Vladimir Martov
BELARUSIAN CHRONICLES,
1941

Chapter IV.
On the Southern Flank of the Western Front

"The Russians are incredibly stubborn after all!"
Fedor von Bock, 1941

By July 10, 1941, on the sector south of Orsha, three motorized corps (the 47th, 46th and 24th) of the German 2nd Panzer Group of Colonel General G. Guderian had prepared to advance across the Dnieper River. The 24th Motorized Corps was the first to reach the Dnieper - already on June 27 it had taken Bobruisk, opening the way across the Berezina. And on June 29 the chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, wrote in his diary: "…Guderian - and this is entirely correct from the operational point of view - is advancing with two tank divisions (the 3rd and 4th) on Bobruisk and is conducting reconnaissance in the direction of the Dnieper clearly not in order to observe the Bobruisk area, but in order to force the Dnieper, if the opportunity for this presents itself. If he does not do this, he will be making a major mistake. I hope that even today he will take possession of the bridges across the Dnieper at Rogachev and Mogilev and thereby open the road to Smolensk and Moscow…"

Subsequent events somewhat cooled the ardor of the German commanders: the 3rd Tank Division failed to seize a bridgehead near Rogachev, and its reconnaissance battalion on the way to Mogilev on July 2 was stopped at Chechevichi (at the point where the Mogilev-Bobruisk highway crosses the Drut River). The 4th Tank Division headed for Stary Bykhov, where it also failed to seize a bridgehead.

That is, the enemy failed to seize the crossings over the Dnieper on the move in the area of Rogachev and Mogilev.

It was then that a characteristic entry appeared in the combat journal of the 3rd Tank Division, that "after the heady successes of the first days of the war, no one could have supposed that the Russians on the Dnieper would offer such serious resistance..."

After the new events that occurred after this "characteristic" entry (the counterattack of two Soviet mechanized corps at Lepel and the offensive of the 117th Rifle Division in the area of Zhlobin), despite the successful repulsion of the Soviet attacks, the strength of the enemy was correctly assessed by the Germans.

The 2nd Panzer Group prepared to force the Dnieper with all the seriousness of which the Wehrmacht was capable in the summer of 1941.

* * * * *

By the beginning of the new German offensive the troops of the Soviet Second Strategic Echelon had not yet completed their concentration on the Dnieper line. At the same time it cannot be said that there were few Soviet troops.

The Soviet troops south of Shklov were combined into two armies: the 13th and the 21st. The remnants of the 4th Army were withdrawn to the second echelon (to the area of Propoisk, Novozybkov) for re-manning.

The main blow of two motorized corps of the 2nd Panzer Group (the 46th and 24th; in all 3 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions and a reinforced regiment) fell on the Soviet 13th Army. Its headquarters, which had retreated from Molodechno and then taken part in the defense of Minsk, on July 7 received new troops and a new defense zone (the boundary line with the 20th Army - Pochinok, Shklov, Cherven; with the 21st Army - Khotimsk, Novy Bykhov, Starye Dorogi). Moreover, on July 8 it "received" a new commander - Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov.

The headquarters was located in the village of Novy Lyubuzh east of Mogilev; on July 11 it relocated to the area of Chausy.

By the beginning of the German offensive the first echelon of the army consisted of the 61st and 45th Rifle Corps (nominally 5 rifle divisions).

S. P. Ivanov (in 1941 - lieutenant colonel, chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 13th Army) wrote in his memoirs: "The troops of the army occupied the defense on a wide front, building their combat orders in one echelon. The density of artillery was 5-6 guns per kilometer of front. To create a stable anti-tank defense in such conditions is very difficult. The air defense remained weak. There was little anti-aircraft artillery, there was as yet no army aviation at all, and the front-line fighter aviation was not always in a position to cover our troops. The army also lacked mobile formations, by maneuvering which it would have been possible to deliver counterattacks against the wedged-in enemy groupings. The 20th Mechanized Corps was also not suitable for this, for it… represented in fact a rifle formation. But our main misfortune was again the circumstance that the enemy forestalled us and delivered blows against the troops that had not yet fully concentrated.

The army administration itself also experienced a great shortage of men, technical means of communication and motor vehicles. On July 9 it was manned with command staff only to the extent of 30 percent. Suffice it to say that in our operational department there were 6 men missing, in the communications department - 9, and in the artillery department - 20. Informing Marshal S. K. Timoshenko of this, A. V. Petrushevsky asked him to render assistance in bringing the army administration up to strength. Semyon Konstantinovich reacted to this request, as always, quickly. On the same day <July 8> Generals V. N. Matveyev and M. A. Korolev arrived to the positions of chief of artillery and commander of the armored troops. Subsequently, communications officers, artillerymen, tank men also began to arrive.

As regards reconnaissance data, from them it became clear that the greatest threat was represented by the direction Berezino, Mogilev. From this followed the necessity of continuing the mobile defense in the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, in order to gain time for the concentration of the main forces on the Dnieper line and the equipping of bridgehead fortifications at Shklov and Mogilev".

The 61st Rifle Corps (commander - Major General F. A. Bakunin, chief of staff Major General I. I. Birichev, after his wounding on July 9 - Colonel A. N. Koryakov) had under its subordination the 53rd, 110th and 172nd Rifle Divisions.

The 53rd Rifle Division (division commander - Colonel I. Ya. Bartenev) had received an order as early as June 15, 1941 to redeploy to Belarus from the Volga Military District, and from June 19 its first echelons began to arrive in the area of Gomel. In connection with the unfavorable development of events on the Western Front it was decided to transfer it to the area of Orsha; the units of the 53rd Rifle Division arriving from July 3 occupied a defense zone in the area of Shklov. At the same time the 110th Rifle and the 36th Light Artillery Regiments of the division remained in the area of Gomel and subsequently operated in the composition of the 21st Army. The actions of the 53rd Division were supported by the 3rd Battalion of the 438th Corps Artillery Regiment and the 301st Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command (this artillery regiment was retreating from the area of Baranovichi and probably already had losses in material).

The 110th Rifle Division of Colonel V. A. Khlebtsev moved out from Sverdlovsk to the west of the USSR with the beginning of the war; by July 3 its main forces had already arrived in the area of Mogilev. The reinforced battalions from the composition of the 223rd and 394th Rifle Regiments (respectively of the 53rd and 110th Divisions) became involved in the holding battles west of the Dnieper and by the beginning of the German offensive, judging by the memoirs of the participants in those events, had not returned to their divisions. The actions of the 110th Division were supported by two battalions of the 438th Corps Artillery Regiment.

The defense of the bridgehead fortification in the area of Mogilev and of the city itself was entrusted to the 172nd Rifle Division (commander - Major General M. T. Romanov). Besides the divisional artillery (two artillery regiments), the actions of the division were supported by the 601st Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 110th Division.

It is interesting that the administration of the 61st Corps arrived in the area of Mogilev on June 27, but at the beginning of July it departed to the area of Orsha (the center of the defense of the 20th Army, in whose composition the corps was included). Only with the allocation of a special defense zone in the area of Mogilev (of the 13th Army) on July 7 did the headquarters of the 61st Corps again receive an order to take under its responsibility the defense zone from Shklov to Mogilev.

South of Mogilev from the village of Dashkovka to Novy Bykhov (inclusive) was located the zone of the 45th Rifle Corps (the 187th and 148th Rifle Divisions). The corps was being transferred from Ukraine; at the end of June 1941 it was still concentrating in the area of Chernigov and other rifle divisions were subordinated to it. In reality by the beginning of the German offensive the positions on the Dnieper south of Mogilev were occupied only by the 187th Rifle Division; beginning from July 4-5, it was already fighting against the 4th Tank Division of the Wehrmacht, had lost the bridgehead fortification in the area of Stary Bykhov, but had repelled all the enemy's attempts to seize its own bridgehead in this area.

From the composition of the 148th Division by July 8, according to the memoirs of S. P. Ivanov, only 8 echelons had arrived. At the same time in the battles on the Dnieper line after July 10, 2 rifle regiments with artillery were already participating. On the night of July 10 the units of the division were to take up the defense on the line Selets, Borkolabovo, having forward detachments along the line of the Lokhva River, Slonevshchina. The headquarters of the division arrived in Krichev on July 17.

Moreover, in the forward zone of the 13th Army the holding battles were conducted by the formations of the "former composition" of the army: the 20th Mechanized Corps of Major General A. G. Nikitin (the 26th and 38th Tank and the 210th Motorized Divisions) and the 4th Airborne Corps of Major General A. S. Zhadov (the 7th and 8th Airborne Brigades).

The mechanized corps (by this time it had lost 2/3 of its personnel and almost all its heavy armament and represented, in the opinion of A. I. Eremenko, a weak rifle division) held the position Krasnaya Sloboda, Tverdovo along the Drut River (south of Belynichy), but on July 9 it was outflanked by the enemy, withdrew to Mogilev and on the afternoon of July 11 received an order to disengage and go for re-manning.

The 4th Airborne Corps (A. I. Eremenko: "in the composition of the 7th Brigade there were in all 1100 men and 15 guns of various calibers, in the 8th Brigade - about 1000 men and also 15 guns") as early as July 8 received an order to depart to the disposal of the 4th Army for re-manning, but was able to disengage only by July 10. In the second half of July the corps had to enter battle again, therefore it is not superfluous to recall that both brigades had only quite recently been re-formed from rifle units (of the composition of the 4th A/B Corps only the 214th Brigade had special training, because it had already been used "for its purpose" earlier).

The 2nd Rifle Corps of Major General A. N. Ermakov, retreating to the east from Minsk itself, was withdrawn from the subordination of the 13th Army, however subsequent events again linked the fate of the 13th Army and the 2nd Rifle Corps.

Thus, the combat value of the first echelon of the 13th Army at the beginning of the German offensive, in all likelihood, was equivalent to 4 rifle divisions (²/₃ of the 53rd RD + the 110th RD + the 172nd RD + the 187th RD + ¹/₃ of the 148th Division), which occupied a wide zone along the Dnieper from Shklov to Novy Bykhov (more than 100 km).

In the reserve of the 13th Army was listed the 137th Rifle Division of Colonel I. T. Grishin (it was making a march from the area of Orsha and by July 10 had come out to the area of Sukhari, Pridantsy east of Mogilev).

East of Mogilev units of several other rifle divisions (the 132nd, 160th) were also unloading, and they soon entered battle in the composition of the 13th Army. On July 13 these arriving units received an order to be united under their command by the headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps (formerly of the Reserve of the High Command).

The 20th Mechanized Corps, which had been withdrawn to the reserve, can also be assigned to the second echelon; it too by force of circumstances turned out to be linked with the fate of the 13th Army (possibly yet another "calculated division", and moreover one that had already gained experience of fighting the enemy).

* * * * *

The 21st Army on the southernmost flank of the Western Front (headquarters - Gomel) found itself outside the zone of the new German offensive. In the "War Diary" of F. Halder active movements of Soviet troops into the area of Gomel were noted, however the German command could not for a long time understand their significance. On July 13 F. Halder listed, among others, the "Gomel grouping of the enemy", but remarked: "No essential significance should be attached to this grouping, however the 2nd Panzer Group must nevertheless secure its right flank in case of an attack from the side of this grouping…" Only one 1st Cavalry Division of the Wehrmacht was left against the 21st Army (as a screen).

And meanwhile, as of July 10, the Soviet 21st Army had in its composition three rifle corps and the 25th Mechanized Corps. Here a "mighty fist" was concentrating under the command of Marshal S. M. Budyonny.

The right-flank 67th Rifle Corps (Brigade Commander F. F. Zhmachenko; the 102nd and 151st Rifle Divisions) was being transferred from the area of Chernigov and immediately before the beginning of the German offensive received a zone from Novy Bykhov (excl.) to Gadilovichi; the 132nd Rifle Division intended for it was unloaded in the area of Chausy and did not become part of the corps.

The strike 63rd Rifle Corps (commander - Corps Commander L. G. Petrovsky; the 61st, 167th and the 154th Rifle Division transferred from the 66th Corps) was concentrating in the area of Rogachev, Zhlobin. Besides the divisional (in each division - one howitzer and one light artillery regiment) and corps artillery (the 546th Corps Artillery Regiment), it was given the 387th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command, the 318th High-Power Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command, the 503rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment (of the 121st Rifle Division) and the 3rd Battalion of the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment (in all in the composition of the corps, according to memoirs, there were no fewer than 11 artillery regiments).

The left-flank 66th Rifle Corps (Major General F. P. Sudakov) had in its composition the 232nd Rifle Division and units of the 53rd Rifle Division (the 110th Rifle and the 36th Light Artillery Regiments) and occupied the zone Streshin, Rechitsa.

The 25th Mechanized Corps (Major General S. M. Krivoshein; the 50th and 55th Tank and the 219th Motorized Rifle Divisions) was being transferred from Ukraine to the area of Novozybkov, the Zlynka station, Klimovo. This was a "second priority" mechanized corps, formed in March 1941 in the Kharkov Military District; according to E. Drig, as of July 1 the corps had 163 tanks (almost all the tanks - in the service of the 50th Tank Division); on July 9 the 50th Tank Division additionally received 32 medium T-34 tanks.

To coordinate the actions of the 63rd Rifle and 25th Mechanized Corps, the former commander of the troops of the Western Front, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov, left Moscow for Dovsk (where the field administration of the 21st Army was located), however soon (July 4) he was arrested and then brought before a Military Tribunal.

After the unsuccessful attack on Zhlobin on July 7 the 117th Rifle Division was withdrawn to the area of Dovsk into the reserve of the army. The army also included a detachment of armored trains (BePo 51 and 52¹).

The Air Force of the 21st Army (the 13th Bomber Aviation Division of Major General F. P. Polynin and the 11th Mixed Aviation Division of Lieutenant General G. P. Kravchenko) as of July 8 had 121 serviceable aircraft, that is, almost a third of all the aircraft of the Western Front (see Table 3-2 in more detail).

Besides the grouping in the area of Dovsk, Rogachev, Zhlobin, in the composition of the 21st Army it was planned to create a second strike grouping in the area of Mozyr, Kalinkovichi (according to the directive of the Stavka of the High Command of July 4, 1941). It was to include the 5th Cavalry Corps of Major General F. V. Kamkov (the 3rd and 14th Cavalry Divisions) and the 16th Mechanized Corps of Division Commander A. D. Sokolov (the 15th and 39th Tank and the 240th Motorized Divisions). The overall command of the mobile group was entrusted to Major General F. V. Kamkov.

To the area of Bragin, Khoiniki from the composition of the Southwestern Front were to be transferred the administration of the 27th Rifle Corps, the 171st Rifle (formerly in the composition of the 25th Rifle Corps of the 19th Army) and the 28th Mountain Rifle Divisions.

Moreover, several artillery regiments, a number of light cavalry divisions being formed in the internal districts of the USSR, and the 32nd Cavalry Division from the composition of the Southern Front were transferred to the 21st Army. In all, in the composition of the 21st Army it was intended to concentrate 15 rifle, 1 mountain rifle, 4 tank, 2 motorized and 3 cavalry divisions, more than twenty artillery regiments (corps, howitzer and anti-tank), as well as several light cavalry divisions.

By order of the chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov, the 16th Mechanized Corps was to be transferred to Mozyr no later than July 9, however in reality it did not have time to approach the places of loading (by July 11 only the motorized rifle regiment and the rear services of the 15th Tank Division had arrived). In connection with the sharp aggravation of the situation and the breakthrough of German tanks to Berdichev, the greater part of the mechanized corps remained in Ukraine; the corps commander, Division Commander A. D. Sokolov, was taken prisoner in the Uman "cauldron" and died on August 17, 1941.

In the area of Berdichev, units of the 5th Cavalry Corps of Major General F. V. Kamkov also entered battle.

The 171st Rifle and 28th Mountain Rifle Divisions together with the headquarters of the 27th Rifle Corps also remained in Ukraine and already on July 15 entered battle on the right flank of the Southwestern Front.

Marshal S. M. Budyonny was also directed to Ukraine - on July 10 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Southwestern Direction, and already on July 12 the field administration of the Commander-in-Chief began work in Poltava. Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov - the former commander of the Northwestern Front - was appointed the new commander of the 21st Army.

In reality, by the beginning of the battles on the Dnieper line, the composition of the 21st Army numbered 7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized rifle divisions.

Chronicle of the War

July 10, 1941

The strike forces of the German 46th Motorized Corps of General of Tank Troops G. von Fitinghoff (the tank brigade of the 10th Tank Division) had reached the Dnieper north of Mogilev as early as July 8, but, as the modern researcher Leonid Plotkin writes, several days were spent on pulling up the rear services. The pontoon-bridge parks represented a particular problem. Before the beginning of the war the command of the Wehrmacht had provided the tank corps with them in full. But in Belarus there turned out to be so many rivers that by the beginning of the forcing of the Dnieper all the parks had been used. To build a heavy pontoon bridge across the Dnieper required three parks, while it was planned to build two heavy and two medium bridges simultaneously. It was necessary to urgently dismantle the pontoon bridges in Bobruisk and Chechevichi and transfer them to the Dnieper.

The pontoon-bridge park of the 10th Tank Division, as L. Plotkin reports, arrived in Vysokoye (between Mogilev and Shklov) on the night of July 9 to 10.

At this time the SS motorized division "Reich" came out to Shklov. In the book of Roman Ponomarenko devoted to the history of the SS division "Reich", a heavy battle of the subunits of this division for the heights west of Shklov is described, as a result of which it was possible to liquidate the Soviet bridgehead fortification and seize Shklov (the city is on the western bank of the Dnieper River).

R. Ponomarenko also describes the defeat on this day of the 2nd Company of the sapper battalion (the losses, according to the report of the division to the Main Directorate of the SS, amounted to 83 killed and 27 missing), unfortunately, without indicating the exact place. This is not quite what was written about in the Soviet summaries ("the defeat of the motorized pontoon battalion and the communications battalion"), but the losses described in a single battle are quite large, especially by the German standards of 1941.

L. Plotkin explained this episode as follows: the 2nd SS sapper company, operating in the composition of the combat group of the SS motorized infantry regiment "Deutschland" on the southern flank of the corps, was left to restore the bridge over the Drut River in the area of Dolzhanka (this is a little north of Chechevichi), while the main forces of the SS regiment went to the area northwest of Mogilev, and came under the blow of units of the Soviet 20th Mechanized Corps.

South of Mogilev the German 24th Motorized Corps of General of Cavalry* Baron L. Geyr von Schweppenburg, with the forces of the 4th Tank and 10th Motorized Divisions, began forcing the Dnieper in the zone of the 45th Rifle Corps.

As Nikolai Borisenko writes in his book "The Dnieper Line", on the eve (on the night of July 9) units of the Soviet 187th Rifle Division (the 292nd and 338th Rifle Regiments) crossed to the western bank of the Dnieper and attacked the enemy. The artillery of the 187th Division supported the attackers with fire from the eastern bank. The abandoned defensive positions of both regiments on the eastern bank were to be occupied by units of the 148th Rifle Division, however they, apparently, did not have time to approach the Dnieper line. As a result, only combat security remained at the positions.

The attacking Soviet units managed to capture Dashkovka, the Barsuki station and Novy Bykhov, but in the area of Stary Bykhov they were met with failure: it was precisely here that the main forces of the 24th Motorized Corps concentrated, prepared to force the river.

Early in the morning of July 10 the enemy began forcing the Dnieper in the area of Stary Bykhov. As Paul Carell writes, the 2nd Company of the 34th Motorcycle Battalion of Captain Rode from the composition of the 4th Tank Division forced the Dnieper with battle and formed a bridgehead, after which the 79th Engineer Battalion set about building a crossing, which was finished on the night of July 11.

North of the 4th Tank Division (at Borkolabovo) the German 10th Motorized Division forced the Dnieper.

By 14.00 the divisions of the 24th Motorized Corps managed to occupy Sledyuki and Sidorovichi and to take under control the Mogilev-Gomel highway; the bridgehead acquired dimensions of 7 km in width and 10 km in depth.

It is precisely the forcing of the Dnieper by the forces of the 24th Motorized Corps that is considered the beginning of the grandiose Smolensk Battle.

Analyzing the situation that had developed, S. P. Ivanov wrote in his memoirs: "Taking into account the activity of enemy aviation on July 9 in the areas of Shklov and Stary Bykhov, as well as the attempts of the ground troops to force the Dnieper, we foresaw the possibility of enemy blows in these directions, but not with such large forces as it turned out in reality. If the intentions of the German 46th Tank Corps were basically understood by us, the appearance of the 24th Corps on the left flank of the army became a complete surprise for us. The army headquarters failed to foresee its regrouping from near Rogachev, since we had no aviation for conducting air reconnaissance, and there were no subunits of the 187th Rifle Division beyond the Dnieper. The front headquarters also could not help us with its information…"

Indeed, even in the reconnaissance summary of the headquarters of the Western Front of July 10 it was said that the 24th Motorized Corps had prepared to force the Dnieper on the sector Vishchin, Rogachev, Zhlobin, Proskurov, that is, much further south than the actual sector of the forcing.

Later, in a conversation with the chief of the German General Staff, Colonel General F. Halder, the chief of staff of Army Group "Center", Major General G. von Greiffenberg, reported: "On the basis of the testimony of prisoners and captured maps it has been established that our offensive across the Dnieper became a complete surprise for the enemy…" (an entry in Halder's War Diary of July 12).

July 11

The German 2nd Panzer Group began forcing the Dnieper on new sectors: the 47th Motorized Corps forced the river south of Orsha and occupied two bridgeheads in the area of Babinichi and Kopys, the 46th Motorized Corps (the 10th Tank Division and the SS motorized division "Reich") occupied a bridgehead in the area of Shklov (in the area of Avgustovo, Pleshchitsy).

The Forcing of the Dnieper by the 46th Motorized Corps

The line of the Dnieper River in the area of Shklov was defended by quite insignificant forces. V. Yu. Kazantsev (liaison officer of the 18th Rifle Division, which was defending north of Shklov) recalled after the war: "A week after the Dnieper battles, under the most regrettable circumstances, in enemy captivity, I met the commander of one of the regiments of the 53rd Rifle Division, Colonel M. A. Zhuk *. He told me the sad story of his regiment, which was on the extreme right flank and, next to our 316th Regiment, was defending Shklov. One of the battalions of the regiment was detached as a forward detachment to the Drut River. This battalion never returned to its regiment. Another battalion, cut off from the main forces of the unit, defended the city of Shklov itself, located on the western bank of the Dnieper, and was almost completely killed on the very first day of the battles on July 10. The third battalion, stretched in a thread along the eastern bank of the Dnieper on a front assigned to a whole regiment, on July 10 was still desperately resisting the enemy offensive. But this battalion was nothing against the countless force of the enemy, who was rushing across the Dnieper in the area of Shklov.

It turns out that when our 316th Regiment on July 11 tried to establish communication with the left neighbor and to clarify the combat situation on its sector, the neighbor was no longer there at all…"

R. Ponomarenko writes that "in the morning of July 11 the SS regiment "Der Fuhrer" continued the offensive toward the Dnieper, clearing the territory of the last remnants of the Soviet troops and seeking the most convenient places for preparing the further dash across the river. A surprise for the Germans was the abandonment by the Red Army men without a fight of the well-fortified positions on the eastern bank of the Dnieper after a single attack by "Stuka" dive bombers. As a result, after noon on July 11 the SS regiment "Der Fuhrer" in the area of Shklov calmly began forcing the Dnieper…"

All the same, the forcing of the Dnieper by the enemy did not come cheap for him. Colonel General G. Guderian wrote in his memoirs: "Strong artillery fire and repeated bomb attacks by enemy aviation on the area of the bridge building by the 10th Tank Division made the forcing of the river considerably more difficult than on the front of the 47th Tank Corps. At the SS division "Reich" the bridge was also damaged by enemy aviation. Despite this, the division managed to force the river and to send a forward detachment in the direction of Gorki…"

The Forcing of the Dnieper by the 24th Motorized Corps

The accumulation of the German 24th Motorized Corps (units of the 4th Tank and 10th Motorized Divisions) on the bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov continued. The attempts of the Soviet 45th Rifle Corps defending here to throw the enemy back into the Dnieper with its own forces were not crowned with success.

For the next day a new counterattack by the forces of the 13th Army was planned:

— the 507th Regiment of the 148th Rifle Division was ordered to firmly hold the defense along the Dnieper line south of Mogilev on the line Selets, Stayki.

— the 292nd Regiment of the 187th Rifle Division, reinforced with artillery, received the task, in interaction with the 747th Regiment of the 172nd Division, to advance from the area of Staraya Mileevka on Sidorovichi.

— the arriving units of the 160th Rifle Division were to take possession of the villages Pribrezhye and Perekopadovichi.

— the 137th Rifle Division was to come out to the area of Staraya Mileevka with the task of building up the blow of the first echelon.

— the 187th Rifle Division, according to the memoirs of S. P. Ivanov, was also given an "active task". However, apparently, the division, which found itself at the tip of the main German blow, was already fighting with separate units and subunits (including on the western bank of the Dnieper) and, as A. I. Eremenko wrote in his memoirs, "did not represent a full-fledged formation".

The 137th Rifle Division, which continued to concentrate in the second echelon of the 13th Army in the area of Sukhari, received an order to move out and attack the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov. Valery Kiselev, who wrote the history of the 137th Division, reports: "Colonel Grishin received the order to move out from Sukhari only in the evening of July 11. The order was given in a categorical form: "To throw the enemy into the Dnieper". Immediately the units of the division were raised on alarm and sent by march to the line Dubrovka-Volkovichi-Usushek. It was necessary to cover more than 30 kilometers quickly. In Sukhari all superfluous property and equipment were left, even overcoats and packs. On the march the infantry time and again broke into a run. The drivers urged on the teams of horses with the guns: it was necessary to hurry.

A few hours after the beginning of the march Colonel Grishin established communication with the commander of the 45th Rifle Corps, Magon, who was entrusted with coordinating the counterattack of our troops on the Bykhov direction. Colonel Grishin reported to the corps commander that he had at hand in the division as yet only five battalions of infantry and two artillery battalions. Only a few hours remained before the beginning of the battles, and the division had still not been gathered into a fist…"

Meanwhile, another strike formation of the German 24th Motorized Corps - the 3rd Tank Division - was moved out to the area of Mogilev (it was regrouped from the right flank of the corps to the left). At Rogachev it was replaced by the 1st Cavalry Division and the forward detachments of three infantry divisions following behind.

The combat group of the 3rd Tank Division under the command of Colonel Gunther von Manteuffel - commander of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Regiment * began its movement toward Mogilev. In the area of Novaya Lezhnevka it repelled a counterattack of Soviet units (obviously, subunits of the 187th Division on the western bank of the Dnieper) and occupied Soltanovka 10 km south of Mogilev, thereby coming out to the starting positions for the offensive.

The command post of the combat group was located in the area of Mezhesyatki.

Against the Soviet 21st Army the enemy did not undertake active operations.

July 12

North of Mogilev

The German 46th Motorized Corps went over to the offensive from the bridgehead in the area of Shklov. The main blow was delivered by the 10th Tank Division. The Soviet 53rd Rifle Division was encircled and dispersed, the communication of the command with it was lost, the commander of the 223rd Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Semenov, was wounded, and, as already indicated, the commander of the 12th Rifle Regiment, Colonel M. A. Zhuk, had been taken prisoner on the eve.

The 61st Rifle Corps (headquarters - forest south of Evdokimovichi) was forced to bend its right flank, holding with the 110th Rifle Division the line Saskovka, Prudki. As a result the German 10th Tank Division already on this day advanced far to the east and captured the district center Gorki. The elbow-to-elbow communication of the 20th and 13th Armies of the Soviet Western Front was disrupted.

In the area west and southwest of Gorki the Soviet 2nd Rifle Corps, which had been withdrawn for re-manning, came under the blow, and both divisions of the corps (the 100th and 161st) found themselves in encirclement.

The Defense of Mogilev

With the German 24th Motorized Corps things were considerably worse. The combat group of G. von Manteuffel of the German 3rd Tank Division, divided into two detachments, attempted to break through to the city along the Bobruisk highway, but after a heavy 14-hour battle in the area of Buinichi was repelled with heavy losses - here the defense was held by the 388th Rifle Regiment of the 172nd Division of Colonel S. F. Kutepov, which was supported by the artillery group of Colonel I. S. Mazalov.

According to Soviet data, 39 German tanks and armored vehicles remained on the battlefield. The defenders also suffered heavy losses, but managed to hold their positions.

A. Isaev cited the memoirs of Horst Sobel, who served in the German 3rd Tank Division: "The 3rd Tank Division began the attack against Mogilev with two combat groups. The right combat group <under the command of Major E. Wellmann - commander of the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Regiment> advanced somewhat forward, but then the attack was stopped because of the strong resistance of the enemy. The left group <of Captain von Kokenhausen - commander of the 1st Company of the 3rd Motorcycle Battalion> immediately came to catastrophe. The infantry on motorcycles, which was to accompany the tanks, got stuck in deep sand and did not come out to the line of the attack. The commander of the tank company began the attack without the support of infantry. The direction of the attack, however, was a training ground of the Mogilev garrison, where mines had been laid and trenches dug. The tanks ran into a minefield, and at that moment artillery and anti-tank guns opened fire on them. As a result the attack failed. The company commander was killed, and 11 of our 13 tanks were lost…"

The indicated losses (11 tanks) refer only to the losses in the first attack of the second group. In the description of the combat operations of the 3rd Tank Division it is stated that only up to noon the 2nd Tank Battalion lost 18 tanks. This day became a "black" one (just as for the 1st Tank Battalion - the battle at Zhlobin near Pobolovo on July 6).

As a result it was necessary to renounce the capture of Mogilev by an attack from the west. By the end of the day the units of the 3rd Tank Division occupied the front Soltanovka, the railway embankment in the area of Selets, Tumanovka.

In the combat journal of the 3rd Tank Division an entry appeared that on the basis of the experience of recent days one could draw the conclusion that "rather than creating bridgeheads near large cities (Rogachev, Mogilev), where there are large enemy forces, it is better to seize them in other places, recognizing, of course, that there the approaches are worse…"

The main forces of the 3rd Tank Division began to be withdrawn from the battle; they were directed to the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov.

South of Mogilev

According to the memoirs of S. P. Ivanov, early in the morning the commander of the 45th Rifle Corps, Division Commander E. Ya. Magon, reported to the army headquarters that the counterattack planned for 4.00 against the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov would have to be postponed to 7.00 because of problems with the delivery of ammunition. The new commander of the 13th Army, F. N. Remezov, decided to look into everything himself and set out for the headquarters of the 45th Corps, located in Chervony Osovec, but in the area of Davydovichi fell into an ambush. - Here (in the area of Davydovichi, Lisichnik) the forward detachment of the German 4th Tank Division had already come out. Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov was wounded and evacuated; part of the workers of the army headquarters was taken prisoner.

The units of the 13th Army nevertheless attacked the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov. In the second half of the day units of the 137th Rifle Division also participated in the attacks on the bridgehead. S. P. Ivanov recalled after the war: "At about 18 o'clock we with the commander of the 137th Division, Colonel I. T. Grishin, already appeared at the command post of E. Ya. Magon, and Grishin reported the arrival of his four rifle battalions. Two artillery battalions were on the way. It was impossible to delay. The corps commander decided with the approaching subunits of the 137th Division and two battalions of the 148th Division to counterattack the enemy consolidating on the bridgehead. In the evening a hot battle flared up. The counterattacking troops were supported by the 11th Aviation Division, commanded by the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Aviation G. P. Kravchenko. During the day it destroyed the enemy crossing at the Barsuki station <north of Borkolabovo>. Moreover, concentrations of artillery in the area of Borkolabovo were attacked from the air. According to the reports of the pilots, there were hits, fires were observed; in an air battle our airmen shot down one "Heinkel-111". The actions of the aviation, and I frankly admit that I saw such a number of our aircraft in the air for the first time, inspired the soldiers, raised their offensive impulse. Leaving dozens of corpses and several burned tanks on the battlefield, the enemy was forced to retreat. However the bridgehead in the area of Bykhov could not be liquidated by our forces, which were few compared to the enemy…"

S. S. Biryuzov (the future marshal) dates the beginning of the attacks of his 132nd Rifle Division on the Bykhov bridgehead to July 12. The division was intended for the 67th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army, however it unloaded east of Mogilev and in connection with the deterioration of the situation in the area of Mogilev it was subordinated to the 13th Army.

On the eve the division administration arrived in the area of Chausy, and, as S. S. Biryuzov wrote in his memoirs: "…Now it was necessary to gather the division, which had been stretched along the railway over an enormous distance from Poltava to the Chausy station, near Mogilev.

