subordination to the 39th Motorized Corps).

The Soviet 24th Rifle Division, reinforced by a composite tank battalion, conducted an attack on Holshany and occupied Traby, but was then stopped. K. N. Galitsky described this event as follows: "On the main direction Traby, Oshmyany the 168th Rifle Regiment struck, reinforced by the composite tank battalion that had arrived at night under the command of Major Egorov. This battalion had three companies. In the composition of the 1st tank company, commanded by Captain N. Sizov, there were 8 KVs, in the 2nd (commander Captain Nesterov) - 15 T-34s, in the 3rd (commander Senior Lieutenant Shevchenko) - 14 light T-26 tanks".

G. N. Regblat explained the appearance of these tanks in the composition of the 24th Division as follows: "We also managed to collect 8 KV tanks and 25 tankettes, concentrate them in the forest northwest of Bogdanovo, refuel them and provide them with ammunition, unite them under the general command of the tank commander Major Egorov and subordinate them to the commander of the 24th RD, Major General Galitsky. Subsequently the latter very successfully on 27.6.1941 used the tanks in the battle at Traby, in cooperation with infantry and artillery, and successfully defeated the 19th (not precisely) tank division of the enemy, destroying 127 tanks of the enemy". (Again the figure of 127 tanks destroyed by the 24th Rifle Division arises, only now this number includes the losses of the 19th Tank Division also for June 27.)

A modern researcher (https://iam-krasnoyarsk.livejournal.com) established the identity of Major Egorov - this is the commander of the tank regiment of the 29th Tank Division of the 11th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Army, V. S. Egorov (I have only the question of which tank regiment of the 29th Division was commanded by I. G. Cheryapkin, and which by V. S. Egorov: the 57th or the 59th?). After the retreat from Grodno (or returning from leave to his unit, such a thing is also possible) Egorov found himself in the area of Lida, where he headed the composite tank battalion of the 21st Corps, attached to the 24th Division.

Looking ahead let us say that after the battles against the German 19th Tank Division and the subsequent new retreat, which will be discussed later, he was taken prisoner in early July 1941 in the area of Dzerzhinsk, survived and after his liberation at the end of the war in 1947 was awarded the Order of Lenin.

And Mark Solonin presented data on the irrecoverable (!) losses in tanks of the German 19th Tank Division as of July 3: they amounted to 21 units: 6 Pz.II, 13 Pz.38(t) and 2 Pz.IV.

Evening of June 27

K. N. Galitsky in his memoirs indicated that on June 27 units of his division took Survilishki by battle and continued the offensive toward Grauzhishki (that is, in the direction of Oshmyany). In the CJ of the German 57th Motorized Corps the emphasis is placed differently: "At the present moment the enemy undoubtedly exerts a particularly massive pressure on the 19th TD, which is in a difficult position in view of the stretched front, however its positions are held, despite substantial losses. The commander of the group is definitely aware that the position of the 19th TD is difficult, and the holding of its positions is decisive for the successful completion of the entire operation".

And in the CJ of the German 3rd Tank Group it is recorded: "General impression of June 27: The attempts of the enemy to break through from the area east of Lida [to the north] were successfully prevented by the forces of the 57th Tank Corps…"

K. N. Galitsky described the understanding of the situation by the command of the 24th Division and the corps in the evening of June 27 as follows: "By the end of the day an officer of the headquarters arrived at the command post <of the division>, who had been left in Molodechno to hand over the military camps to the units of the 50th Rifle Division. He reported that the latter had approached the city on June 25 and together with the remnants of the retreating 5th Tank Division, the cadets of the Vilnius Infantry School and the 84th Regiment of the NKVD troops had on the move entered into fierce battles with the units of the advancing 39th Tank Corps of the enemy…

Having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, the 50th Rifle Division in the night of June 27 was forced to withdraw to the line Kovali, Stazhinki northwest of Minsk.

Not all this was known to the officer who had arrived from Molodechno. But about the capture of the city by the enemy and the withdrawal of the 50th Division he knew. From his report it also followed that already on June 25, when the 12th Tank Division of the 39th Tank Corps of the enemy attacked our troops in the area of Molodechno, its forward units approached the Minsk fortified region, where they became engaged in battles with the 44th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army.

