"After all, Russians are incredible stubborn!"
Fedor von Bock, 1941
By 10 July 1941, three motorized corps (47th, 46th, and 24th) of Colonel General H. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group were ready to begin their offensive across the Dnieper south of Orsha. The 24th Motorized Corps was the first to reach the Dnieper - as early as 27 June, it captured Bobruisk, opening the way through the Berezina.
On 29 June, Chief of the German Army General Staff Colonel General F. Halder wrote in his diary:
"…Guderian - and this is entirely correct from an operational standpoint - is advancing with two panzer divisions (3rd and 4th) on Bobruisk and conducting reconnaissance towards the Dnieper clearly not to observe the Bobruisk area, but to force the Dnieper if the opportunity arises.
If he does not do this, he will be making a major mistake.
I hope that today he will seize the bridges over the Dnieper at Rogachev and Mogilev, thereby opening the road to Smolensk and Moscow…"
Subsequent events somewhat cooled the ardor of the German commanders: the 3rd Panzer Division failed to seize a bridgehead near Rogachev, and on 2 July, its reconnaissance battalion heading towards Mogilev was stopped near Chechevichi (where the Mogilev-Bobruisk highway crosses the Drut River). The 4th Panzer Division moved towards Stary Bykhov, where it also failed to seize a bridgehead.
Thus, the Germans did not manage to capture the Dnieper crossings near Rogachev and Mogilev by a sudden assault.
At that time, the 3rd Panzer Division war diary recorded a telling entry:
"… After the intoxicating successes of the first days of the war, no one could have imagined that the Russians would offer such serious resistance on the Dnieper…"
After subsequent events (the counterattack by two Soviet mechanized corps near Lepel and the offensive by the 117th Rifle Division near Zhlobin), despite successfully repelling Soviet attacks, the strength of the enemy was assessed accurately by the Germans.
The 2nd Panzer Group prepared to cross the Dnieper with all the seriousness that the Wehrmacht was capable of in the summer of 1941.
On 10 July, with the 24th Motorized Corps' crossing of the Dnieper near Stary Bykhov, the grand Battle of Smolensk began. On 11 July, the 46th and 47th Motorized Corps of the 2nd Panzer Group launched their offensive across the Dnieper between Orsha and Mogilev.
The advance of the 2nd Panzer Group split the Soviet Western Front in two, which is why events south of the German breakthrough are discussed separately in this chapter.
Shortly after seizing the bridgehead, the 24th Motorized Corps continued its advance eastward and on 17 July captured Krichev, leaving Mogilev in its rear.
By 17 July, German infantry formations arriving at the Dnieper, subordinated to the 7th Army Corps HQ, began relieving the mobile units blockading Mogilev. The 7th Army Corps' report stated:
"An assault is becoming increasingly necessary, since the forces concentrated on the bridgehead [referring to the city of Mogilev on both sides of the Dnieper] pose a serious threat to the army's rear, provide frontal cover for enemy forces east of the Dnieper to strike north and south at the flanks of the 12th and 9th Army Corps, and finally block an important line of communications…"
The Soviet High Command also understood the importance of holding Mogilev. A telegram from Stavka read:
"Gerasimenko. Make Mogilev into a Madrid under Bakunin's command."
After the mobile formations were relieved by infantry units, Mogilev was encircled tightly.
On 20 July, four divisions of the German 7th Army Corps began their assault on the city.
* * * * *
On 27 July, F. von Bock recorded in his diary:
"Mogilev has fallen. 35,000 prisoners and 245 artillery pieces captured!"
The next day, Chief of the German Army General Staff F. Halder noted:
"The Mogilev area has been completely cleared of enemy troops. Judging by the number of prisoners and guns captured, it can be assumed that, as originally believed, there were six enemy divisions located here."
Indeed, the attempt by the 13th Army to break out of encirclement failed, and directly in the Mogilev area, six divisions of the 61st Rifle and 20th Mechanized Corps were destroyed:
• 53rd, 110th, and 172nd Rifle Divisions,
• 26th and 38th Tank Divisions,
• 210th Motorized Division.
However, in the Mogilev area and along the Krichev axis, the enemy defeated not only the six divisions encircled near Mogilev, but all divisions of the 13th Army and most of the 4th Army.