With me was a separate reconnaissance battalion, whose subunits were already conducting active reconnaissance in the area of the Hitlerite Bykhov bridgehead. It was necessary to tear part of the scouts away from the combat task and send them out on motorcycles in all directions. This measure justified itself. Soon reports came that in the area of Krichev the main forces of the 498th Rifle Regiment under the command of Colonel F. M. Rukhlenko, one of the battalions of the 712th Rifle Regiment, several batteries of the 425th Artillery Regiment and some other subunits had unloaded. Even further away it was possible to find, with one battalion, the commander of the 605th Rifle Regiment, Colonel G. I. Mazhurin. The location of the remaining echelons, in which up to two thirds of the composition of the division was located, the scouts were unable to establish…"

The units of the 132nd Division (with forces up to 5 battalions with artillery) came out to the right flank of the 137th Rifle Division. Together they occupied the line Lipets, Kutnya, Aleksandrov, Usushek, with the task of subsequently advancing on Koloniya Grudinivka, Krasnitsa and entering into contact with the other units which were already fighting against the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov.

As a result of the Soviet attacks a wedge 6-8 km wide was driven between the German 10th Motorized Division and the 4th Tank Division on the bridgehead (in the area of Perekopadovichi, the Grudinivka state farm, Pribrezhye).

The 160th Rifle Division of Major General I. M. Stugarev, which had unloaded at Chausy, also participated in the offensive against the German bridgehead. Most likely it was this division that the commander of the 32nd Division, S. S. Biryuzov, had in mind - the division - "the neighbor on the right", which entered battle immediately after unloading. Taking into account the task for July 12, it is not excluded that it was precisely the units of the 160th Division that participated in the occupation of Perekopadovichi and Pribrezhye. At least in the combat journal of the German 10th Motorized Division for July 12 it was said that "a new enemy division is attacking from Kostinka", and in the journal of the 3rd Tank Division on the following day the attacks of Soviet troops from Kostinka are again mentioned and the established Soviet 132nd and 160th Rifle Divisions are listed.

Moreover, in the combat order of battle of the units and formations of the Western Front, compiled by Lieutenant General G. K. Malandin on July 13, the 160th Rifle Division (19 echelons) is described in the composition of the 45th Corps in the area of Grudinivka, Pribrezhye (in the document - "Gruzilovka, Pribreshye").

However, in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation there are no documents of the 160th Division for the period of interest to us.

The Soviet 4th Army

The Soviet 4th Army, which had only just been withdrawn for re-manning to the rear, was ordered to take up the defense on the Krichev direction along the Pronya and Sozh Rivers.

The 28th Rifle Corps:

— the 143rd Rifle Division of two-regiment composition (the 635th and 800th RR; the third regiment "has not yet been found", soon it took part in the combat operations in Polesie) took up the defense along the eastern bank of the Basya and Pronya Rivers in the area of Chausy (the line Borodinichi, Klyuch), the division headquarters - Dranikha east of Chausy;

— the 42nd Rifle Division took up the defense along the eastern bank of the Pronya River on the line Zakrupets, the mouth of the Pronya River and further west of Propoisk;

— the 55th Rifle Division conducted defensive works from Propoisk (excl.) to Staraya Kamenka (on the Sozh River south of Propoisk); its 84th Light Artillery Regiment was moved out to the area of Propoisk; the division headquarters - Sychin southeast of Propoisk;

— the 6th Rifle Division was being re-formed in the area of Krasnopolye (in the second echelon of the army); by the morning of July 13 its "armed part" was being moved out to the area of Cherikov.

The 47th Rifle Corps:

— the 121st Rifle Division - Novozybkov; its 503rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment was left at firing positions in the zone of the 63rd Corps of the 21st Army in the area of Rogachev;

— the 155th Rifle Division - Klimovo.

Corps artillery regiments:

— the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment - at firing positions east of Propoisk;

— the 455th Corps Artillery Regiment - being brought up to strength in Veprin (southeast of Cherikov);

— the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment - Krichev, transfer to Novozybkov was planned;

— the 447th Corps Artillery Regiment - Smolensk.

The state of the units and formations of the 4th Army is presented in Table 4-1. The almost complete absence of artillery attracts attention (in fact, at the disposal of the army there were only the 84th Light Artillery Regiment of the 55th Division and the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment), and there is insufficient information about the state of the special units (engineer, communications and others). This is not surprising, since, for example, the 6th and 42nd Divisions represented the pitiful remnants of the divisions defeated in the Brest Fortress, while the 55th and 143rd Divisions had already participated in heavy battles with a superior enemy and had survived the difficulties of retreat (here is meant not only numerical, but tactical and operational superiority, as well as superiority in the air).

In reality, the rear line from Chausy to Propoisk could be occupied only by part of the divisions of the 28th Rifle Corps and the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment. At the same time no interaction between the "rear" 4th Army and the 13th Army, defending on the Dnieper line, was organized.

As regards the 47th Corps, it was in fact withdrawn to the reserve of the front in the area east of Gomel (on July 14 the administration of the 47th Corps departed to the disposal of the High Command, and the divisions of the corps were subsequently used in other directions).

On July 11 a new commander of the 4th Army was appointed (instead of the arrested A. A. Korobkov) - Major General K. K. Rokossovsky, recalled from the Southwestern Front. He arrived at the headquarters of the Western Front on July 17, but in connection with the deterioration of the situation in the area of Smolensk he was left to organize the defense in the area of Yartsevo.

As a result, Colonel L. M. Sandalov remained in command of the 4th Army, and Colonel I. A. Dolgov remained the acting chief of staff.

July 13

North of Mogilev

While the 46th Motorized Corps continued the offensive to the east, the organization of counterattacks against the Shklov bridgehead was taken up by the commander of the 61st Rifle Corps, Major General F. A. Bakunin; in the evening of July 12 F. A. Bakunin was subordinated the 20th Mechanized Corps (in essence, a rifle formation), which had only just been withdrawn from the battle and was considerably battered.

In the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front it was said that "the 20th Mechanized Corps at 5.00 from the line Saskovka, Nichiporovichi went over to the offensive in the direction of Bel; having covered 2 km, the corps was stopped by the artillery and aviation of the enemy". Apparently, only the units and subunits located near the Orsha highway were able to take part in the attack; the main forces of the mechanized corps were able to go over to the counteroffensive only on July 17.

Subunits of the 425th Rifle Regiment of the 110th Division and the 514th Rifle Regiment of the 172nd Division also attacked the German bridgehead (the 514th Regiment had earlier been withdrawn to the reserve of the corps, now it was subordinated to the headquarters of the 110th Rifle Division; in turn the 394th Rifle Regiment of the 110th Division, which was defending the sector in the area of the Minsk highway, as well as the 601st Howitzer Artillery Regiment, was subordinated to the headquarters of the 172nd Division).

However the forces used in the counterattack clearly did not correspond to the scale of the tasks. The operational reserves of the 13th Army had already been used against the Bykhov bridgehead south of Mogilev. As a result the attacks of the Soviet troops on the German bridgehead in the area of Shklov were repelled.

The Defense of Mogilev

The German 3rd Tank Division, having renounced a direct attack on Mogilev, continued to cross over to the bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov. The battles for the bridgehead fortification in the area of Mogilev died down until the approach of the German infantry divisions. The main events unfolded on the eastern bank of the Dnieper north and south of the city.

South of Mogilev

The headquarters of the Soviet 13th Army was to organize a new offensive against the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov, however after the losses of the previous day it could hardly really engage in its organization. It is difficult to say to what extent the headquarters of the 45th Corps, which found itself in encirclement in the area of Chervony Osovec, controlled its troops.

To the area of Chausy from near Orsha arrived the headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps, to take command over the 137th, 132nd and 160th Rifle Divisions operating against the Bykhov bridgehead. The commander of the 132nd Division, S. S. Biryuzov, recalled after the war how into the area of the battles "…the commander of the 20th Rifle Corps, S. I. Eremin, arrived and invited me to his command post, which was merely a well-trodden patch on the edge of the forest. Here under a bush a field tent was pitched, two or three telephone sets were installed. That was all.

Simultaneously with me there arrived here (also on summons) the commander of the 137th Rifle Division, Colonel I. T. Grishin, and the commander of another, it seems the 160th Rifle Division, whose surname I, unfortunately, no longer remember <apparently, Major General I. M. Skugarev had not yet arrived in the area of the battles - VM>. We briefly reported on the state of our troops, hoping to receive from our immediate superior exhaustive information about the situation that had developed and instructions on further actions. But, to our deep regret, General Eremin himself did not have a precise idea of the situation on the front of the 13th Army…"

On the northern face of the German bridgehead operated the 507th Rifle Regiment of the 148th Division and the detachment of the 747th Rifle Regiment of the 172nd Division. Of interaction with the 292nd Rifle Regiment of the 187th Division, apparently, there was no longer any question; nothing is known either about the actions of the 338th Rifle Regiment of this division.

The attack of the detachment of the 747th Regiment (the reconnaissance battalion of the 172nd Division was included in the detachment, the detachment was commanded by the chief of staff of the regiment, Major G. I. Zlatoustovsky) on Sidorovichi and Slobodka was at first successful. However, to the aid of the units of the German 10th Motorized Division came units of the 3rd Tank Division transferred to the eastern bank of the Dnieper. The combat group of Colonel U. Kleemann (three motorized infantry battalions) threw back the Soviet detachment, which by the end of the day took up a circular defense on the edge of the forest north of Slobodka, Nedashev, straddling the Gomel highway.

From the front the German bridgehead was again attacked by the second echelon of the 13th Army. The 137th Rifle Division, with the support of units of the 132nd Division on its right flank (even further on operated the 160th Rifle Division) and two battalions of the 148th Division on the left, attacked from the line Makhovo, Dubrovka, Volkovichi, Usushek in the direction of Krasnitsa and by 12.00 had reached the line Pustoy Osovec, Lisichnik, (excl.) Gryazivets.

The commander of an artillery battery of the 771st Rifle Regiment, G. G. Pokhlebaev, recalled: "The infantry attacked in unison and boldly. My battery was attached to the battalion of Captain Kozlov. We were given the task: to liberate from the encirclement the headquarters of the 45th Corps. When we came out to the road to Davydovichi, it was already a stone's throw to the location of the headquarters <in Chervony Osovec>, one could see the exchange of fire at the small forest. But we could not cross the road in any way, the fire was terrible, one could not raise one's head, and it was not visible from where they were firing. I and Captain Kozlov went on reconnaissance, in order to spot the targets and determine how best to approach the encircled. Bent double, we came out onto a rye field, I from my knees began to look through binoculars at Davydovichi, and Kozlov stood up to his full height. Suddenly bullets began to whistle, one hit me in the side, and I immediately fell, looked - the wound was not fatal. I crawled up to Kozlov - and he was not breathing. I carried him out of this place. They bandaged me, and I had to take command of the battalion on myself. We buried Captain Kozlov when it became quieter.

The attack on the grove was nevertheless organized. We rose well, the battery supported with fire, and soon I was in the dugout of the corps headquarters. There was Colonel Ivashechkin, the chief of staff. How glad he was, he embraced me like a own son, did not want to let me go. Later Makar Vasilyevich became a general, but I never saw him again, or else we would have recalled this episode…"

However by this time the enemy had already accumulated sufficient forces on the bridgehead (2.5 divisions), of which the Soviet command had no idea. The chief of staff of the 771st Rifle Regiment of the 137th Division, A. V. Shaposhnikov, recalled that "At dawn on July 13 the commander <of the 20th Rifle> corps, General Eremin, called the regiment. He called from the CP of the division commander and asked about the situation. I reported that on the bridgehead, according to reconnaissance data, there were already about three hundred tanks. When I said this to him, the general simply did not believe it: "What are you saying, where would the Germans get so many tanks? Do you know how much a tank costs?". Later <the commander of the 137th Division> Grishin warned me on occasion: "In future beware of reporting such data, or else they may accuse you of exaggerating the enemy's forces". But we were not mistaken then: before us was indeed a whole German corps…"

The German units counterattacked the Soviet positions. A hot battle flared up, as a result of which the divisions of the German 24th Motorized Corps, which had the task of breaking through to the Pronya River, were tied down by the Soviet attacks (the enemy assessed their strength as 2-3 divisions); in the combat journal of the German 4th Tank Division significant losses in tanks are noted. But the Soviet units also advanced in the end by only a few kilometers; by the end of the day the divisions of the 20th Rifle Corps occupied the western edge of the forest south of Maly Osovec, Ryzhkovka, Chervony Osovec and Sutoki.

At the place of the greatest advance (at the junction of the German 10th Motorized and 4th Tank Divisions) the Soviet units found themselves in encirclement; here too (in the area of the Grudinivka state farm east of Perekopadovichi) found themselves in encirclement the operational group of the headquarters of the 45th Rifle Corps, which later managed to break out of the encirclement. On August 9, 1941, for the battles in the area of Grudinivka on July 12-13, the Order of the Red Banner was awarded to the chief of staff of the 45th Rifle Corps, Colonel M. V. Ivashechkin, the chief of the operational department of the headquarters, Major G. S. Lazko, and the chief of staff of the artillery of the corps, Colonel S. E. Mukhin.

* * *

South of the German breakthrough the Soviet units (a composite detachment of the 236th Rifle Regiment and some subunits of the 187th Division headed by its commander, Colonel I. I. Ivanov) took up the defense with the front to the west and to the north along the Dnieper and Ukhlyast Rivers (on the line Pribor, Radkov).

They found themselves in the zone of the 67th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army, which in the composition of two rifle divisions (the 102nd and 151st) occupied a position between the 45th and 63rd Corps. N. Borisenko writes in his book "The Dnieper Line": "At 4.20 on July 13 the commander of the 67th Rifle Corps, Brigade Commander F. F. Zhmachenko, ordered Colonel P. M. Gudz <commander of the 102nd Rifle Division> to immediately establish communication with the 338th Regiment of the 187th Rifle Division, to shoot the guilty for the unauthorized withdrawal, to personally restore order on the sector of the regiment and to subordinate to himself the units of the 187th Division operating in this direction. However, Colonel Gudz was unable to fulfil this order in conditions of complete obscurity of the situation…"

By 12.00 the 102nd Rifle Division (at its disposal were two rifle regiments out of three: the 410th and 467th) was ordered to seize a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the area of Novy Bykhov and at 18.00 with its main forces to go over to the offensive along the route Novy Bykhov, Komarichi, Stary Bykhov, destroying the Bykhov grouping of the Germans.

The 102nd Rifle Division was unable to set out so quickly, but already on the night of July 14 it forced the Dnieper on the sector Shapchitsy, Novy Bykhov.

The Offensive of the Soviet 21st Army

On this same day the offensive of the Soviet 21st Army on the Bobruisk direction began. Despite the fact that the corps had concentrated in the area of Rogachev, Zhlobin well in advance, the order for the offensive was given on the eve and was to some extent unexpected. At the same time it was also unexpected for the enemy.

The main blow was delivered by the 63rd Rifle Corps of Corps Commander L. G. Petrovsky, located in the center of the combat orders of the army. The right-flank 61st Rifle Division was to force the Dnieper at Zborovo and advance in the direction of Bliznetsy, Falevichi, Startsy; the 167th Rifle Division had as its immediate aim the capture of Rogachev and was subsequently to advance on Volosovichi; the left-flank 154th Rifle Division advanced along the railway Zhlobin-Bobruisk.

Early in the morning the forward detachments of the Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps, having driven back the weak screens of the German 1st Cavalry Division, forced the Dnieper and occupied Bliznetsy, Rogachev and Zhlobin. According to the memoirs of S. P. Ivanov, "since the army did not have in its composition engineer units and organic crossing equipment, the crossing of the Dnieper was carried out with the help of improvised means and was somewhat delayed..."*

Soon it was possible to restore the railway bridge in the area of Zhlobin.

A description of the battles in the area of Rogachev was left by the commander of the 167th Rifle Division, Brigade Commander V. S. Rakovsky (cited in the memoirs of Eremenko): "On July 12 by 12 o'clock I was summoned to the command post of the corps commander, having with me all the data on the state of the units and their combat capability. At the CP of L. G. Petrovsky was also the commander of the 21st Army. I introduced myself to the commander, and he orally gave me an order, the essence of which was as follows:

Before the 167th Division the enemy at the present moment occupies the defense on a wide front and has no sufficient reserves.

I order:

On July 13 at 15.00 the 167th Rifle Division is to force the Dnieper River and occupy the city of Rogachev, bearing in mind a further offensive in the direction of Bobruisk.

For me this order was unexpected, since earlier there had been no signs of a transition to the offensive with the forcing of the Dnieper. The 167th Division occupied the defense also on a wide front and was not ready for the offensive. Therefore I turned to the army commander with a request to increase the time for preparation. However the commander explained that he could not give time.

Immediately from the CP of the corps commander I transmitted by telephone to the chief of staff, Colonel Chechin, the instruction: to gather the commanders of the units, their deputies and the chiefs of staff, to call the crossing park of the division to the river. But in reply he reported that the crossing park of the division had been destroyed today by enemy aviation. The situation became sharply complicated.

Before my departure L. G. Petrovsky informed me that he was attaching to the 167th Division the corps artillery regiment, whose commander was already on the way to my CP, and moreover he said that he would be at the crossing area at Rogachev at 15.00.

On the way back we with the commissar A. G. Sergeev were thinking over the plan of action, the execution of which could meet no few difficulties.

At the command post of the division all the officers were already assembled. In a few words I set out the combat task, very briefly listened to the considerations of the chief of the engineer service and the chief of artillery of the division. In order to give the unit commanders as much time as possible for the preparation and organization of the battle, I gave the order briefly. The regimental commissar Sergeev was also brief in setting out the political task.

The plan of forcing the Dnieper was simple, since, besides a dozen ordinary boats, there was no crossing equipment. The essence of the plan consisted in forcing the Dnieper on two regimental sectors. The 520th Rifle Regiment (regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Yakovlevich Nekrasov) crossed at the blown-up wooden bridge near Rogachev. The 615th Rifle Regiment (regiment commander Colonel Efim Georgievich Golobokov) had as its aim by active actions with the use of a smoke screen on the widest possible front to divert the attention of the enemy from the main direction. The means of crossing - improvised and boats, which the regimental commanders had. The task of the 520th Regiment consisted in taking possession of Rogachev, that of the 615th Regiment - in seizing a bridgehead 1.5-2 km deep.

At the western bank of the Dnieper a large number of rafts and floated timber had accumulated. It was decided under the cover of artillery fire to send a detachment to seize this timber, in order to build from it an assault bridge for the infantry.

…The weather was sunny and hot. On the bank under the cover of forest and bushes intensive preparation was going on, one subunit after another was arriving. The soldiers made rapid crossings. Now everyone already knew that there would be an offensive, and were inspired by this. Very helpful to us was the fact that even before the beginning of the artillery preparation L. G. Petrovsky arrived. I remember I came to the area of the Rogachev bridge and at the same time the corps commander drove up there. We together checked the readiness of the subunits of the first echelon for the forcing. These were the companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 520th Regiment. Under the leadership of Captain Pokatilo and the political instructor Kozlov they were preparing, under the cover of artillery fire, to throw the first landing on boats, consisting of assault groups to seize the bridgehead. Leonid Grigoryevich gave them several valuable pieces of advice.

The chief of artillery of the division, Colonel Rudzit, reported on the readiness of the artillery and mortars to open fire. Exactly at 15.00 the artillery preparation began. Such strong fire had never before been seen on our sector of the offensive. Three artillery regiments, an artillery battalion and mortars brought down on the enemy a hurricane of fire… With the first artillery salvo the boats with the assault groups moved away from the bank. The special detachments for the floating of rafts and the construction of the assault bridge together with the sappers began the floating. Other soldiers of the sapper battalion pulled up these rafts, fastened them to the piles of the destroyed bridge, carried the decking from the surviving part of the bridge and laid the assault bridge.

The enemy was so stunned and demoralized that at first he offered no resistance at all. But soon the Hitlerites came to their senses and brought down on the crossings artillery and mortar fire, began to bomb them from aircraft. On the river a difficult situation was created, but the soldiers of the division continued to carry out the task set. The very young, recently formed sapper battalion coped brilliantly with the task entrusted to it. The assault bridge across the whole width of the river was built very quickly. I still cannot without emotion recall that heroic moment when, paying no attention to the explosions of shells, mines and aerial bombs, the sappers continued stubbornly and selflessly to work. Unfortunately, my memory has not preserved the names of the hero-sappers.

With the construction of the assault bridge the crossing of the whole 520th Regiment began, then the 465th. The decision to cross both regiments at the Rogachev bridge was suggested to me by Leonid Grigoryevich. The fact is that the 615th Regiment, having fulfilled the task of diverting the enemy, could not fully carry out the crossing on its sector, since there the conditions were especially difficult, although several platoons crossed and held a small bridgehead on the western bank. An attempt to cross the remaining subunits of the regiment in this area would have cost us great losses and would have taken much time.

As soon as the 520th Regiment had crossed, the offensive began, a stubborn battle developed in the city of Rogachev. The enemy, using previously adapted buildings, offered stubborn resistance. The soldiers of the division, disregarding danger, selflessly rushed into battle and smashed the enemy's strongpoints. I remember the report of the commander of the 520th Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Yakovlevich Nekrasov, about the heroic deeds of the soldiers and officers.

During the battle for the city a certain gap formed between the regiments. The Hitlerites attempted to attack on the flank, and the right-flank subunit began to withdraw, then Sergeant Lukyanenko jumped forward and shouted: "Not a step back! Smash the invaders!" He rushed to the machine gun, which had fallen silent, and from a short distance began to shoot down the enemy soldiers. Following his example, the subunit opened deadly fire on the fascists, and the enemy was forced to withdraw. During this battle the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 520th Regiment, Captain Pokatilo, who was the first to force the Dnieper and the first to break into Rogachev, died a hero's death. After the death of the commander the battalion continued to carry out the task. The battle in the city of Rogachev continued until 23 o'clock on July 14.

Using the darkness, the Hitlerites withdrew beyond the Drut River.

As soon as the infantry subunits of the 520th and 465th Regiments had crossed over the assault bridge, the sapper battalion set about constructing a crossing for the artillery. The crossing by the dawn of July 15 was finished, and the first to go was the 576th Artillery Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stepan Efimovich Popov. The howitzer regiment under the command of Major Likhachev remained at the former positions. The rear units and subunits did not cease to work, all night providing the soldiers with everything necessary, including food.

By telephone I reported to the corps commander about the latest events and received from him the instruction to put everything in order and after the crossing of the 576th Artillery Regiment to continue the offensive. On the following day the division, provided during the night with everything necessary, resumed the offensive…"

The 25th Mechanized Corps (the 50th Tank and the 219th Motorized Divisions), which was in the second echelon of the army, was finishing its concentration, and had already suffered its first losses: as a result of an air raid on July 12 the commander of the motorized rifle regiment of the 50th Tank Division, Colonel V. L. Lukyanov, was killed.

The 55th Tank Division (because of weak combat readiness) remained at the disposal of the army headquarters in the area of Novozybkov.

The 117th Rifle Division, previously withdrawn to the reserve of the army, was also moved out to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

The southern flank of the offensive was secured by the 66th Rifle Corps (the 232nd Rifle Division). Having crossed by 10.00 over the Dnieper on the sector Streshin, Bely Bereg (south of Rechitsa), the 232nd Division began moving out to the starting positions for the offensive on Bobruisk from the south through Parichi.

The modern researcher K. B. Strelbitsky writes that already on July 13 "the settlement of Parichi was liberated by units of the 232nd Rifle Division…" However it is hardly likely that the division could have advanced such a great distance in one day across such difficult terrain. According to the operational summary of the headquarters of the 21st Army, by 10.00 on July 14 the 232nd Division had come out only to the starting line for the offensive Yakimovskaya Sloboda, Strakovichi near Shatilki (now Svetlogorsk), which is more than 30 km from Parichi, and only by the morning of July 15 did it approach the settlement itself.

But according to the same operational summary of the headquarters of the 21st Army, the detachment of Kurmyshev and the 487th Rifle Regiment (the already mentioned "unfound regiment" of the 143rd Division) already on July 14 held the line Rudnya, Parichi, the Ratmirovichi station and further along the Ptich River. Apparently, it was precisely they who liberated Parichi, which was occupied by German covering subunits away from the zone of the main blow.

July 14

North of Mogilev

Repeated attacks of the composite detachments of the Soviet 110th Rifle Division (from the composition of the 425th and the 514th Rifle Regiments attached to it) against the German bridgehead in the area of Shklov were again repelled.

And at this time units of the 46th Motorized Corps (in the vanguard - the 10th Tank Division, followed by the SS motorized division "Reich") advanced even further and took Mstislavl, while, according to the memoirs of G. Guderian, they suffered heavy losses, especially in artillery.

The commander of the 10th Tank Division, F. Schaal, described this episode as follows: "Between Gorodishche and Gorki the vanguard of the division passed through dense thickets of forest. There too, then, in the nighttime, the greater part of the division passed. However when the artillery group went by the same route, it came under mortar fire from both sides, and then under an attack by infantry. Fortunately, nearby the motorcycle battalion of the SS division "Reich" had taken up a position. It came to the aid of the artillerymen and saved them from inevitable destruction…"

Possibly the described losses are connected with the breakthrough from the encirclement of the divisions of the 2nd Rifle Corps (the 100th and 161st) through the communications of the 46th Motorized Corps.

However, because of the rapid advance of the German mobile formations these Soviet divisions again found themselves in encirclement (the 161st Division concentrated in the area of the forest 2 km southeast of Eskovka, while the surrounding settlements Gorki, Dribin and Koptevka had already been occupied by the enemy).

The Soviet Counterattack on Gorki

The Soviet command, having realized the danger of the enemy's breakthrough between Orsha and Mogilev, ordered the organization of a counterattack in the direction of Gorki.

From the north the divisions of the 16th and 20th Armies were ordered to advance on Gorki. However the 46th Motorized Corps was advancing in the center of the combat orders of the 2nd Panzer Group, from the north its offensive was covered by the 47th Motorized Corps, which took the main blow of the 20th Army (the Soviet 16th Army at this time was solving a completely different task - it was trying to organize the defense of Smolensk). As a result on the southern bank of the Dnieper a battle flared up between the German 47th Motorized Corps and the Soviet 5th Mechanized Corps.

To meet the 5th Mechanized Corps, from the south on Gorki the troops of the 4th Army - the second echelon of the Western Front - were to attack:

— the 28th Rifle Corps (in the order the 42nd, 143rd, 55th and part of the 6th Rifle Division are listed) was ordered to attack the enemy from the area of Ryasna, Shirki, Osinovka along the eastern bank of the Pronya River;

— the second detachment of the 4th Army (the 4th Airborne Corps and the detachment of the 6th Rifle Division; the 25th Mechanized Corps was also planned to be subordinated to it) under the overall command of Major General A. S. Zhadov received an order to advance on Gorki from the area of Bakhrevka, Krichev through Mstislavl.

Moreover, from the line of the Basya River in the direction of Gorki the formations of the 13th Army were to advance: the 160th and 137th Rifle Divisions of the 20th Rifle Corps and the 20th Mechanized Corps.

However this plan had little in common with reality. The 20th Rifle Corps had already been drawn into the battle for the Bykhov bridgehead, soon found itself in encirclement and lost communication with the command.

The 20th Mechanized Corps was preparing for an offensive against the bridgehead in the area of Shklov, that is, in a completely different place.

The 28th Rifle Corps was incapable of delivering any counterattacks, it itself came under the blow of the German 24th Motorized Corps east of Mogilev and soon was dismembered: the greater part of the corps found itself in encirclement, the 55th Division was drawn into the battles along the Sozh River from Propoisk to Krichev.

The detachment of Zhadov also soon came under the blow in the area of Krichev. A. S. Zhadov described in his memoirs the forces which in the end could be used by him for the counteroffensive: "Having assessed the situation that had developed, we threw here our reserve - a battalion reinforced with artillery. Moreover, by the instruction of the commander of the 4th Army, in the evening of July 14 a reinforced regiment of the 6th Rifle Division was directed to this area. Thanks to the measures taken, on this sector our units successfully held back the enemy…"

The 25th Mechanized Corps mentioned in the order was in the process of concentration and entered battle a few days later in a completely different place (in the composition of the 21st Army).

South of Mogilev

The main forces of the German 24th Motorized Corps (the greater part of the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions, the 10th Motorized Division) were still tied down by battles with units of the 45th and 20th Rifle Corps, while they organized a small "cauldron" in the area of the greatest wedging-in of the Soviet units (Grudinivka, Poddubye, Ryzhkovka).

The commander of the 24th Motorized Corps, General of Cavalry L. Geyr von Schweppenburg, while visiting the headquarters of the 10th Motorized Division, pointed out that "the XXIV Tank Corps by its sharp blow on Rogachev and the early forcing of the Dnieper drew upon itself the main forces of the enemy, while to the north the 10th Tank Division had already found itself at Mstislavl. Thus, against the weakest place of the tank group (the XXIV Tank Corps) there turned out to be substantially more powerful enemy forces than against the main forces of the tank group…"

However some units of the German 24th Motorized Corps nevertheless were able to go over to the offensive.

The detachment of the German 3rd Tank Division, which attacked along the Gomel highway in the direction of Mogilev, was stopped. Moreover the enemy was driven out of Lykovo and went over to the defensive.

At the same time the forward detachment (the 3rd Tank and Motorcycle Battalions, reinforced with artillery) under the command of Colonel U. Kleemann broke through to Amkhovaya (on the Propoisk highway). Continuing the offensive, it came out to the Chausy highway in the area of Petrovichi (halfway between Mogilev and Chausy), advanced to the east and by the end of the day seized a bridgehead across the Resta River in the area of Garbovichi 20 km west of Chausy.

Part of the forces of the 4th Tank Division began the offensive to the south, in the direction of Propoisk. The reconnaissance battalion of this division was directed to Propoisk by forest roads south of the highway. In the second half of the day, without encountering the enemy, it came out to the city, but here it ran into stubborn resistance and requested help. However first the Soviet attacks prevented the quick replacement of the 35th Tank Regiment of the division, then the advance was delayed because of a destroyed bridge near Cherenki. As a result by the end of the day the combat group of Colonel G. Eberbach (2 battalions of the 35th Tank Regiment) approached Propoisk to a distance of 5 km; the attack on the city was postponed to the following day.

The situation south of Mogilev on July 13:

The situation south of Mogilev on July 14, 1941:

The situation south of Mogilev on July 15, 1941:

In connection with the outflanking, the 20th Rifle Corps received an order on the night of July 15 to withdraw to the east (in the memoirs of S. S. Biryuzov it is stated that the units of the 20th Rifle Corps received an order to withdraw on the night of July 14; but, it seems, this is a mistake, although it is difficult to say anything definite about this due to the absence of many documents from the Soviet side).

The headquarters of the 13th Army, it seems, lost control of its units in the area of the Bykhov bridgehead; the headquarters of the 45th Corps had only just broken out of the encirclement (it concentrated in the area of Petukhovka 12 km south of Chausy). The headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps, which had only arrived in the area of Chausy on July 13, had a poor idea of the situation. The assistant of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps, I. A. Suetin, recalled after the war: "Almost the entire operational department of the corps headquarters in these days was occupied with finding out where which units were standing. There was almost no telephone communication, radio was unreliable, and it was little used. But the situation had to be known in detail. It often happened that on the map a unit was standing here, but in reality it was no longer there. In essence we were engaged in the reconnaissance of our own units. When I arrived during the day of the thirteenth of July at the division of Grishin, there they were conducting a battle, and I went to the Chausy highway - there were the Germans, columns of motor vehicles, tanks, pushing straight on Chausy…"

The Offensive of the Soviet 21st Army

Meanwhile the 21st Army continued its offensive on the Bobruisk direction.

The main forces of the 63rd Rifle Corps had already crossed to the western bank of the Dnieper. They completely cleared Rogachev and Zhlobin of the enemy, after which they advanced a little further to the west, while the 61st Division forced the Drut River.

Units of the German 255th Infantry Division of the 53rd Army Corps entered battle with the 63rd Corps.

To the north the 67th Rifle Corps with two divisions on both banks of the Dnieper began the offensive on Stary Bykhov.

On the southern flank of the army the 232nd Rifle Division of the 66th Rifle Corps continued to move out to the area of Parichi.

July 15

German Command

The commander-in-chief of Army Group "Center", Field Marshal F. von Bock, reacted to the report of the offensive of the 21st Army in the area of Rogachev and Zhlobin as follows: "The Russians are beginning to get insolent on the southern wing of the 2nd Army. They are attacking near Rogachev and Zhlobin. Near Gomel the Russians are also displaying activity, and so it will continue until the northern wing of Rundstedt's Army Group "South" advances substantially forward. The Luftwaffe, which had been given instructions to keep this area under observation, had earlier discovered nothing worthy of attention. We were informed of the first outbreaks of activity in this place only last night. It is known, however, that the offensive of the XXXV Corps across the swampy terrain is developing slowly and is attended by great difficulties!