There was something to think about. All the more so because at the same time I learned of the sharply worsened situation to the south of us. The 37th Rifle Division, defending there along the eastern bank of the Gavya River in the area of Lapnishki <Lipnishki>, had already the day before with battles abandoned Voronovo. Still further south, from the area of Grodno, the troops of General Boldin's group had begun the previous night to withdraw to the east. All this was inevitably bound to affect the position of our division.

Therefore in the evening, before making a decision on the organization of the battle of the next day, I considered it necessary together with my assistants to sort out the situation. The chief of staff, Major Podorvanov, having reported the position of the units of the division and of the enemy troops, made the conclusion:

- By our blow we have driven a wedge into the columns of the divisions of the enemy's 57th Tank Corps and have delayed them. But the German 39th Tank Corps advancing to the northeast has taken possession of Molodechno and is developing the offensive on Minsk. Thus, our tactical success could not, of course, affect the operational position of the enemy advancing on the Minsk direction.

- For the units of the division, - supplemented this conclusion Battalion Commissar Korpak, - a serious situation is being created. The fascist tanks are in our rear, and there are no few of them in front of the front either. Apparently, we must go to the corps headquarters and thoroughly report the situation that has arisen.

Such was also my opinion. I considered that the further offensive in these conditions without a clear operational goal was hardly expedient to continue. It was necessary to clarify the plan of action of the corps commander, of the commanders of the neighboring divisions, and to receive an instruction - whether the division should continue to advance in the direction of Oshmyany or defend on the line achieved.

Therefore we with the deputy for political affairs immediately set out for the corps headquarters. We arrived there at the moment when it, after a strong air bombardment by the enemy, was folding up to change its location. The forest all around was burning. Having reported to the corps commander on the situation at the front of the division, I expressed the opinion about the inexpediency of further offensive against Oshmyany.

General Borisov agreed with this. He reported that on the front of the corps the enemy was conducting an offensive with two corps: the 57th Tank and the 8th Army. This morning it had occupied Lida, having driven out of it our 17th Rifle Division. It and the 37th Rifle Division had the whole day conducted defensive battles on the line of the rivers Gavya, Neman, experiencing a great shortage of ammunition, since the warehouses located in Lida and Yuratishki could not be taken out. In conclusion General Borisov ordered us also to go over to the defensive.

With that we returned to the division. During the whole next day our units conducted fire combat on the line achieved. The 19th Tank Division of the enemy, which had suffered great losses in the battles with our division on June 25-27, did not undertake attacks either".

June 28

Soviet memoirists did not write about new attacks of the units of the 24th Rifle Division on this day, however these reports exist in the CJ of the German 3rd Tank Group: "At night activity of the enemy's artillery was noted in front of the positions of the 19th Tank Division on the sector between Survilishki and Traby. In the morning a tank attack took place northeast of Traby. The enemy withdrew with losses and carried out a maneuver to the southeast. The command of the 57th Tank Corps believes that it will hold its sector of the front".

At 17.20 there was another report in the CJ of the 3rd Tank Group on the same subject: "Report of the 57th Tank Corps that the Russians began a counterattack in the morning of June 28 with large forces. The battle against a large mass of Russians gave our soldiers a certain feeling of superiority. The Russians used their heaviest tanks (4 pieces), which cannot be destroyed by our 50-mm anti-tank guns. Units of the 19th Tank Division destroyed 18 tanks of the enemy (there are no heaviest tanks of the enemy among them).

Since ground reconnaissance established that in front of the positions of the 18th Motorized Division up to the <rivers> Zhizhma and Gavya there is no enemy, the 18th Motorized Infantry Division, with the approval of the headquarters of the 57th Tank Corps, is advancing to the sector of the river located there".

K. N. Galitsky wrote in his memoirs: "By the end of the day of June 28 the chief of the operational department of the corps headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel G. N. Regblat, arrived at the command post of the division. He reported that communication with the front headquarters had been established. A radiogram had been received signed by the Military Council of the front, containing an order to withdraw to Lyubcha, Korelichi, Stolbtsy. In connection with this, General Borisov had decided to withdraw the corps from the battle, covering itself with strong rearguards, and to concentrate it on the line of the old state border. To me G. N. Regblat conveyed the following order: the 24th Rifle Division was to make a march and concentrate beyond the line of the border in the area of Bakinovo, Rabtsevshchizna (10-15 km southwest of Dzerzhinsk).