From the 45th Rifle Corps, two regiments of the 187th Rifle Division (292nd and 338th) were completely destroyed, while the third regiment was pushed back into the 21st Army sector, where the division was reconstituted, including the 292nd and 338th Rifle Regiments.
Two regiments of the 148th Rifle Division were destroyed:
• 507th Regiment, which fought south of Mogilev alongside Major General M. T. Romanov's division,
• 496th Regiment, which took part in the attack on the Bykhov bridgehead with divisions of the 20th Rifle Corps.
The 148th Division HQ, arriving on 17 July in the Krichev area, took command of what was essentially a new division, which continued fighting as part of the 13th Army.
The 45th Rifle Corps HQ managed to break out of encirclement near the Bykhov bridgehead. Division commander E. Ya. Magon soon led a composite detachment, which operated in the Mstislavl and Krichev sectors.
According to Army Commander V. F. Gerasimenko, the 20th Rifle Corps was defeated not so much by the enemy as by railroad transfers. Poorly coordinated, its units, after entering their first battle for the Bykhov bridgehead, soon found themselves encircled.
By the end of the Mogilev battles, remnants of its divisions (132nd, 137th, and 160th) along with their commanders had mostly broken out. However, the 20th Rifle Corps HQ was destroyed; on 28 July, during the crossing of the Sozh River near Propoisk, Corps Commander Major General S. I. Yeremin and Chief of Staff Colonel V. A. Simanovsky were killed.
From the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army, the 143rd and 42nd Rifle Divisions and most of the 6th Rifle Division were destroyed near Mogilev.
Remnants of the 143rd Rifle Division broke out together with the 160th Division of the 20th Rifle Corps. It was quickly reconstituted and later fought as part of the Bryansk Front.
The 42nd Rifle Division also attempted to break out of encirclement alongside the 20th Rifle Corps. However, after heavy fighting on 19-20 July, contact with the corps was lost, and the division's remnants continued their breakout independently.
Only on 29 July did Colonel M. E. Kozyr, with a group from the division HQ and the 44th Rifle Regiment HQ, manage to break out. Already on 30 July, by order of the 21st Army, the 42nd Division (effectively reconstituted anew) was subordinated to the 21st Rifle Corps HQ.
The 6th Rifle Division also had to be reformed from scratch and soon re-entered combat as part of the 45th Corps.
* * * * *
It is important to emphasize that the German offensive across the Dnieper line on 10-12 July 1941 was an unpleasant surprise for the Soviet command. No "serious" defense along the Dnieper had been established by the Soviets: divisional defensive sectors along the river were several times wider than prescribed by regulations, and no echeloned defense in depth could be organized.
This was true for the 18th Rifle Division (20th Army) south of Orsha, the incomplete 53rd Rifle Division (lacking one rifle and one artillery regiment) near Shklov, and the 187th Rifle Division south of Mogilev, which, on the eve of the German offensive, had partially crossed to the west bank of the Dnieper.
These were precisely the divisions in whose sectors German motorized corps seized bridgeheads and launched their new offensive eastward.
Soviet official historiography explains the defeat of Soviet forces along the Dnieper by difficulties in concentrating the Second Strategic Echelon troops. While acknowledging the problems of transporting large numbers of troops by rail under enemy air attacks, it is necessary to highlight other factors that played no lesser - and perhaps an even more decisive - role.
In my view, the main reason for the Soviet defeat along the Dnieper line was not the "thin thread" of Soviet divisions per se, but rather, first of all, the lack of preparedness for a new German offensive, and correspondingly, the absence of plans to repel it.
The defensive operation along the Dnieper was pure improvisation. The Soviet command had no operational reserves to counter German breakthroughs. The battered 20th Mechanized Corps and 2nd Rifle Corps, withdrawn into the second echelon, were incapable of launching counterattacks. The 4th Army, destroyed in the Border Battle and withdrawn to reserve (a "shadow" of four divisions, almost without artillery or specialized units), could not be counted on.