At 10.00 I called <the commander-in-chief of the German Ground Forces> Brauchitsch: …I personally view the situation that has developed as follows: near Rogachev and Zhlobin the enemy troops with forces up to two divisions have become engaged in battle with the 255th Division. But the position here is comparatively satisfactory, since behind the combat orders of the division are located the LIII Army Corps and other units. The situation around Gomel for the time being appears uncertain, however reconnaissance subunits report that there is significant activity on the part of the Russians…

<On the whole,> The position of the right wing does not cause me concern; it will be further strengthened after the XXXV Corps, stuck in the swamps, approaches. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the battle is developing both on the Dnieper and east of the Dnieper. It began very favorably for us with the breakthrough of two tank groups, but it is far from finished. One cannot perceive the situation that has developed there with excessive optimism, relying on fleeting impressions. The victory has not yet been won!.."

"…In the second half of the day <the commander of the 2nd Army> Weichs reminded me that the main task of the 2nd Army - besides advancing in the north-eastern direction - is to ensure the security of its right flank and accordingly of the right flank of the army group. I said that this can be achieved if the enemy, who is now attacking in the area of Rogachev, is thrown back beyond the Dnieper. Weichs holds the same opinion. I told him that the 4th Army had sent the 1st Cavalry Division to Stary Bykhov, so that it might attack from there in a southerly direction on both sides of the Dnieper. In principle, I should resubordinate this division to Weichs, in order to ensure a unified command on his right flank, but Kluge, with whom I had already discussed this topic, very much asked me to leave the division under his command. I had to satisfy his wish, about which, by the way, I now regret!.."

In the Area of Mstislavl

The enemy, after the capture of Mstislavl, continued the offensive to the east.

On the eve the headquarters of the Soviet 4th Army had sent to the area of Mstislavl the detachment of the 6th Rifle Division (the 84th Rifle Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 125th Regiment with an artillery battalion of the 84th Artillery Regiment of the 55th Division), which was headed by the commander of the 6th Division, Colonel M. A. Popsuy-Shapko.

Having come out to the area of concentration, M. A. Popsuy-Shapko found out that Mstislavl had already been captured by the enemy.

Securing the southern flank of the offensive, the SS regiment "Der Fuhrer" received an order to turn to the south and take under control the highway Mogilev-Mstislavl. R. Ponomarenko writes: "Already in the evening, almost 15 km north of the road Mogilev-Mstislavl, the SS regiment "Der Fuhrer" became involved in battles with Red Army detachments, and the battles continued at night too, to which the Germans were in principle unaccustomed. In the morning of July 16 the enemy <Soviet units> retreated, and the road Mogilev-Mstislavl was taken under control by the SS men. Now the regiment began to advance on Mstislavl…"

South of Mogilev

The Soviet units that had occupied Lykovo on the eve resumed their attacks. The 2nd Battalion of the 394th Motorized Infantry Regiment, which came under the blow in the area of Zaprudye and was covering the left flank of the offensive of its 3rd Tank Division (temporarily subordinated to the 10th Motorized Division), suffered heavy losses, losing 131 men killed and wounded.

However on the front of the 24th Motorized Corps the enemy managed to create yet another "cauldron" in the area of Lisichnik, Butrameevka, Makhovo, Buda Isakova: units of the 3rd Tank Division (the 1st Battalion of the 394th Motorized Infantry Regiment with artillery) attacked to the south along the Propoisk highway and joined up with units of the 4th Tank Division, which attacked to the north through Volkovichi on Kutnya. From the front the Soviet units were pressed by units of the 10th Motorized Division, reinforced with the 2nd Tank Battalion of the 3rd Tank Division. However it was not possible to create a full-fledged "cauldron" south of the Propoisk highway: the Soviet units, for the most part, managed to withdraw to the east. Moreover, as a result of Soviet artillery fire the commander of the German 4th Motorized Infantry Brigade, Colonel Dietrich von Saucken, was wounded.

The commander of the Soviet 132nd Rifle Division, Major General S. S. Biryuzov, was also wounded, but soon returned to the ranks. When in 1942 he received the Order of Lenin, in the recommendation the battle at Volkovichi, among others, was mentioned: "Comrade Biryuzov, being surrounded by enemy tanks at Volkovichi and directing the battle, personally fired at the enemy tanks from an anti-tank gun, knocked out an enemy tank and shot the fascists at point-blank range. After the end of the battle and the withdrawal to his units, Comrade Biryuzov was pursued by two fascist motorcyclists, whom he shot at point-blank range from a submachine gun..."

In the Area of Chausy

At this time the forward detachment of U. Kleemann of the German 3rd Tank Division continued its advance to the east. Behind it moved the combat group of G. von Manteuffel (the 1st Tank Battalion, a battalion of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Regiment and an artillery battalion). By the end of the day the enemy had come right up to Chausy; by this time the main forces of the German 3rd Tank Division had already come out to the Chausy highway.

The German offensive on the eastern bank of the Resta River was held back by units of the 160th Rifle Division (there is scanty information about the participation in the battles of the 537th Rifle Regiment and a separate anti-tank artillery battalion, as well as an attack on the headquarters of the 160th Division). Here the 699th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of Major S. F. Nilovsky (who had the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the Finnish campaign *) also entered battle.

The breakthrough of the 3rd Tank Division of the Wehrmacht to the Chausy highway cut off the main forces of the 20th Rifle Corps south of the highway. The heavy battles and the active actions of the enemy had a demoralizing effect on the Soviet troops. The assistant of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps, I. A. Suetin, recalled (from the book of V. Kiselev): "Once near Chausy it was necessary to detain the soldiers withdrawing in disorder. The commanders and political instructors were supposedly killed, there was no communication, the Germans were everywhere. I stop them, and they keep on coming and coming, some groups came even from beyond the Dnieper. It was a good thing that nearby there were carts with food and field kitchens, this helped to stop them. And sometimes there were such panic-mongers that one could get into trouble oneself. One such group began to be stopped by the chief of artillery of the corps, someone fired at him from a rifle and killed him*. The soldiers, however, immediately shot this scoundrel. When more than a hundred such encircled men had gathered, a vehicle with Colonel Grishin drove up to us, he happened to be passing by. He lined them all up, cursed them properly and led them away to his division as replacements…"

A similar picture is drawn in his memoirs by V. G. Babur, assistant of the chief of communications of the 137th Division: "…On one of the first days of our stay at the front we are driving with Colonel Grishin to some regiment of ours or the corps headquarters, I do not remember exactly. And toward us come and come groups of soldiers. Grishin ordered me to get out of the vehicle, to stop the people and bring them to him in the division, and he drove on. I stopped about forty men, they turned out to be from the 132nd Division. I ask the soldiers: "Where are you coming from?" - "From the encirclement". It turns out they are withdrawing without an order. Soon on the road there appeared about five German vehicles with mortars. They turn toward us. A junior lieutenant from this group says: "That's it, lads, bayonets into the ground, let's go to the Germans, they'll kill us anyway". I could do nothing. There, I think, are the scoundrels because of whom we are retreating. I was not going to surrender, I hid in the bushes. The Germans got out of the vehicles and began to hit them with the butts of their rifles. I went to look for my own and only on the second day in some forest I heard the noise of engines and cursing. I guessed that these were ours. There was Major Malykh himself with his artillery regiment. He knew me, saw me - was glad. "And you are already considered missing…", - he says. He gave me a vehicle and sent me to the headquarters to Grishin…"

In the Area of Propoisk

Meanwhile the combat group of G. Eberbach of the German 4th Tank Division (2 tank battalions with artillery and a reconnaissance battalion) early in the morning, having thrown back the subunits of the 42nd Rifle Division, captured the crossings over the Pronya River and occupied Propoisk (now - Slavgorod). Further the enemy continued the advance along the Warsaw highway and was stopped only at the Lobchanka River by the demolition of the bridge.

According to the report of the acting commander of the 42nd Division, Colonel M. E. Kozyr, the composition of the division had two rifle regiments (the 44th and 459th; in all 5 battalions), which a day before the German attack (by 4.00 on July 14) had occupied the defensive line along the Pronya River from Zakrupets to Propoisk (over 20 km). Directly Propoisk was defended by two battalions of the 44th Regiment.

In the 44th Regiment there were in all two 45-mm guns and one 50-mm mortar. In the immediate vicinity of Propoisk was the 84th Light Artillery Regiment of the 55th Rifle Division. However, according to the memoirs of an officer of this regiment, D. A. Morozov, one battalion of the regiment had already been sent to the area of Krichev, the second - to the area of Cherikov for the preparation of a counterattack on Gorki (together with a rifle regiment). Thus, in the area of Propoisk there remained one artillery battalion.

In the combat journal of the 4th Tank Division of the Wehrmacht it was stated that "the enemy at Propoisk fights very stubbornly, large artillery. Especially strong pressure from the southwest…" As a result of the stubborn battle the 1st Battalion of the 44th Regiment of the 42nd Division was thrown back beyond the Sozh River into the zone of the 55th Division, and of the 2nd Battalion there remained 70 men. The remaining forces of the 42nd Division (the 3rd Battalion of the 44th Regiment and two battalions of the 459th Regiment) were forced to withdraw to the northeast and soon found themselves in encirclement.

L. M. Sandalov (at that time - colonel, acting commander of the 4th Army) described the situation in the area of Propoisk in his memoirs as follows: "Neither anti-tank mines nor other means for creating serious engineer obstacles in the path of the enemy were available here. The rifle platoons and companies had barely had time to dig little trenches. The approaches to the river from the west were covered by the fire of the artillery regiment. In the area of Propoisk one of its battalions stood at open positions, prepared to fire over open sights. At the bridge over the Pronya River a battery of anti-tank guns was placed, and the bridge was prepared for demolition. There too was the command post of the commander of the 44th Rifle Regiment.

A kilometer beyond Propoisk the local population under the leadership of the former commandant of the Brest fortified region, General Puzyrev, had dug a multi-kilometer deep trench, but no one occupied it. …the fact is that Puzyrev is subordinated directly to the front engineer and is building defensive lines according to his plan. The outline of these lines is not coordinated with the troops…

Before dawn on July 15 the continuous massive raids of his <the enemy's> aviation on Cherikov and especially on Propoisk began. And at about 4 o'clock Colonel Kozyr reported to me that German tanks by a sudden blow from the northwest had broken through the bridge over the Pronya River at Propoisk and were spreading toward Cherikov, while in Propoisk itself a battle was going on.

- Now that is the time to advance! - <the member of the Military Council of the 4th Army> Shlykov threw up his hands.

- Go, Fyodor Ivanovich, to the sixth division, - I asked him. - Take measures so that the enemy does not crush it at Cherikov.

Then I called <the commander of the 55th Rifle Division> Lieutenant Colonel Ter-Gasparyan, ordered him with part of the forces of the 55th Rifle Division to help Colonel Kozyr hold Propoisk, and myself also set out for the 333rd Rifle Regiment of the 6th Division.

- Do not report to the front headquarters about the breakthrough at Propoisk until my return, - I ordered Colonel Dolgov. - Do not move the army headquarters from the area of Cherikov. I am afraid that the headquarters of the formations may follow us*.

In the regiment I remained until the middle of the day of July 15. The defense there was solid. Moreover the commander <of the 28th Rifle> corps sent there two battalions of the corps artillery regiment <the 462nd>. But in the 42nd Rifle Division things were not going well. Its counterattacks in the area of Propoisk were not crowned with success. The help from the 55th Rifle Division was late, and Propoisk was captured by the Germans.

In the second half of the day of July 15, having returned to the command post of the army, I with pain in my heart and, I confess, with some fear reported what had happened to S. K. Timoshenko. Toward evening a telegram followed from him: "Report who is to blame for the surrender of Propoisk".

By that time all the details had already become known to us. At 3 o'clock 30 minutes, at the moment of the air strike on Propoisk, trucks and carts belonging to our troops retreating from the Dnieper drove onto the bridge over the Pronya. Following them, or more precisely together with them, enemy tanks also broke through the bridge. By the fire of the battery standing at the bridge, two German tanks and a truck were knocked out. But the battery itself was immediately crushed. The commander of the 44th Regiment did not have time to give the order to blow up the bridge, and the German 4th Tank Division began to spread with part of its forces toward Cherikov, while with its other regiments it broke into Propoisk from the rear.

- Let us answer the front headquarters honestly that the command of the army is primarily to blame for the surrender of Propoisk, - I proposed to Shlykov. - We did not establish communication with the troops retreating to the Pronya from the Dnieper, we had a poor knowledge of the situation.

Fyodor Ivanovich did not agree:

- The Military Council of the front is not a priest. Having listened to our confession, it will not say: "God will forgive..."

It ended with Shlykov himself composing the answer, in which he indicated only who commanded the units at Propoisk and how the city was captured by the enemy. I did not sign this telegram, and it went to the addressee with only the signature of the member of the Military Council of the army..."

In the archive there is a record of the negotiations of the headquarters regarding the abandonment of Propoisk: "Colonel Dolgov at the telephone.

From 14 to 15 at night the enemy shelled our defense in the area of Propoisk with artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire, especially strong fire was on the area of the bridges. At night aviation bombed several times in the area of Propoisk. In all up to 100 tanks with motorized infantry concentrated. At 3.30 on 15.7 up to a battalion of tanks with motorized infantry up to a battalion broke through the bridge in the direction of Krichev. The bridge remained not blown up, because on the western bank of the Pronya River was our defense. The broken-through tanks and infantry were stopped on the line Sokolovka, Aleksandrovka 2nd <on the Lobchanka River> by the defense of units of the 6th RD. The 42nd RD remained in the defense in the area of Propoisk. At about 16.00 the bridge in the area of Propoisk was destroyed by our aviation. All day the battle went on two lines. Against the 42nd RD and against part of the 6th RD on the front Sokolovka, Aleksandrovka 2nd. From an intercepted radiogram it is known that the enemy is in need of fuel. General Popov using the 55th RD is organizing the destruction of the broken-through tanks and the restoration of the situation at Propoisk. The covering detachments for the Mstislavl, Roslavl direction have all come out to their areas and taken up the defense. The area of Mstislavl was occupied by enemy mechanized units at 14.00 on 14.7.

In the area of Mstislavl on 15.7 at 16.00 aviation discovered a concentration of tanks. According to aviation data, the column of the enemy from the Gorki station divided into two parts: on Smolensk and on Mstislavl. The fulfilment of the directive of 14.7 is planned after the restoration of the situation at Propoisk.

Unclear is the position of the 143rd RD regarding its subordination. It is being used by the 13th A, referring to the order of the front. We do not have this order…

Marshal <Timoshenko>

Why are you marking time, why have you not manifested influence in the direction of Mogilev on the enemy?

Answer: because the enemy <during the> period of regrouping went over to the offensive and with the liquidation of the threat to the Propoisk direction there was nothing further with which to conduct the offensive in the northern direction.

Question: is the readiness for the fulfilment of Order No. 065 ensured? Answer in one word.

Answer: "No".

- Then tell the commander that he will go under trial for the non-fulfilment of the order.

- Colonel Sandalov all day personally directs the battle for the liquidation of the broken-through grouping of the enemy.

- Propoisk must be returned this very night or in the morning.

- All measures for this have been taken.

- Good, I will wait for the results.

- I have not reported one important fact. According to Order No. 065 we should have a mechanized corps. It has not arrived so far. Where is it to be found? Please say exactly which mechanized corps?

- The answer has been given*".

The Soviet 13th Army

Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko entered into the command of the 13th Army (appointed the day before as acting army commander). He planned to support the offensive of the 21st Army on Bobruisk, however he unexpectedly found out that his new army was in a difficult position, communication with the 61st and 20th Rifle and 20th Mechanized Corps was lost, and at his disposal there were only the remnants of separate divisions.

In the report to the commander of the Western Front of July 19 Gerasimenko pointed out:

"Having received your order on my appointment as commander of the 13th Army, I by the morning of 15.7.41 arrived in the area of Chausy.

Approaching the area of the army headquarters, I already on 15.7 saw on the roads between Krichev and Chausy very many rear and even combat units of infantry and artillery, going from west to Krichev. The army headquarters of the 13th knew nothing about these withdrawing units, because there was no rear guard service in the army and in general the rear service in the army has not been organized until now.

Having oriented myself in the situation, I came to the conclusion that the troops of the army consist of a multitude of headquarters and a certain number of battalions at these headquarters, which in essence were not combat-capable. The exception was the 172nd RD, occupying the defense area - Mogilev. The other units, by virtue of the unsystematic nature of the railway transport, represented some kind of jumble of different units and subunits, not knowing each other and not controlled.

Thus, for example, the 144th RD was unloading somewhere near Orsha, while one of its battalions ended up in Chausy, the 148th RD had one regiment unloaded near the city of Mogilev, about 2 battalions were met by me in the area of Krichev and subordinated to the commander of the 160th RD, while the headquarters of the 148th RD arrived only on 17.7.41 at the Krichev station, not having the possibility to communicate with its units, because near Krichev there were already enemy tanks, and not knowing where the remaining units of the division were.

Such or almost such a position was in the 160th and 132nd RD, in which there were in all 2 battalions each, and where the remaining units of these divisions were, their commanders did not know, because they were still in echelons on the way to Roslavl. Thus, the 20th RC, in which 3 RD were listed: the 132nd, 137th and 160th RD, in essence had about 8 rifle battalions sufficiently battered in the previous battles and panic-stricken.

All the units of the 20th RC by my arrival occupied the defense on stretched fronts in the area of Chausy, between the flanks of which by 12.00 on 15.7 small tank subunits of the enemy had infiltrated. There were no reserves in the army.

Leaving the 21st Army, I knew that the 151st and 187th RD under the command of the commander of the 67th RC were to advance in the direction of St. Bykhov. Having arrived in Chausy, however, I learned that this task had been assigned to the 45th RC, whose headquarters at that time was in the area of Chausy, while its commander, Division Commander Magon, had left for Propoisk to establish communication with the 151st and 187th RD allegedly subordinated to him (by the way, Propoisk had already been occupied by the enemy).

According to the data available in the army headquarters of the 13th by my arrival, the enemy occupied:

1) Mstislavl - with no less than a battalion of tanks and armored vehicles and motorized infantry.

2) Gorki - a large concentration of tanks and armored vehicles.

3) In Dribin - about a battalion of tanks and 150-200 trucks, part of which was heading along the road to Chausy.

4) On all the roads leading from the west to the area of the disposition of the 20th RC, small subunits of tanks, armored vehicles and motorized infantry of the enemy were operating, with which the units of the 137th and 160th RD were conducting battles.

5) The 4th Army in the person of its 42nd RD by this time had abandoned Propoisk, without even blowing up the bridges, which I had to blow up with the forces of aviation. The enemy forces in the area of Propoisk were assessed - about a battalion of tanks with motorized infantry (subsequently it turned out that the 35th Tank Regiment of the enemy was operating here).

The organized blow of the 20th RC to the north and with part of its forces on Molyatichi, which I organized, was reported to you by my delegate, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov. It was approved by you, but what came of it I still do not know, because despite all my attempts, I could not communicate with the headquarters of the 20th RC.

On the way to Chausy, having arrived in Krichev, I found there the commander of the 4th A/B Corps, General Zhadov. From him I learned of the task assigned to him by you for the covering of the line of the Sozh River. Moreover he complained to me about the absence of artillery in his corps. And, as he reported, if he had artillery, he would not let the enemy across the Sozh River. I immediately subordinated to him about 2 artillery regiments located in the area of Krichev and searching for, but unable to find, their units and formations. After this I was calm for the line of the Sozh River…"

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The 21st Army continued active combat operations, however the forward detachments of the German infantry divisions continued to approach the zone of its offensive. According to the memoirs of G. Guderian, at first they consisted of reconnaissance battalions and small motorized infantry detachments, and "their combat strength was not great". However behind the backs of these forward detachments the main forces of the German 2nd Army were moving out to the front.

Into the zone of the offensive of the 63rd Rifle Corps, besides the 255th Infantry Division, the 267th Infantry Division was urgently transferred.

The 102nd Rifle Division of the 67th Rifle Corps, advancing along the western bank of the Dnieper, occupied Ludchitsy 7 km south of Stary Bykhov, but further ran into stubborn resistance: the forward detachment of the 31st Infantry Division of the 12th Corps had already approached here.

On the eastern bank of the Dnieper the 151st Rifle Division at 12.00 entered battle with units of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Wehrmacht on the line Nikonovichi, Pribor.

The movement of the corps of the 21st Army in diverging directions (to the west and to the north) provided a chance for the German command. The 52nd Infantry Division of Major General L. Rendulic, which was moving to the area of Mogilev, was ordered to deviate to the south and concentrate in the area of Ozerany (west of the Drut River), in order to deliver a flank blow against the Soviet troops advancing on Bobruisk.

In Polesie

The 232nd Rifle Division of the 66th Corps from the line Parichi, Knyshevichi went over to the offensive on Bobruisk from the south and pressed back units of the German 134th Infantry Division beyond the Krupinets River (15 km from Bobruisk).

The offensive was supported by the ships of the Pinsk Military Flotilla, which on July 11 for actions in this area allocated the Berezina Detachment of River Ships (ORS). In the course of the battle the monitor "Vinnitsa" was lost (knocked out by the enemy, ran aground and blown up by the crew).

In the process of the offensive units of the 232nd Rifle Division established communication with various detachments operating in Polesie. Probably the largest of them was the already mentioned detachment of Kurmyshev*. It was mentioned in the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front already in the first half of July 1941. Apparently, the 232nd Rifle Division, like other divisions of the Second Strategic Echelon, detached for actions in the forward zone (west of the Dnieper) a reinforced battalion, which was headed by Lieutenant Colonel L. V. Kurmyshev; in the course of the combat operations he subordinated to himself the BePo 51 and 52 operating in the same area (from the composition of the 6th Separate Armored Train Battalion of the 21st Army; zone of responsibility - the railway branches Gomel-Kalinkovichi-the Starushki siding and Bobruisk-the Rabkor station). Moreover, it was reinforced at the expense of the retreating subunits of the Soviet divisions defeated in the Border Battle (on this day the remnants of the 24th Rifle Division and the 11th Mechanized Corps got in touch with the detachment headquarters in the area of Karpilovka <now the settlement of Oktyabrsky>).

According to the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front, by 15.00 on July 15 the detachment of Kurmyshev had come out to the line Drazhnya, Kovchitsy (north and northwest of Parichi) with the front to the northeast; in the west it occupied the front Glusk, Zapolye*. On this same day, with the support of armored trains, it attacked Orsichi, but was repelled.

Petr Lebedev cited in his research the memoirs of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 66th Rifle Corps, G. S. Zdanovich: "I was struck when I became convinced that this semi-mythical detachment, in my understanding, really exists and successfully conducts combat operations against the enemy. Among the local population there were legends about it. The detachment of Kurmyshev became a reference point for the partisan groups that had just been created. They said that, having entered battle with the enemy at the Rotmirovichi siding, the detachment knocked out 15 armored vehicles and destroyed up to fifty Hitlerites. At the Rabkor station the first soldiers of the detachment who fell in battle are buried. Together with the partisans, by a daring raid the enemy headquarters in the village of Glusha was destroyed.

I did not have occasion to meet Kurmyshev himself, but an impression was formed of him as a courageous, efficient commander, able to act independently in a very complex situation. Qualities at that time rather rare".

Along the Pripyat River the 75th Rifle Division of Major General S. I. Nedvigin also operated (after the heavy battles of the first days of the war its combat value was equated to a rifle regiment). Retreating to the east under the pressure of the 35th Army Corps ("35th Special Command": the 45th and 293rd Infantry Divisions), it had already on July 4 abandoned Pinsk (occupied without a fight by the enemy on July 5) and Luninets (abandoned on July 10) and now had withdrawn to the line east of the Sluch River.

Here too fought the 20th Motorcycle Regiment (of the 14th Mechanized Corps) and the 18th (Zhitkovichi) Border Detachment.

The German 35th Army Corps had already in the first ten days of July replaced the 1st Cavalry Division. Here is what the German general A. Philippi wrote about this in his book "The Pripyat Problem": "The 1st Cavalry Division had to be withdrawn from the forest-swampy terrain, since in connection with the large losses in the horse strength (mainly because of the shortage of oats) its combat capability was threatened with serious danger and, moreover, with the means of communication available in the division its headquarters in these conditions could not maintain sufficient contact either with the higher or with the subordinate instances. But the infantry army corps following the cavalry division also only with difficulty advanced forward, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Russians and the heavy terrain, although north of the Pripyat the enemy had fewer forces and the command was exercised less operatively than south of the river…"

Besides the named units and formations, in Polesie operated the 214th Airborne Brigade of Colonel A. F. Levashov, partisan detachments were being formed, and also the remnants of Soviet divisions were retreating from the very border.

July 16

The Approach to the Area of the Battles of the German Infantry Divisions

The German infantry formations of the 2nd Army, advancing to the east, had already come out to the line of the Dnieper River with their main forces and began to replace the mobile formations on the bridgehead fortifications:

— the 9th Army Corps (the 137th, 292nd, 263rd and 268th Infantry Divisions) came out to the area of Orsha, Kopys, Shklov and covered the communications and crossings over the Dnieper of the 47th and 46th Motorized Corps;

— its neighbor to the south - the 12th Army Corps (the 31st and 34th Infantry Divisions) was forced to deviate to the south, to the area of Stary Bykhov, which was subjected to attacks by Soviet troops.

To the area of Mogilev from the second echelon the 7th Army Corps (the 7th and 23rd Infantry Divisions) was moved out. This somewhat postponed the beginning of the assault on Mogilev.

With the advance of the infantry divisions to the east the German command obtained the possibility of reinforcing its strike groupings. The German 10th Tank Division of the 46th Motorized Corps continued the offensive and occupied Khislavichi. To cover its communications from the south, units of the SS division "Reich" moved out to the area of Mstislavl.

Meanwhile units of the Soviet 161st Rifle Division with the 151st Corps Artillery Regiment broke out of the encirclement in the area of Temny Les (east of Dribin); according to Soviet documents, the exit from the encirclement was facilitated by the attack on Dribin of the reconnaissance battalion of the division under the command of the chief of staff of the division, Major A. I. Murashev.

It is difficult to reconstruct the events of those days. It is known that the Military Council excluded the commander of the 161st Division, Colonel A. I. Mikhailov, the regimental commissar A. I. Orlov and the chief of staff, Major A. I. Murashev, from the lists for the award of the Order of the Red Banner, and on August 21 A. I. Mikhailov was removed from the post of commander of the division.

The approach of the infantry units to the area south of Mogilev allowed the German command to set the task for the 24th Motorized Corps to continue the offensive through Krichev on Roslavl. The German 10th Motorized Division, leaving for the blockade of Mogilev from the south only its motorcycle battalion (on the line Kostinka-Lykovo), moved after the 4th Tank Division to the south in the direction of Propoisk, with the aim of freeing the strike units of the tank division for the further offensive.

In the Area of Chausy

At 3.00 in the morning the combat group of U. Kleemann resumed the offensive on Chausy and already at 4.30 reported the capture of the city.

Besides the units of the 160th Division, in the area of Chausy was stationed the 143rd Rifle Division (of two-regiment composition) from the composition of the 4th Army, but its main forces were on the eastern bank of the Pronya River (in the area of Zarechye, Glushets). Chausy itself was defended by a reinforced rifle battalion, which moreover detached a company with a battery of 45-mm guns to cover the road to Chausy from the side of Gorki. It is not surprising that the enemy did not note any particular resistance.

However the capture of Chausy in itself gave little to the enemy: the highway bridge had already been blown up. A few hours later a ford across the Basya River was reconnoitered 800 m to the south.

But, according to the report of German reconnaissance, the railway bridge 2 km south of Chausy remained intact. It was precisely for it that a hot battle flared up. Only at 18.30 did the 1st Tank Battalion of the 3rd Tank Division of the Wehrmacht report the capture of the undamaged bridge.

Moreover, the enemy captured yet another crossing over the Pronya River - in the area of Putki northeast of Chausy. Here the reconnaissance and motorcycle battalions of the 3rd Tank Division crossed over; by the end of the day they had approached Molyatichi, and the reconnaissance battalion organized reconnaissance to the Sozh River and reached Staroselye north of Lobkovichi.

The exit of the 3rd Tank Division to the area of Molyatichi completed the operational encirclement of the formations of the Soviet 13th Army in the area of Mogilev.

In the Area of Cherikov

The combat group of G. Eberbach of the German 4th Tank Division (the 2nd Tank Battalion, a motorized infantry battalion and a motorcycle company, reinforced with sappers and artillery) continued the offensive in the Krichev direction along the Warsaw highway: it restored the bridge over the Lobchanka River, overcame the defense of the units of the Soviet 6th Rifle Division and approached Cherikov.

These events are described in the memoirs of an officer of the artillery of the 55th Rifle Division, D. A. Morozov:

"…The news <from the army headquarters> turned out to be extremely unpleasant. Lieutenant Colonel <G. A. Ter-Gasparyan - commander of the 55th Division> said that as early as July 10-11 the German troops had forced the Dnieper. By the evening of July 14, having advanced a hundred kilometers, they had captured Mstislavl, threatening Krichev from the north. A very difficult situation was developing for us.

The 2nd Battalion of the 84th Artillery Regiment was urgently sent to the area north of Krichev for joint actions with units of the 6th Rifle Division, which were to prevent the Germans from reaching the city. Our division received a new task. Having made on the night of July 15 a thirty-kilometer march, it concentrated in the forests south of Cherikov. It was assumed that we would take part in a counterattack against the enemy grouping that had broken through to Gorki-Mstislavl. But the counterattack did not take place.

At dawn a new order was received: to immediately return the 107th Rifle Regiment with the 1st Battalion of the 84th Artillery Regiment to Propoisk. It turned out that German tanks had broken into Propoisk, pressed back the 42nd Division and were advancing on Cherikov.

- What the devil is this! We had just left Propoisk, and there is a breakthrough! - Ter-Gasparyan was indignant. He was a hot-tempered, irascible man and always reacted painfully to all failures, both his own and others'.

Colonel Semenov <chief of artillery of the division> supported him:

- Some kind of bedlam. Right under our noses the Germans have snapped up the city. Our shirt is on fire, and we are pouring water into our boots! So many troops, and we still cannot stop the fascists!

- There are not a few troops, but there are enough holes, one has only to have time to plug them!

Listening to their conversation, I thought that the command of the troops in our direction was probably being exercised far from in the best way. Neither I nor other comrades knew at that time either the scale of the failures or their causes. Information about events outside the division reached us with delay, in the most general terms.

During the day the units of the division conducted reconnaissance of the crossings over the Sozh, prepared rafts in case of forcing the river.

The scouts sent forward reported that the Germans had broken through the defense on the Lobchanka River, a tributary of the Sozh, 12 km west of Cherikov. There the 333rd Regiment of the 6th Rifle Division was defending. There were few men left in it, there was no artillery at all. The regiment could not repulse the tank blow and withdrew to the crossing over the Sozh, to the area of Miragoshch-Zhuravel.

Ter-Gasparyan, without waiting for instructions from the corps headquarters, decided to transfer our units across the river, in order to hold Cherikov. But it was not possible to carry this out - German tanks were already approaching the city.

The battalions of the 111th Rifle Regiment that had managed to cross over, having barely moved out to the south-western outskirts of Cherikov, immediately entered battle. I and Semenov were at that time near the crossing, south of the city. We had no means to organize artillery support for the fighting battalions. And guns were very much needed there!

An hour after the beginning of the battle German tanks broke into Cherikov. Ter-Gasparyan ordered the battalions to withdraw back to the eastern bank of the river. Later he, in a conversation with Semenov, regretted that he had not transferred the division during the day and had not organized the defense of Cherikov in advance. Semenov reassuringly answered him that for this we had not had an order from above, and it was difficult to suppose that the situation would change so sharply and unexpectedly.

After the loss of Cherikov we were ordered to take up the defense along the bank of the Sozh from Gronov (five kilometers east of Cherikov) to Propoisk. The 333rd Rifle Regiment was temporarily transferred to the composition of our division. Together with it and the 161st reserve regiment we now had five rifle regiments.

Our 107th Regiment, returned to the area of Propoisk, could not render substantial support to the units of the 42nd Division that had retreated from the city. The attempt to return Propoisk ended in failure, and the regiment was forced to go over to the defensive, holding a small bridgehead.