- You will withdraw, - he added, - together with the 8th Anti-Tank Brigade of Colonel Strelbitsky…"

G. N. Regblat wrote in his "Brief Report": "On 28.6 radio communication with the front headquarters was suddenly established, but since all the cipher documents had been destroyed, the negotiations were conducted in clear text. The front headquarters was informed of the combat activity of the units of the corps and of the situation with ammunition. In addition, the front headquarters was oriented about its decision to withdraw and about the area where it was desirable to deliver ammunition.

By the end of the day of 28.06.41 in response to an inquiry in clear text signed by Pavlov, Fominykh, Klimovskikh a radiogram was received, which said: force march <march> Lyubcha, m. Korelichi, m. Stolptsy <Stolbtsy>.

In connection with this the corps somewhat changed its decision and re-grouped the units of the corps to the south, because the telegram gave to understand that here we would be given help in ammunition and a way out of the encirclement.

Soon it turned out that all these points were occupied by the enemy and in them there were large military garrisons.

The 17th RD, which was to follow this route, reported that it was forced for the second time to force the Neman River and to move along the right* left bank of the river, because all the bridges available on this route had been blown up.

By 4.00 on 29.6, under the influence of enemy aviation, the corps headquarters reached the Berezina River in the area of Bakshty, forced it and concentrated in the forest northwest of Petukhovo, where at 12.00 on 29.6 the commander of the 21st RC and his chief of staff arrived…"

On June 29 German troops occupied Ivye.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

The Retreat of the 21st Corps

The morning entry of June 29 in the CJ of the German 57th Motorized Corps reads: "The night passed calmly, the enemy contrary to expectations did not begin new attacks in the morning. The 19th TD reports that the enemy in front of the front of the division has gone to the southeast. This report served as the basis for the morning report to the Tank Group: the calmly passed night, the enemy in front of the front is withdrawing to the southeast; air reconnaissance did not notice the presence of the enemy, the results of ground reconnaissance have not yet been received. The corps' request for air support of the 19th TD by the forces of the 8th Air Corps was therefore rejected.

Shortly after sending this message it turned out however that the enemy had not retreated, but rather in some places had withdrawn less than 100 meters, in the rest the positions were preserved. Especially strong positions of the enemy were noted in the areas of Subbotniki and Rybaki <a village between Zhemyslavl and Subbotniki>. The 19th TD during the night advanced its right flank up to Gavya to link up with the 18th MD, which had come out there the previous day".

G. N. Regblat described in his "Brief Report" the retreat of the 21st Rifle Corps as follows: "At the crossing <in the area of Bakshty> the 37th RD, the 24th RD, the 8th Artillery Brigade and a whole series of other units concentrated. A very large accumulation resulted, and only one crossing had been built.

The enemy, conducting intensified reconnaissance after the retreating units, soon discovered the accumulation of forces at the crossing and began bombing. From 5.00 to the end of the day of 29.6 enemy aviation did not cease to bomb the accumulation of units and material at the crossing and in the areas of concentration.

At this crossing the enemy inflicted especially great damage on the material and personnel. Here 2/3 of the material was put out of action. By the end of the day a significant part of the material means remained on the opposite bank and was ferried during the night.

During the night of 30.6 the corps headquarters made a march along the route of the 24th RD and by the morning of 1.7 concentrated in the area of Sestrishche, which is 2 km south of Poldorozhye.

By this time, by my personal trip, communication was established with the 24th and 17th RD.

The 37th RD moved to the north and had battles in the area of m. Kamen <6 km southwest of Ivenets>, but soon also came out along the route of the 24th RD.

Thus, along the route of the 24th RD moved the 37th RD, the 24th RD and the corps headquarters.

On the night of 2.7 a march was made in the direction of Rubezhevichi <the old line of the state border, 20 km west of Dzerzhinsk>. On this meridian all the indicated units fell into a fiery bag created by the organized defense of the enemy.

By concentrated fire of two divisions the units were brought out of the fiery bag and by decision of the corps commander the 24th RD from the morning of 3.7 was to break through the defense of the enemy and bring out the units of the 37th RD and the corps headquarters.

By 15.00 on 3.7 all units had concentrated in the Borovye forest and by a night march reached the forest 3 km west of Bakinovo <10 km southwest of Dzerzhinsk>.