In the 13th Army's reserve, only the 137th Rifle Division was available; it had its mission changed several times and was eventually sent on foot from the Orsha area, along with the 160th Rifle Division, arriving piecemeal. However, both divisions had to operate "off the march," with no knowledge of the terrain or situation (the 45th Corps HQ soon lost control of its forces, while the 20th Rifle Corps HQ arrived too late to meaningfully improve command and control).
Against the Bykhov bridgehead, Soviet forces were nevertheless concentrated (three understrength rifle divisions; the involvement of the 132nd Rifle Division was a matter of chance), and they managed to temporarily pin down the enemy. But against the Shklov bridgehead, only elements withdrawn into reserve from the defending 61st Rifle Corps could be used.
It was precisely the enemy breakthrough east of the Dnieper from the Shklov bridgehead that split the Western Front's defense into two parts.
Secondly, it was unclear who was responsible for planning the defense along the Dnieper in the Mogilev area. Until 7 July, the Mogilev sector belonged to the 20th Army, which was preparing its own offensive (the Lepel counterattack) and for whom Mogilev was not a primary defensive position.
On 7 July, the sector was transferred to the 13th Army HQ - the same HQ that had retreated from Lida, had repeatedly been attacked by German tanks, and had suffered heavy losses. According to a report from Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov to Marshal S. K. Timoshenko on 9 July:
"The 13th Army HQ is staffed only to 30%... The signals battalion is unformed. There is a severe shortage of passenger and cargo vehicles. The army has no aviation whatsoever, neither for combat nor for communications…"
To what extent was this HQ, which had recently been struck and lost many officers and its codes, able to assume effective command by the time of the German offensive across the Dnieper? How well did it understand enemy dispositions and its own forces?
Most importantly: how prepared was Lieutenant General F. N. Remezov, who had previously commanded the 20th Army (appointed to command the 13th Army on 8 July after the fatal wounding of the previous commander, Lieutenant General P. M. Filatov), for a defensive battle along the Dnieper line?
Only a few days later, the HQ suffered another blow when Remezov was severely wounded (12 July). The army was then taken over by Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko (former commander of the 21st Army), who, by his own admission, had been preparing to support the active operations of the 21st Army until he encountered the catastrophic condition of his new army.
The Soviet 13th Army was particularly ill-fated in the early war: from day one it had to improvise, fighting not where it was planned to (near Lida instead of Bielsk on the southern face of the Bialystok salient), commanding completely different divisions than expected.
Moreover, within a short period, it had three different commanders, and by late July, a fourth had been appointed, who was again inclined towards active operations, this time near Krichev and Cherikov, and, quite possibly under the influence of superiors, did not prepare for defense against the new German offensive that soon followed.
* * * * *
It is unlikely that difficulties in redeployment and concentration of the Second Strategic Echelon played a decisive role in the defeat of Soviet troops near Mogilev, especially since at that very time the Soviet command had formed a strike grouping for an offensive on Bobruisk - a fully equipped 63rd Rifle Corps with powerful artillery. On the southern flank, the command also had a mobile reserve - the 25th Mechanized Corps (at least one tank and one motorized rifle division in combat readiness).
The 21st Army, on the southernmost flank of the Western Front (HQ - Gomel), was entirely outside the sector of the new German offensive. In F. Halder's War Diary, active Soviet troop movements into the Gomel area were noted, but their significance was not understood by the German command for some time. On 13 July, Halder listed, among others, the "Gomel grouping of the enemy", but remarked:
"No great importance should be attached to this grouping, but the 2nd Panzer Group must nevertheless secure its right flank against possible attack from it…"
Against the 21st Army, only one Wehrmacht division - the 1st Cavalry Division - was left as a screen.
Meanwhile, as of 10 July, the Soviet 21st Army included three rifle corps and the 25th Mechanized Corps. Here, a "powerful fist" under Marshal S. M. Budyonny was being concentrated.
The right-flank 67th Rifle Corps (102nd and 151st Rifle Divisions) was being transferred from the Chernigov area, and just before the start of the German offensive was assigned a sector from Novy Bykhov (excl.) to Gadilovichi; the 132nd Rifle Division, intended for it, was unloaded near Chausy and did not join the corps.