After a respite the regiment at night broke into the southern part of the city, killed the Hitlerites caught there by surprise, set fire to several tanks and motor vehicles. In the morning the fascists threw into the attack two tank battalions with submachine gunners <the defense of Propoisk was entrusted to the group of Lieutenant Colonel Smilo von Luttwitz: a motorized infantry and reconnaissance battalion, united by the headquarters of the 12th Motorized Regiment; north-west of Propoisk in the reserve of the division was the tank battalion of the 4th Tank Division - VM>. Until noon a hot battle went on for every house. Our riflemen could not repulse the onslaught of the armored vehicles: the infantry had no anti-tank guns or mines. The regiment withdrew to the starting lines…"

The proximity of success forced the German command to hasten events: in the combat journal of the 4th Tank Division of the Wehrmacht it is stated that "the blow on Krichev must be carried out without regard to the time of day, and if necessary even before the arrival of all subordinate units…"

Already in the evening of July 16 the combat group of Colonel G. Eberbach reported the capture of the undamaged bridge over the Udoga River 3 km east of Cherikov.

Taking into account the capture of the crossings over the Pronya River in the area of Chausy and Putki by the German 3rd Tank Division, the way to Krichev was open.

Soviet Command

One 107th Rifle Regiment of the 55th Rifle Division was not enough to restore the situation in the area of Propoisk. To liquidate the German breakthrough in the area of Propoisk the front headquarters brought in the 25th Mechanized Corps in the composition of two divisions: the 50th Tank and the 219th Motorized Rifle (in the operational summary of the front headquarters it is stated that the 25th Mechanized Corps at 0.15 on July 16 moved out "to the area of Krichev").

The 50th Tank Division of Colonel V. S. Bakharov, having 57 medium T-34 tanks and 50 light T-26 tanks, concentrated in the area of Lebedevka (15 km southwest of Propoisk) and received the task of conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Propoisk, Mashevskaya Sloboda (on the Mogilev-Propoisk highway), Stary Bykhov. Apparently, the terrain was not very suitable for the actions of a large tank formation. According to E. Drig, as a result of reconnaissance in the swampy terrain 12 T-34 tanks and 20 light T-26 tanks were lost.

The 219th Motorized Rifle Division moved out to the area of the battles in the second echelon (it came out to the area of Chechersk, Vornovka).

However in conditions of the rapid advance of the German troops the measures taken by the Soviet command were constantly late. Among other things because, as S. P. Ivanov wrote in his memoirs, "communication with the troops was systematically disrupted. To control them became ever more difficult…"

The headquarters of the Soviet 13th Army by this time had relocated to the area 5-7 km east of Krichev; the headquarters of the 4th Army and the 45th Rifle Corps were changing their disposition. At the same time, because of the threat of an enemy blow from the area of Yartsevo, the headquarters of the Western Front was evacuating. The communication of the headquarters of the 13th Army with the headquarters of the Western Front was maintained by delegates. The communication of the headquarters of the 4th Army with the 28th Corps was interrupted.

In the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front as of 20.00 it was said about the 13th Army: "Due to the fact that the enemy, having penetrated into the depth of the disposition of the units of the army, disrupted the control of the troops, communication and routes of supply of the army, the army commander in the second half of the day of 16.7 decided to withdraw the units of the army to an intermediate defensive line along the Pronya River…"

However by this time the enemy with two tank divisions had already overcome this defensive line. Maybe that is also why on the following day the Stavka cancelled the order of Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko to withdraw the troops (the 61st Rifle and 20th Mechanized Corps) from the area of Mogilev.

The next defensive line - along the Sozh River from Krichev to Khislavichi - was occupied by the detachment of Major General A. S. Zhadov (two brigades of the 4th Airborne Corps and the detachment of the 6th Rifle Division of Colonel M. A. Popsuy-Shapko). However this line was too large for such small forces. Moreover, while occupying the defense, the detachment of Zhadov was, by order of the headquarters of the 4th Army, to advance with its main forces from the line Bakhrevka, Krichev in the direction of Mstislavl, Gorki.

Simultaneously A. S. Zhadov received orders from the commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko, who reinforced the detachment with artillery and set the task of covering the area of Krichev.

Parallel subordination to two army commanders did not have the best effect on the actions of the detachment. In the negotiations with the headquarters on July 19 Zhadov blurted out: "I do not know to whom to subordinate myself, to the 13th or the 4th Army!.."

The commander of the 45th Rifle Corps, Division Commander E. Ya. Magon, who was left practically without troops, received an order to cover the Mstislavl direction, for which V. F. Gerasimenko subordinated to him "the last arriving 2 rifle battalions".

E. Ya. Magon also subordinated to himself the units of the 2nd Rifle Corps that had come out of the encirclement, in particular the 603rd Rifle Regiment and the 632nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 161st Division.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

Meanwhile the resistance of the enemy in the zone of the offensive of the 21st Army increased. The 102nd Rifle Division of the 67th Corps, which had come out to the line Nerazh-Vyun (in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Drut Rivers) in the immediate vicinity of Stary Bykhov, was counterattacked by significant enemy forces and stopped.

The Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps was tied down from the front by two approaching infantry divisions of the 53rd Army Corps (the 255th and 267th), while two infantry regiments of the German 52nd Infantry Division, reinforced with artillery, delivered a counterblow from the area of Ozerany along the western bank of the Drut River against the flank of the Soviet grouping.

The former commander of the German division, General L. Rendulic, wrote in his memoirs: "In this case it was a matter of an atypical flank blow, to which only in theory, in textbooks on tactics, some role may be assigned. In this situation much depended on the reaction of the Russians to our actions, since they must have had information about our division. They could have reduced the effectiveness of our blow only if they had met us with offensive actions, in order to defeat or at least delay the division as far as possible from the area where the big battles had already flared up. In the grouping of the forces of the division it was precisely this possibility that was taken into account. But the enemy chose a different decision, which for a long time remained unclear to us, since we had no air reconnaissance…

In the first half of the day an officer arrived from the division, which was conducting a battle on the flank, and, having reported that the division was not in a condition to hold back the onslaught of the Russians, asked for urgent help. Toward noon I gave the order to prepare for the offensive and the order of its conduct…

The situation became clear and it became obvious that between the northern flank of its advancing troops and the Drut River the enemy had gone over to the defensive. And although, as it turned out, he had at his disposal significant forces (five divisions), he took the most unfortunate decision. He halted his offensive, and this gave me the possibility to pull up first the main forces of the previously sent out regiment on motor vehicles, of which only some subunits had participated in the battle, and then also an artillery battalion…

The enemy withdrew somewhat. As expected, flanking fire was opened on our advancing troops from the eastern bank of the river, including from heavy artillery, which it was not possible to suppress, and therefore we had to keep our left flank at a distance of 3-4 km from the river. The offensive continued. However by the end of the day the troops again ran into the strong defense of the enemy. Under cover of darkness they carried out a regrouping, in order to continue the offensive on the following day…"

In Polesie

The German 43rd Army Corps (the 134th and the 131st Infantry Division urgently sent here) counterattacked and stopped the advance of the 232nd Rifle Division.

The 75th Rifle Division, retreating along the Pripyat under the pressure of the 35th Army Corps, withdrew beyond the Sluch River to the line Gulevichi, Vilcha.

Meanwhile in the area of Ozarichi (60 km north of Mozyr) the remnants of the 17th Rifle Division with Major General T. K. Batsanov, retreating from Lida, came out of the encirclement.

Soon T. K. Batsanov was appointed commander of the 24th Rifle Division that had come out on the eve (gathered from the remnants of the 17th and 24th Divisions), and the former commander of the 24th Division, Major General K. N. Galitsky, was recalled to the disposal of the commander of the 21st Army.

July 17

The Defense of Mogilev

The German infantry formations began to replace the mobile units blockading the city. At the same time the German command came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take the city.

The 7th Army Corps of General of Artillery W. Farmbacher, which was given the task of taking Mogilev, had in its composition the 7th Infantry Division (advancing along the Minsk highway) and the 23rd Infantry Division (advancing along the Bobruisk highway).

In the report of the German 7th Army Corps it was said: "The assault becomes ever more necessary, since the enemy forces concentrated on the bridgehead represent a serious threat in the rear of the army, give cover from the front to the enemy forces located east of the Dnieper for blows to the north and south against the flanks of the 12th and 9th Army Corps and, finally, block an important line of communications…"

The Soviet command also understood the importance of holding Mogilev. The telegram of the Soviet Stavka of the High Command read: "Gerasimenko. Make Mogilev a Madrid under Bakunin".

The commandant of the Mogilev garrison, Colonel I. P. Voevodin, wrote in his diary: "Mogilev is surrounded on all sides. But we still maintain communication with the front headquarters through the pilot Tatarintsev… Tatarintsev delivered an order in the name of the corps commander. To me, as the chief of the garrison, there are threats - to be shot…"

Until this time Mogilev even received march replacements; apparently, the encirclement by the German mobile formations, which were called upon to solve completely different tasks, was not dense. In the operational summary of the headquarters of the 13th Army it is stated that on July 18 the 110th Rifle Division received 850 men of march replacements.

Only with the replacement of the mobile formations by infantry formations was Mogilev taken in a dense ring.

North of Mogilev

A. I. Eremenko presented in his memoirs the memoirs of the former commander of the 61st Corps, F. A. Bakunin, regarding the combat operations of the troops encircled in the area of Mogilev:

"From the morning of July 17 from the line Gorodishche, Knyazhitsy the 20th Mechanized Corps and two regiments of the 110th Division went over to the offensive in the general direction of Kopys, Orsha. At first the offensive developed successfully, the troops came out to the line Yakovlevichi, Printsevka <should be Prontsevka 10 km east of Kopys>, but were met by large forces of tanks and infantry of the enemy, stopped and by the end of the day of July 20 were forced to withdraw to the line Pervomay, Okunevka, Knyazhitsy. In the course of these battles, under the influence of large forces of aviation and tanks of the enemy, our troops suffered great losses. The enemy managed to break through with tanks to Gorodishche. The Hitlerites rushed to the south, threatening the command posts of the 20th Mechanized and our corps. It was a good thing that on this direction there turned out to be the firing positions of the corps artillery, from which with direct fire and concrete-piercing shells we destroyed several tanks; part of the tanks turned to the north and was also destroyed by the fire of our artillery and tank destroyers, who skillfully used bottles with incendiary mixture and bundles of hand grenades. Our troops managed to hold back the enemy on the line Gorodishche, Knyazhitsy…"

I. I. Yakubovsky (in July 1941 - major, commander of the 51st Tank Regiment of the 26th Tank Division of the 20th Mechanized Corps) listed the settlements that it was possible to occupy in the course of the offensive: Domany, Zaimishche, Divnovo, Ordat, Starye Chemodany, Zabrodye.

However the approach of the main forces of the German 9th Army Corps threw back the Soviet troops to their starting positions. Moreover the calculation for a simultaneous attack on the German bridgehead from the north (from the side of Orsha) was not justified - by this time the Soviet troops had already abandoned Orsha.

The Advance of the 46th Motorized Corps

The release of the units of the 46th Motorized Corps, previously engaged in the defense of communications, allowed them to continue the advance to the east. The SS regiment "Der Fuhrer" reached Mstislavl, already occupied by subunits of the 10th Tank Division, with which it almost entered battle by mistake. Thus the German 10th Tank Division was also able to continue the offensive, took Pochinok, after which it headed further to Yelnya.

However the pulling up of the units was slow, they were constantly subjected to attacks by the troops encircled in the area of Mogilev. The reinforced regiment "Grossdeutschland" repelled Soviet attacks in the area of Chernevka, and the SS regiment "Der Fuhrer" for two days found itself tied down by battles in the area of Mstislavl.

Here on the night of July 17 part of the detachment of Major General A. S. Zhadov went over to the offensive. L. M. Sandalov wrote in his memoirs that "the detachment of Colonel Popsuy-Shapko together with the right-flank units of the airborne corps conducted a successful offensive on Gorki. The chief of staff <of the 4th Airborne> corps, Colonel A. F. Kazankin, reported by telephone that on this direction by our unexpected attack on the flank the enemy was crushed and thrown back from Mstislavl several kilometers to the northwest…"

In the Area of Krichev

The German 4th Tank Division continued the offensive in the Krichev direction. Early in the morning its advance along the Warsaw highway was halted - here at the village of Sokol'nichi the 19-year-old senior sergeant Nikolai Sirotinin performed a feat, knocking out 10 tanks and armored personnel carriers*.

However there was little chance for the Soviet troops to hold the city. By this time units of the German 3rd Tank Division had already reached Lobkovichi on the Sozh River 10 km north of Krichev. Thus in the area of Krichev the main strike forces of the 24th Motorized Corps joined up.

As a result in the first half of the day the enemy occupied Krichev, and on the night of July 18 forced the Sozh River and seized a bridgehead. The 7th Airborne Brigade defending here withdrew to Klimovichi south of the Warsaw highway. The composite detachment of the 45th Rifle Corps also withdrew from the line north of the Sozhenka River. The chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary that the right flank of the 2nd Panzer Group "secured for itself freedom of maneuver in the direction of Roslavl…"

The Soviet command agreed with this conclusion: in the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front of July 18 it was said: "The front from the side of Krichev to Roslavl is open…"

Besides the 7th Airborne Brigade, in the area of Krichev there were not a few Soviet troops, but they represented separate units and subunits of the 132nd, 137th, 148th and 160th Rifle Divisions, which had lost communication with the higher command.

The historian of the 137th Division, V. Kiselev, cited the memoirs of the commander of a machine-gun company of the 2nd Battalion of the 409th Rifle Regiment, S. S. Larionov, who participated in the defense of Krichev: "Our battalion was travelling last in the regiment, and, obviously, in the whole division. On the twelfth of July we disembarked from the railway cars sixty kilometers from Krichev, and covered all this distance on foot. On the sixteenth of July our battalion, commanded by Captain Kim, took up the defense about four kilometers west of Krichev, at the village of Sokol'nichi. In the battalion there were six hundred men, including in our machine-gun company - one hundred and twenty, and twelve machine guns. With us there were four guns, but toward evening from the west along the highway we saw a tractor which was hauling a 122-millimeter howitzer. The radiator of the tractor had been pierced and it dragged along slowly, with difficulty. The artillerymen asked to be taken in by us. I called the captain, but he refused. Then I on my own responsibility allowed them to stay with us, since the tractor could not move anyway, and to us it would be a help, although the artillerymen had only nine shells left.

At dawn of the following day, July 17, we saw how along the highway straight at our positions a column of tanks was moving, twenty vehicles. Obviously, having spotted us, the column deployed into combat order, and the tanks quickly went over to the attack. We opened fire, and after about thirty minutes the tanks turned back, leaving seven burning vehicles on the field. From the flank some of our guns were still firing at the tanks, and very accurately. Only many years later I learned that it was the gun of Sergeant Nikolai Sirotinin from the 6th Rifle Division. Soon the Hitlerites began an artillery bombardment, aircraft flew in, and at about eleven o'clock tanks again went over to the attack, this time sixteen, and already of the T-III type. Behind the tanks came 20-25 motorcyclists and about fifty infantrymen. By this time bottles with incendiary mixture had been brought up to us, and when one of ours set fire to the first tank, the Germans began to rush about: to go forward or to retreat. Then the second tank caught fire, the third - it was the gun from the flank that was firing. We rejoiced: "Well done, artillerymen!". But soon three tanks came around to our rear, we could not knock them out, and they began to iron the trenches. But without infantry they were weak and soon left. On the field there stood thirteen knocked-out German tanks, and five or six of them had been knocked out by the howitzer men who had attached themselves to us…

…During the battle Captain Kim led the rifle companies away to Krichev and we, the machine gunners, remained alone. Soon the Hitlerites began a new attack, and we too had to withdraw into the city. There I saw Captain Kim, we had six German submachine guns, he shouted: "Why submachine guns? Marauders!". I never saw him again. The soldiers later said that he was already fighting without collar tabs, they had demoted him.

The battles in the city began and by the evening of that same day the Germans had pressed us beyond the Sozh. As we left, we blew up the bridge… We took up the defense behind the river. By this time in my company there remained seven machine guns. I placed them in an arc. Soon we see how two boats of Hitlerites are swimming across the river. We let them land, and then opened point-blank fire - and all of them to mincemeat… Soon of the company we had twelve-fourteen men left…"

In the Area of Propoisk

The attacks of the units of the 55th Rifle Division on Propoisk continued.

In the area of Mashevskaya Sloboda (near the Mogilev-Propoisk highway 18 km northwest of Propoisk) at about 13.00 the detachment of the 50th Tank Division with forces up to 10 tanks (5 T-34 and 5 T-26) and a motorized company entered battle. The Soviet side reported the destruction of 70-80 vehicles and 10 tanks of the enemy, as well as up to 500 men of personnel.

In the combat journal of the German 24th Motorized Corps it is said that during the relocation of the corps headquarters from the area of Krasnitsa to the area of Rabovichi the headquarters column was attacked by Soviet tanks in the area of Krasnaya Polyana (a couple of kilometers from Mashevskaya Sloboda), while suffering losses.

On the following day the attack of Soviet tanks (according to German data, "possibly the very same ones") on the march column of the 41st Motorized Regiment of the 10th Motorized Division is described.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

According to the Soviet operational summary, during the day of July 17 the 21st Army conducted stubborn battles with the counterattacking enemy. In the reconnaissance summary of the headquarters of the Western Front the following outline of the front of the army as of 16.00 is described: Rzhavka, Nikonovichi (on the eastern bank of the Dnieper), then Ludchitsa, Ozerany, Falevichi, Radusha, Mormol and further to the west - Novaya Belitsa (north of Parichi), Glusk.

The events here developed as follows: the approaching 12th Army Corps (the 31st Infantry Division) and the 1st Cavalry Division continued to press the 67th Rifle Corps.

The units of the 102nd Rifle Division were forced to withdraw to Ludchitsa, which had already been captured by the enemy and which had to be taken anew, while the control of the units was lost. The commander of the 21st Army, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, gave the order: "...to remove from his post the commander of the 102nd Rifle Division, Colonel Gudz, for the absence of leadership of the combat activity of the division during July 17, which led to the disruption of the successfully begun battle in the Bykhov direction, and to petition the Commander-in-Chief to bring him before a tribunal…"

The division was taken over by the chief of staff, Brigade Commander I. G. Bessonov, but Colonel P. M. Gudz managed to avoid the Military Tribunal; in August 1941 he was for some time the chief of staff of the 160th Rifle Division (as has now become known, he was nevertheless arrested on August 12 in Gomel and remained in custody until March 1942, then returned to the army, commanded other rifle divisions, and became a Hero of the Soviet Union).

Soon the commander of the 67th Rifle Corps, instead of Brigade Commander F. F. Zhmachenko, was appointed Major General K. N. Galitsky - the commander of the 24th Rifle Division, which had come out of encirclement on the eve. F. F. Zhmachenko was recalled to the disposal of the commander of the 21st Army.

The counterblow of the German 52nd Infantry Division along the western bank of the Drut River also stopped the offensive of the Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps on Bobruisk. The 52nd Division came out to the highway Bobruisk-Rogachev and gained a foothold 2 km to the south. According to the memoirs of its commander L. Rendulic, as a result of the battles 1000 Soviet soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, the same number constituted the losses in killed and wounded (about his own losses Rendulic reported that they turned out to be "unexpectedly small").

In Polesie

The offensive of the 232nd Rifle Division of the 66th Rifle Corps was also stopped.

Among other things, the 232nd Division lost the support of the ships of the Pinsk Military Flotilla: as V. Spichakov writes in his book devoted to the Pripyat Military Flotilla, because of the sharp drop in the water level in the Berezina the ships began to withdraw to the Dnieper River.

The 75th Rifle Division, defending in Polesie along the Pripyat, under the pressure of the German 35th Army Corps withdrew to the line Elno, Mikashevichi, Pogost, Turov. The division was subordinated to the headquarters of the 66th Corps.

July 18

The Advance of the 46th Motorized Corps

The German 10th Tank Division, moving in the vanguard of the 46th Motorized Corps, had already approached Yelnya to a distance of 10 km. However the main forces of the corps were still engaged in protecting their own communications.

The regiment "Grossdeutschland" again found itself drawn into the battles in the area of Chernevka; after repelling the Soviet attacks it received an order to advance to the east and take upon itself the defense of the line from Ryasna to Koskovo, including Mstislavl. Thus it was to replace the SS regiment "Der Fuhrer", which on the following day resumed the offensive to the northeast through Khislavichi and Pochinok to Dorogobuzh.

Soviet Command

The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops of the Western Direction, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, gave the order to retake Krichev and to advance on Propoisk and Mogilev. However the main forces of the 13th Army were fighting in encirclement in the area of Mogilev (the 61st Rifle and 20th Mechanized Corps) and north of the Sozh River (the 20th Rifle Corps and units of the 4th Army), while the remnants of the 187th Division had been thrown back into the zone of the 21st Army. In fact, under the command of Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko there was only the composite detachment of the 45th Rifle Corps. Therefore in the morning of July 18 the troops of the 4th Army were transferred to the operational subordination of the 13th Army (which, moreover, never got a full-fledged commander).

According to the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front, at the disposal of the 4th Army there were two corps:

— the 28th Rifle Corps, like the 13th Army, was already partly fighting in encirclement. Only the 55th Rifle Division occupied the defense along the eastern bank of the Sozh River from Propoisk to Krichev (excl.). The position of two other rifle divisions (the 6th and 42nd) is described "on the other side" of the Sozh River (i.e., in encirclement): the 42nd Division - in the area of Zakrupets, gizhenka, Novinka, the 6th Division with two regiments (without one battalion) - (excl.) Dolgoye, Sokolovka, Polepensky (all - on the eastern bank of the Pronya River north and northeast of Propoisk). Communication with the 143rd Rifle Division was absent ("on paper" the army headquarters of the 13th subordinated it to the headquarters of the 45th Corps, but the latter had no communication with the division; the 143rd Division was coming out of encirclement together with the administration of the 20th Corps and the remnants of the 160th Division).

— the 4th Airborne Corps with two brigades and four battalions of the 6th Rifle Division defended the crossings over the Sozh River on a wide front from Krichev to Khislavichi.

In the Area of Krichev

The enemy forced the Sozh River already with large forces and sent a reconnaissance detachment in the direction of Roslavl.

The commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, A. S. Zhadov, wrote in his memoirs: "The loss of Krichev, apparently, caused serious concern to Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. I was ordered to urgently arrive to him at the CP…

I went to the Commander-in-Chief. My soul was anxious: what should I report to him? That the airborne men had fought bravely and skillfully, but, unfortunately, the superiority was on the side of the enemy, especially in tanks, artillery and aviation...

Having heard my brief report on the situation in the area of Krichev, Semyon Konstantinovich very calmly said:

- There is no time for reflection. With the loss of Krichev the Roslavl direction has been weakened. It is necessary to stop the advance of the enemy. Your airborne corps still has good cadre personnel, but the brigades have no artillery. The rifle corps of Magon has very few men, but it has combat equipment and artillery. Unite the efforts of both corps and from the morning of July 19 deliver a blow on Krichev and, in interaction with the units of the 13th Army, restore the situation in this area. Act as actively and decisively as possible, - Timoshenko admonished me.

Returning to the corps, I all the way thought how best to carry out the task set. At the corps headquarters I learned that the situation had become even more complicated. As we had supposed, it was not possible to unite the efforts of our corps with the composite detachment of Division Commander Magon, and on July 19 it was not possible to deliver the counterblow planned by the Commander-in-Chief…"

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The 21st Army received a new order to destroy the Bobruisk-Bykhov grouping of the enemy, while the Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Western Direction, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, pointed out: "I draw the attention of the commander of the 21st Army to the completely unjustified slowness of the indicated operation…"

According to the plan of the Soviet command, the 25th Mechanized Corps and the 67th and 63rd Rifle Corps were to close their flank with the 13th Army; the task of taking Bobruisk was assigned to the 66th Rifle Corps alone.

However as a result of the approach to the area of the combat operations of the German troops freed after the liquidation of the Minsk "cauldron", the initiative here passed to the enemy. The 102nd Rifle Division of the 67th Corps, operating on the western bank of the Dnieper, was pressed back to Novy Bykhov. Therefore only one 151st Rifle Division was able to take part in the offensive on Stary Bykhov. In the order signed at 1.30 on July 18, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko ordered: "by decisive actions of the 151st RD on Bykhov to liquidate the breakthrough between the Mogilev and Bykhov groupings of the armies" (attention is drawn to the fact that this order was given to the 13th Army).

According to the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front as of 8.00, the 151st Rifle Division destroyed up to an infantry regiment of the enemy; according to the data as of 20.00, "the 151st Rifle Division continued the offensive on Stary Bykhov, begun at 3.00 on 18.7. The results of the offensive are being ascertained".

The German 53rd Army Corps (the 255th, 267th and 52nd Infantry Divisions) continued the attacks against the 63rd Rifle Corps in the direction of Zhlobin, Rogachev.

In Polesie

The battles of the 232nd Rifle Division with units of the 43rd Army Corps continued.

A fighter battalion under the command of the 1st secretary of the Oktyabrsky District Party Committee, T. P. Bumazhkov, with the support of the detachment of L. V. Kurmyshev and BePo 52, routed a German headquarters in Ozemlya.

German Command

Despite the repulsion of the Soviet offensive, the development of the situation on the southern flank caused concern to Field Marshal F. von Bock, who left in his diary such a remark:

"The position on the southern wing of the 2nd Army has worsened. The enemy in this direction has built up his forces to eight divisions; moreover, according to reconnaissance data, the Russians have a tank corps in reserve. Weichs reported to me that he might have to direct the XIII Army Corps to this area. I stated that this measure was extremely undesirable and could be considered only in the most extreme case. Behind the positions of the LIII and XXXXIII Corps new units are approaching the front: the 260th Division (from the reserve of the OKH) and the 167th Division, which had just come out of a battle that had lasted many days behind the front line. Weichs first of all demanded from his rear these two divisions. I, moreover, proposed to him to move the 258th Division to the right wing of the XIII Corps or a little to the south of it, so that the division would be within reach in case of necessity…

…When I returned home <from a trip to the troops>, Tresckow met me with the news that the 2nd Army was intending to use the XII and XIII Corps on its right wing. I immediately called the chief of staff of the army. He confirmed this information and said: "Uncoordinated attacks by small forces have not led to success. As is known, battles are not won by defensive battles and scattered counterattacks. In this connection the commander wants to attack in a southerly direction with the forces of the XII and XIII Corps simultaneously".

I answered that this was not quite what I would have liked. I have already said more than once that the main mission of the army is the offensive across the Dnieper in the north-eastern direction. That is where the main forces must be concentrated. For the protection of the right flank a minimum of troops must be employed.

Soon after this I issued a written order demanding that the army continue to attack in the north-eastern direction with its main forces, and moreover send the XIII Corps by the shortest route to the Dnieper and force it across the river. As for the XII Corps, its units were proposed to be employed in a southerly direction only in case of extreme necessity…"

However, apparently, the German command did not succeed in "employing a minimum of troops for the protection of its right flank". The attacks of the Soviet troops became ever more persistent, and ever more troops participated in them. As a result, while the German 46th Motorized Corps continued the offensive on Yelnya, the continuous attacks of the Soviet troops forced the German 24th Motorized Corps to suspend the further advance and go over to the defensive with the front to the south and southeast on the line from Propoisk to Krichev along the Sozh River.

July 19

German Command

A new entry appeared in the diary of von Bock regarding the southern flank of the army group: "After reading the morning reports, I formed the impression that the 2nd Army, acting contrary to my instructions, has moved the XIII Corps too far to the south. In order to clarify the situation, I sent my chief of staff to the disposition of the army. It is high time, in fact, to transfer large forces of infantry across the Dnieper! For the time being the enemy is employing for the attacks on the southern flank of Guderian's group scattered composite units and subunits. But this may change at any moment. I can be sure of our victory at Smolensk only on the condition that the 2nd Army crosses the Dnieper and begins to develop the offensive on its eastern bank, thereby freeing the tank units which are necessary for the completion of the encirclement east of Smolensk and for repelling the attacks of the Russians from the Moscow direction. I consider the threat to the southern flank of the 2nd Army to be exaggerated; with all that, the enemy continues to counterattack also in the south. There are two reinforced corps there and the 31st Division, which today was employed by the 2nd Army for attacks in a southerly direction. It is a great pity that for this reason the fulfilment of my plan is postponed by at least a day…"

The Soviet 13th Army

The battles continued on the front from Bykhov to Propoisk and further along the Sozh River, as well as in the besieged Mogilev.

In his report to the commander of the Western Front (on this day it became Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko) on the state and position of the troops of the 13th Army, the army commander V. F. Gerasimenko concluded:

"Conclusion:

1) The 61st RC can and will fight. Only its supply needs to be organized.

2) The 20th RC was defeated not by the enemy but by our railway transport. Its position and state are now unknown. All the delegates sent to it have not returned, there is no radio communication with it. It has also not been possible to establish communication by aircraft. I am taking further measures for communication with this corps through the 28th RC, which occupies the defense on the southern bank of the Sozh River between Propoisk and Cherikov.

3) The 4th A/B C is hardly likely to be able to fulfil the task of restoring the situation on the line of the Sozh River and covering the Roslavl direction.

4) The 4th Army with part of its forces is also on the western bank of the Sozh River, supposedly on the line of the Pronya River. The 55th RD is on the eastern bank of the Sozh River on the sector Cherikov, Propoisk; the state of its units is no better than that of the units of the 20th RC.

6) The 13th Army has no reserves. I fear for the Roslavl direction, but I can exert no influence on the enemy with anything".

* * *

Meanwhile the units and formations of the 20th Rifle Corps, which found themselves in the rear of the enemy, were coming out to the Warsaw highway. The breakthrough across the Warsaw highway and the crossing of the Sozh River by units of the 132nd Rifle Division opened a ten-day epic of the exit from encirclement of the units and the administration of the 20th Corps.

V. Kiselev cited in his book memoirs about the breakthrough across the Warsaw highway of units of the 137th Division. The assistant of the chief of the rear of the 20th Rifle Corps, I. I. Tsvik: "At the military council at the corps headquarters a plan of the breakthrough across the highway was worked out. According to this plan, in the vanguard of the main forces was placed the 137th Rifle Division of Colonel Grishin, on the right - the 132nd Division of General Biryuzov, and on the left - the 160th Division. I was sent to Grishin for observation and assistance. Personally Colonel Grishin looked better than the other division commanders. It was evident that this man was of iron will. I knew that his division looked better than the others. At dawn on July 19 the plan of the breakthrough across the highway began to be carried out…"

The commander of the communications battalion of the division, F. M. Lukyanyuk: "When the commanders of the units gathered at the bus of the corps commander, General Eremin said: "There are two variants of the exit from the encirclement. The first - to go out to the east north of the highway, but then there will be little use for the state, and moreover we will lose equipment and men. The second - to strike at the highway, then we will for some time block the enemy's path to Moscow". Everyone approved the second variant. Eremin asked Grishin to whom of the regimental commanders he could give a concrete task. Grishin with a nod of his head pointed to Malinov. The corps commander took from Malinov the map and drew for him the situation and the plan of the breakthrough. Grishin ordered me to pull the communication line after Malinov. I entrusted this to the commander of the company, Nikitaev. He seated a soldier with an apparatus and the end of the cable by a tree, and the communication was pulled after Malinov…"

On this same day the commander of the 771st Rifle Regiment, Colonel I. G. Malinov, went missing; the historian of the division V. Kiselev cited in this connection a semi-detective story (killed, shot himself, taken prisoner, surrendered voluntarily, was a German agent?), which, however, does not look improbable against the background of the events of the summer of 1941.

The chief of staff of the 771st Rifle Regiment, A. V. Shaposhnikov, recalled: "At that moment the vehicle of the corps commander drove up to us. General Eremin had come personally to check the execution of the plan of the breakthrough. I reported to the general the situation. He was all covered with dust, unshaven, deadly tired, so that it was difficult to recognize him. - "And where is the regiment commander?" - Eremin asked me. - "He is bringing up the 3rd Battalion" - "A fine time he has found… I place the operation on you, captain. The task: to saddle the highway, to break a breach to the Sozh and to take up the defense on that bank of the river. If you fulfil it - well done, if you do not fulfil it - I will shoot you… Was it you who reported to me in the morning of the thirteenth about the number of tanks on the bridgehead? You were not far from the truth, captain…". The general sighed and drove off. I never saw him again.