On this line the units were met by strong organized machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire from the areas of the pillboxes, which is west of Dzerzhinsk.

In connection with this on 5.7 a conference of the commanders of the units was convened, which was headed by the temporarily commanding 21st RC General Zakutny, at which it was decided to preserve the personnel, to abandon the damaged material remaining and to come out of the encirclement in small groups.

Thus the divisions in small detachments independently began to come out of the encirclement.

Major General Zakutny remained to follow with the 37th RD. He ordered me to help bring out of the encirclement the shells <thus in the typewritten copy of Regblat's autograph an illegible word was typed> of the 24th RD.

The 17th RD moved in the direction of Osipovichi, the 24th and 37th moved to the south.

The most organized way out of the encirclement was made by the 24th RD.

The remaining units of the 37th RD and the 17th less organized…"

Major Generals T. K. Batsanov and K. N. Galitsky in the middle of July 1941 brought out of the encirclement the remnants of their 17th and 24th Rifle Divisions. They were united into one "detachment of the 24th Rifle Division" under the command of T. K. Batsanov ("Batsanov's Detachment"), and K. N. Galitsky was recalled to the disposal of the headquarters of the 21st Army (later appointed commander of the 67th Rifle Corps).

Soon the restored 24th Division (no longer the Iron one, because the division came out without its banner, much later the Combat Banner was found, it was preserved by Belarusian peasants, and the proud name of the division was restored) was included in the composition of the 3rd Army, the headquarters of which at the end of July came out of the encirclement and received new troops and a new defense zone in Polesie.

T. K. Batsanov was appointed the new commander of the 24th Rifle Division, G. G. Skripka (previously - commander of the 55th RR of the 17th RD) the chief of staff; into the new division were included the restored 55th RR (previously the 17th RD), the 168th RR (under this name the detachment of Kurmyshev was included in the 24th RD), and also the 487th RR (previously the 143rd RD, then the 232nd RD). *

The commander of the 37th Division, Colonel A. E. Chekharin, came out of the encirclement, but his division, like the 37th, in fact ceased to exist. On September 19, 1941, during an inventory of the divisions defeated in the border battles, the 17th and 37th RD were disbanded. In September 1941 A. E. Chekharin was appointed commander of the 269th Rifle Division of the 3rd Army of the Bryansk Front; he died in October 1941 during the defeat of the troops of the front.

The commander of the 21st Corps, Major General V. B. Borisov, died on the retreat routes, the corps headquarters was brought out of the encirclement by the chief of staff, Major General D. E. Zakutny; he was later used in the composition of the 21st Army of the Western (then Central) Front.

About the further actions in the composition of the 21st Army of K. N. Galitsky and D. E. Zakutny it is said in my 5th Chapter.

Corps Commander of the 21st, Major General V. B. Borisov

In the "Brief Note" of G. N. Regblat there are many unflattering words about the "cowardly behavior" of the corps commander, Major General V. B. Borisov: "Major General Borisov, commander of the 21st RC, on the line of Rubezhevichi left in an armored car in an easterly direction and I never met him again in the units of the divisions. Whether he came out of the encirclement or not, I do not know".

I. V. Boldin (in 1941 - lieutenant general, deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front and commander of the Mechanized Cavalry Group, which at the very beginning of the war delivered a counterattack in the area of Grodno) mentioned in his memoirs (unlike the memoirs of K. N. Galitsky, which are extremely uninformative for understanding the combat operations), that during the retreat from the Belostok salient "On July 2 we found ourselves forty kilometers from Minsk. Here we met the commander of the 8th Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, Colonel I. S. Strelbitsky…

- Are you the only senior officer here? - I ask him.

- No, why. There are also older than me. The commander of the 21st Rifle Corps, Major General Borisov, and the commander of the 27th Rifle Division, Major General Stepanov.

- Where are they?

- They are sitting over there.

Indeed, about fifty meters from us two generals were sitting on a sawn tree and talking about something. Seeing me, the generals got up.

- What brings you here, Ivan Vasilyevich? - asks A. M. Stepanov, buttoning his tunic.

- Well, I decided to check how you command the troops, - I answer, looking at them searchingly.

- I believe that anyone in our place would have commanded the same way as we did, - responded V. B. Borisov.