The strike 63rd Rifle Corps (61st, 167th, and the 154th Rifle Division, transferred from the 66th Corps) was concentrating near Rogachev and Zhlobin. In addition to divisional artillery (each division had one howitzer and one light artillery regiment) and corps artillery (546th Corps Artillery Regiment), it was reinforced by:
• 387th RHK Howitzer Artillery Regiment,
• 318th RHK Heavy Howitzer Artillery Regiment,
• 503rd Howitzer Artillery Regiment (121st Rifle Division),
• 3rd Battalion of the 420th Corps Artillery Regiment.
According to memoirs, the corps had at least 11 artillery regiments in total.
The left-flank 66th Rifle Corps included the 232nd Rifle Division and elements of the 53rd Rifle Division (110th Rifle and 36th Light Artillery Regiments), holding the Streshin-Rechitsa sector.
The 25th Mechanized Corps (50th and 55th Tank Divisions, 219th Motorized Rifle Division) was being transferred from Ukraine to the Novozibkov, Zlynka Station, Klimovo area. This was a "second wave" mechanized corps, formed in March 1941 in the Kharkov Military District. According to E. Drig, as of 1 July it had 163 tanks (almost all in the 50th Tank Division); on 9 July, the 50th Tank Division additionally received 32 T-34 medium tanks.
To coordinate the actions of the 63rd Rifle Corps and the 25th Mechanized Corps, former Western Front Commander Army General D. G. Pavlov arrived in Dovsk (where the 21st Army field HQ was located) from Moscow. However, on 4 July, he was arrested and later tried by a Military Tribunal.
After the failed attack on Zhlobin on 7 July, the 117th Rifle Division was withdrawn to army reserve in the Dovsk area. The army also included an armored train detachment (BP No. 51 and 52).
The 21st Army Air Force (13th Bomber and 11th Mixed Air Divisions) had 121 operational aircraft as of 8 July, almost one-third of all aircraft on the Western Front.
In addition to the grouping in Dovsk-Rogachev-Zhlobin, the 21st Army planned to form a second strike grouping near Mozyr and Kalinkovichi (per Stavka directive of 4 July 1941). This was to include:
• 5th Cavalry Corps (3rd and 14th Cavalry Divisions),
• 16th Mechanized Corps (15th and 39th Tank Divisions, 240th Motorized Division).
Overall command of the mobile group was assigned to Major General F. V. Kamkov.
The 27th Rifle Corps HQ, 171st Rifle Division (previously part of the 25th Rifle Corps, 19th Army), and the 28th Mountain Rifle Division were to be transferred from the Southwestern Front to the Bragin-Khoiniki area.
Additionally, the 21st Army was to receive several artillery regiments, several light cavalry divisions forming in the USSR's interior military districts, and the 32nd Cavalry Division from the Southern Front. In total, the 21st Army was intended to include: 15 rifle divisions, 1 mountain rifle division, 4 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, over twenty artillery regiments (corps, howitzer, and anti-tank), plus several light cavalry divisions.
The 16th Mechanized Corps was to arrive in Mozyr no later than 9 July, but in reality, it could not reach loading stations in time (by 11 July, only the motorized rifle regiment and rear units of the 15th Tank Division had arrived). Due to the deteriorating situation and a German tank breakthrough to Berdichev, most of the corps remained in Ukraine, where it entered combat near Berdichev along with elements of the 5th Cavalry Corps.
The 171st Rifle and 28th Mountain Rifle Divisions, together with the 27th Rifle Corps HQ, also remained in Ukraine and on 15 July entered combat on the right flank of the Southwestern Front.
Marshal S. M. Budyonny was also sent to Ukraine - on 10 July, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction, and by 12 July, his field HQ was operational in Poltava.
The new 21st Army commander was Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, former Northwestern Front commander.
By the start of the Dnieper battles, the 21st Army actually included 7 rifle, 2 tank, and 1 motorized rifle divisions.
Despite this, Soviet forces on the southern flank of the Western Front were sufficient. The question was their distribution and command.
Moreover, east of the Dnieper, the Third Strategic Echelon of Soviet forces was concentrating - close enough for the German offensive to reach it, but still too far to assist the Second Strategic Echelon.