Soon the 3rd Battalion of the regiment with its commander, Captain Gorbunov, also approached, but the commander of the regiment, Colonel Malinov, was not with it. According to the plan, the 1st Battalion, of Major Moskovsky, was to come out to the highway and strike along it to the left, the battalion of the 409th Regiment was to do the same from the right flank, and two other battalions of our regiment were to strike in the center and immediately go to the Sozh. When I was setting the task for the 2nd Battalion, its commander, Captain Leonenko, could barely stand on his feet from fatigue. - "I understand nothing," he says, "I have not slept for three days". I had to lead the battalion myself. On the outskirts of the village Aleksandrovka 1st, before the highway, we were met by fire from groups of submachine gunners, but when the companies rose in unison to the attack, all these Germans immediately withdrew. We came out to the highway calmly, the Germans did not interfere. We left a covering force on the road and with the main forces of the battalion quickly crossed to the other side of the highway. There were still about three kilometers to the Sozh, but we did not meet the Germans. And on the flanks meanwhile a terrible shooting rose, especially in the battalion of Major Moskovsky. There alone of our machine guns there were about twenty…

We crossed calmly: we found fords. And on that side there were already our own, from the 55th Motorized <Rifle - VM> Division. Soon columns of our motor vehicles began to approach the river. And I see from afar: some drivers abandon their vehicles and - more quickly to the other side of the river. The order here was restored by a girl typist from the regimental headquarters. As she began to scold these drivers all over the bank, I see - they return for the vehicles. She also begged the officers of the 278th Light Artillery Regiment to pull out our staff vehicle with a team of horses. The first vehicle went well, and after about an hour all the motor transport had been ferried to the southern bank of the Sozh and hidden in the coastal bushes…"

On the whole, the exit of the 137th Division from the encirclement turned out to be successful. According to V. Kiselev, all six rifle battalions that were in the composition of the division before the breakthrough came out, both artillery regiments, the rear services and special subunits. Only the reconnaissance battalion and the anti-tank artillery battalion were lost as combat units.

V. Kiselev cited the testimonies of the participants in those events. The commander of the armored car company of the reconnaissance battalion, V. G. Bakinovsky: "Before the war our battalion was a serious force: about five hundred men, twenty motorcycles, ten armored cars, a company of amphibious tanks. In the first week of the war we practically did not engage in reconnaissance, having no communication with the chief of reconnaissance of the division, Major Zaitsev. There were in all two sorties to the other side, and moreover the data brought back were outdated.

We were the first to cross the Warsaw highway, there were no regiments yet. I went there in a passenger vehicle, we came under machine-gun fire, the vehicle with the whole crew was shot up, I had to return alone. I saw on the highway several German guns, they were waiting for us. I returned to the battalion - everything was burning there: vehicles, tanks. "What is the matter?" - I ask the deputy commander of the battalion, Gladnev. - "Solomin ordered everything to be destroyed and to leave". We crossed the highway at night, under machine-gun fire, about 150 men. The battalion commander Solomin did not come out of the encirclement. The scouts went to the place where the equipment had been burned, he was sitting there, he said to them: "I must be where the material is". Later there was an investigation of what had happened. The military tribunal established that the equipment of the battalion could have been taken out. I heard that Solomin was shot as an enemy of the people, but who and when - I do not know*. They said that supposedly partisans. He was a well-groomed officer, they said that for marrying a Polish woman he had been dismissed from the army in 37. He was a cavalryman, he understood nothing about equipment. And he did not love his horse: he would kick it first, and then mount. And about the commander of the 238th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion I only know that he disappeared. But they said that when a German column was going along the highway, he jumped out and got into a German tank. After the breakthrough from the encirclement our battalion was disbanded, and I was transferred to the 771st Regiment…"

F. M. Lukyanyuk: "The commissar and the chief of staff of the reconnaissance battalion were demoted to privates by the decision of the tribunal. These were not the only cases of cowardice and betrayal. Then in the division there were talks that the traitors turned out to be the chief of staff of the artillery of the division, the deputy chief of the political department for the Komsomol. Many claims were made by the division commander also to the reconnaissance. The chief of reconnaissance of the division, Major Zaitsev, in peacetime had shown himself to be a literate and well-trained commander, but at the front - as a coward and panic-monger. In regard to reconnaissance he did not fulfil a single order of the division commander, moreover, by his lies he misled him. For cowardice, panic-mongering and non-fulfilment of an order Zaitsev was tried by a tribunal, he crawled on his knees, asked for forgiveness. He was not shot, but from the Bryansk encirclement he came out in Gorky, our wives wrote to us about this…"

After the breakthrough across the Warsaw highway some units of the 137th Division were left on the northern bank of the Sozh River south of the highway.

Together with units of the 160th Division the 143rd Rifle Division of the 28th Corps, which had been encircled east of Chausy, was coming out of the encirclement, while losing two thirds of its composition.

The 42nd Division of the same corps, after several attempts to break through together with the 20th Rifle Corps, subsequently broke out of the encirclement independently.

In the Area of Krichev

In his memoirs A. S. Zhadov wrote that "on July 19 it was not possible to deliver the counterblow planned by the Commander-in-Chief…"

However according to the operational summary of the headquarters of the 4th Army, units of the 4th Airborne Corps from the area of Klimovichi (apparently, we are talking about the 7th Airborne Brigade) began to come out to the starting positions for the offensive with the aim of restoring control over the Warsaw highway east of the Sozh River.

The 1st Battalion of the 7th Brigade came out to Poloshkovo, followed on Barsuki, the 2nd Battalion came out to Korenets, advanced on Mikheevichi. The 3rd Battalion came out to Velikan, followed on Chernets, Kamenka. By the morning of July 20 the advance of the brigade was stopped on the line Zamostye (on the Warsaw highway), Korenets, Chernets.

The 8th Airborne Brigade began its movement to the west from the area of Dubrovitsa (west of Shumyachi).

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The Soviet 21st Army continued to repel the onslaught of the approaching infantry divisions of the German 2nd Army. Units of the 102nd Rifle Division of the 67th Rifle Corps on the western bank of the Dnieper continued to be pressed toward the bend of the Dnieper.

Heavy battles flared up on the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers. The 151st Rifle Division, advancing along the eastern bank of the Dnieper, reached the line of the mouth of a nameless river south of Pribor, Kuty, having approached the German crossing in the area of Stary Bykhov to a distance of a little more than 10 km.

As Stephen Newton writes in his book devoted to Field Marshal W. Model, to liquidate the crisis on the front in the interfluve the 1st Cavalry Division was reinforced with the combat group of Lieutenant Colonel W. von Lewinski from the composition of the 3rd Tank Division. The operational group that was formed was headed by Lieutenant General W. Model. (Only on July 23 was the tank regiment of the 3rd Tank Division able to be withdrawn for rest.)

The enemy attacked the 151st Rifle Division from the area of Smolitsa at the junction with the 187th Division and by the end of the day had seized the village of Palki.

In this same area the 50th Tank Division of the 25th Mechanized Corps entered battle. The detachment of the commander of the 50th Tank Division, Colonel B. S. Bakharov (in the composition of 20 T-34 tanks) at 9.00 went over to the offensive along the route Bakhan, Aleksandrovo, Bovki, Krasnitsa, Kuskovichi on Stary Bykhov.

It is difficult to reconstruct the actions of the detachment: according to some data, at about 16.00 the detachment of Bakharov attacked the enemy in the area of Bovki, Trilesino, according to others - at about 12.00 north of Aleksandrovo it discovered a minefield. According to yet another report, the detachment of Bakharov only at 21.00 reached Bovki, where it met up to a battalion of the enemy with motorcycles, armored cars and anti-tank guns. And at 6.00 on July 20 the corps headquarters received from the detachment a report from the area of Aleksandrovo, while it was reported that the losses amounted to one T-34 tank.

Possibly it is precisely to this episode that the recommendation for the award of the Order of the Red Banner to V. S. Bakharov refers (awarded in February 1942): "Having received the task on 15.7.41 to reconnoiter the enemy grouping in the area of St. Bykhov, Colonel Bakharov personally led a detachment of 20 tanks. Having correctly organized the reconnaissance and the movement of his detachment, Colonel Bakharov in the area of Bakhva <it is difficult to say what is meant: in this area there were the settlements of Bovki, Borki, Bortsy and Borovki - VM> 40 km in the rear of the enemy discovered up to a regiment of German infantry moving in the direction of Propoisk. By actions from ambushes and a decisive tank attack, Comrade Bakharov scattered the infantry in the forest and destroyed up to 2 battalions of Germans, 35 trucks, 12 guns, 2 staff buses. When the tank of Colonel Bakharov was knocked out by a thermite shell and caught fire, Bakharov under the most terrible fire of machine guns and submachine guns transferred to another tank and continued to direct the battle. For two days Colonel Bakharov fought his way back, overcoming minefields and enemy ambushes. Thanks to personal courage, composure and the coordinated actions of the whole detachment, Comrade Bakharov brought the detachment back with valuable information about the enemy with small losses".

The information about the enemy's losses in this case should be taken critically. It is important to note that the division commander of the tank division found himself isolated from the command of the division for two days.

At this same time another part of the 50th Tank Division supported the 151st Division. In the operational summary of the headquarters of the 25th Mechanized Corps as of 6.00 on July 20 it was said that "by the actions of our tanks the breakthrough of the enemy at the junction of the 2 rifle divisions was stopped on the line Bakhan-Polyaninovich <Polyaninovich - south of Palki>. Losses 8 light T-26 tanks, 3 T-34 tanks. Missing the commander of the 99th Tank Regiment, Major Reznikov (apparently blown up by a land mine in the tank)*…"

Meanwhile the 219th Motorized Rifle Division entered battle in a completely different area: with one regiment it attacked the enemy in the area of Propoisk, occupied Mikhaylovka, Kurganovka, the southern and south-western outskirts of Propoisk. Its losses amounted to about 300 men killed and wounded.

The 10 T-26 tanks (from the composition of the 50th Tank Division) sent to support it did not reach the addressee, they became involved in battle in the area of Rzhavka and withdrew to the area of Rogi (on the following day 10 new tanks were sent to support the 219th Motorized Division: 5 gun and 5 machine-gun T-26, which arrived on July 21).

The 63rd Rifle Corps was pressed back to the Dnieper, but held Rogachev and Zhlobin and retained control over the crossings over the river in its zone.

In Polesie

The battles between the Soviet 232nd Rifle Division and the German 43rd Army Corps continued. The fresh 260th Infantry Division approached the area of the battles and went over to the offensive in the direction of Berezovka (southeast of Glusk).

July 20

German Command

Field Marshal F. von Bock began the daily entry in his diary with these words: "Today a real hell broke loose! In the morning news came that the enemy had broken through the positions of Kuntzen's group near Nevel… Near Smolensk the enemy began a powerful offensive tonight… On the southern wing of the 4th Army the 10th Motorized Division <in the area of Propoisk> was attacked from all sides, but was saved in time by the approaching 4th Tank Division…"

In the report to the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, von Bock described the situation on his southern flank as follows: "…The reasons for the delays with the offensive of the 2nd Army across the Dnieper, as well as the measures of the army group to overcome them, are well known. Now the army is striving to advance as far as possible in its sector, while at the same time moving out screens against the enemy, who is threatening its southern wing and has at his disposal approximately nine divisions.

…The position on the southern wing of the 2nd Army is gradually improving, since the Russian units opposing the XXXXIII Army Corps located at the tip of the right wing have ceased their attacks and withdrawn to their former positions. A lull is also observed in the sector of the LIII Army Corps.

Attacking in a southerly direction along the Dnieper, the 31st Division has reached Novy Bykhov, and there is hope that tomorrow it will succeed in forcing the Dnieper at this place. The XIII Corps is forcing the Dnieper north of Stary Bykhov, the VII Corps is attacking Mogilev, and the left wing of the IX Corps continues the offensive in an easterly direction along the <Smolensk> highway".

The Soviet 13th Army

The 61st Rifle Corps and the 20th Mechanized Corps subordinated to it fought in encirclement in a vast area from the fortified tete-de-pont west of Mogilev to the Basya and Resta Rivers with the front to the east - on the line Gladkovo, Sukhari, Bolshoye Bushkovo, (excl.) Chernevka. The overall command of the encircled troops was exercised by the commander of the 61st Corps, Major General F. A. Bakunin. Communication with the command was maintained episodically.

The formations of the 20th Rifle Corps continued to come out of the encirclement on the southern bank of the Sozh River.

Another "echelon" of the 13th Army was made up of the troops of the 4th Army transferred to the subordination of the army, which occupied the defense and counterattacked the enemy on the line of the Sozh River from Propoisk to Mstislavl: the 28th Rifle Corps (the 55th Rifle Division), the 4th Airborne Corps with the detachment of the 6th Division, the detachment of the 45th Rifle Corps.

The 4th Airborne Corps of Major General A. S. Zhadov, reinforced with the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment, continued the offensive with the aim of restoring the situation in the area of Krichev. According to the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front, the 7th Airborne Brigade occupied Korenets and the forest to the west, but further was stopped by enemy fire from the direction of Mikheevichi and withdrew to the line Velikan, Gryazivets, the grove north of Korenets.

The 8th Airborne Brigade "due to difficult terrain and damaged bridges reached by the end of the day the grove north-west of Politskoye and therefore could not take part in the combat operations in the area of Krichev".

The corps received an order to "pull up" the 8th Brigade and on the following day to resume the attacks in the area of Krichev. From the southwest on Krichev (from the area of Poklady) a composite battalion was sent into the offensive.

The composite detachment of the 45th Corps continued its formation in the area of the Ponyatovka station south of Shumyachi. The corps commander of the 45th, Division Commander E. Ya. Magon, was subordinated the detachment of Colonel M. A. Popsuy-Shapko.

The Assault on Mogilev

Meanwhile the German 7th Army Corps began the assault on the city. The 7th Infantry Division attacked Mogilev from the northwest, the 23rd - from the southwest. The 15th Infantry Division from the reserve of the OKH was also approaching Mogilev, and it too was subordinated to the headquarters of the 7th Corps.

Yet another, the 78th Infantry Division (transferred to the 7th Corps from the composition of the 13th), crossed the Dnieper in the area of Borkolabovo and attacked Mogilev along the Gomel highway, but was stopped.

In his book "Hitler Moves East" Paul Carell left the following description of the assault on Mogilev by the 23rd Infantry Division: "On July 20 the city west of the river was in the ring of four German divisions belonging to the 7th Corps.

On that same day at 14.00 two regiments of the Berlin-Brandenburg 23rd Infantry Division of Major General Hellmich went over to the assault. The 9th Infantry Regiment from Potsdam, the keeper of the traditions of the old Potsdam Guards infantry regiments, managed to cross the river, but now lay pinned down by fire on a tiny bridgehead. The 68th Infantry Regiment found itself unable to break through the Soviet defense, and the 67th Infantry Regiment on the following day also could not boast of great achievements.

When the frontal attack bogged down on the outskirts of the city, Hellmich attempted to strike at the bridge linking Mogilev and Lupolovo from the southeast - in the direction up the river. The undertaking succeeded. In a fierce night battle the 9th Infantry Regiment managed to dislodge the reliably entrenched and skillfully defending enemy.

But the German losses turned out to be very high. The 11th Company of Lieutenant Schrottke (67th Infantry Regiment) was literally crushed. In the garden the enemy struck it on the flank. All the officers in the company perished, it lost two thirds of its strength. Meanwhile on the western side of the Dnieper the 10th Company of Lieutenant Brandt (67th Infantry Regiment), hiding behind the bank, made its way right up to the automobile bridge. Mingling among the Russian equipment and running across to the other side, the soldiers of the 10th Company came into contact with the soldiers of the 9th Infantry Regiment on the bridgehead on the eastern side.

Brandt held the bridge and the bank bridgehead under unexpectedly accurate artillery fire, under the fire of snipers who shot anyone who raised his head, and repelling furious attacks of Soviet soldiers. When Major Hannig broke into the eastern part of the city with the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, the attackers came under machine-gun fire. Seriously wounded, the major collapsed on the bridge, but ordered his men not to stop. The snipers finished him off.

In the morning of July 26 the Russians under the cover of fog lying in the Dnieper valley managed to blow up the 200-meter wooden bridge in the eastern part of the city, partially destroying it completely. One can say that the Soviet soldiers literally burned their bridges. The Red Army men held on at already lost positions and fought to the last cartridge. In the end, gripped in the death grip of the 78th, 15th, 23rd and 7th Infantry Divisions, the defense gave up the ghost. Some tried to break through in a westerly direction on trucks, but without success.

The Germans quite quickly restored the wooden bridge, and the 23rd Infantry Division crossed over to the eastern bank. The 15th Infantry Division occupied Mogilev. A strangely smelling brown liquid flowed through the streets of the city: it was the Russians who had blown up the huge lager tanks of the brewery. Beer flowed in streams into the Dnieper. The victors did not have a chance to drink the beer brewed by the vanquished.

The 23rd and 15th Infantry Divisions took 12,000 prisoners. Among them there turned out to be surprisingly few officers. The officers for the most part either perished or managed to break through. The losses of the 23rd Infantry Division amounted to 264 men killed, 83 - missing and 1088 - wounded. A considerable price for a city located far in the rear of the advancing units of the Wehrmacht…"

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The units of the 102nd Rifle Division operating on the western bank of the Dnieper were pressed toward the Dnieper. As N. Borisenko writes, as a result of the battles of July 19 and 20 the 410th Rifle Regiment in fact ceased to exist; by the morning of July 21 its remnants were gathering in the area of Zvonets on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. The 467th Rifle Regiment was pressed to the Dnieper in the area of Pokrovsky and Vilyakhovka. N. Borisenko further reports: "In the combat report of the headquarters of the 102nd Rifle Division to the commander of the 67th Corps for July 20 it is said that, having encountered a significant superiority of the enemy's forces, especially motorcycle and armored units, after 5 hours of resistance it was forced to withdraw to the left bank of the Dnieper. In fact on July 20 only the headquarters of the division and the communications battalion withdrew to the left bank, while the rifle regiments with heavy battles on July 21 and 22 came out to the crossing independently, in parts… For the past battles the division suffered enormous losses and had in its composition no more than 2.5 battalions of infantry…"

On July 22 near the village of Vilyakhovka the commander of the 467th Rifle Regiment, Colonel Sh. G. Kipiani, died of his wounds (he lost both legs, but did not leave the battlefield, continuing to direct the regiment).

On the eastern bank of the Dnieper no less dramatic events took place. Continuing the attacks at the junction of the 151st and 187th Rifle Divisions, the enemy, as described in the operational summary of the headquarters, with forces up to an infantry regiment by 14.00 "reached and took possession of the north-eastern outskirts of Obidovichi. The further attempt of the enemy to break through along the highway to Dovsk was repelled by units of the 50th TD…"

Thus, to stabilize the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh the Soviet command was forced to use its main strike force - the 50th Tank Division. According to the operational summary, by 20.00 it was conducting a battle on the southern outskirts of Obidovichi. On the morning of July 21 in its composition there remained serviceable 15 medium T-34 tanks and 19 light T-26 tanks, 4 T-34 tanks and 11 T-26 tanks were under repair; 29 T-34 and 17 T-26 tanks had bogged down and not returned for other reasons (on July 21, 7 tanks were evacuated from the battlefield).

The 219th Motorized Division with one motorized rifle regiment unsuccessfully attempted to seize Propoisk. The following position of its regiments is described:

— the 55th Motorized Rifle Regiment (of the 55th Tank Division) - southern outskirts of Propoisk,

— the 50th Motorized Rifle Regiment (of the 50th Tank Division) - the highway west of Propoisk,

— the 710th Motorized Rifle Regiment (properly of the 219th Division) - 1 km west of Kurganovka.

The Soviet 63rd Rifle Corps held Rogachev and Zhlobin; Field Marshal F. von Bock described the situation here as a "lull".

In Polesie

The approach of the German 260th Infantry Division to the flank of the 232nd Rifle Division advancing in the direction of Bobruisk forced the Soviet troops to withdraw to the south.

As a result the German 134th Infantry Division occupied Parichi, where it immediately organized a crossing over the Berezina River, through which motorized subunits of the 260th Infantry Division passed in the direction of Shchedrin.

The main forces of the 260th Division by the end of the day seized Romanishche.

Major General S. I. Nedvigin was appointed commander of the 232nd Rifle Division (before that - commander of the 75th Rifle Division). Soon, instead of Major General F. P. Sudakov, the commander of the 66th Corps was appointed the former commander of the 1st Rifle Corps, Major General F. D. Rubtsov, who had come out of encirclement².

The Soviet 75th Rifle Division (according to the report of the army headquarters of the 21st, it had in its composition about 1600 men) conducted a battle for Zhitkovichi; there is information that Nedvigin was replaced as division commander by Colonel A. M. Pirov (who had previously commanded the 204th Motorized Division near Grodno).

July 21

The Assault on Mogilev

The German troops continued the assault on the city. The Soviet troops under the pressure of the enemy abandoned Buinichi.

I. I. Yakubovsky cited in his memoirs the report of Bakunin to the headquarters of the 13th Army: "For the second day I am conducting stubborn battles with superior enemy forces. I am holding the position. The shells are running out. I request to be informed when the shells will be delivered…"

In the Area of Mstislavl and Krichev

The 4th Airborne Corps of Major General A. S. Zhadov was moving out to the starting positions for a new offensive on Krichev.

The 7th Airborne Brigade occupied the western outskirts of Krasny Bor, the grove north of Korenets, the grove north of Gryazivets in readiness to go over to the offensive on Mikheevichi.

The 8th Brigade operated separately: it entered battle on the line Studenets, Petrovichi 18-20 km east of the Sozh River, but was stopped on the line Pogulyaevka, Brozdany; large losses of personnel of the 8th Brigade are noted (35 %).

The details of the battle are unknown, but in the award list for the assistant of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 4th Airborne Corps, Major N. E. Kolobovnikov, it was said that he "helped to carry out the withdrawal of the 8th Airborne Brigade from semi-encirclement in full composition".

To Petrovichi the composite detachment of the 6th Division (two battalions of the 712th Regiment <of the 132nd Division> and the 3rd Battalion of the 84th Regiment), which was defending east of Mstislavl, was also thrown back.

In the Area of Propoisk

Units of the 55th Rifle and 219th Motorized Rifle Divisions continued the attacks on Propoisk. F. Halder noted that on the eve the situation had been stabilized only by the involvement of the 4th Tank Division, but already in the evening of July 21 the situation in the area of Propoisk again became acute.

Field Marshal F. von Bock left such an entry: "The situation on the southern wing of the XXIV Tank Corps has acquired such a threatening character that I was forced to give the order to the 2nd Army to urgently restore the situation. From the point of view of the army, the XIII Corps in full composition should have dealt with this. Moreover, a little later the army began to deploy the IX Corps too, in order to oppose the Russian troops who were continuously attacking the southern wing of the army group.

One cannot deny that our thoroughly battered opponent has achieved impressive successes! The reports of air reconnaissance indicate that the enemy is employing additional forces against our southern flank…"

Thus the enemy failed to free the 24th Motorized Corps for the further offensive to the east. The Soviet attacks tied down the entire southern flank of Army Group "Center". On the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers (including Propoisk) the main forces of the 24th Motorized Corps were already engaged: the strike units of the 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions, as well as the 10th Motorized Division and the 1st Cavalry Division in full composition.

The German 2nd Army was also forced to shift the emphasis of its actions ever more to the south, toward its excessively stretched southern flank. For its strengthening the 12th, 53rd and 43rd Corps had already been allocated, along the Pripyat in Polesie the 35th Corps was advancing, the 7th Corps blockaded Mogilev. And now the 13th Corps was also to be employed for the strengthening of the southern flank of the army. By the twenties of July only one left-flank 9th Army Corps could participate in the offensive to the east.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

According to the data of the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front, the enemy on the sector of the 67th Corps in the morning of July 21 delivered a blow from the area of Kulikovka and seized the area of Rekta, Zhuravichi, Shapchitsy, Verichev.

Apparently, we are talking about the continuation of the offensive of Model's Operational Group, which attacked this time from the area of Kulikovka in the direction of Rekta, Zhuravichi on the Warsaw highway northeast of Dovsk. The enemy managed to wedge even further into the defense of the 67th Corps, it seized Bakhan, Dobry Dub, Rogi and advanced to Prudok and Peregon near the Warsaw highway, but further was stopped.

It seems that it is precisely these events that are described in the reconnaissance summary of the headquarters of the Western Front for July 23: "in the area of Nov. Bykhov the enemy with forces of the 31st ID, 1st CD with tanks, having gone over to the offensive in the direction of Dovsk, had no success and suffered losses of up to two battalions of infantry…"

In the morning of July 22 F. Halder wrote in his diary: "On the Dnieper in the area of Nov. Bykhov the enemy also continues to hold his positions and offers stubborn resistance…"

At the same time the Shapchitsy mentioned in the operational summary were in the zone of responsibility of the 102nd Rifle Division, the remnants of which were just gathering in the area of Shapchitsy, Zvonets and soon occupied the front Shapchitsy-Il'ich (Colonel S. S. Chernyugov entered into command of the division).

Verichev northwest of Rogachev - this is the zone of the 63rd Rifle Corps.

In Polesie

The German 260th Infantry Division early in the morning continued the attacks from the area of Romanishche, by 9.00 seized Gomza, by 16.00 - Peschanaya Rudnya (south of Parichi).

The detachment of Lieutenant Colonel L. V. Kurmyshev with BePo 52 conducted a battle with the enemy in the area of the Rabkor station, preventing its concentration in the area of Karpilovka.

July 22 (1 month of the war)

The Defense of Mogilev

An entry in the diary of Field Marshal F. von Bock: "On the whole the day passed quietly, even on the front of the XXIV Tank Corps, which found itself in a difficult position, a lull set in. The Russians continue to stubbornly defend in the area of Mogilev, so that the attacks of our two best divisions (the 23rd and 7th) had only very limited success in this direction…"

The High Command of the troops of the Western Direction (Commander-in-Chief - Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, Chief of Staff - Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov) reported to the Stavka: "First. In Smolensk the fierce battle has been going on for the seventh day… The enemy at Yartsevo has not been liquidated…

Second. The Yelnya station on the railway Smolensk, Sukhinichi is occupied by the enemy. The 19th RD of the 24th A this morning at Yelnya went over to the offensive and by 9 o'clock had enveloped the enemy with one regiment from the north and two regiments from the south. There is a battle for the capture of Yelnya.

The 107th RD repelled a threefold attack north of Yelnya with heavy losses of the enemy.

Third. Velikiye Luki - a battle is going on on the approaches, the initiative is ours, the enemy is defending and yesterday withdrew 3-5 km from the city.

Fourth. Mogilev - all the attacks of the enemy during 10 days have been repelled, the city is held by our troops; it has a circular defense and is defended by the forces of two divisions. The difficulties consist in the delivery of ammunition. The commander of the 21st A has been given the order that the 102nd RD and the 105th RD*, operating on St. Bykhov, should link up with Mogilev and thereby create greater stability. We are delivering ammunition by aircraft…"

S. P. Ivanov wrote in his memoirs that "on July 22 the chief of the General Staff, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, through the headquarters of the Western Front, requested from us concrete information about the units defending Mogilev. He was informed of the available forces of the 172nd Division of M. T. Romanov and an urgent request was expressed to help with ammunition. The reaction followed quickly. From the front headquarters an order came to lay out signal bonfires in the area of the Lupolovo station. On the same night a group of transport aircraft dropped ammunition and food. Part of them fell on the sector of the 747th Rifle Regiment, and several containers again ended up with the enemy. At dawn a fierce battle flared up for these cargoes, and they were recaptured from the Hitlerites…"

In the Area of Mstislavl and Krichev

The command of the 13th Army reported that "despite all the measures taken, the situation <in the area> of Krichev has not been restored and the battles are going on east of the Sozh River.

The 8th Airborne Brigade is conducting stubborn battles with units of the 39th Tank Regiment³ in the area of Petrovichi, Studenets.

The 7th Airborne Brigade is holding the area of the grove southeast of the settlement Krasny Ruchey, Korenets, the settlement Velikan. I am moving out the composite detachment of the 161st RD to the crossroads of the roads Roslavl, Knyazevo…"

The detachment of the 6th Rifle Division also fought in the area of Petrovichi.

Soviet Command

Meanwhile the Soviet command had prepared an offensive with the use of reserves in the Western Direction. It planned by active actions of the operational groups from the composition of the Front of Reserve Armies to defeat the Smolensk grouping of the enemy. The troops of the 29th, 30th, 24th and 28th Armies were drawn into the counterattacks.

The 28th Army concentrated in the area of Roslavl and received an order to go over to the offensive on Smolensk from the south through Pochinok.

The armies of the southern flank of the Western Front were left with their former tasks: the 13th Army (with the 4th Army) - to occupy Propoisk and Krichev, the 21st Army - to defeat the Bobruisk-Bykhov grouping of the enemy.

In the Area of Propoisk

The 25th Mechanized Corps (the 50th Tank and the 219th Motorized Rifle Divisions with the 696th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment) was still to support the offensive of the 28th Rifle Corps on Propoisk. It received an order during July 22 to take possession of Propoisk, and on the following day to continue the offensive in the direction of Shelomy, Krasnitsa, Slobodka - that is, to advance to join up with the Mogilev grouping to a depth of more than 50 km.

However the new attack in the direction of Propoisk again ended in failure: the enemy managed to forestall the attack of the 50th Tank Division. Only at 16.00 did the 50th Tank Division deploy on the line Lyudkovo, Byazuevichi and go over to the offensive, but again was stopped.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The enemy continued the attacks in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers, trying to break through south of Obidovichi. The Soviet 67th Corps was forced to withdraw even further to the south, but then the advance of the enemy was stopped on the line Peregon, south of Bakhan, Zatishe, Iskan, the forest south of Obidovichi.

Meanwhile the commander of the 21st Army, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, at 17.30 gave a new order for the offensive. This time the main blow was to be delivered by the 67th Rifle Corps of Major General K. N. Galitsky (the 102nd, 151st and 187th Rifle Divisions, two corps artillery regiments), which was reinforced with the 117th Rifle Division and the 387th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command. Its main task was to restore communication with Mogilev and to restore the front along the Dnieper line.

The 151st and 117th Rifle Divisions, delivering the main blow, were to receive two artillery battalions of the 387th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command each.

The beginning of the attack of the 67th Corps was set for the morning of July 23, however in fact it was able to go over to the offensive only on July 24, while the plan of the offensive and the composition of the strike grouping changed somewhat.

The CP of the headquarters of the 21st Army was moved out to the area of Dovsk, here the 55th Tank Division - the reserve of the army - was already concentrated.

Here too, to the area of Dovsk, new reserves were moved out. The already mentioned 117th Rifle Division was concentrating in the area of Dovsk by the morning of July 23, after which it was to come under the subordination of the headquarters of the 67th Rifle Corps. The 155th Rifle Division was being transferred to the area of Dovsk by the end of July 23. The command over the 117th and 155th Rifle Divisions was to be taken by the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps, which had come out of encirclement (after the death in encirclement of the corps commander, Major General V. B. Borisov, the corps was headed by the former chief of staff, Major General D. E. Zakutny, and the former commander of the 37th Rifle Division, Colonel A. E. Chekharin, was appointed chief of staff of the corps).

The 63rd Rifle Corps in the area of Rogachev and Zhlobin also began a regrouping for a new offensive. The readiness of the offensive was set for July 24, but in reality it went over to the offensive on July 25.

On the southern flank of the corps the 110th Rifle Regiment with artillery crossed the Dnieper (with the help of the ships of the Pinsk Military Flotilla), went over to the offensive and took possession of Mormol and Korotkovichi. The details of the battle are unknown, but on this day the commander of the 110th Regiment, Major K. A. Reimer, and the chief of staff, Captain F. F. Guryev, perished.

In Polesie

The German 260th Infantry Division continued to press the units of the 232nd Rifle Division south of Parichi and occupied Chernin.

The German 134th Infantry Division continued to hold Parichi.

The detachment of Kurmyshev by the end of the day conducted a battle in the area of the Rabkor station. BePo 52 by the end of the day conducted a battle in encirclement in the area of the Zalesye siding.

July 23

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

From the area of Roslavl the offensive of the Operational Group of the 28th Army began: the 145th (commander - Major General A. A. Volkhin) and 149th (Major General F. D. Zakharov) Rifle and 104th Tank Divisions (Colonel V. G. Burkov); the reserve of the group was made up by the motorized rifle regiment of the 106th Tank Division. The group was reinforced with the 320th Gun Artillery Regiment of the Reserve of the High Command, the 643rd and 364th Corps Artillery Regiments, as well as several separate artillery battalions.

On July 21-22 the Operational Group under the command of Major General P. G. Egorov (chief of staff of the 28th Army) delivered blows in the direction of Yelnya. In the evening of July 22 it received an order to go over to the offensive on Smolensk. The immediate task of the new offensive - by the end of the day to come out to the line Strigino, Pochinok, Trutnevo; by July 25 the Operational Group was to come out to Smolensk.

The remaining divisions of the 28th Army, united by the headquarters of the 33rd Rifle Corps (the 217th, 222nd and 120th Rifle⁴), were left on the defensive.