- With such moods we will not go far, - I answered. - You have a whole army here. It only needs to be united, inspired and led into battle. And what are you doing? Have you decided to wash your hands of it?

Stepanov and Borisov are silent. They did not suppose that the conversation would take such a turn. In conclusion I announced that I was taking command upon myself, appointing Strelbitsky as my deputy, and ordered them to take up the identification of weapons and ammunition.

Further events showed that I was not mistaken in my choice of deputy. Colonel Strelbitsky turned out to be an excellent commander and a skillful organizer.

We began to prepare a reconnaissance in force south of Minsk. It was necessary on this direction to try again to bring the troops out of the encirclement.

At the appointed time the battalions moved forward, but ran into an enemy tank ambush. Colonel Strelbitsky on a T-37 tankette rushed there. He returned upset.

- The battalions suffered heavy losses. Of them there remained a handful of soldiers, who bravely conduct an unequal battle.

While Strelbitsky is reporting this, the forest in which we are located began to be bombed by fascist aviation. Then to the explosions of bombs were added the explosions of shells and mines. In various parts of the forest fires started.

There remained only one thing - to save the remaining troops. Part of them was led by General Borisov, but soon I was reported that he had died…"

In the memoirs of K. N. Galitsky the meeting with the corps commander V. B. Borisov is described on July 3: "We approached the old state border in the morning of July 3 in the area of Rubezhevichi. It was dawning. Ahead lay the line of fortifications, solidly made here by our troops many years ago. Not having discovered signs of the presence of large enemy forces, our reconnaissance went forward. When the main forces of the division moved after it, the fortifications suddenly came to life. It turned out that they had been captured by the Hitlerites, who brought down on us a squall of mortar and artillery fire. Our infantry lay down.

I decided to break through with battle. But several attacks undertaken by us on the same morning were repelled by the enemy. Soon we received reconnaissance data, from which it followed that in front of us were units of the enemy's 17th Tank Division.

Subsequently I learned that it was part of the troops that formed the inner front of the encirclement of our formations, which found themselves in the enemy ring to the west of Minsk. For the liquidation of the encircled, the German-fascist command had allocated large forces - twenty-one divisions. And one of them now blocked our way to the east.

To break through here again or to reconnoiter other ways for the exit from the encirclement? My reflections were interrupted by the arrival of Major General V. B. Borisov. Having arrived at the command post of the division and having heard my report, he ordered to break through the front of the enemy in the morning of July 4 and, advancing in the direction of the city of Uzda, to bring out after us from the encirclement the 37th Rifle Division following us and the corps headquarters".

Thus, it is unlikely that Major General V. B. Borisov died on June 30, as indicated in some sources; in the lists of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR he was listed as missing. There is his grave in Radoshkovichi west of Minsk (a reburial?).

In 1965 he was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War. His fate resembles the fate of some other corps commanders of 1941, in particular Major General S. M. Chestokhvalov - commander of the 25th Rifle Corps, who went missing after the defeat near Vitebsk in July 1941, about whom in memoirs and in prosecutor's documents also little pleasant was written, but who in 1965 was in exactly the same way awarded posthumously the Order of the Patriotic War, in fact rehabilitated.

When the Chekists (and Lieutenant Colonel G. N. Regblat - chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 21st Corps - came from the Border Troops, that is, a Chekist) at the beginning of the war described the behavior of the senior military commanders of the Red Army, they described them to the measure of their understanding of the military situation and to the measure of their attitude to the military leaders as potential "enemies of the people". Their reports were preserved in the archives much better than the combat journals of military units, which found themselves in numerous "cauldrons" (Belostok, Minsk, Kiev, Bryansk and Vyazma).

And the dead military leaders, what of them? They can no longer answer.