This reveals a systemic error: having failed to support the First Strategic Echelon in the Bialystok-Minsk battle, the Second Strategic Echelon found itself alone against Army Group Centre's strike forces in mid-July. Meanwhile, the Third Strategic Echelon could not help the Second during the Dnieper bridgehead battles, and by the time it was committed to combat, the enemy had already transferred its main forces east of the Dnieper.
Thus, the Wehrmacht continued to defeat the Red Army piece by piece - echelon by echelon.
* * * * *
The Soviet command for a long time failed to grasp the decisive objectives of the German crossing of the Dnieper on 10-11 July. It even did not abandon its planned offensive towards Bobruisk on 13 July. The 63rd Rifle Corps successfully pushed back German screening forces and captured Rogachev and Zhlobin. However, the second strike grouping in the Mozyr area could not be formed: the deteriorating situation in Ukraine prevented the transfer to Polesye of the 16th Mechanized Corps, the 5th Cavalry Corps, or additional rifle divisions. In reality, only the 232nd Rifle Division conducted operations on the left flank of the 21st Army.
Moreover, the exploitation echelon - the 25th Mechanized Corps - had to be redeployed to the area of the German breakthrough towards Krichev, wasting precious time in reassigning its mission. It entered combat only after the enemy had already taken Krichev and German army corps had reached the Dnieper.
Two rifle divisions of the 67th Corps were also used to reestablish contact with Mogilev.
As a result, the Soviet offensive on Bobruisk failed. The 21st Army had to conduct operations along diverging axes: part of its forces advanced towards Bobruisk, while another part was ordered to close the gap with the 13th Army and strike the German bridgehead near Stary Bykhov.
The result was that the 21st Army achieved success in neither direction: fragmentation of forces, weakening of the strike grouping, and uncoordinated actions led to failure. The enemy not only repelled the Soviet offensive but also seized the initiative.
Furthermore, the gap between German motor-mechanized and infantry units proved not so large - their "echelons," unlike those of the Red Army, were closely linked and rapidly supported each other. Very soon, German units freed up from the battles in the Minsk "pocket" arrived in the combat zone. Moreover, the Minsk pocket, apparently, was not as "tough a nut" as Bialystok - it contained fewer troops, who were less able to fight in an organized manner within their units and formations. With the arrival of infantry divisions, the decisive shift in favor of the enemy occurred.
This is why the second offensive by the 21st Army in late July also failed: Soviet troops encountered the well-prepared defenses of the main forces of the German 2nd Army, which could reinforce threatened sectors. Meanwhile, Soviet forces were conducting active operations along a broad front from Velikiye Luki to Polesye, unable to reinforce their strike groupings.
Nor did the daring cavalry raid into the enemy rear succeed in the Civil War style. It turned out that Polesye was poorly suited for cavalry operations. First, the Germans learned this through their own experience (they had to withdraw the 1st Cavalry Division from Polesye and send it after tank and motorized divisions); later, Soviet commanders realized it as well.
In addition, the operational rear of Army Group Centre was saturated with infantry divisions moving east, so there was no sparse rear area, no operational space. These second-echelon infantry divisions were used to "cleanse" the territory. As a result, the Soviet 32nd Cavalry Division was first split in two (after the Germans secured the Bobruisk-Slutsk highway), then the group north of the highway was blocked. Its attempt to cross the Berezina River towards Lyubonichi failed; it was encircled in the forest north of Kopcha village, broke out westwards, but was soon encircled again in the forest southeast of Osipovichi (in the Osipovichi-Korytno-Tatarka triangle) and destroyed. The German 87th Infantry Division reported capturing 815 prisoners.
The defeat of the Soviet 13th Army near Mogilev once again confirmed the truth: a battle lost at the High Command and front level is difficult to win at the division or regiment level. Against the well-coordinated Wehrmacht machine, Soviet soldiers and officers could only oppose heroism.
The Soviet High Command wished to make Mogilev "a Madrid." However, it is one thing to declare Mogilev "a Madrid", and quite another to supply the troops with ammunition and food. As Major General P. N. Rubtsov, Chief of Staff of the 19th Army at Vitebsk, wrote in his battle report, "battle is voracious," and neither the troops encircled in the Smolensk pocket nor those blockaded in Mogilev were properly supplied: establishing a reliable air bridge was impossible under enemy air superiority. Moreover, neither Mogilev nor Smolensk had been prepared for prolonged defense, making it inaccurate to compare Mogilev in 1941 to the German "fortresses" of 1944, which were specifically prepared for encirclement fighting.