At first the Soviet troops were opposed by units of the SS division "Reich" and the Leib Regiment "Grossdeutschland" of the 46th Motorized Corps; in Strigino the headquarters of the 46th Motorized Corps was located.

Two Soviet rifle divisions (the 145th and 149th) drove back the screens of the enemy and, as was stated in the operational summary of the combat operations of the Western Front, "under the continuous influence of aviation are conducting a battle at the crossings over the Stomet River". However the 104th Tank Division did not have time to concentrate for the new offensive and came out to the starting positions only on the following day. As a result the group did not fulfil the task set for the day. In the order of the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov, it was stated:

"1. As a result of the battle of 23.7.41 the defending units of the enemy have been thrown back beyond the Stomet River. At the first and decisive pressure the enemy withdraws.

2. The task set for 23.7 has not been fulfilled by the units.

Noted: a) a completely insufficient rate of advance by both the 145th and the 149th RD. The 104th TD has lagged behind inadmissibly;

b) there is no daring on the part of the commanders, starting from the squad commander;

c) the striving for frontal attack predominates. Shrubs and forest are not used for partial envelopment of the enemy's flanks;

d) instead of intensifying the pressure and accelerating the pursuit of the withdrawing enemy, they often pursue at a crawl;

e) the power of infantry fire for suppressing firing points and advancing forward is not fully used;

f) artillery lags behind in the fulfilment of the tasks set owing to the lagging of the artillery observers behind the infantry;

g) observation of the battlefield is poorly organized. This explains the scantiness of information about the forces and actions of the enemy.

The commander ORDERED:

1) On 24.7 the 145th and 149th RD are to continue the fulfilment of the task set for 23.7. The beginning of the offensive - 24.7. 4.00.

2) All the indicated shortcomings are to be eliminated…"

In the Area of Mstislavl and Krichev

The Soviet 13th Army continued active operations east of Krichev and Mstislavl.

According to the data of the Soviet operational summaries, the enemy continued stubbornly to defend Mikheevichi and Studenets. In the evening reconnaissance summary of the headquarters of the Western Front it was said: "as a result of the battle on the line Petrovichi, Studenets the 39th Tank Regiment, suffering heavy losses, withdrew to the area of Mstislavl…"

In the Area of Propoisk

Units of the Soviet 4th Army and the 25th Mechanized Corps of the 21st Army resumed the attacks on Cherikov and Propoisk. By 16.30 the 107th Rifle Regiment of the 55th Rifle Division (its combat strength was assessed by the Soviet command as a battalion), reinforced with two artillery batteries from the composition of the 132nd and 137th Divisions and a battalion of the 84th Artillery Regiment with 8 guns, occupied the south-eastern outskirts of Propoisk. But further, as stated in the evening operational summary of the headquarters of the 4th Army, "not being supported by units of the 219th Motorized Rifle Division, it had no success in taking possession of Propoisk".

The 25th Mechanized Corps (the 50th Tank Division, the 219th Motorized Rifle Division and the motorized rifle regiment of the 55th Tank Division), attacking from the west in the direction of Propoisk, was again stopped with heavy losses - the 17th Infantry Division of the 13th Corps had already come to support the 10th Motorized Division, which had been repelling the attacks on Propoisk for a week.

On the night of July 24 the divisions of the 25th Mechanized Corps were ordered to go over to the defensive.

Meanwhile units of the 20th Rifle Corps continued to cross the Sozh River. According to the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front, by the end of the day from the composition of the 132nd Rifle Division 1.5 thousand men and 18 guns had crossed, from the composition of the 137th Division - 3 thousand men.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The 21st Army continued the regrouping for a new offensive in the direction of Bykhov and Mogilev.

Taking into account the "activity of the German grouping in the area of Khichinki, Kulikovka, Zapolyanye" (in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh), part of the 55th Tank Division was moved out to the area of Zimnitsa (for the re-manning of the 50th Tank and the 219th Motorized Divisions).

In Polesie

From the zone of the 66th Rifle Corps a cavalry group under the command of Colonel A. I. Batskalevich (the 32nd Cavalry Division from the Crimea and the newly formed 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions in the North Caucasus) was sent through the rear of the enemy.

The 32nd Cavalry Division was a full-strength pre-war cavalry division (with a tank regiment, which it transferred to the 232nd Division, with an artillery battalion, air defense means, etc.), however the 43rd and 47th were hastily formed so-called light cavalry divisions of wartime.

At least one more cavalry division (the 52nd) was to take part in the raid, but it did not have time to approach the area of the combat operations and in the evening of July 30 was included in the composition of the 13th Army.

The group had the task of routing the rear of the Bobruisk, Mogilev and Smolensk groupings of the enemy: the 32nd Division was ordered to follow the route Shatilki, Glusk, Yasen, Lyubonichi, Dashkovka, Dribin; the 43rd and 47th Divisions - along the route Davydovka, Dubrovo, Novye Dorogi, Osipovichi, Klichev, Knyazhitsy, Gorki. The completion of the raid was planned at Khislavichi, Pochinok and the Tychinino station. The overall command of the group was entrusted to the Inspector General of Cavalry of the Red Army, Colonel General O. I. Gorodovikov.

The 32nd, 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions concentrated in the area of the Rabkor station in readiness for the following day to go over to the offensive.

Covering the concentration of the Soviet cavalry divisions, the detachment of L. V. Kurmyshev came out to the line Shkava, the Zalesye siding (north of Karpilovka).

The detachment of the 24th Rifle Division was ordered to send partisan detachments to the area of Glusk, Selets, Novoselki.

In support of the raid of the cavalry, the 66th Corps was ordered to deliver a blow in the direction of the Moshnya station, Ratmirovichi (the 232nd Rifle Division was reinforced with one rifle regiment of the Mozyr Fortified Region and the tank regiment of the 32nd Cavalry Division, which had in service fast light BT tanks and armored cars). There is extremely little information about the actions of the 232nd Division from the Soviet side. But in the history of the German 260th Infantry Division heavy battles in the area of Romanishche and the repulsion of Soviet tank attacks are recorded.

The Defense of Mogilev

The Soviet troops, blockaded by four infantry divisions, continued to offer fierce resistance in the city. Street battles began; the enemy broke through to the railway station; the 78th Infantry Division operating on the eastern bank of the Dnieper occupied the Lupolovo airfield.

Units of the Soviet 61st Rifle Corps were pressed back to the line Konstantinovka, Kamenka. The communication of the headquarters of the 61st Corps with the 172nd Rifle Division, which was defending directly in Mogilev, was interrupted.

I. I. Yakubovsky wrote in his memoirs: "On July 23 by a meeting blow of the 7th Infantry Division from the north and the 78th from the south the enemy managed to split our grouping into two parts, to seize the railway station Lupolovo and the airfield located in its area. The supply of our troops, already limited, ceased completely.

The bleeding units of our corps were transferred to this sector, in particular the 51st Tank Regiment - to the area of the aviation motor plant. The acting deputy commander of the 26th Tank Division, Colonel K. F. Skorobogatkin, personally gave me at the CP of the regiment the order: to take possession of the grove and to come out to the Lupolovo station.

Having discovered our concentration, the enemy opened massive mortar fire. By the explosion of a mine I was wounded, bandaged myself and ordered the attack to begin…

We managed to press the enemy, to seize a pontoon park which was intended for the forcing of the Dnieper. Soon I received an order from the division command to withdraw. We set fire to the pontoons, the vehicles and the property and withdrew into the forest. Almost all night behind us a huge glow spread…"

Later, for the battles in the area of Mogilev on July 23-24, Major I. I. Yakubovsky was recommended for the Order of the Red Banner.

Soviet Command

In the evening the High Command of the troops of the Western Direction gave an order to the 13th Army:

"The 20th Army, which has been fighting for several days in semi-encirclement, not only repels the enemy, but delivers partial blows to the fresh units of the enemy, accompanied by heavy losses for him in men and material.

In exactly the same way the 16th Army has for several days been conducting successful battles with the stubbornly resisting enemy for Smolensk.

Meanwhile on the front of your 13th Army and the 4th Army the enemy, taking advantage of the passivity of the army, on the contrary, has wedged into the disposition of the army for several days, having seized Krichev and Propoisk, and the 13th and 4th Armies still cannot take possession of these cities.

According to your own reports the enemy in front of the front of the 13th and 4th Armies has the material part of tank divisions without fuel, stands passively in front of the front of the army.

I order:

1) immediately to clear the rear of the straggling Red Army men and commanders, putting them into the ranks;

2) immediately and decisively to activate the actions of the 13th and 4th Armies, having as the first task to take possession of Propoisk and Krichev, in the future together with the units of the 4th and 21st Armies to advance with the left flank of the army to join up with the Mogilev corps, and with the right flank to advance on Gorki, securing the flank of Kachalov's group, which is advancing from Roslavl on Smolensk;

3) to report on the orders given and your actions;

4) to report on the guilty commanders in the surrender of Krichev and Propoisk".

July 24

German Command

In the diary of Field Marshal F. von Bock such an entry appeared: "In the morning <the commander of the 2nd Army> Weichs called and gave a very pessimistic description of the situation on his southern wing. Weichs says that if parts continue to be taken from his right wing, this will create a threat to Bobruisk. I told him that Bobruisk does not worry me. In my opinion, it is high time for Weichs to transfer his units to the other bank more quickly. I told him that this is in his own interests, since otherwise he will have to clear the western bank of the Dnieper of the enemy…"

The Defense of Mogilev

Street battles continued in Mogilev. The proposal of the commander of the German 7th Army Corps, General of Artillery W. Farmbacher, for capitulation was rejected.

Von Bock left in his diary the following remark: "Mogilev, which is now being attacked by three divisions and heavy artillery fire, is on the verge of collapse, but nevertheless it still continues to snap back. The Russians are incredibly stubborn after all!"

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

Early in the morning the attacks of the Operational Group of the 28th Army in the direction of Pochinok resumed. The operational group was headed by the army commander, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov.

The 149th Rifle Division continued the battles on the line of the Stomet River east of Gavryukovka, the 145th Division occupied Gaponovo southwest of Vaskovo, and by the morning of the following day had reached the line Vaskovo, Konikhovka; the left flank of the division advanced in the direction of Borovka (covering the flank of the group from the side of Khislavichi).

The 104th Tank Division began moving out to the right flank of the operational group and deployed with the front to the north on the line Zaborye, Pustosh.

However the Soviet troops advanced extremely slowly, and the enemy had the possibility of transferring reinforcements to the front of the Soviet offensive, in particular, units of the 18th Tank Division from near Krasny. As a result the Operational Group again did not achieve the set goal. In the order of Kachalov it was said: "The combat operations of 24.7 only on the sector of the 145th RD (on one direction) ensured success and the units advanced forward.

The commander of the 149th RD, Major General Zakharov, did not organize the battle.

The artillery acted at extreme distances without interaction with the infantry and within the artillery of the Reserve of the High Command, the corps and the troop artillery.

As a result of this the units, having met with the organized resistance of insignificant enemy forces, not only did not advance forward, but also withdrew, having lost the points captured on the eve.

The Military Council draws attention and demands from the commanders, commissars and political workers direct leadership of the battle, to be in the companies, battalions, by exactingness and, when necessary, by personal example to compel the units to fulfil the tasks set by the order…"

It was ordered to continue the offensive on the following day, the 149th Rifle Division was reinforced with 5 T-34 tanks.

In the Area of Propoisk

In execution of the demands of the High Command of the troops of the Western Direction to activate actions, the commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko, at 6.20 issued an order for the attack on Propoisk:

"1. The enemy in Propoisk shows no activity. It allows our detachments freely to maneuver, to cross the river, to go around to its rear.

Consequently, the enemy has no forces in Propoisk for active actions.

2. Under your personal responsibility I set the task by any means, using the forces of the 28th RC and the units of the 20th RC that have come out (which are headed by the commander of the 2nd Corps <Major General A. N. Ermakov>), by the end of 24.7 to occupy Propoisk and to advance to the line Nov. Nikolsky, Zavad-Virovaya, height 166.3, south of Kalinin, maintaining close communication with the 219th Motorized Rifle Division.

Bear in mind in the future to advance in interaction with the units of the 21st A in the direction of Mogilev.

3. Report the execution every two hours".

At 13.25 an analogous order was given by the acting commander of the 4th Army, Colonel L. M. Sandalov, however he postponed the offensive to the night of July 25:

"1. The enemy on the front Cherikov, Propoisk shows no activity, conducts patrol service with tanks and motorcyclists along the highway Cherikov, Propoisk and with a detachment of motorized infantry with tanks and artillery defends Propoisk.

2. The 28th RC, covering itself along the Lobchanka River from the side of Krichev, on the night of 24 to 25.7 is to deliver a blow on Propoisk, with the units of the 20th RC from the line Aleksandrovka, Aleksandrovka 2nd and the units of the 55th RD in interaction with the 219th Motorized Rifle Division from Rudnya is to take possession of Propoisk and come out to the front of the settlement Nov. Nikolsky, Zavad-Viravaya, mark 166.3, the settlement Kalinin. In the future to advance in interaction with the 21st A on Mogilev.

3. On the right the 4th A/B C is conducting a battle for Krichev.

On the left the 219th Motorized Rifle Division is in the area of Rudnya.

4. I place responsibility for the fulfilment of this task on the commander and commissar of the 28th RC. To replace the commanders of the units who did not cope with this task in the past, and to bring before a tribunal the commanders guilty of the non-fulfilment of the order to take Propoisk.

5. Report the execution every two hours".

However, despite such menacing orders, the night attack on Propoisk again proved unsuccessful.

Moreover the 25th Mechanized Corps of the 21st Army operating in this area was putting itself in order and conducting a regrouping for the subsequent offensive. On July 25 in the 55th Tank Division there were only 17 light T-26 tanks and 7 armored cars, in the 219th Motorized Division - 12 light tanks and 7 armored cars. The main strike force of the mechanized corps remained the 50th Tank Division, concentrated in the area of Vaskovichi southwest of Propoisk: it had in service 149 tanks, including 65 medium T-34.

Also unsuccessful was the attempt to involve in the offensive the units of the 137th Division occupying a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Sozh River in the area of Aleksandrovka. As V. Kiselev describes in his book, while a conference of commanders was going on at the corps headquarters, the enemy unexpectedly attacked the positions of the 2nd Battalion of the 771st Rifle Regiment and the 497th Howitzer Regiment and destroyed them. More than 200 soldiers of the 2nd Battalion perished; moreover, according to the data of the Book of Memory of the Slavgorod district, 470 artillerymen of the 497th Howitzer Artillery Regiment are buried in a mass grave. Of the number of artillerymen less than a hundred men remained alive; back across the Sozh River they managed to ferry only one gun.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The 21st Army went over to the offensive. This time the main blow was delivered by the 21st and 67th Rifle Corps on the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers in the direction of Mogilev.

The 21st Rifle Corps (it united under its command the 117th and 187th Rifle Divisions) attacked in the direction of Bakhan (the 117th Rifle Division) and entered battle for Rogi and Dobry Dub (the 187th Rifle Division).

The 155th Rifle Division did not have time to approach the area of the battles.

The 67th Corps (the 151st Rifle Division went over to the offensive) attacked in the area of Vet.

The 63rd Rifle Corps conducted a reconnaissance in force before the forthcoming offensive.

According to the report of the High Command of the troops of the Western Direction, "against the 21st Army the enemy is very quickly accumulating forces and already has at his disposal three corps. It is necessary to hasten the concentration of the group of Comrade Gorodovikov, since it may be late…"

In Polesie

The cavalry group of Colonel A. I. Batskalevich also went over to active operations: the 32nd Division crossed the Ptich River on the sector Kholopenichi, Rozhanov (west of Karpilovka), began the advance to the north and by the end of the day occupied Glusk.

On the night of July 25 the units of the division took up the starting position for the seizure of the Warsaw highway.

The 43rd (Brigade Commander I. K. Kuzmin) and 47th (Major General A. N. Sidelnikov) Cavalry Divisions were delayed with the advance (the march of the cavalry divisions was detected by enemy aviation, and they were forced to take cover in the forests) and began active operations later.

The battles in the zone of the Soviet 232nd Rifle Division continued. The 18th Tank Regiment, attached to the 232nd Rifle Division, continued the attacks in the area of Romanishche, Ugly (west of Parichi), while suffering heavy losses (especially in material). The German 260th Infantry Division opposing it lost 92 men killed and 510 wounded.

The German 134th Infantry Division attacked in a southerly direction (on Rakshin), however suffered heavy losses (the 232nd Division was supported by the fire of the monitor "Smolensk" of the Berezina Detachment of River Ships, which expended all its ammunition). The 232nd Division withdrew to the line Sudovitsa, Rakshin, Dubrova.

The Formation of the Central Front

By this time the defense zone of the Western Front had already been broken through by the German offensive, while in the area of Yelnya the troops of the Front of Reserve Armies had entered battle with the enemy.

With the aim of improving the command on the left flank of the Western Direction, on the night of July 25 it was ordered to form the CENTRAL FRONT (commander - Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, chief of staff - Colonel L. M. Sandalov, chief of artillery - Major General M. P. Dmitriev, commander of the Air Force of the front - Division Commander G. A. Vorozheykin, headquarters - the city of Gomel).

For the formation of the front headquarters the headquarters of the 4th Army was directed; subsequently, to bring the headquarters up to strength, the necessary specialists were sent from the Main Directorate of Cadres of the People's Commissariat of Defense. The boundary with the Western Front - Bryansk, Roslavl, Shklov, Minsk (all inclusive for the Western Front), the boundary with the Southwestern Front - the administrative boundary of the BSSR.

The main operational direction of the Central Front - Gomel, Bobruisk, Volkovysk.

The combat composition of the troops of the Central Front is presented in Table 4-2. At first there were two armies in the composition of the front.

Table 4-2

Combat composition of the troops of the Central Front on 25 July 1941

The 13th Army (commander - Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko; headquarters near Rodnya) - the main formations of the army were in encirclement in the area of Mogilev (the 61st Rifle and 20th Mechanized Corps) and west of Krichev (units of the 45th and 20th Rifle Corps). At the disposal of the army commander in fact there remained only the detachment of the 45th Corps of Division Commander E. Ya. Magon.

On July 20 E. Ya. Magon was subordinated the detachment (reinforced regiment) of the 6th Rifle Division, which was already operating in the Mstislavl direction, and to the headquarters of the 13th Army - the 4th Airborne Corps, operating in the Krichev direction (soon also subordinated to E. Ya. Magon).

Moreover, the 148th and 160th Rifle Divisions were urgently restored, and they soon entered battle in the composition of the 45th Corps. However these were hastily restored "from improvised materials" detachments, and not rifle formations formed according to the tables of organization - they were not even brought up to the proper strength, did not have the artillery and special units prescribed by the tables, and represented simply "meat" of march battalions that had grown onto the "bone" of the remnants of the cadre formations.

Thus, according to the report of V. F. Gerasimenko, on July 26 two march battalions of 1000 men each arrived at the disposal of the army. These battalions needed administration and special units, which in the conditions of the second half of July 1941 there was nowhere to take. Without administration and special units they often turned into "cannon fodder".

The formations of the 4th Army were transferred to the 13th Army: the 28th Rifle Corps, which was defending on the line of the Sozh River and conducting battles for Propoisk - in essence, one 55th Rifle Division plus numerous detachments of the divisions that had come out of encirclement.

As of July 25, according to the data of the headquarters of the 13th Army, the following had come out of the encirclement:

— from the composition of the 137th RD - 3278 men with 31 guns (obviously, the losses of the division on the morning of July 24, including the 497th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, are not taken into account here);

— from the composition of the 132nd RD - 1800 men with 18 guns;

— from the composition of the 160th RD - 1500 men.

— from the composition of the 148th RD (the 496th Rifle Regiment) - 400 men;

The administration of the 20th Corps remained in encirclement; in the headquarters of the army there was information that the corps commander, Major General S. I. Eremin, was wounded.

The 11th Mixed Aviation Division of Lieutenant General G. P. Kravchenko was attached to the 13th Army; according to the report of V. F. Gerasimenko, it had in all about a dozen and a half aircraft, mainly fighters, and could not conduct "large-scale combat operations".

The 21st Army (Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, the former 1st deputy of the Inspector General of Infantry of the Red Army, was appointed commander) had its former task: to defeat the Bobruisk-Bykhov grouping of the enemy. Unlike the 13th, this was a full-fledged army, in its composition - the 25th Mechanized Corps and four rifle corps.

The losses of the army, according to data as of July 20 (according to the report of the chief of the direction, Major Maksimov, of July 26), amounted to about 20,000 men; to make up for these losses the army requested 20 march battalions, 10 regimental commanders, 25 battalion commanders and 350 platoon commanders. According to this request it received 10,000 plus 8 march battalions - in all 18,000 men.

From the air the 21st Army was supported by the 28th Mixed Aviation Division and several separate aviation regiments (the 103rd and 135th Short-Range Bomber and the 9th and 126th Fighter); the 13th Bomber Aviation Division operating in this direction was already disbanded on July 25.

On the morning of July 28 the composition of the Air Force of the 21st Army included:

— bombers - 26 SB and 30 Su-2 (including 13 Su-2 that arrived from Kharkov in the composition of the 103rd Bomber Aviation Regiment on July 27) = 56 aircraft.

— fighters - 6 I-16, 6 MiG-3, 1 I-15 and 1 I-153 = 14 aircraft.

The actions of the front were supported by the Berezina and Pinsk detachments of river ships of the Pinsk River Flotilla.

July 25

An entry in the diary of Field Marshal F. von Bock: "In the morning a representative of the Stavka, Field Marshal Keitel, arrived, in order to receive first-hand information about the "Smolensk cauldron" and the "hole" in its front. After I had briefly outlined the situation to him, Keitel set out to me the Fuhrer's ideas on this account. The Fuhrer considers that encirclements need not necessarily be strategic and that we should pay more attention to tactical "small cauldrons", which are easier to clear of the enemy. In the Fuhrer's opinion, such a method is more effective and requires far less expenditure of time and resources than the former one. Unfortunately, this idea seems to me mistaken. I believe that numerous "small cauldrons", on the contrary, will distance us even more from the fulfilment of the important tasks set before us! Keitel let my statement pass by his ears and said that the Fuhrer would be glad to learn how his idea of "small cauldrons" is being realized, for example, on the right wing of the 2nd Army with the assistance of units of the 2nd Panzer Group or the XXIV Motorized Corps. The Fuhrer is, moreover, greatly concerned about the position on this wing, since the Russian troops defeated by Reichenau <commander of the 6th Army of Army Group "South"> are retreating to the north in the direction of Mozyr, from where they may attack the southern wing of the army group. I told Keitel that these considerations come into contradiction with the directive sent to us yesterday by the High Command of the Ground Forces. In accordance with this directive the troops of my right wing together with Guderian's tank group must advance to the southeast, while Keitel proposes to turn them to the southwest. Keitel said that he would certainly talk on this topic with the High Command of the Ground Forces. I called Greiffenberg, who is at present at the headquarters of the High Command of the Ground Forces, and asked him to raise the same question. Keitel switched to international problems…

In the morning I learned that the 2nd Army wants to withdraw the VII Corps from Mogilev and direct it to the southeast, in order to free the XXIV Motorized Corps engaged there. I immediately stopped these movements and ordered the corps of the left wing to move out as quickly as possible in the direction of Khislavichi…"

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

The Operational Group of the 28th Army continued the offensive on Pochinok. The forward units of the 104th Tank Division came out to the area of Ryabtsy, Solovka, Seminovo.

The 149th Rifle Division reached the line Nikulino, Osinovka, the 145th Division - the Maslovka station, Dmitrievka.

However by this time formations of the German 9th Army Corps had already come to the aid of the 2nd Panzer Group.

The 292nd Infantry Division, having made a march dash of 40-50 km (according to German data, almost without encountering resistance), by July 26 occupied a front 20 km wide on the southern flank of the Yelnya grouping in the area south of Strigino.

The 263rd Infantry Division came out to Azarovka on the Smolensk-Roslavl highway.

W. Haupt wrote in his book devoted to Army Group "Center": "The 263rd Infantry Division was transferred to the composition of the 2nd Panzer Group and received an order to come out to its zone as quickly as possible, in order to free its tank formations for the further offensive. On July 25 and 27 the 463rd and 485th Regiments and the 263rd Reconnaissance Battalion with battles crossed the Smolensk-Roslavl highway and replaced the divisions "Grossdeutschland" and "Reich", which were occupying positions with the front to the south. The main forces of the reinforced 483rd Infantry Regiment were still on the line Aleksandrovka-Khislavichi, where one battalion was conducting heavy battles with the lagging Russian units.

The replacement proceeded not without complications, since the motorized units on armored personnel carriers do not have the same conditions of employment as the infantry. Therefore it happened that the Russian units found themselves between the forward positions of the infantry and the firing positions of the artillery in the rear, and they could be destroyed only in the course of a fierce close battle.

During this battle our 263rd Infantry Division was attacked on the flank by Russian units, and in the following days it was forced to conduct heavy battles against three fresh Soviet divisions, supported by tanks, artillery and heavy infantry weapons…".

In the Zone of the Soviet 13th Army

In the composition of the 45th Corps in the Mstislavl direction the hastily restored 148th Rifle Division entered battle. According to the data of the headquarters of the 13th Army, as of July 26 it was subordinated 2 battalions of the 712th Rifle Regiment (of the 132nd Division) with 25 guns, two composite detachments (420 men with 2 guns and 170 men), as well as the 3rd Battalion of the 125th Regiment of the 6th Division. The division had the task of coming out to the eastern bank of the Sozh River; by 13.00 it had come out to the line Kornilovka, Osetishche, Babichevka.

The northern flank of the offensive was secured by the detachment of the 6th Rifle Division of Colonel M. A. Popsuy-Shapko (it concentrated in the area Medkovka, Skvereta, Kornilovka).

The detachment of the 160th Division (at first it included 1 battalion of the 84th Rifle Regiment and the 636th Rifle Regiment with a strength of up to a battalion with 14 guns) went over to the offensive on both banks of the Oster River. North of the river its advance was stopped by a counterattack of tanks from the area of Koroblevo; by 13.00 the detachment had withdrawn to the area 0.5 km east of Titovka; but south of the Oster River its left flank continued to advance on Ganovka.

Thanks to the moving out of the new units of the 45th Corps, both brigades of the 4th Airborne Corps were able to concentrate on the actions in the area of Krichev.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The Soviet 25th Mechanized Corps resumed the offensive on Propoisk, however yet again was stopped on the approaches to the city, while the 50th Tank Division suffered heavy losses in material (on July 24 the 50th Division had at its disposal 149 tanks: 65 T-34 and 84 T-26, - while on July 29 in the report of the corps commander, Major General S. M. Krivoshein, only 56 tanks are indicated: 20 T-34 plus 13 under repair and 11 T-26 plus 12 under repair).

The 21st Rifle Corps continued the offensive (the 117th Rifle Division by the morning of July 26 conducted a battle on the line Bakhan, Zelenaya Roshcha, the 187th Rifle Division - on the line Rogi, Prudok) and the 67th Rifle Corps (the 151st Rifle Division occupied Vet).

West of Rogachev and Zhlobin the 63rd Rifle Corps went over to the offensive, but was unable to break through the German defense. As a result on the morning of July 26 the position of the 61st Rifle Division is described as "unchanged" (the line Kostyashevo, Khapany east of Verichev); the 167th Division fought on the line Yasenovka, the eastern slopes of a number of heights, the 154th Division - the eastern outskirts of Minkov, Novy Mazalov, Veliky Les, Kabanovka, the eastern outskirts of Kaleev Grud.

The 110th Rifle Regiment occupied the zone Poletaevka, Istobki.

In Polesie

The raid of the cavalry group of A. I. Batskalevich continued. The 32nd Cavalry Division with three regiments (the 65th, 153rd and 86th) crossed the highway Slutsk-Bobruisk in the area of Simanovichi, the Zavolochintsy state farm, Volchki.

The fourth cavalry regiment (the 121st), with which the division administration was moving, was attacked by enemy aviation, which delayed the advance until the approach of infantry. As was stated in the report of Colonel A. I. Batskalevich, "the 121st Cavalry Regiment with the division administration that approached the crossing at that time came under a strong attack of aviation, which until late at night kept the regiment clamped in the forests. At night the regiment attempted to overcome the highway and force the river on the northern outskirts of Simanovichi. The enemy, having pulled up from the area of Slutsk motorized infantry, armored vehicles and tankettes, organized a strong rebuff and a battle which was conducted until 3.00 on 26.7, did not ensure the crossing for the regiment…"

The 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions concentrated in the area of Orekhovka, Zaostrovye, Kurgany south of Novye Dorogi, fulfilling the task for July 24.

In the Area of Mogilev

The German troops continued the assault on the city. On the night of July 26 the Soviet troops blew up the bridge over the Dnieper River.

The commander of the 172nd Rifle Division, Major General M. T. Romanov, having lost communication with the command, took the decision to break out of the encircled Mogilev. It was decided to move to the west into the forest massif in the area of Tishovka. At about 24.00 the remnants of the 172nd Rifle Division began the breakthrough from the encirclement.

The 61st Corps and the troops subordinated to it (the 20th Mechanized Corps, as well as the remnants of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, the 507th Rifle Regiment of the 148th Rifle Division and some other units), encircled in the area east of Mogilev, also began preparing for a breakthrough from the encirclement.

At a conference of the commanders of the encircled formations in the village of Sukhari (26 km east of Mogilev) there were present the commander of the 61st Rifle Corps, Major General F. A. Bakunin, the commander of the 20th Mechanized Corps, Major General N. D. Vedeneev (he had taken over the corps in place of the wounded A. G. Nikitin), the commanders of the divisions Colonel V. A. Khlebtsev (the 110th Rifle), Brigade Commander F. A. Parkhomenko (the 210th Motorized Rifle) and Major General V. T. Obukhov (the 26th Tank)⁵. The possibility of withdrawing the remaining forces of the corps from the encirclement was discussed. It was decided to begin the breakthrough in the evening of the same day. The plan envisaged the movement of the troops by three routes in the general direction of Mstislavl, Roslavl. In the vanguard followed the units of the 20th Mechanized Corps, in the rearguard - the most combat-capable units of the 110th Rifle Division.

On the night of July 26 the Soviet troops in three columns began the breakthrough in the direction of Chausy.

In his report to the General Staff of the Red Army the deputy chief of staff of the 13th Army, Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Ivanov, reported:

"On 25.7.41 the commander of the 61st RC, General Bakunin, reported: "I have withdrawn to the area of Bolgushevo, Ryki. Indicate immediately where our units are, so that I may come out to join them. Whether to blow up or not - we are too late. We need ammunition".

On 26.7 Bakunin reported. Accepted and deciphered only the end of the telegram. He writes: "the units are not capable of continuing the battle. Only the heroic efforts of the senior command staff somehow during the night are knocking them together. I request to cover by aviation and to take out the wounded by the means of aviation. Due to the absence of fuel and ammunition, we are forced to render the material unserviceable". Our further inquiries about his location yielded no answer. We believe that Bakunin withdrew to the 20th MC and the 110th RD, while the 172nd RD, which fought in Mogilev, apparently remained there.

2. Why did Mogilev remain without fuel? The warehouse of the People's Commissariat of Defense for fuel was located at the Bunichi station <apparently, Buinichi> 8 km from Mogilev, it was burned by the unauthorized action of the chief of the warehouse, who fled. The remaining stocks were expended by the units. On 15.7 at the moment of the cutting off of Mogilev by the enemy from the bases, the units there had two refuelings of fuel.

3. Why were there no shells? By the moment of the encirclement the units of the 61st RC were supplied on an equal footing with all the units of the army from the supply station, and by the moment of the encirclement they had 1-1.25 combat loads on average. There were no stocks of ammunition in Mogilev. Further attempts to supply the Mogilev garrison with shells had no success, since the airfield was occupied by the enemy.

4. Measures have been taken for the reconnaissance and search for the units of the 61st RC. Daily inquiries by radio and transmission of the order to Bakunin "Do not surrender Mogilev". Search parties have been sent out, disguised as commanders. Parachutists have been dropped. They are conducting reconnaissance by aircraft. There are no results".