The Wehrmacht. 57th Motorized Corps. June 29+

Considering the weakening of the pressure from the Soviet troops and the imminent approach of its own infantry divisions, on June 29 the enemy began the withdrawal of its mobile formations from the battle for the solution of new tasks. They were replaced by the infantry divisions of the 9th Army. In the CJ of the 3rd Tank Group it was said: "The headquarters of the 57th Tank Corps reports that by the decision of the command of the 9th Army the sector of the front up to Subbotniki, previously part of the zone of responsibility of the 9th Army, is transferred to the 161st Infantry Division. The headquarters of the Group agrees that the 18th Motorized Division should already today hand over its sector of the front to the 161st Infantry Division and redeploy to Devenishki (north of Geranyony). From 30.06 the units of the division are to make a march through Voronovo, Vilnius to the disposal of the 57th Tank Corps in the area of Smorgon, Mikhalishki…

The 57th Army (Motorized) Corps must report when the 19th Tank Division can be withdrawn from its present sector of the front for the solution of new combat tasks in the direction of the upper reaches of the Western Dvina…

19:00

In front of the positions of the 19th Tank Division large enemy forces have been discovered, which makes the withdrawal of the division from the battle impossible…

The task of the units of the German 57th Motorized Corps for June 30: the holding of the line Geranyony, Survilishki, Bogdanov, Volozhin, Rakov, Minsk…"

As we know, only a couple of days later the 57th Motorized Corps (the 19th Tank and 18th Motorized Divisions) was able to begin a new offensive: on July 2 the forward detachment of the 19th Tank Division, moving in fact in an operational void, along good roads from Vilnius through Glubokoye and Postavy, covered about 200 km and reached the Western Dvina River in the area of Polotsk. The lengthy Defense of Polotsk began.

Thus, the 21st Rifle Corps in the battles at Lida delayed the advance of the German 57th Motorized Corps to the east for a whole week (June 25-July 1) - a very worthy result by the standards of the summer of 1941.

Map. Position of the German units in the area of Lida on July 1, 1941.

As on all such Wehrmacht maps, one should not pay attention to the numbering and disposition of the Soviet units - it does not correspond to reality.

The German 161st Rifle Division, having continued its march to the east after the capture of Lida (June 27), replaced first the units of the 19th Tank Division at Subbotniki, then the units of the 18th Motorized Division at Traby. On July 3-4 the 161st Division replaced the "next on the list" / "on the way of the march to the east" mobile formations of the Wehrmacht: the 14th Motorized Division in the area of Volozhin, then the 12th Tank Division in the area of Vishnevo, Rakov, which were able as a result to continue the offensive to the east.

The infantry divisions of the 5th and 6th Army Corps moved quickly to catch up with the mobile formations (they entered the soon flaring up Smolensk Battle already in the middle of July). And the 161st Division was able to return to the front only by the beginning of August near Smolensk, in the area of Dukhovshchina.

*****

The boorish tone of Lieutenant General I. V. Boldin in relation to Generals Borisov and Stepanov, which he allowed himself in his memoirs, can hardly be justified: after all, they in June 1941 fought far more worthily than Boldin himself.

But such was then the "ideological directive", that is how in Soviet times "heroes" and "traitors" were appointed. To sort this out now, 80 years after the end of the war, is difficult. We try…

footnotes

1. Regblat speaks of the corps artillery regiments in the plural; probably, besides the 56th CAR, the second corps artillery regiment of the 21st Corps was the 467th Corps Artillery Regiment, which in early July 1941 took part in the Lepel counterattack, then in the Smolensk Battle. ⇑

2. According to the pre-war table of organization, a rifle regiment of the Red Army had 18 guns (12 anti-tank 45-mm guns and 6 regimental 76-mm guns) and 49 mortars (company, battalion and regimental) ⇑

3. According to the pre-war plan of deployment of the troops of the second echelon of the ZapOVO, the 24th Rifle Division was to be transported first of all (together with the 100th Rifle Division) by echelon by motor transport and by rail with the calculation of concentrating the first echelons of the divisions in the area of concentration assigned to it no later than M3 (the third day after the declaration of mobilization). For the transport of people, horses and trains, the 30th Motor Transport Regiment consisting of 240 ZIS-5 vehicles and 625 GAZ-AA vehicles was allocated to the disposal of the commander of the 24th Rifle Division.
Perhaps this somehow explains what so surprised Mark Solonin: the presence at the beginning of the war in the 24th Division of 415 motor vehicles. ⇑

4. I deliberately occasionally insert into my text quotes from military memoirs of the Soviet time - in this way their atmosphere is better understood. And considering that all those memoirs had scientific consultants, it becomes clearer why real military-historical research became possible only after the collapse of the USSR and why only non-official historians were able to engage in it effectively. A greater disgrace than Soviet military-historical science is difficult to imagine. ⇑

Date of publication of this page - October 01, 2026.