It is unsurprising, then, that German infantry formations arriving in late July stormed Mogilev, and the exhausted, demoralized defenders who had lost all hope could resist no longer, beginning their sorrowful march into captivity, which for most was their last.
Every defeated nation has its heroes: in Poland, the heroes of Westerplatte; in France, de Gaulle. They act as guardians of military honor, restoring the "image" of the defeated side.
In the catastrophic year of 1941, the Soviet Union also had its guardians of military honor: in Belarus - Brest Fortress, the Polotsk fortified region, Mogilev. Colonel S. F. Kutepov, commander of the 388th Rifle Regiment, 172nd Rifle Division, made famous by K. Simonov, declared:
"…We have decided among ourselves: no matter what happens around us, no matter who advances, we are here, near Mogilev, and will stand as long as we live. Look around and see how much we have dug in. What trenches, what dugouts! Can such fortifications be abandoned? Soldiers do not dig fortifications just to abandon them. This is a simple, old truth, but one we often forget…"
K. Simonov continued:
"As I later realized, Kutepov probably already knew what we did not yet know: that the Germans had crossed the Dnieper to the left and right of Mogilev, and that he and his regiment would remain encircled.
But he had the pride of a soldier who refused to acknowledge or believe that other units were fighting poorly. He was well dug in; his regiment fought well and would continue to fight well. He knew this and believed others should do the same.
And if they did not fight as he did, he refused to accept it. He wanted to think the entire army fought as his regiment did. And if that was not so, he was ready to die. Because others fought poorly, he would not change his conduct…"
Colonel Kutepov died near Mogilev.
Other heroes of the war fell as well. But it was from such pockets of resistance that an atmosphere was created within the Wehrmacht (first at the lowest level - among soldiers and officers) which found expression in the heavy sigh: "This is not France!" Into the well-oiled blitzkrieg machine fell "grains of sand" that eventually led to its breakdown.
Commander-in-Chief of the German Army General Field Marshal W. von Brauchitsch stated at the Army Groups Chiefs of Staff meeting on 25 July:
"The peculiarities of the country and the character of the Russians give the campaign its special nature. The first serious opponent." (Halder's diary)
But these "grains of sand" were ground into dust by the German machine.
In the disastrous early months of the war, the Red Army lost its experienced battalion and regimental commanders, the backbone of any army. First, the First Strategic Echelon armies were ground down, and now the Second Echelon armies. The new battalion and regimental commanders had to learn the art of war directly in combat, learning at the cost of their subordinates' blood.
* * * * *
The Soviet command failed to achieve its objectives on the southern flank of the Western Direction; the offensive towards Bobruisk petered out, and combined with the defeat of the 13th Army, the result was clearly negative.
Yet the active operations of the southern flank of the Soviet Western Front greatly alarmed the German command. To launch a counterattack against the Soviet 21st Army, they had to commit reserve forces of the German Army High Command, originally intended for operations near Mogilev (otherwise, German mobile forces could have reinforced their strike groupings near Yelnya and Krichev, and Mogilev would have fallen much earlier). Moreover, the continuous Soviet attacks on Propoisk and Krichev forced the German 24th Motorized Corps to halt its advance.
In any case, the course of events on the southern flank of Army Group Centre was far from what the German command had envisioned. Its setbacks included: the halt of the entire 24th Motorized Corps' advance and its entanglement in defensive fighting (recall that as early as 17 July, F. Halder wrote in his diary that the right flank of the 2nd Panzer Group had "secured freedom of maneuver towards Roslavl…"); the diversion of significant forces to capture Mogilev, something the German command always sought to avoid; the fixing in place of a large number of infantry formations, including reserve units.
Later, the German command turned this "minus" into a "plus", employing the strengthened southern flank of Army Group Centre against the Central and Southwestern Fronts, leading to the encirclement and destruction of Soviet forces in the Kiev "pocket."
However, this significantly delayed the main objective of the 1941 campaign - the capture of Moscow.