July 26

German Command

An entry in the diary of von Bock: "In the morning I told Brauchitsch about the conversation I had had with Keitel yesterday and added that I could not in any way accept the idea of "small cauldrons" he had proposed. The "cauldron" in the area of Rogachev is so ephemeral that it is not even worth mentioning. In the area of Gomel there is, it is true, yet another potential "cauldron", but we, in order to shut the gate, lack the pressure of tank units from the western direction. The only railway bridge across the Dnieper is near Rechitsa, but its seizure is attended by great difficulties. Moreover, the troops stationed around the above-mentioned "cauldrons" must constantly bear in mind the danger of an attack from the eastern direction. If Guderian turns to the south as sharply as is planned, the breach between the front of his group and the troops of the army group advancing in the eastern direction will only increase. Moreover, the attack in a southerly direction by the forces of Guderian's group will inevitably bog down on the right flank, since large Russian forces are stationed near Rogachev. I continue to insist on a powerful concentrated offensive by all the forces of the army group in an easterly direction, since only such an offensive will allow us finally to destroy the battered armies of Timoshenko opposing the army group. At the same time the securing of the security of our southern flank must be taken upon itself by Army Group "South". However, judging by the corridor conversations which I have heard, one may draw the conclusion that I am hardly likely to succeed in persuading the High Command of the Ground Forces to agree with my proposals…"

Indeed, the idea of von Bock that Army Group "Center" would continue the offensive to the east while Army Group "South" was to take upon itself the securing of its southern flank, by the end of July had already lost its relevance.

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

Fierce battles continued in the zone of the offensive of the Operational Group of the 28th Army, which was attempting to break through to the Khmara River.

The 104th Tank Division conducted a battle with the enemy on the line Ivanovka, Gerasimovka.

The 145th and 149th Rifle Divisions slowly advanced forward, but the German units being transferred to the area of the Soviet offensive tied down the Soviet troops. As stated in the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front, "the 145th Rifle Division is suffering heavy losses. The offensive is developing slowly thanks to the influence of enemy aviation and the threat to the left flank from the west…"

In the Zone of the Soviet 13th Army

The offensive of the 45th Rifle Corps developed more successfully. Its 148th Rifle Division came out to the eastern bank of the Sozh River in the area of Rudnya, the Sozhenka River, Pneva, Bednya, (excl.) Chertovshchina.

The 160th Rifle Division operating to the south (1200 men) with its 443rd Regiment advanced from the area of the forest 0.5 km east of Titovka in the direction of Koroblevo, Zimonino, with its 636th Regiment - from the area of Pervomayskaya in the direction of Dyagovichi, Bel 1st.

Units of the 4th Airborne Corps, having completed the regrouping, resumed the offensive on Mikheevichi.

The battles in the area of Propoisk also continued.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

On the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers the German 12th Army Corps was reinforced with the new 112th Infantry Division from the reserve of the High Command, which delivered a counterblow from the area of Polyaninovich in the direction of Zimnitsa. As a result the 117th Rifle Division, which had seized Bakhan, found itself cut off, communication with it was lost. The commander of the 21st Rifle Corps, Major General D. E. Zakutny, who had left for the 117th Rifle Division, was taken prisoner in the area of the villages Bolshaya and Malaya Zimnitsa*. Only at night with battle did the units of the 117th Rifle Division come out of the encirclement, while the division commander, Colonel I. L. Khizhnyak, was wounded.

As a result of the German counterblow the 187th Rifle Division abandoned Rogi and Prudok and was thrown back to the south.

The 155th Rifle Division continued its concentration in the area of Dovsk, only one of its battalions was able to support the actions of the 187th Division.

Thus the front of the 21st Rifle Corps rolled back to the south to the line Svenckopolye, Dragunsk.

The 151st Rifle Division of the 67th Corps, counterattacked at the junction with the 117th Division, was pressed back to the southern outskirts of the village of Vet and conducted battles for Iskan.

The position of the 63rd Corps in the operational summary of the headquarters of the 21st Army is described as unchanged.

In Polesie

The 66th Rifle Corps went over to the defensive on a wide front: the 232nd Rifle Division - on the line Zdudichi, Buda south of Parichi, the detachment of Kurmyshev (with BePo 52) occupied the area of Ratmirovichi, the Rabkor station. The ships of the Berezina Detachment of the Pinsk River Flotilla conducted a massive shelling of the crossing at Parichi, while the monitor "Smolensk" received damage.

The German 293rd Infantry Division, advancing along the Pripyat, occupied Petrikov. Soon Colonel S. F. Pivovarov was appointed commander of the 75th Rifle Division.

The fulfilment of the task of liquidating the Soviet cavalry group of Colonel A. I. Batskalevich was entrusted to the commander of the troops of the operational rear of Army Group "Center", General of Infantry M. von Schenckendorff. He brought in units of the 162nd, 252nd and 87th Infantry Divisions, aviation and a cavalry regiment of the SS under the command of H. Fegelein (the future brother-in-law of Hitler).

As a result the enemy succeeded in restoring control over the Warsaw highway. Three cavalry regiments of the 32nd Division found themselves cut off from the main forces north of the highway.

South of the highway the 121st Cavalry Regiment, pursued by the enemy, was overtaken and encircled in the area of Seltsy. Only on the night of July 27 did it manage to break out and join up with the units of the 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions in the area of Orekhovka.

In the Area of Mogilev

In Mogilev only focal street battles were conducted with the remnants of the Soviet troops.

The commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko, reported to Marshal S. K. Timoshenko that he had given the order to the units of the 61st Corps to break through to the front Propoisk-Cherikov to join up with the 28th Corps.

The remnants of the 61st Rifle Corps, gathered in the area of Sukhari, at about 4.00 began the breakthrough in the direction of Chausy, however they ran into units of the German 78th Infantry Division, whose headquarters had been located in Blagovichi since July 20, right on the way from Mogilev to Chausy.

In the history of the defense of the city a description of the battle from the German side is given: "At 4 o'clock in the morning from the side of Blagovichi the noise of battle began to grow. A little later the reconnaissance of the 5th Infantry Regiment reported that north of Samulki the offensive of the enemy had begun, which was trying to encircle the regiment. Simultaneously from the village of Moshok they reported that the Russians were encircling them. The division commander sent reinforcements to Moshok. At about 7 hours 40 minutes the Russians approached the headquarters to 300 meters. By superior forces the enemy's offensive was stopped. At 9 hours 30 minutes the main forces of the division went over to the defensive. The division suffered heavy losses. But from the evening of July 26 we were in an advantageous position for the offensive in the morning. On July 27 at 5 o'clock the Russians with the help of all types of weapons began to break through to Blagovichi. The division, having withstood the assault, at about seven o'clock with the forces of all regiments went over to the offensive. Gradually, exhausting the Russians in battles, we moved forward. The resistance of the enemy weakened. After our capture of the village of Kholmy the regiments took the enemy in a ring, where he was defeated…"

July 27

Soviet Command

The Soviet High Command of the troops of the Western Direction reacted sharply to the decision of the commanders of the formations encircled in the area of Mogilev to break out of the encirclement. In the report to the Stavka of the Supreme High Command it was stated: "In view of the fact that the defense of Mogilev by the 61st Rifle Corps diverted upon itself up to 5 infantry divisions* and was conducted so energetically that it tied down large enemy forces, we had ordered the commander of the 13th Army to hold Mogilev at all costs and ordered both him and the commander of the Central Front, Comrade Kuznetsov, to go over to the offensive on Mogilev, having in the future the securing of the left flank of Kachalov and the coming out to the Dnieper. However the commander of the 13th Army not only did not spur on the vacillating commander of the 61st Corps, Bakunin, but let slip the moment when the latter unauthorizedly abandoned Mogilev, began the withdrawal to the east and only then reported.

With this movement of the corps a difficult situation is created for it and the enemy's divisions are freed, which can maneuver against the 13th and 21st Armies. Immediately upon receipt of the news of the withdrawal from Mogilev and of the street battle still continuing there, an order was given to the commander of the 13th Army to stop the withdrawal from Mogilev and to hold the city at all costs, and to replace the corps commander Bakunin, who grossly violated the order of the command, with Colonel Voevodin, who firmly stood for holding Mogilev, and to bring Bakunin before a tribunal…"

The commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko, was replaced by Major General K. D. Golubev, who had come out of the encirclement (the former commander of the 10th Army in the Belostok salient).

The Soviet 13th Army

Major General K. D. Golubev immediately entered into the position and sent to the commander of the Central Front, Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, the following report:

"I report that on the night of 26 to 27 July I took over from Lieutenant General Comrade Gerasimenko and entered into the command of the 13th Army. I ask you to excuse me that I did not call in and introduce myself personally. I was very much hurried, in Moscow by Comrade Stalin and Comrade Zhukov and here at the headquarters by Comrade Timoshenko, so that I should go straight to the army as quickly as possible. Having familiarized myself with the situation and your instructions, I understood that the center of efforts must be on K. <Krichev> and P. <Propoisk> and the holding of M <Mogilev, which had already been abandoned - VM>. I was also a witness to the fact that instead of the exact fulfilment of the order of the Military Council of the army on the organization of the night offensive on K., some responsible commanders are engaged in dawdling, in striving under one or another argument to refuse the offensive, etc.

I will decisively put an end to this disgrace, applying merciless measures.

I also ask for permission on the following fundamental question:

It is necessary to reinforce the army with one or two rifle divisions and one tank division. At present the army has as a whole combat organism only one 55th RD, all the rest are only the designation of divisions, in reality they are for the most part composite detachments hastily manned without a sufficient amount of artillery and machine guns. There are no tanks, there are absolutely no anti-tank means, nor means of air defense. The 512th Air Defense Regiment Battalion belonging to the army was seized by Kachalov, and he did the same with a number of other rifle and artillery units.

It is very bad with ammunition, since July 10 the army has not received a single shell, and certain types of ammunition are completely absent. There is about 10 % of artillery in the army. There are 54 machine guns in the whole army. There are no lubricating and wiping materials, materials and spare parts for the repair of weapons.

CONCLUSION: 1. In the present form the army on a 120 km front is in a condition to act against those insignificant enemy forces which are in front of it. True, this enemy, unlike us, is well equipped with artillery, mortars and has tanks.

2. It is necessary sharply to raise discipline and respect for orders and to instill a taste for night actions.

3. For conducting an offensive operation the army must be reinforced with 1-2 rifle and 1 tank divisions, reinforced with means of air defense and anti-tank defense (1-2 battalions each). Without this the army is not prepared for offensive actions. Moreover, it is hardly likely to be able to hold the front in case of an attack by large enemy forces, for the front is represented by a thin thread of infantry. There are no reserves as of today, I intend to withdraw to the reserve and form the 6th RD. Internal measures for the formation from separate detachments, as well as at the expense of the arriving replacements of whole units and formations, will be carried out, but this is all only infantry.

That is the state in which I took over the army, and my request for help".

(It must be said that a day before this Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko had also reported on the unfavorable material state of the army: "The position with all types of material supply is very unfavorable. Especially bad with ammunition.

At present in the troops there is from half to one combat load of ammunition. At the army supply bases there are no whole series of ammunition: 37-mm, 76-mm, 85-mm anti-aircraft and 120-mm mortar rounds.

There are no lubricating and wiping materials.

No weapons are arriving to make up for the natural attrition and for new even small formations.

The army has no stocks of weapons at all. There is nowhere to repair weapons, since there are no artillery repair workshops.

The further prospects of supply with ammunition and weapons are unknown, since to the repeated requests and inquiries up to the present time from the artillery directorate of the front no answer has been received…")

On this same day at about 4.00 Major General K. D. Golubev gave the order for the offensive. The 45th Rifle Corps was ordered during July 27 to take possession of the Krichev bridgehead, and on the night of July 28 to take possession of Krichev and come out to the front Ivanovka, Kostyushkovichi, Komarovichi.

The 28th Rifle Corps received the task of routing the enemy at Propoisk by artillery fire (in interaction with the units of the 21st Army), but the main efforts K. D. Golubev considered it necessary to apply in the area of Cherikov: it was ordered to force the Sozh River, to cut the Warsaw highway and by the end of July 28 to occupy the line Turya (north of Cherikov), Krivaya Sloboda, Rogalnya, Krasnaya Sloboda on the Pronya River.

The commander of the 28th Rifle Corps, Major General V. S. Popov, received an order to form from the units coming out of the encirclement the group of Grishin. According to the data of the headquarters of the 13th Army as of July 26, the group of Grishin ("the detachment of the 137th Division") was made up of the following detachments (new data compared with the figures of the army headquarters as of July 25):

— of the 137th Division - 3500 men

— of the 160th Division - 1500 men

— of the 132nd Division - 900 men

— of the 143rd Division - 300 men

— of the 148th Division - 300 men

— of the corps units and small groups - about 300 men (in all about 6800 men)

— with 52 guns of various systems (most likely, the losses of the guns of the 397th Howitzer Artillery Regiment on the morning of July 24 are again not taken into account).

The 4th Airborne Corps continued the offensive on Mikheevichi; its 8th Brigade, operating south of the Sozhenka River, took possession of the forest west of Prokhorovka.

The 55th Rifle Division resumed the attacks and came out to the southern outskirts of Propoisk.

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

The Operational Group of Kachalov continued active operations: its 104th Tank Division conducted a battle for Ivonino, Stupino, and by the end of the day had come out to the line Pogulyaevka, Marchenovka, height 220.7. The 149th Rifle Division occupied the line (excl.) Stupino, (excl.) Osinovka, the 145th Rifle Division - Osinovka. Novy Derebuzh.

In the course of the offensive the Soviet troops succeeded in routing the German strongpoint in Voroshilovo; according to Soviet data, 114 soldiers and officers of the enemy were taken prisoner.

The losses of the operational group of the 28th Army are listed in the report to the Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Western Direction:

The losses of the 104th TD amounted to 26 men of the command staff, 52 of the junior command staff, 62 of the rank-and-file.

In the 149th RD - 10 command staff, 48 junior command staff, 910 rank-and-file.

In the 145th RD - 78 command staff, 274 junior command staff, 1689 rank-and-file.

Losses in material - 1 KV, 3 T-34, 33 "PT-22 and T-26"*.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The battles on the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers continued. The 155th Rifle Division counterattacked the enemy in the direction of Bolshaya Zimnitsa, but was stopped on the line Borki, Trud.

The 151st Rifle Division of the 67th Corps was pressed back to the line south of Iskan, Vet.

The position of the 63rd and 66th Corps is described as unchanged.

In Polesie

The cavalry group of Batskalevich (at his disposal remained the 43rd and 47th Cavalry Divisions and the 121st Cavalry Regiment of the 32nd Division) undertook yet another attempt to break through north of the Warsaw highway - this time in the area of Pastovichi, Novye Dorogi.

Major General A. N. Sidelnikov (commander of the 47th Cavalry Division) wrote in his report: "…fulfilling the task - acting through the rear and the railway junction Orsha and linking up with the broken-through units of the 32nd CD from 11.00 together with the 43rd CD and the 121st Cavalry Regiment of the 32nd CD, attempting on the sector Pastovichi, Nov. Dorogi to break through into the forests southeast of Osipovichi, covered by reinforced battalions of infantry. The actions of our cavalry group were coordinated, but in the process of the battle the enemy brought up along the highway from the side of Bobruisk and Slutsk up to 2 motorized regiments with tanks and artillery. The defense was supported by enemy aviation. The conducted mounted and dismounted attack had no success and was repelled by the enemy on the 2nd defensive line. During the battle about a battalion of manpower was killed and cut down, 2 aircraft were shot down, 3 tanks, 2 anti-tank guns and several machine guns were knocked out. A headquarters was routed, up to 5 trucks and 2 warehouses - fuel and artillery - were burned".

By the end of the day the 43rd Cavalry Division (together with the headquarters of the 32nd Division) concentrated in the area of Shcheglovshchina, and after a night march on July 27-28 came out to the area of Podolye, Bobrovichi, Zamostochye, that is, withdrew to the area northwest of Karpilovka.

The 47th Cavalry Division concentrated in the area of Vesely Ostrov, Slavkovichi, the Amur colony (a little further to the west).

Major General A. N. Sidelnikov ended his report with the following justification: "The withdrawal to the new area was forced by the impossibility of a breakthrough, because the Germans, after detecting us at the crossing of the Ptich River, having concentrated on the line Evsevichi, Starye Dorogi large forces of troops and strongly fortified the defense of the highway Bobruisk-Slutsk. There is a threat of envelopment by the Bobruisk and Slutsk groupings. The horse strength is greatly exhausted - every day horses fall from overstrain".

The End of the Battles in the Area of Mogilev

F. von Bock wrote in his diary: "Mogilev has fallen. 35,000 prisoners and 245 artillery guns have been captured!"

On the following day the chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces F. Halder noted: "The area of Mogilev has been finally cleared of the enemy's troops. Judging by the number of captured prisoners and guns, one may consider that here, as was supposed, there were initially six enemy divisions".

Indeed, directly in the area of Mogilev 6 divisions of the 61st Rifle and 20th Mechanized Corps were defeated.

The 61st Rifle Corps: the 53rd, 110th and 172nd Rifle Divisions. The attempt at an organized exit of the corps from the encirclement did not succeed: after two days of battles Major General F. A. Bakunin ordered to break through to the east in small groups, having first destroyed all the equipment and dispersed the horses. He himself brought out of the encirclement a group of 140 men. The military commissar of the corps, Brigade Commissar I. V. Voronov, and the chief of the political department, Regimental Commissar A. I. Turbinin, perished. On August 3 the chief of artillery of the 61st Corps, Brigade Commander N. G. Lazutin, was taken prisoner*.

The commander of the 53rd Rifle Division, Colonel I. Ya. Bartenev, was also taken prisoner. From the composition of the division by July 20 about a thousand men without heavy armament had gathered at the assembly point beyond the Desna. Soon the 53rd Division was restored and operated in the composition of the Reserve Front (on August 1 it is listed in the composition of the 43rd Army). The composite company (the remnants) of the 223rd Rifle Regiment (it was headed by the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Semenov) fought in the composition of the 110th Division.

The 110th Rifle Division was destroyed almost completely (disbanded in September 1941), the division commander, Colonel V. A. Khlebtsev, went over to partisan actions; on December 16, 1941, he brought out of the encirclement a group of 161 men*. The chief of staff of the 110th Division, Colonel Ya. P. Chistopyanov, is listed as missing (there is information that he fell "under the hot hand" and was shot by L. Z. Mekhlis as early as the first half of July). The commander of the 394th Rifle Regiment, Colonel Ya. S. Slepokurov, is listed as missing; the commander of the 425th Rifle Regiment, Colonel A. S. Pshenichnikov, perished on July 27, 1941.

The 172nd Rifle Division was also completely defeated and disbanded, its commander, Major General M. T. Romanov, while coming out of the encirclement was wounded, taken prisoner and in December 1941 executed for pro-Soviet agitation in the Hammelburg concentration camp. The commander of the 388th Rifle Regiment, Colonel S. F. Kutepov, and both commanders of the artillery regiments of the division, Colonels I. S. Mazalov (the 340th Light Artillery Regiment) and I. F. Zhivolup (the 493rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment), perished.

The 438th Corps Artillery Regiment, attached to the 61st Corps: on the night of August 3 in the zone of the 21st Army in the area of Vaskovichi 270 Red Army men and 50 men of the command staff came out of the encirclement without material.

The 20th Mechanized Corps: the 26th and 38th Tank and the 210th Motorized Divisions. The acting corps commander, Major General N. D. Vedeneev, came out of the encirclement (in August 1941 he was appointed chief of a faculty at the Academy of Armored Troops in Moscow and only at the end of 1944 returned to the active army). The remnants of the 210th Motorized Division at the beginning of August 1941 were brought out by its commander, Brigade Commander F. A. Parkhomenko; on August 7, 1941, he received the rank of major general. The division itself was re-formed into the 4th Cavalry Division (the 210th Motorized Division had been formed in the spring of 1941 precisely on the basis of the 4th Don Cossack Cavalry Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of the Red Star Division named after K. E. Voroshilov), which subsequently fought in the composition of the Bryansk Front.

The remnants of the 26th Tank Division were brought out of the encirclement by its commander, Major General V. T. Obukhov. The commander of the 38th Tank Division, Colonel S. I. Kapustin, was taken prisoner near Roslavl on September 29, 1941. Both tank divisions were disbanded in September 1941.

S. P. Ivanov wrote in his memoirs that the decision to break out of the encirclement without the sanction of the Stavka did not receive approval. "After coming out of the encirclement, - General Bakunin later related, - I was summoned to Moscow, to the cadres department, where I heard from General A. D. Rumyantsev unjust reproaches about the allegedly premature surrender of Mogilev. In spite of this, I reported to him about those who particularly distinguished themselves and tried to hand over the list of them. But I received to this an unequivocal answer: "We do not decorate the encircled"..."

At the same time it is known that at the beginning of August 1941 for the battles near Mogilev the Order of the Red Banner was received (most - posthumously) by the already listed Major General M. T. Romanov, Regimental Commissar A. I. Turbinin, Brigade Commander N. G. Lazutin, Colonel S. F. Kutepov, Colonel I. S. Mazalov, Colonel V. A. Khlebtsev (in the order erroneously written A. A. Khlebtsev), Colonel A. S. Pshenichnikov, Colonel Ya. S. Slepokurov, as well as Major V. L. Zabolotsky (assistant chief of staff for the rear of the 61st Rifle Corps, listed as missing) and some others.

* * *

However in the area of Mogilev the enemy defeated not only the 6 divisions that were encircled in the area of Mogilev, but all the divisions of the 13th Army and the greater part of the 4th Army.

From the composition of the 45th Rifle Corps two regiments of the 187th Rifle Division (the 292nd and 338th) were completely defeated, while the third regiment was thrown back into the zone of the 21st Army. Here the division was restored, including the 292nd and 338th Rifle Regiments.

Two regiments of the 148th Rifle Division were also defeated: the 507th, which fought south of Mogilev together with the division of Major General M. T. Romanov, and the 496th, which took part in the attack on the Bykhov bridgehead together with the divisions of the 20th Rifle Corps. The headquarters of the 148th Division, which arrived on July 17 in the area of Krichev, headed in fact a new division, which fought in the composition of the 13th Army.

The headquarters of the 45th Rifle Corps managed to break out of the encirclement in the area of the Bykhov bridgehead, the corps commander E. Ya. Magon soon headed a composite detachment which operated in the Mstislavl and Krichev directions.

The 20th Rifle Corps, in the words of the army commander V. F. Gerasimenko, was defeated not so much by the enemy as by the railway transport. The weakly controlled units of the corps soon after entering into their first battle for the Bykhov bridgehead found themselves in encirclement. By the moment of the end of the battles for Mogilev the remnants of the divisions (the 132nd, 137th and 160th) together with their commanders had already for the most part come out of the encirclement. However the administration of the 20th Rifle Corps was defeated; on July 28 during the crossing of the Sozh River in the area of Propoisk the corps commander, Major General S. I. Eremin, and the chief of staff, Colonel V. A. Simanovsky, perished.

Here too in the area of Propoisk, while coming out of the encirclement on July 28, the commander of the 13th Mechanized Corps, Major General P. N. Akhlyustin, who was retreating from the Belostok salient, perished.

From the composition of the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army near Mogilev the 143rd and 42nd Rifle Divisions and the greater part of the 6th Rifle Division were defeated. The remnants of the 143rd Rifle Division came out together with the 160th Division of the 20th Rifle Corps. It was hastily restored and subsequently fought in the composition of the Bryansk Front.

With the 20th Rifle Corps the 42nd Rifle Division attempted to break out of the encirclement. However after heavy battles on July 19-20 communication with the corps was interrupted, and subsequently the remnants of the division broke out independently. Only on July 29 Colonel M. E. Kozyr with a group of the division headquarters and the headquarters of the 44th Rifle Regiment broke out of the encirclement, and already on July 30 by order of the 21st Army the 42nd Division (in fact restored anew) was subordinated to the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Corps.

The 6th Rifle Division also had to be formed anew; soon it entered battle in the composition of the 45th Corps.

July 28

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

The Operational Group of V. Ya. Kachalov continued to attempt to seize the crossings over the Khmara River, but was constantly subjected to counterattacks by the enemy and the influence of his aviation. In the report to Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov reported: "…As of today I have three fighter aircraft. The enemy with large units of aviation does not allow us to advance, and most importantly all the time bombs the artillery positions. The fighter aviation regiment allocated to our disposal arrived at our airfields, but General Zhigarev subordinated it to himself. I have no aviation. I request to provide me with aviation, fighters…"

A new order was given: "The troops of the group of the 28th Army have inadmissibly lingered in overcoming individual centers of resistance and firing points of the 263rd German Division.

For four days the units have been marking time, sometimes stopping before groups of motorcyclists or individual anti-tank guns.

I DEMAND from the commanders, political workers and soldiers the seizure at all costs tomorrow 29.7 of the crossings over the Khmara River.

The enemy in front of the units of the group has already begun to withdraw and one more blow is needed in order to destroy him before the crossings over the Khmara River…"

In the Area of Mstislavl and Krichev

The 45th Rifle Corps continued to clear the eastern bank of the Sozh River in the area southeast of Mstislavl.

The 148th Rifle Division fought on the line Omshary, Lyakhovichi, the forest 2.5 km west of Babichevka, the 160th Rifle Division north of the Oster River approached Koroblevo, south of the Oster River - to Dyagovichi.

The 8th Brigade of the 4th Airborne Corps came out to the eastern bank of the Sozh River in the area east of Prokhorovka (north of Krichev), the 7th Brigade with one battalion came out to the eastern bank of the Sozh River at Chernets (south of Krichev).

However the actions of the 4th Airborne Corps, which for 10 days had not succeeded in restoring the situation in the area of Krichev, caused dissatisfaction of the new army commander Major General K. D. Golubev. In the report to Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov he wrote: "…for the repeated non-fulfilment of the combat orders to take possession of Krichev, for the fact that instead of the offensive after the powerful artillery preparation of ours, when the Germans ran away - the units of the 7th and 8th Airborne Brigades not only did not advance, but almost without any pressure themselves retreated (so it happened also on the night of 27 to 28.7) and all this did not find any influence on the part of the command of the 4th Airborne Corps - the Military Council of the army removed from the post the commander of the 4th Airborne Corps, Major General Zhadov, and the military commissar Olenin, appointing in their place Colonel Grishin and Regimental Commissar Krasnovsky. The command of the 7th Airborne Brigade was also removed from the post and brought before a tribunal for the surrender of Krichev on 17.7 - in their place strong leadership was sent (the assistant of the chief of the reconnaissance department of the army headquarters, Major Leshchina, and Battalion Commissar Nikonov). The new leadership has been given the corresponding instructions and practical assistance will be rendered. I hope for a turning point in the Krichev direction for the better…"

The measures of K. D. Golubev did not find support from the commander of the front. Major General A. S. Zhadov was recalled to the disposal of the front headquarters and soon appointed chief of staff of the 3rd Army. Colonel M. D. Grishin (commander of the 2nd Rifle Division of the 10th Army of the Belostok salient, on June 22 was on leave, returning to his unit, managed to get only as far as Borisov, where he headed the "composite division" in the composition of the group of I. Z. Susaykov; by the end of July 1941 he was at the disposal of the Main Directorate of Cadres of the People's Commissariat of Defense) soon headed the restored 42nd Division in the composition of the 21st Army.

Thus, Colonel A. F. Kazankin soon entered into the command of the corps, V. M. Olenin returned to the post of military commissar of the corps. Major S. M. Evgrafov was appointed chief of staff of the 4th Airborne Corps.

Besides the command of the 4th Airborne Corps, K. D. Golubev also asked to replace the chief of staff of the army, Brigade Commander A. V. Petrushevsky, the chief of the reconnaissance department, Colonel Starov, and the chief of the rear, Colonel Gladkov, and to send other commanders in their place, since the officers available in the 13th Army were not suitable for these positions.

In the Area of Cherikov

The 28th Rifle Corps changed the vector of the offensive and attacked in the area of Cherikov. It forced the Sozh River and attempted to intercept the Warsaw highway in the area of Bogdanovka (east of Cherikov). The battles went on the eastern and southern outskirts of Cherikov, as well as in the area of Miragoshch, Zhuravel and Bakov west of Cherikov.

There is information that two cavalry divisions of the group of O. I. Gorodovikov could be used as the echelon of the development of success (in the brief report on the Central Front it was said that on July 29 "the troops of the front were warned about the actions of two cavalry divisions (group of Gorodovikov) in the direction of Cherikov, Mogilev…")

However it was not possible to break through the enemy's defense. And a few days later the cavalry divisions of the "reserve of the High Command" had to be used in a completely different place.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The main battles were conducted on the front in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh Rivers (in the zone of the 25th Mechanized Corps, the 21st and 67th Rifle Corps).

Against the 63rd Rifle Corps the enemy did not undertake active operations.

In Polesie

After the failures of the previous days the cavalry group of Batskalevich ceased active operations. Its three cavalry regiments, which found themselves north of the Warsaw highway, undertook diversionary actions, attacked the Yasen station and the Tataraka halt on the railway line Minsk-Bobruisk.

However the German 87th Infantry Division operating here was able to reliably cover the important communication. In the report of General of Infantry M. von Schenckendorff it was said that "the local security units (subunits), for example, guarding the Yasen station, repeatedly found themselves in a difficult position, however the enemy nevertheless did not succeed, with the exception of individual small damages which were quickly eliminated, in thoroughly putting the railway line out of action…"

July 29

The Offensive of Kachalov's Group

The Operational Group of the 28th Army continued active operations, but again failed to seize the crossings over the Khmara River and break through to Pochinok.

The Soviet 13th Army

The new commander of the 13th Army, Major General K. D. Golubev, gave the order:

"1. The enemy stubbornly defends the road Khislavichi, Krichev, Propoisk. His centers of resistance have been identified and offer resistance: 1. Gostinka, Zimonino, 2. Krichev, 3. Cherikov, 4. Propoisk.

2. The 13th A delivers a blow to the enemy, coming out with the right flank of the 148th RD to the Sozh River and taking possession of Krichev, Cherikov, Makarenkov, cutting the communications of the enemy. The beginning of the attack at night.

3. The 45th RC is to destroy the enemy in the area of Gostinka, Zimonino and Krichev and come out to the line of the Sozh River Borovaya, Lyudogoshch, Bel 2nd, Ivanovka, Oblogi (2 km east of Kostyukovichi), Krylovka <Prygovka>. During the night by detachments with forces of 20 men each with a sapper squad to intercept the roads Zui, Ivanovka, Oblogi, the eastern outskirts of Prygovka. From the morning of 30.7 to attack Krichev from the north and south, in the future to have the task of advancing in its direction on Chausy to the Pronya River.

4. The 28th RC is to cut the road Krichev, Propoisk in two places, destroy the enemy in the areas of Cherikov and Bolotny, Makarenkov, having as the immediate task to take possession of the bridgehead a) Bogdanovka, Latyshino, height 166.2, Miragoshch, b) Sokolovka, Aleksandrovka 1st. To have as the task in the future to advance in the direction of Rabovichi to the Pronya River.

5. The Air Force of the army:

a) during the night to bomb Krichev and Cherikov,

b) during the day not to allow the approach of the enemy along the roads: 1) from the side of Lobkovichi, 2) from the side of Molyatichi, 3) from the side of Botvinovka, 4) from the side of Rechitsa.

c) to cover the actions of the infantry and to bomb the enemy Krichev, Cherikov.

6. The CP of the army headquarters in the forest west of Krivaya.

7. I demand from the commanders of all degrees the conduct of active reconnaissance (especially night reconnaissance) with the capture of prisoners and certainly daring and persistent actions during the offensive, in no case allowing withdrawal from the occupied lines.

Commander of the 13th Army Major General Golubev.

Member of the Military Council Brigade Commissar Furt.

Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov⁶".

By order of the commander of the 13th Army, Major General K. D. Golubev, on the basis of the 4th Airborne Corps a "composite division" was formed, subordinated to Division Commander E. Ya. Magon. The brigades were re-formed into composite regiments, a composite battalion was additionally included in the division; it was also planned to use the administration of the 160th Division. The commander of the "composite division" in the documents is Colonel M. D. Grishin.

In the Area of Mstislavl and Krichev

The 148th Rifle Division continued to advance toward the Sozh River, took possession of Gostinka and Polokhovo and conducted a battle on the approaches to Zimonino. In the evening summary battles for Borovaya, Nadeykovichi and Zimonino are indicated.

In the area of Krichev the 4th Airborne Corps forced the Sozh River in two places. North of Krichev the 8th Brigade ("the 8th Composite Regiment") occupied Voronevo, but after a counterattack of the enemy withdrew to the eastern bank of the Sozh River. (In November 1941 the episode with the capture of Voronevo was mentioned in the recommendation for the award of the Order of the Red Banner to Colonel M. D. Grishin).

South of Krichev the 7th Brigade ("the 7th Composite Regiment") continued to clear the bank of the Sozh River of the enemy and seized Mikheevichi, with part of its forces forced the Sozh River and fought in the area north of Kalinino. In the evening the composite detachment of Major V. S. Timchenko (chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 4th Airborne Corps) broke into Krichev.

In the Area of Cherikov

According to the Soviet operational summaries, the 28th Rifle Corps (in its composition one 55th Rifle Division is named, since the 137th Division on this day by order was withdrawn to the reserve of the front) took possession of Bogdanovka and conducted a battle for Miragoshch, Zhuravel, Ramidovsky, for the southern and eastern outskirts of Cherikov.

In Polesie

In the morning the 232nd Rifle Division with the subordinated 487th Rifle and 18th Tank Regiments went over to the offensive in the area of Parichi and came out to the line the southern outskirts of Skalka, Selishche, Chernin, Romanishche, Ugly. In the course of the battle 26 BT tanks lost in the battle of July 24 were discovered (of them 23 tanks had burned out and were not subject to restoration).

The detachment of Kurmyshev with the support of BePo 52 occupied the western outskirts of Chernye Brody.

However the commander of the 66th Corps, Major General F. D. Rubtsov, recognized the results of the battle as unsatisfactory: "The units and formations did not fulfil the task, acting sluggishly and indecisively.

1. The 793rd Rifle Regiment did not take possession of the town of Parichi, having a superiority of forces and means on its sector. Colonel Puzikov, despite my personal instruction, was unable to organize the battle and did not occupy Parichi.

2. The commander of the 797th Rifle Regiment, Colonel Voznyuk, showed inability to organize interaction with the artillery, infantry and between the 1st and 3rd rifle battalions, without any grounds ordered the battalion to leave Slobodka and withdraw to Romanishche and begin digging in.

3. The detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Kurmyshev also did not take possession of Chernye Brody.

4. The units of the 232nd RD during the artillery preparation did not come out to the line of the attack (200-250 m), thereby conducting the offensive in less favorable conditions.

5. The commanders of the artillery in the battle turned out not to be in their place.

All that has been taken shows that the commanders of various degrees, besides the inability to organize the battle, treat combat orders with inadmissible frivolity, considering their non-fulfilment a natural phenomenon…"

For the next day the units of the corps received the order to resume the offensive.

The 75th Rifle Division continued to defend along the Pripyat River. Its actions were supported by the Pripyat Detachment of River Ships of the Pinsk Military Flotilla. In the evening F. Halder wrote: "River steamers on the Pripyat hamper the actions of our troops. The cavalry corps of the enemy is still operating in the rear of Army Group "Center"".

On the eve north of Rogachev the remnants of the administration of the 3rd Army, retreating from Grodno itself, headed by Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, came out of the encirclement. The command of the Central Front immediately decided to use it: already on the following day the 66th Rifle Corps, the Mozyr fortified region, the 75th Rifle Division and other detachments operating in Polesie were transferred to the subordination of the army.

V. I. Kuznetsov was left as commander of the army, Major General A. S. Zhadov was appointed chief of staff; the headquarters was located in the area west of Kalinkovichi.

July 30

In the Zone of the Soviet 13th Army

The chief of the German General Staff F. Halder wrote in his diary: "As a result of the continuous and stubborn battles of the enemy, the tank formations could not be withdrawn from the front. The 4th Tank Division had to be brought into battle again in the area of Krichev, and the regiment "Grossdeutschland" - in the area of Roslavl…"

Thus the Soviet attacks in the area of Krichev and Roslavl continued to tie down the German strike groupings. At the same time the Army Group of Guderian formed on July 28 (the 24th Motorized Corps, the 7th and 9th Army Corps), despite the activity of the Soviet troops, continued preparing for a new offensive.

The 148th Rifle Division of the 45th Corps conducted the offensive in the direction of Dubrovka, but in connection with the appearance of a new enemy grouping in the area of Borovaya, Rudnya (here units of the German 7th Army Corps, freed after the battles for Mogilev, were identified) by 16.00 was forced to go over to the defensive (on the line Yanovka, Kornilovka and further along the northern bank of the Sozhenka River).

The composite detachment operating south of the Sozhenka River abandoned Gostinka.

The 4th Airborne Corps in the area of Krichev was counterattacked. As a result three battalions of the 8th Airborne Brigade withdrew to the area of Prokhorovka, the fourth - to the area of Mikheevka.

The 7th Brigade with part of its forces conducted a battle for Prudki and the intersection of the railway and the Warsaw highway; two of its battalions remained on the western bank of the Sozh River and conducted a battle on the southern outskirts of Krichev. Almost all the soldiers of this detachment, including the commander, Major V. S. Timchenko, perished*; only 13 men crossed back over the Sozh River.

In all the losses of the corps for July 28-30 amounted to (presented in the combat report of the headquarters of the 13th Army of August 1):

7th Brigade: 63 killed, 580 wounded, no information on 607 men;

8th Brigade: 192 killed, 618 wounded, no information on 1059 men.

The 28th Rifle Corps (the 55th Rifle Division) conducted a regrouping before the new offensive.

On this day into the forest in the area of gizhenka north of the Sozh River the remnants of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, retreating from the area of Mogilev, in the number of 1000 men, came out.

In the Zone of the Soviet 21st Army

The Soviet 21st Army was ordered to go over to a new offensive in the morning of July 31, however literally a few hours later it received a new order - to go over to the defensive.

In Polesie

The 66th Rifle Corps of the "new" 3rd Army all day slowly advanced forward, however again did not fulfil the task of the day; it received an order to resume the offensive in the morning of July 31 and to occupy Parichi.

The cavalry group of Batskalevich had its former task of breaking through the Warsaw highway, however here the initiative passed entirely to the enemy.

The 162nd Infantry Division went over to the offensive and came out to the line Glusk, Dubrovo, Budenichi.

July 31

The offensive of the Operational Group of Kachalov finally petered out.

In the zone of the 21st Army a relative lull set in.

In the zone of the 13th Army the 45th Rifle Corps resumed the attacks, but as a result of the counterattacks of the enemy was forced to go over to the defensive. The 148th Rifle Division was stopped on the line Kornilovka, Yanovka, Pnevo and defended the sector Lipovsky, Korolishki, (excl.) Zimonino.

The 4th Airborne Corps occupied the line Prokhorovka, Mikheevichi, Prudki.

The 55th Rifle Division of the 28th Rifle Corps with its main forces resumed the offensive on the northern bank of the Sozh River in the area of Bogdanovka, Zhuravel, Bakov, but as stated in the operational summary of the headquarters of the Central Front, it had no success.

The commander of the 13th Army, Major General K. D. Golubev, gave a new order for the offensive:

The 45th Rifle Corps (the 148th Rifle Division, the restored 6th Rifle Division and the 649th Corps Artillery Regiment) received an order to destroy the enemy in the area of Galeevka, Dubrovka, Zimonino and by the end of August 1 to come out to the Sozh River on the front Paradino, Lyudogoshch, Kholmy, Glushnevo, having the task in the future of advancing on Molyatichi.

The 6th Rifle Division received an order by a night march to move to the area of Ganovka, to take into its composition the 654th Rifle Regiment (of the 148th Division) and to go over to the offensive.

The "composite division" of the 4th Airborne Corps was to clear the eastern bank of the Sozh River on the line (excl.) Glushnevo, (excl.) Borisovichi.

In Polesie

The German 162nd Infantry Division continued the offensive and by the evening of August 1 had reached the line Troychany, the Prussy farmsteads, Rudnichi, Berezino, south of Bayanovo. General of Infantry M. von Schenckendorff in his report wrote: "Very bad roads and swampy forests hampered the advance more than the resistance of the enemy. The enemy repeatedly made his way into the rear of our units along impassable roads, mainly with Cossack and Caucasian cavalry subunits, which proved themselves as brave and staunch fighters. Thus, in the evening of 1.08.1941, during one of such sorties, the enemy made a surprise attack on the division headquarters, which found itself in a difficult position and in the course of the battle lost a large number of motor vehicles, a radio set, a train, etc."

On August 1 the cavalry group of Batskalevich was to resume the movement in the direction of the Warsaw highway, but its commanders sent the higher command the following telegram: "As a result of prolonged battles and marches the horse strength is extremely exhausted and cannot stand a march of 20-25 km. The material lags behind, ammunition is running out, there is no grain. The exhaustion of the horse strength makes the units non-combat-capable. The enemy is accompanied by aviation and everywhere at the junctions meets motorized mechanized infantry. I consider it necessary to withdraw the units of the group beyond the Ptich River to be put in order. Batskalevich, Genezyk, Glinsky".

On this subject F. von Bock left in his diary the following entry: "The Russians do not encode a large part of their radio messages, which is very much to our advantage. Today, for example, the commander of the detachment of Russian cavalry operating behind the front line on my southern wing reported that he had to withdraw to his own because of a shortage of food, ammunition and horses…"

* * * * *

It is important to repeat that the German offensive across the Dnieper line on July 10-12, 1941 became an unpleasant surprise for the Soviet command. No "serious" defense along the Dnieper was created by the Soviet command: the defense zones of the Soviet divisions on the line of the Dnieper River were several times larger than the regulation, and no echeloning in depth could be created. This applied to the 18th Rifle Division (of the 20th Army) south of Orsha, this applied to the incomplete 53rd Rifle Division (without one rifle and one artillery regiment) in the area of Shklov; south of Mogilev this applied to the 187th Rifle Division (which, moreover, just on the eve of the German offensive had with part of its forces crossed to the western bank of the Dnieper). - This concerned precisely those divisions in whose zone the German motorized corps seized bridgeheads and began the new offensive to the east.

As an explanation of the defeat of the Soviet troops on the Dnieper line, Soviet official history points to the difficulties of the concentration of the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon. Without denying the problems of the transfer by rail of a large number of troops in conditions of air opposition of the enemy, attention should be drawn to a number of other factors that played no less, and maybe even a more determining role.

It seems to me that the main reason for the defeat of the Soviet troops on the Dnieper line consisted not in the "thin thread" of the Soviet divisions in itself, but, first, in the absence of readiness for the new German offensive and, accordingly, in the absence of plans for its repulsion. The defensive operation on the Dnieper line turned out to be pure improvisation. The operational reserves for parrying the German breakthroughs were not available to the Soviet command. The 20th Mechanized and 2nd Rifle Corps, which had been considerably battered and withdrawn to the second echelon, could not be used in counterattacks. The 4th Army, defeated in the Border Battle and withdrawn to the reserve (the "shadows" of four divisions almost without artillery and special units), also could not be taken into account.

In the reserve of the 13th Army there was only the 137th Rifle Division, to which the task was changed several times and which in the end was sent on a march on foot from the area of Orsha, as well as the 160th Rifle Division, arriving in parts. However both these divisions were forced to act, as they say, "on the move", without knowledge of the terrain and the situation (the headquarters of the 45th Corps soon lost control of its troops, and the headquarters of the 20th Rifle Corps arrived too late in the area of the battles and could not in principle improve the command of the troops).

Against the Bykhov bridgehead it was nevertheless possible to gather troops (three incomplete rifle divisions; the involvement of yet another 132nd Rifle Division in the battles for the Bykhov bridgehead was a matter of chance) and for some time to tie down the enemy, but against the Shklov bridgehead only the units of the defending 61st Rifle Corps that had been withdrawn to the reserve could be used. It was precisely the breakthrough of the enemy east of the Dnieper from the Shklov bridgehead that cut the defense of the Soviet Western Front into two parts.

Second, it is unclear who was to plan the defense along the Dnieper in the area of Mogilev. Until July 7 the area of Mogilev was in the zone of responsibility of the 20th Army, which was preparing itself to go over to the offensive (the Lepel counterattack) and for which Mogilev was not the main point of defense. And on July 7 this zone was taken over by the headquarters of the 13th Army - the very headquarters which had retreated from Lida itself, had repeatedly been attacked by German tanks and had suffered heavy losses. According to the report of Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov to Marshal S. K. Timoshenko of July 9, "The administration of the 13th Army is manned with command staff only to the extent of 30 %... The communications battalion has not been formed. There is a great shortage of passenger and cargo motor vehicles. The army has absolutely no aviation either for battle or for communication…"

To what extent did the headquarters, which had recently been subjected to a blow and had lost many officers and ciphers, manage to take the command into its own hands by the moment of the German offensive from the Dnieper line? To what extent did it possess information about the enemy and its own troops? And most importantly: to what extent was Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov, who had previously been the commander of the 20th Army, prepared for a defensive battle along the Dnieper line?

And a few days later there followed yet another blow to the headquarters and a serious wounding of Remezov, after which the army was taken over by Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko (the former commander of the 21st Army), who, by his own admission, was preparing to support the active actions of the 21st Army, until he was faced with the catastrophic state of his new army.

The Soviet 13th Army in the first days of the war was in general fatally unlucky: not only did it from the first day of the war have to improvise: it fought in a completely different place from where it had been planned (in the area of Lida instead of Belsk on the southern face of the Belostok salient), and completely different divisions were subordinated to it, - but also in a short interval of time it was appointed its third commander. And by the end of July there appeared a new - already the fourth! - commander, who again was disposed to active actions, this time in the area of Krichev and Cherikov, and was not preparing (quite probably, under the influence of the higher commanders) for the defense against the soon-to-occur new offensive of the German troops.

It is hardly likely that the difficulties of the transfer and concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon played a determining role in the defeat of the Soviet troops near Mogilev also because it was precisely at this time that the Soviet command formed for the offensive on Bobruisk a strike grouping - the full-strength 63rd Rifle Corps with powerful artillery. At the disposal of the command on the southern flank there was a mobile reserve - the 25th Mechanized Corps (at least one tank and one motorized rifle division in a state of combat readiness).

That is, there were enough Soviet troops on the southern flank of the Soviet Western Front. The question was in their distribution and the command of them.

Moreover, east of the Dnieper the Third Strategic Echelon of the Soviet troops was concentrating - close enough for the German offensive to be able to reach it, but nevertheless far enough for it to be able to help the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon.

In this a certain systemic error is visible: having not rendered assistance to the troops of the First Strategic Echelon in the Belostok-Minsk Battle, the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon in the second ten days of July themselves found themselves one on one with the strike groupings of Army Group "Center". At the same time the Third Strategic Echelon during the battles for the bridgeheads on the Dnieper could not help the troops of the Second Strategic Echelon with anything, and by the moment when the troops of the Third Strategic Echelon were all the same drawn into the battle, the enemy had already transferred to the eastern bank of the Dnieper the main forces of Army Group "Center". Thus the Wehrmacht continued to smash the Red Army in parts - echelon by echelon.

* * * * *

The Soviet command for a long time did not understand the decisive aims of the forcing of the Dnieper by the enemy on July 10-11. It did not even abandon the offensive on the Bobruisk direction on July 13. The 63rd Rifle Corps successfully drove back the screens of the enemy and occupied Rogachev and Zhlobin. However it was not possible to create a second strike grouping in the area of Mozyr: the aggravation of the situation in Ukraine did not allow the transfer to Polesie of either the 16th Mechanized Corps, or the 5th Cavalry Corps, or additional rifle divisions. In fact the combat operations on the left flank of the 21st Army were conducted by one 232nd Rifle Division.

Moreover the echelon of the development of success - the 25th Mechanized Corps - had to be transferred to the area of the German breakthrough in the Krichev direction, while precious time was spent on the re-targeting of the corps. It was able to enter battle only when the enemy had already occupied Krichev, and the German army corps had approached the Dnieper.

To restore communication with Mogilev, two rifle divisions of the 67th Corps were also used.

As a result the Soviet offensive on Bobruisk did not succeed. The 21st Army had to conduct combat operations in diverging directions: part of the forces operated in the direction of Bobruisk, another part received an order to close the flank with the 13th Army and deliver a counterblow against the German bridgehead in the area of Stary Bykhov. As a result the 21st Army achieved success neither in one nor in the other place: the dispersion of forces, the weakening of the strike grouping and the actions in no way coordinated with each other did not contribute to the achievement of success. The enemy succeeded not only in coping with the Soviet offensive, but also in seizing the initiative.

Moreover the gap between the motorized mechanized and infantry units of the Wehrmacht turned out to be not so great - their "echelons", unlike those of the Red Army, turned out to be not so torn apart and they quickly came to each other's aid. Very soon the German troops freed after the battles in the Minsk "cauldron" approached the area of the battles. Among other things, the "Minsk cauldron", apparently, turned out to be not such a "tough nut" as the "Belostok" one - there were fewer troops in it and they less often managed to fight in an organized manner, in the ranks of units and formations. With the approach to the area of the battles of the infantry divisions a final turning point in favor of the enemy set in.

That is why the second offensive of the 21st Army in the twenties of July did not achieve success either: the Soviet troops ran into the already prepared defense of the main forces of the German 2nd Army, which had the possibility of reinforcing the attacked sectors of the front. While the Soviet troops conducted active offensive operations on a wide front from Velikiye Luki to Polesie and could not reinforce the offensive groupings.

The dashing cavalry raid through the rear of the enemy in the style of the Civil War also did not succeed. It turned out that Polesie is poorly suited for the actions of cavalry. First the Germans learned this from their own experience (they had to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Division from Polesie and send it after the tank and motorized divisions), later the Soviet commanders understood this.

Moreover the operational rear of Army Group "Center" was saturated with infantry divisions advancing to the east, so that there was no rarefaction of the rear, no operational expanse. It was precisely the infantry divisions of the second echelon of Army Group "Center" that were brought in for the "clearing" of the territory. As a result the 32nd Cavalry Division was first cut into two parts (by taking control of the highway Bobruisk-Slutsk), then the group that had broken through north of the highway was blockaded. The attempt of the northern group to cross the Berezina River in the direction of Lyubonichi was not crowned with success, it was encircled in the forest north of the village of Kopcha, managed to break out to the west, but soon found itself again encircled in the forest southeast of Osipovichi (in the triangle Osipovichi-Korytno-Tataraka) and destroyed. The German 87th Infantry Division reported the taking of 815 prisoners.

The defeat of the Soviet 13th Army near Mogilev once again confirmed the truth that a battle lost at the level of the High Command and the front is difficult to replay at the level of a division and a regiment. To the well-coordinated mechanism of the Wehrmacht the Soviet soldiers and officers could oppose only heroism.

The Soviet High Command wished "to make Mogilev a Madrid". However one thing is to declare Mogilev a "Madrid", another is to provide the troops with combat supply. As the chief of staff of the 19th Army near Vitebsk, Major General P. N. Rubtsov, wrote in the report on the combat operations, "battle is voracious", and combat supply was not provided either to the troops encircled in the Smolensk "cauldron" or to the troops blockaded in Mogilev: to create a reliable air bridge in conditions of the enemy's supremacy in the air was unrealistic. Moreover neither Mogilev nor Smolensk was prepared for a long-term defense, which makes incorrect the comparison of the fate, for example, of Mogilev in 1941 with the German "festungs" of 1944, which were prepared for the struggle in encirclement. It is not surprising that the German infantry formations that approached in the second half of July took Mogilev by storm - the exhausted, demoralized and having lost all hope defenders could no longer oppose anything to them and began their sorrowful path out of the encirclement. For most of them it turned out to be the last.

Every state that has lost a war has its heroes: in Poland - these are the heroes of Westerplatte, in France - de Gaulle. They act in the role of the guardians of military honor and are called upon, as it were, to restore the "image" of the side that suffered defeat.

There were also guardians of military honor in the USSR in the catastrophic year of 1941: in Belarus this is the Brest Fortress, the Polotsk Fortified Region, Mogilev. The commander of the 388th Rifle Regiment of the 172nd Rifle Division, Colonel S. F. Kutepov, who became known thanks to K. Simonov, declared: "…We have already decided among ourselves here: whatever happens around us, whoever attacks, we stand right here, at Mogilev, and we will stand as long as we are alive. You walk around and look how much has been dug. What trenches, what dugouts! How can they be abandoned? Soldiers do not dig fortifications in order to abandon them. The truth is simple, old, but people forget it…"

K. Simonov further continued: "As I understood later, Kutepov obviously already knew what we did not yet know: that to the left and right of Mogilev the Germans had forced the Dnieper and that he with his regiment would have to remain in encirclement. But he had the pride of a soldier who did not want to know and did not want to believe that next to him some other units were fighting badly. He had dug in well, his regiment fought well and would fight well. He knew this and considered that others should do the same. And if they do not do the same as he, then he does not wish to take this into account. He wishes to think that the whole army fights as his regiment does. And if this is not so, then he is ready to perish. And because others fight badly, he will not change his behavior…"

Colonel Kutepov perished near Mogilev.

The heroes of other episodes of the war laid down their heads. But it was precisely from such centers of resistance that the atmosphere in the Wehrmacht was created (first at the very lowest level - at the level of soldiers and officers), which found expression in the heavy sigh: "This is not France!" Into the well-adjusted mechanism of the blitzkrieg "grains of sand" fell, which in the end led to its breakdown. The Commander-in-Chief of the German Ground Forces, Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch, at a conference of the chiefs of staff of the army groups on July 25 declared: "The peculiarity of the country and the peculiarity of the character of the Russians give the campaign a special specificity. The first serious opponent" (an entry from Halder's diary). - But the "grains of sand" themselves were ground into "dust" by the German mechanism.

In the disastrous first months of the war the Red Army lost its experienced battalion and regimental commanders, who constitute the backbone of any army. First the armies of the First Strategic Echelon were ground down, now the armies of the Second Echelon. The new battalion and regimental commanders had to learn the art of war directly in combat conditions. To learn at the cost of the blood of their subordinates.

* * * * *

Meanwhile the country urgently needed heroes: it was necessary somehow to smooth over the impression of the discouraging beginning of the war. July-August of '41 is the time for the distribution of awards to those who distinguished themselves in battle. On July 8 the Heroes of the Soviet Union became three fighter pilots who had made aerial rammings - S. I. Zdorovtsev, M. P. Zhukov and P. T. Kharitonov.

On July 22 (on the day of the execution of D. G. Pavlov, V. E. Klimovskikh, A. T. Grigoryev and A. A. Korobkov) the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was received by:

— Lieutenant K. E. Anokhin - flight commander of the 170th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 23rd Mixed Aviation Division (posthumously; shot down on July 6 in the area of Zubovo near Orsha),

— Colonel Ya. G. Kreizer - commander of the 1st Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division,

— Captain I. A. Kaduchenko - commander of a tank battalion of the 115th Tank Regiment, attached to the 1st Motorized Rifle Division.

On this same day the title of twice Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously was received by the commander of a special-purpose fighter aviation regiment, Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Suprun, who on July 4, 1941, covering a group of bombers, single-handedly entered battle with six German fighters, was wounded and died, having managed to land the damaged fighter.

On July 24 the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was received by the commander of the 57th Tank Division, V. A. Mishulin, who distinguished himself near Smolensk (promoted to lieutenant general of tank troops directly from colonel).

On July 26 the title of Hero posthumously was received by Captain N. F. Gastello - a month after he directed his burning bomber at a column of enemy armored vehicles on the highway Molodechno-Radoshkovichi.

On August 5 for the battles in the area of Borisov and the defense of the Solovyovo crossing in the area of Smolensk the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was received by Colonel A. I. Lizyukov.

On August 9, 1941, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a large group of soldiers and commanders of the Western Front received awards. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was earned by:

— Captain F. A. Batalov - commander of a rifle battalion of the 437th Rifle Regiment of the 154th Rifle Division, distinguished himself during the liberation of Zhlobin (already on August 17, 1941 he perished in the area of the village of Skepnya),

— Lieutenant V. G. Kamenshchikov - pilot of the 126th Fighter Aviation Regiment (first of the 9th Mixed Aviation Division of the Belostok salient, then in the composition of the 13th Aviation Division of the Western Front),

— Senior Lieutenant S. G. Ridny - flight commander of the same 126th Aviation Regiment.

Simultaneously a large group of soldiers and officers received awards of various ranks. The Order of Lenin was received, among others, by Major Generals N. V. Korneev (chief of staff of the 20th Army), I. P. Alekseenko (commander of the 5th Mechanized Corps, by that time already posthumously) and A. M. Gorodnyansky (commander of the 129th Rifle Division), Division Commander E. Ya. Magon (commander of the 45th Rifle Corps), Colonels N. A. Gagen (commander of the 153rd Rifle Division), K. G. Trufanov (commander of the motorcycle regiment of the 7th Mechanized Corps) and B. V. Yansen (commander of the 135th Short-Range Bomber Aviation Regiment).

The Order of the Red Banner was awarded to Major Generals E. P. Zhuravlev (deputy commander of the 5th Mechanized Corps), G. D. Tkachenko (chief of artillery of the 21st Army) and M. T. Romanov (commander of the 172nd Rifle Division), as well as many other commanders and soldiers.

On August 15 the commanders and soldiers of the composite detachment of I. V. Boldin that had come out of the encirclement were awarded. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was received by:

— Senior Political Instructor of the 245th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 37th Rifle Division K. N. Osipov,

— Lieutenant A. P. Dubinets - "commander of the motorcycle company of the composite division" of Boldin.

The Order of Lenin, among others, was received by the commander of the 27th Rifle Division, Major General A. M. Stepanov, who perished while coming out of the encirclement; the Order of the Red Banner - by his chief of staff (who became chief of staff of the "composite division" of Boldin), Lieutenant Colonel T. V. Yablokov, as well as by the commander of the 8th Anti-Tank Brigade I. S. Strelbitsky.

On August 31 there was another mass award of those who distinguished themselves. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was received by:

— Captain B. L. Khigrin - commander of an artillery battalion of the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment of the 47th Rifle Corps (posthumously; according to the award recommendation, on July 5 on the approaches to the Drut River "he accepted battle with 40 tanks, placed the guns for direct fire, after the death of the crews personally took to the gun, knocked out 4 tanks and 4 guns and died a hero's death"),

— Sergeant Ya. D. Belyaev - commander of an armored car of the separate reconnaissance battalion of the 100th Rifle Division (posthumously; distinguished himself in the battles for Ostroshitsky Gorodok and at the village of Somry of the Krupki district on July 7, 1941),

— Sergeant M. N. Dmitriev - gun layer of an anti-tank gun of the 1st Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division (distinguished himself in the battles on the Orsha direction),

— Senior Lieutenant N. M. Chepurnoy - commander of a battalion of the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 14th Tank Division ("for the exemplary fulfilment of combat tasks of the command on the front of the struggle against the German-fascist invaders and the courage and heroism displayed in this": he distinguished himself in the battle for the village of Chernogostye on the Chernogostnitsa River, then for the villages of Vorony and Vydreya near Vitebsk, was wounded three times, but did not leave the battlefield).

The Order of Lenin was received by:

— Brigade Commander (by the time of the award already Major General) A. I. Zygin - commander of the 174th Rifle Division, which fought near Polotsk,

— heroes of the Lepel counterattack: the commander of the 17th Motorized Rifle Regiment that had come out of the encirclement, Major D. F. Mikhaylovsky, by that time already missing near Smolensk, the commissar of this regiment E. Yu. Eykhman, as well as the commander of the reconnaissance company of the 17th Tank Division, Senior Lieutenant M. D. Koretsky, who had succeeded in restoring communication with the encircled regiment and perished while carrying out the task,

— representatives of the 50th Rifle Division, who distinguished themselves in the battles north of Minsk and for Vitebsk: the commander of an armored car company of the reconnaissance battalion, Lieutenant K. V. Barashkov, as well as two soldiers of the 202nd Artillery Regiment,

— representatives of the 100th Rifle Division: the commander of the 331st Rifle Regiment, Colonel I. V. Bushuev (posthumously) and the starshina of the reconnaissance company A. S. Slobodyanik,

— and moreover, two representatives each from the 115th Tank Regiment of the 57th Tank Division and the 143rd Tank Regiment of the 69th Motorized Division.

A large group of soldiers and officers who distinguished themselves in battle received the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star.

On July 15, 1941, the first mass conferring of general's ranks since the beginning of the war took place, on July 24 a new group of military leaders received general's ranks, and on July 31, 1941 general's ranks were conferred on the commanders of units and formations that participated in the offensive on the Bobruisk direction: the commander of the 63rd Rifle Corps, Corps Commander L. G. Petrovsky, received the rank of lieutenant general, Colonel N. A. Prishchepa (the 61st Rifle Division), Brigade Commanders V. S. Rakovsky (the 167th Rifle Division) and Ya. S. Fokanov (the 154th Rifle Division) and Division Commander G. A. Vorozheykin (commander of the Air Force of the Central Front) - major general.

On August 7 the ranks of major general were received by several more commanders - participants in the battles in Belarus, including Brigade Commanders A. I. Zygin (commander of the 174th Rifle Division, distinguished himself near Polotsk and during the breakthrough from the encirclement on July 20) and F. A. Parkhomenko (commander of the 210th Motorized Division), Division Commanders E. Ya. Magon (commander of the 45th Rifle Corps) and V. A. Yushkevich (of the 44th Rifle Corps), Colonel Ya. G. Kreizer (commander of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division).

In the haste it was not always possible to establish the precise circumstances of the feats, the identity of the soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves. There is a well-founded opinion that the "fiery ramming" on the highway Molodechno-Radoshkovichi was carried out not by Captain Gastello, but by another pilot (Captain A. S. Maslov), and Gastello was shot down in another place.

On August 6 the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union was received by T. P. Bumazhkov and F. I. Pavlovsky - the first partisans of Belarus. According to the official version, on July 18 the detachment of Bumazhkov together with the mechanized detachment of L. V. Kurmyshev routed the headquarters of the German 121st Infantry Division at the village of Ozemlya, and moreover the commander of the division, General Lanzelle, perished. Allegedly the German agency reported on this on July 20, and the Sovinformburo "confirmed" it on July 24.

Although it is known that the 121st Infantry Division operated in the composition of the 16th Army of Army Group "North", its commander, Lieutenant General O. Lanzelle, did indeed perish, but on July 3, 1941, in Latvia near Kraslava. Thus the partisans of Belarus have no relation to this combat episode.

Nevertheless this episode "from the history of the partisan movement of Belarus" has been wandering from book to book until recently.

* * * * *

The Soviet command did not achieve the tasks set on the southern flank of the Western Direction, the offensive on Bobruisk petered out - together with the defeat of the 13th Army there is clearly a negative result.

And all the same the active actions of the southern flank of the Soviet Western Front greatly alarmed the German command. To the counterblow against the Soviet 21st Army it was necessary to bring in troops of the reserve of the High Command of the Ground Forces of the Wehrmacht, intended for actions in the area of Mogilev (in the opposite case the German mobile troops would have been able to reinforce their offensive groupings in the area of Yelnya and Krichev, and moreover the capture of Mogilev would have occurred much earlier). And the continuous attacks of the Soviet troops on Propoisk and Krichev forced the German 24th Motorized Corps to suspend the offensive.

In any case the course of events on the southern flank of Army Group "Center" turned out to be far from what the German command had seen. In its debit - the suspension of the offensive of the whole 24th Motorized Corps and its becoming involved in defensive battles (let us recall that as early as July 17 F. Halder wrote in his diary that the right flank of the 2nd Panzer Group "secured for itself freedom of maneuver in the direction of Roslavl…"); the diversion of significant forces for the capture of Mogilev, which the German command had always tried carefully to avoid; the tying down of a significant number of infantry formations, including from the reserve.

Later the German command converted this "minus" into a "plus", using the reinforced southern flank of Army Group "Center" against the Central and Southwestern Fronts and the defeat of the Soviet troops in the Kiev "cauldron". However this to a significant degree postponed the main goal of the campaign of 1941 - the capture of Moscow.

footnotes

1. Yet another BePo of this battalion (No. 50) was lost as early as the beginning of July during the attack of the 117th Rifle Division on Zhlobin. However the personnel soon received new material, and after some time in the composition of the 21st Army the BePo 50 appeared again. ⇑

2. Major General F. P. Sudakov was appointed deputy chief of staff of the 21st Army for the rear. He succeeded in coming out of the Kiev "cauldron" in September 1941, further he received an appointment as commander of the 3rd Division of the People's Militia in Leningrad and perished on October 2, 1941 in Karelia. ⇑

3. The 39th Tank Regiment was part of the German 17th Tank Division, which fought southeast of Smolensk. But in the 3rd Tank Division of the Wehrmacht operating in the area north of Krichev there were subunits with the number 39 (an engineer battalion, a communications battalion). ⇑

4. On the same day the 120th Rifle Division was transferred to the composition of the 24th Army and took part in the battles for Yelnya. Instead of it the hastily restored 53rd Rifle Division was transferred to the composition of the 33rd Corps. ⇑

5. S. P. Ivanov and A. I. Eremenko date this conference to July 26, and the breakthrough - to the evening of July 27. Why the commander of the 38th Tank Division, Colonel S. I. Kapustin, is not listed among the participants in the conference is unknown. ⇑

6. The order was signed as chief of staff by Lieutenant Colonel S. P. Ivanov, who had replaced Brigade Commander A. V. Petrushevsky, however the front commander did not approve this replacement, and Petrushevsky soon returned to the post of chief of staff of the army. ⇑

Last update of this page - October 02, 2026.